Asked to set Husband's twenty-month-old motion for Wife's financial records for its own hearing, Judge Felix put the question to Wife's lawyer, accepted "No, sir, I do not," and, when Husband said the court could order it, answered: "But I want his consent".
Art. I, s. 21 requires justice "without sale, denial or delay." A trial judge sets his own calendar, and opposing counsel's consent is no part of that authority. Holding a motion pending since May 16, 2024, Judge Felix sets the hearing himself or gives a reason that rests on the court's calendar rather than on opposing counsel's consent.
- May 16, 2024: Husband filed his motion to compel Wife's financial records (DIN 22), listed by Wife's own notice as the "Motion to Compel Evidence of Marital Assets and Financial Information". N-003Read them: Wife's amended notice, Doc 276, p. 1 (link pending redacted copy)
- Feb. 3, 2026: Husband asked whether the court was "refusing me an opportunity to address the discovery issues at a hearing before that?" Judge Felix: "Mr. Davis, would you agree to setting that matter individually before?" Davis: "No, sir, I do not, respectfully." Pressed for "Yes or no?": "No, sir, I do not." Later: "I have an hour. I've asked opposing counsel if he would agree to do that separately." Husband: "You can force him to do it." The court: "But I want his consent" and "I prefer to coordinate between the parties and the counsels with regards to hearings and Mr. Davis has not agreed to that." N-073What authority gives opposing counsel a veto over when a court hears a motion pending since May 2024?Read them: Hearing transcript, Feb. 3, 2026, pp. 14, 18, 21 (link pending redacted copy)
- Feb. 3 to Apr. 17, 2026: everything went to April 17, seventy-three days later, with the promise "We'll do that first." It was argued first. The court ordered three years of mandatory disclosure from the bench and entered no written order. N-073, N-090
Judge Matthew Felix (asked for consent; set the motion with everything else for April 17). Scott Davis, Wife's counsel (refused twice). One motion, one request, one transcript. Every duty here arises from the court's own control of its calendar on this request alone; no other card is needed to establish it.
Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const.: the courts are open, and justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Rule 2.215(g)(1) gives every judge the duty to rule within a reasonable time on every matter submitted. A trial court controls its calendar under Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.200 and its inherent authority; neither depends on a party's consent.
The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
The question whether Davis would agree to an earlier, separate hearing on Husband's motion to compel came up three times in the same 2/3/26 hearing. Each time Davis declined, on the record: "No, sir, I do not, respectfully". When Husband pointed out the court could simply order the hearing, Judge Felix answered: "But I want his consent". He explained that he preferred to coordinate between the parties, and Davis had not agreed. Judge Felix then set everything, the discovery motion included, for the general 4/17 date, promising to take it first. It was argued first that day, and he never ruled on it (N-090). [DENIED]
A court has inherent authority to set its own docket and needs no party's consent to hear a pending motion. On 2/3/26 Judge Felix asked Davis whether he would agree to a separate, earlier hearing on Husband's 20-month-old discovery motion; Davis declined each time, twice stating, "No, sir, I do not." The motion was folded into the general 4/17 calendar instead, so Davis's refusal, not the court's own docket authority, decided when it would be heard.
asked to set an earlier hearing on a 20-month-old motion to compel, the court put the question to opposing counsel three times, was told "No, sir, I do not," and said "But I want his consent"; a court needs no permission to hear a motion.
- Doc 279, the certified transcript of the 2/3/26 hearing.
- Tr. 14:1-19 (first ask and both refusals, 14:14 and 14:17): "Mr. Davis, would you agree to setting that matter individually before?" / "No, sir, I do not, respectfully," and again "No, sir, I do not".
- Tr. 18:21-23 (court's recap: "I've heard the request before. I asked Mr. Davis if he would agree to that and he said no").
- Tr. 21:1-20 ("But I want his consent" at 21:8; coordination sentence at 21:12-14: "I prefer to coordinate between the parties and the counsels with regards to hearings and Mr. Davis has not agreed to that.").
- Tr. 21:16-20 and 23:4-6 (everything set for the 17th, "We'll do that first"). Tr. 9 (surrounding discovery/guardian ad litem argument).
- Transcript runs Tr. 1-24; hearing concluded 12:24 p.m.