The Node Ledger: a public decision record

Interpretable Justice

On May 16, 2024, Husband asked a Florida family court to order Wife’s financial records, including bank statements covering several years of marital income (N-003). Husband maintains that this basic discovery was the only thing he asked of Wife, the same kind of disclosure he had offered her and later gave (N-004), and that he wanted it settled between the two of them so the case could close. His filing said so: "The last thing Respondent wanted to do was to make this ugly and spend money on lawyers that could be spent on or saved for the children" (N-013). What he got instead was more than two years of litigation: a motion to put a guardian ad litem over his children and another to order him into a psychological evaluation, filed seven months later (N-013); a guardian appointed with no finding that either parent is unfit, billed to him at $3,000 due in three days (N-125, N-134); three lawsuits for public records the institutions would not release; and six appeals. Across nearly 200 decision points, the outcomes have stayed out of alignment with the law in a way that spares judicial insiders from accountability. Decided consistently with the facts, they would have moved the case toward it.

Judge Matthew Felix heard Husband’s records motion on April 17, 2026, 701 days later. He granted it from the bench and added: "I didn’t order this discovery and say you have to produce -- you don’t -- I’m not precluding any right to make an objection" (N-090). As of October 8, 2026, 875 days after the motion was filed, there is still no written order, and none of the records that ruling covered have been produced (N-090, N-133).

Every factual allegation about Husband in Wife’s motion for a guardian ad litem, a court-appointed investigator, is a quotation from his May 16, 2024 records motion (N-001). Her counsel filed the guardian motion on December 13, 2024, quoting Husband’s sentence about withholding a payment and stopping before the words that say he did it to get the bank statements (N-013). The next paragraph of his motion says he "has gone to great lengths of which he is very proud to put the children first" (N-013). On June 25, 2026, Judge Felix granted the guardian motion in an order that makes no finding that either parent is unfit (N-125). Four weeks later Wife wrote to chambers about the next order, the one selecting the guardian: "We are waiting on the Order approving one of the individuals." About 25 hours later the judge signed that order. It bills Husband $3,000, due within three days (N-134).

The court system holds a record of its own that it has refused to release. On April 4, 2025, the judge then presiding, Kelly Ayers, offered courthouse camera footage as proof about her own conduct: "I will go get the camera footage and do it because I have not rolled my eyes at you." Asked at the close of the hearing to get it, she answered, "No, sir," and ended the hearing (N-042). The court system confirmed in writing that "a video record does exist," and it has withheld the video for 413 days (N-053).

Start here: the ten decisions that show the pattern

The whole record as one picture: the graph (SVG), the same graph as an image (PNG).

The same record, split by institution, in one fixed frame: the norm the facts required, the decision made, and the distance between the two. All institutions side by side, or one at a time: Judge Ayers (25), Judge Felix (46), Court Oversight (25), Florida Bar (25), Appellate (14), Public Records Litigation (16), UF/Brechner Freedom of Information Project (26).

One card, read the way every card reads

"If you have the record, it must be produced even if it could have been disposed of under your retention schedule." The Florida Bar’s Deputy General Counsel teaches that rule. Here is the card where his own letter meets it, N-116, in the five steps every card follows.

  • L, the law. Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution presumes every public record open and puts the burden of any withholding on the custodian. A retention schedule permits disposal; a record still held must be produced.
  • I, the facts that decide it. Husband requested a closed grievance file from the Bar on November 10, 2025, and sued for it on December 17, 2025. The trial court dismissed the suit in February 2026, and he appealed. On June 5, 2026, while that appeal, 1D2026-0728, was pending, Deputy General Counsel Rick Courtemanche wrote that the file had been disposed of.
  • V, the record. The letter: the records "have been disposed of pursuant to judicial branch and bar records retention schedule and are no longer available." It names no disposal date, no schedule provision, and no one who authorized it.
  • E, what happened. The Bar reported the file gone while the appeal about that file was pending.
  • D, the gap. The official who teaches that a schedule only permits disposal reported the file gone during the appeal over it, and his letter states none of the three facts a custodian states when a record is gone: when, under what provision, and on whose authority.

Every card on this map reads the same way: the law, the facts, the record, what happened, and the gap.

Every card names its source, so any error can be shown from the same records. This record has been shared openly, on X and directly with the people it describes, each of whom has had the chance to answer it.

Start here: five cards, then five more

  1. N-147 "Any postings to social media about the case shall be immediately removed," ordered with no motion or hearing.
  2. N-118 The judge Husband is suing decided whether he could keep Husband's case; his order does not mention that he is a defendant in it.
  3. N-079 The judge's office asked the Bar's lawyer for the dismissal order the day before Husband's opposition was filed.
  4. N-097 UF closed the request at 53 pages the same afternoon its lawyers logged 109 more pages "for review and release approval".
  5. NEW-AG1 Five emails withheld as "confidential under judicial immunity" in a records lawsuit that seeks no damages.

Five more

  1. N-136 Asked to name one disputed fact, the judge answered: "So, don't ask me to explain those matters to you."
  2. N-042 The judge offered "the camera footage" as proof about her own conduct, then answered "No, sir" when asked to get it.
  3. N-078 Asked whether a judge he is suing may keep deciding his divorce, Husband got one sentence: the petition "is denied."
  4. N-031 A sworn 25-page complaint about Wife's lawyer closed in six days; the lawyer was not asked to respond.
  5. N-149 "Upon receipt of payment, I will proceed with the review": $313 before the court would look for Husband's records.

The Cliff Notes: every Start-here card in full, in the D.E.V.I.L. format, on one page

The same ledger, organized three ways. Every card carries its receipt. This is an incomplete record of 194 decision points so far, and it continues to grow.

A note on the density: the drawing is complicated because the record is. Taken one filing at a time, each of these events was easy to overlook, and that is exactly how a pattern stays out of view; holding the whole record in one frame is the point. Card ids beginning with NEW- are intake labels from the newest additions to the record, kept unchanged so existing citations keep resolving. Those cards carry the same audit status as the numbered ones.

Divergent results from Florida’s Judicial System

The law has authority and precedent that control results. All judges are bound to follow the law and precedent established before the litigation over which they preside. When the facts are straightforward and undisputed, litigants and their attorneys understand what result to expect. When a Court’s decisions diverge from the lawful result on the facts before it, there are motions for rehearing, appeals, and oversight authorities, each also bound by authority and precedent. They exist to correct errors and misconduct in the court system.

The appellate courts and judicial and attorney oversight are all part of the same self-contained judicial system. The Florida Bar has well over 100,000 members, although it is controlled by far fewer: the 7 Supreme Court justices and the 52-member Board of Governors. Those small groups almost fully control how the system evaluates itself. That, combined with the control over discipline and licensing of Florida attorneys, gives them enormous power.

Unfortunately, the self-regulating nature of the judicial system and the concentration of immense power at the top create an environment that’s especially resistant to exposing internal corruption and misconduct. Power that is never confronted by a united public is rarely confronted at all. And power without confrontation can become unrestrained and absolute.

The law and professional rules still act as grounds for challenging a system’s credibility and, closely related to that, accountability for system insiders. Every ruling and determination can be measured against what the law actually required. Where the departures repeat, the question stops being whether any single ruling was wrong, which is often debatable, and becomes whether any good faith explanation can account for the departures. More importantly, the public can ask the question that the insider-regulated system will never ask: whether the system is serving the insiders instead of the public.

The whole record, drawn

Every decision point in the ledger, and every recorded link between them, top to bottom in time order. An arrow means the later decision point exists in the record because of the earlier one. It says nothing about what anyone intended. The four focused chains above are cut from this picture. A dashed arrow runs back in time: it joins a later record to the earlier card that record bears on, and claims no cause between them.
N-002 · 2024-05-14 · IGNORED In one week Wife demanded his three years of financials and his doctors, medications, and pharmacies. Across 52 Wife-side filings and 17 hearings, none shows her side using anything he produced, and Husband's April 2025 filing states, without contradiction found, that she "has not sought to take Husband's deposition."N-002FNEW-W2 · 2024-08 -> ongoing · PENDING two years and two generations of subpoenas to Wife's bank since August 2024, and no production answering them has ever been made; the first set ended on a sustained objection, and no ruling on the current set appears anywhere in the record as sweptFNEW-W2N-003 · 2024-05-16 · IGNORED the first motion filed in the case waited 23 months for a hearing while the other side's later motions were heard and grantedN-003N-061 · 2025-10-17 · DENIED Husband tried to ask opposing counsel why he filed for primary custody 26 days before the discovery hearing; the court shut the question off, and declined to set the guardian ad litem motion, later run to an order, while his older discovery motion stayed behind.N-061N-125 · 2026-06-25 · DENIED the order appointing a guardian ad litem over Husband's children makes no finding that either parent is unfit, cites no statute and no rule, names no guardian, and recites a hearing on a date when no session took placeN-125N-039 · 2025-04-01 -> 2026-08-12 · IGNORED Husband's written objection to the cost and risk of a guardian ad litem sat on the docket 450 days before the order granting one and 478 days before the order pricing it at $6,000; neither order mentions cost, risk, or ability to pay.N-039N-119 · 2026-06-10 · EXCUSED twelve days after his own question drew a sworn denial, counsel argued the denied premise to the court as shown "time and time again" and named no concern about either child; the objection to it was never ruled onN-119N-134 · 2026-07-23 · DENIED a party's email asking for the order was followed by a signed order in about 25 hours; the order bills Husband $3,000 within three days, imposes a paid communication service no motion asked, and was entered while his briefed challenge to the appointment sat unruledN-134N-024 · 2025-01-21 -> ongoing · DENIED a court order barred both parents from writing anything critical about the guardian ad litem or her private law firm, recited that they had waived the right to, and no party had asked for any of itN-024N-135 · 2026-07-23 · IGNORED the three-day clock to pay his $3,000 half of a guardian ad litem's retainer ran out before the guardian had ever contacted Husband, and the motion he filed on July 28 to stay or extend it drew only a same-afternoon checkbox form, "not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course," and no decision on the stay or extension, then or sinceN-135N-137 · 2026-07-25 · PENDING the certiorari challenge to the guardian ad litem order is pending, and the Second District has ordered a responseN-137N-073 · 2026-02-03 · DENIED asked to set an earlier hearing on a 20-month-old motion to compel, the court put the question to opposing counsel three times, was told "No, sir, I do not," and said "But I want his consent"; a court needs no permission to hear a motion.N-073N-090 · 2026-04-17 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED after 23 months the motion was finally heard and granted from the bench, and the grant moved nothing: the court said, "I didn't order this discovery and say you have to produce -- you don't -- I'm not precluding any right to make an objection," and entered no written order.N-090N-001 · 2023-10 -> 2024-12-13 · DENIED A three-page motion asking the court to appoint a guardian alleges no incident, no date, no observation, and no witness. Every allegation about Husband is quoted from his own earlier filing. The movant had signed the October 2023 postmarital agreement giving 50/50 fourteen months earlier.N-001N-016 · 2024-12-13 -> 2026-06-25 · IGNORED Husband offered to sign the medical releases and to take the evaluations with no court order needed, Wife's counsel declined on the record, and the motions asking for those very things have gone twenty months without a ruling, as of August 20, 2026.N-016N-004 · 2024-05-22 -> ongoing · EXCUSED on the one issue this case turns on, from May 2024 through February 2025, the only sanction Wife's late disclosure drew was a fee entitlement that was never set.N-004N-026 · 2025-01-31 · REFUSED A signed letter threatening suit claims discovery was withheld pursuant to a valid court order and the marital agreements; asked the next day to name that order, none was named, and the order Husband actually obtained on 10/28/24 ran the other way.N-026N-017 · 2024-12-13 · IGNORED the motion asking the court to appoint a guardian over his children was served only on the lawyer who was exiting the case that same day; the newly self-represented father then asked for a copy four times in writing over fifteen days, and the answer he got was to bring it up at a hearing nineteen days awayN-017NEW-P8 · 2024-11-25 -> 2025-01-31 · REFUSED a motion about children implies a concern about children; asked in writing, more than once, to name it so he could address it, the father was told no explanation was owed unless a court ordered oneNEW-P8FNEW-W8 · 2025-05-09 -> 2025-06-25 · REFUSED three letters over thirty-nine days asked for specific, checkable things by dated deadlines: retract identified statements, withdraw the motions about his children or name the evidence supporting them, produce the promised special-magistrate motion, and answer the June 17 letter's own question about the children's teachers' wellness questionnaires; the located replies answer scheduling items and decline a fifteen-minute hearing, and reach none of those fourFNEW-W8N-036 · 2025-03-24 · DENIED the children's school named three routes, one needing no court process; Husband proposed that one in writing on March 18, no answer is located, and six days later counsel refused to agree to the subpoena, leaving only the route carrying the statutory contempt languageN-036N-041 · 2025-04-04 · DENIED the court gave the day to the motion questioning Husband as a parent and pushed the discovery two months out, and in four years the only documented concern about either child was that each had once seemed tired.N-041N-038 · 2025-04-01 · IGNORED the court asked Wife's lawyer in writing to summarize her testimony, he promised it the same day and never sent it, and the court told its own assistant not to remind him.N-038N-044 · 2025-04-07 · IGNORED the judge asked opposing counsel to summarize Wife's testimony and he agreed in writing; no summary came, and the court withdrew its own request in a signed order and did the work itself, so what her testimony consisted of was never fixed on paperN-044N-056 · 2025-10-03 · IGNORED an 82-page motion asking for findings on opposing counsel's conduct and for misconduct referrals has stood more than ten months with no order in either direction, as of August 20, 2026.N-056N-060 · 2025-10-17 · IGNORED the court set three of Husband's own filings for the 10/17/25 hearing and reached none of them, and the one thing it did grant that day, lifting the stay, was never put in an order, so for six months nobody could say what was stayed.N-060N-092 · 2026-04-17 · EXCUSED an eight-hour trial day on Wife's motion, held while the case was stayed; Husband's noticed motions had waited nine months for any hearing at allN-092N-043 · 2025-04-04 · IGNORED the cooperative route to what the children's school knew was refused in writing, so the school was subpoenaed under a contempt warning, and the compelled witness said nothing had been documented about either child in four years beyond one instance of seeming tired.N-043N-046 · 2025-04-22 · EXCUSED asked in court twice and under oath once to name one thing Husband had filed or done that was inappropriate, no motion, paragraph, or sentence has been identified; the only conduct ever named was an email exchange about baseball equipment, charged to both sides.N-046FNEW-W1 · 2025-04-02 · IGNORED asked under oath whether, to date, she had done anything to investigate the concerns she had about him as a parent, the movant answered that the filing is the investigation: "That's how you investigate it is you file the motions and you have people appointed"FNEW-W1N-128 · 2026-07-03 · PENDING opposing counsel's own exit order, sent direct to chambers, was signed in 19 hours and 54 minutes; the entered order gave him more than the stipulation asked, releasing him "forever relieved of the responsibility's attendant thereto" [sic]N-128N-133 · 2026-07-22 · IGNORED Husband asked the court to put its own Doc 22 ruling in writing; the answer was "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email" and seven August slots that all lapsed; the same court signed Wife's emailed order in 25 hours and set her an eight-hour hearing one day after she asked.N-133N-139 · 2026-07-28 · DENIED Husband sought a hearing by filed motion, by proposed order, and by an email accepting the court's own offered dates, and got no hearing, no order and no reply; Wife asked by email and had an eight-hour day set the next day, by the same court that six days earlier had written "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email."N-139N-143 · 2026-07-30 · PENDING the court closed itself as a correspondence channel and routed both parties to a case manager, the morning after Husband escalated to the chief judge's office.N-143N-140 · 2026-07-29 · PENDING the rule requires a judge to report to the chief judge every month on any matter he has held more than 60 days; on 7/29/26 Husband filed six formal notices in one morning for six matters standing at 290 to 804 daysN-140N-142 · 2026-07-29 · PENDING on the same afternoon the same chambers set Wife's 8-hour hearing by email in 2 hours 7 minutes, Husband asked for the August dates the court had already offered and that any refusal be put in writing; no response to either appears in the recordN-142N-005 · 2024-05-30 -> 2024-08-14 · REFUSED across eleven weeks the client supplied his own firm with the objective, the instrument, and the urgency, in writing, and asked again when nothing went out; the draft arrived the day of his second follow-up, after the first went unanswered.N-005FNEW-W3 · 2024-10-22 -> 2024-10-31 · PARTIAL a compliance certificate that never swears compliance, filed nearly four months late, the lateness itself shrinking the twelve-month window it promisedFNEW-W3N-006 · 2024-06-28 · IGNORED she produced nothing by the deadline her own counsel stipulated, and nothing for months after it, while Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day; she had promised in writing, twice, that she would complyN-006N-007 · 2024-10-28 · EXCUSED Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.N-007N-018 · 2024-12-19 · DENIED the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.N-018N-019 · 2024-12-19 · IGNORED the judge told Husband exactly which motion to file to get the financial records, he filed it in exactly that form, she confirmed on the record that it had worked, and as of August 2026, seventeen months on, no judge has ruled on it.N-019N-040 · 2025-04-04 · IGNORED thirty-five days after Husband filed the motion the court itself had told him to file, the judge said on the record that he had "now opened a door to entitle yourself to more evidence"; twenty-four days after that she recused, without ruling on it.N-040N-147 · 2026-08-04 · PENDING four pages of obligations Husband had never been served, among them a ban on posting about his own case, first reached him on August 4, 2026, entered on a non-party's letter with no motion, no notice, and no hearingN-147N-148 · 2026-08-04 · PENDING over roughly $3,260, the motion asks the court to cut a father's time with his minor children to alternate weekends as "an appropriate sanction," in a case where no order anywhere on this docket has found one problem with Husband's parentingN-148N-151 · 2026-08-07 · PENDING no order to show cause was ever issued; the unsworn contempt motion itself was set for hearing three days after it was filed, with one hour reserved for three motions, one of which asks the court to cut Husband's time with the children to alternate weekends as a sanction.N-151N-028 · 2025-02-10 · DENIED Husband's challenge to the order that killed the bank subpoenas was set for hearing; two days before it, the court denied the parent motion on paper, which mooted the motion set for hearing; the written order denying it as moot was entered the evening of the hearing.N-028N-031 · 2025-02-24 · DENIED the regulator closed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without ever asking him to answer it, and told the complaining lawyer to come back once a court made the finding that court has since refused to makeN-031N-032 · 2025-02-24 -> ongoing · DENIED one family-law docket, two opposite answers from the same regulator: the reason it would not examine the opposing lawyer, and the source of the material it examined when the complaining lawyer was the one accusedN-032NEW-P4 · 2026-06-10 · REFUSED asked twice, on two hearing days, whether he had any emails with The Florida Bar about the complaint against him, counsel denied the existence of "secret emails," a phrase the question never used, and the question as asked has never been answeredNEW-P4NEW-P9 · 2026-05-22 -> ongoing · PENDING the Bar's own letter sent this complaint to its Tampa office for additional investigation; seventy-five days later the office running that investigation had not answered its own complainant's two requests to know whether anything was happeningNEW-P9N-045 · 2025-04-22 · EXCUSED twenty-five pages of unrefuted evidence about opposing counsel's conduct produced no inquiry, no finding, and no conduct identified, in any forum; the court pointed to the Bar, the Bar had already closed the file and pointed back to the court, and the judicial commission later pointed back to the courts as well.N-045N-062 · 2025-10-28 · DENIED a complaint about a concealed courthouse video was closed in a one-page letter that never mentions the video and identifies not one thing the Commission didN-062N-063 · 2025-11-21 · IGNORED the follow-up asked one plain question, whether the Commission had ever tried to get the video, and it drew no answer of any kind, not a denial, not an exemption, nothing reviewable, for about eight months as of August 16, 2026N-063N-064 · 2025-11-24 · PENDING the complaint against Husband says he said something untrue in public; he has asked in writing, again and again, which statement, and the Bar has never named one, while the file stays open and the Bar's own rules keep an open file confidentialN-064N-065 · 2025-11-24 · IGNORED every institution named in the article was invited in writing to point out anything false in it, with an offer to amend; in the nearly nine months from November 24, 2025 through August 20, 2026, not one has named a single sentenceN-065NEW-P7 · 2025-11-24 · IGNORED invited in writing to name one false statement in the article about her, she filed a Bar complaint the same afternoon; through July 23, 2026, across sixteen written demands, nobody has named one.NEW-P7N-085 · 2026-03-20 -> ongoing · IGNORED the regulator announced it would put Husband under oath, he agreed the same week without conditions, waived confidentiality, and invited the public; he renewed his availability repeatedly in writing, and as of August 20, 2026, 153 days later, no subpoena and no dates have issuedN-085N-055 · 2025-09-24 · DENIED the Bar described three internal reviews of the closure but produced no record of what any of them did, and told the complainant that anything further he wrote would go in the file without responseN-055N-077 · 2026-02-09 · PARTIAL asked whether communications with Wife's lawyer ever existed, the Bar's counsel answered, three minutes later, that none were withheld from production; his own filed paper thirteen days earlier had said flatly that they do not existN-077N-079 · 2026-02-13 · DENIED the court solicited the dismissal order from the Bar's counsel the day before Husband's opposition was even filed, granted the dismissal without ever holding a hearing, and denied rehearing with the file ordered closedN-079N-082 · 2026-03-09 · ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE the records showing what the Bar spent on the law firm defending it against its own member were priced and made payable in advance, with the letter noting on its face that Florida law provides no waiver for indigency or public interestN-082N-129 · 2026-07-04 -> ongoing · ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE a dues-paying member asked who funds the outside firm his own Bar retained against him, four times between July 4 and July 11, the first two fifty-six minutes apart the same evening; the Bar answered the question with a price, $101.09, and has never given the answer itselfN-129N-132 · 2026-07-16 · ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE the last remaining records, the ones showing how, when and by whom the Bar's file was destroyed, were priced at $2,614.80 in advance; the figure is exactly 60 hours at the Bar's own internal IT rate, with nothing in it for the vendor whose involvement is the stated reason the price does not changeN-132N-150 · 2026-08-06 · PARTIAL asked three times to confirm that nothing would be destroyed while the appeal about those very records is pending, and that the hold had reached the outside vendor, the Bar answered every fee question in the same document line by line and answered these three with one sentenceN-150NEW-P5 · 2026-07-07 · IGNORED the Bar's lawyer won the ruling, accepted the court's assignment to write the order, and for 56 days the ruling did not exist as an order, so the party that lost it had nothing to appeal; the order entered on 9/1/26 states no ground and addresses no witnessNEW-P5NEW-P10 · 2026-07-07 · IGNORED the Bar's lawyer told a judge he had a "spidey-sense" about the other side's mental health, said he is not a doctor, and advised the self-represented father to spend better time with his children; the objection was immediate and drew no answer, correction, or withdrawalNEW-P10N-116 · 2026-06-05 · DENIED the Bar reported the file destroyed while the appeal about that very file was pending, and named no disposal date, no schedule provision and no one who authorized itN-116N-124 · 2026-06-19 · PARTIAL the routine request got the routine answer in twenty days; the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and the request for executive-committee review drew nothing in writing from anyoneN-124N-131 · 2026-07-11 · PENDING one complaint drew three different written statements from the Bar: that it investigated, that it did not act, and that it disposed of the file; this letter set them side by side and put the good-faith-basis question to sixteen Bar officers, board members, and counselN-131NEW-FAF1 · 2026-07-08 -> ongoing · IGNORED Florida's open-government watchdog was asked four yes-or-no questions about a courtroom video a judge offered on the record and that has never been produced, and about state records the Bar says were "disposed of" while a lawsuit over them was pending; it was told in writing that a statement of "no position" would be understood "as just that"; as of 9/26/26, 80 days after the letter, it has sent nothing on that thread at allNEW-FAF1N-126 · 2026-06-30 · PENDING the appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decisionN-126N-105 · 2026-05-22 · PENDING the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copiedN-105N-130 · 2026-07-07 · DENIED Bar counsel argued three rule grounds by name, the court found none of them, and the four Bar officials' subpoenas were quashed with two of the four sitting in the roomN-130FNEW-B1 · 2025-11-10 · PARTIAL the file that the Bar said had been investigated at multiple levels produced, on request, one email about a typographical errorFNEW-B1FNEW-B2 · 2025-12-15 · REFUSED four written questions, each answerable with a yes, a no, a rule citation, or an index; the entire reply was that he had already been given everything and that the matter is closed; the first real answer came 57 days later, in a paper addressed to a judgeFNEW-B2N-107 · 2026-05-28 · IGNORED a motion asking the court to hear the discovery first and the guardian ad litem second went unruled, and four weeks later the guardian ad litem was appointed with the sequencing question still open.N-107N-110 · 2026-05-30 · DENIED the same chambers gave the guardian ad litem hearing a date twelve days out; for the 30-minute hearing Husband needed first, the 5/27/26 offer was 63 days out, and it was heard on 7/7, twelve days after the guardian ad litem had already been granted.N-110N-121 · 2026-06-16 · DENIED the second complaint arrived with a written conflicts notice on its face, and closed in 23 days without a word about the conflicts, from an institution that was at that moment an active defendant in the complainant's pending lawsuit against itN-121N-153 · 2026-07-24 · IGNORED the Bar assigned the review of its closure to an official the complainant's conflicts notice had named, said the review could take 60 days, and on day 60 had no decision and no answer to who assessed the conflictsN-153NEW-P6 · 2025-02-24 -> 2025-10-10 · IGNORED seventeen emails in this chain, six replies out, three emailed status formulas and three mailed letters, and not one of his questions answered; when he asked in writing whether there was a rule against speaking with him, no one repliedNEW-P6N-033 · 2025-02-28 · IGNORED the court told Husband exactly what to file if he wanted discovery, he filed it in exactly that form, and as of 8/17/26, 535 days later, no judge has ruled on it; the gate the court built has never opened.N-033N-034 · 2025-03-02 · IGNORED Wife objected to the second set of bank subpoenas and told the court a fifteen-minute hearing would resolve it; as of September 23, 2026 the objection had gone 570 days without a ruling, blocking the records that whole time.N-034N-042 · 2025-04-04 · DENIED the judge offered the courthouse camera footage as proof about her own conduct, and when Husband asked her to go get it she said "No, sir" and ended the hearing, and it has never been produced.N-042N-047 · 2025-04-28 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED the disqualification rule was applied as written and Judge Ayers left the case, but the realignment the rule exists to produce, a neutral tribunal, never happened: under her successor the first-filed discovery motion has no written order, the psychological-evaluation motion is unruled, and the fee entitlement was never setN-047N-048 · 2025-04-28 · DENIED the judge who inherited the case signed an order of recusal the same day, stating no reason, and that order was left out of the circuit's records production and refused entry into the appellate recordN-048N-049 · 2025-06-24 · DENIED the venue motion was denied from the bench with no findings, the winning side was told to write the order, and fees were reserved for "both parties" when only one side had ever asked for them.N-049N-087 · 2026-04-06 · DENIED nine days before it affirmed, the court refused to add the video to the record and struck five filings in a one-page order naming no judge, while an order from the same court fifty-five days earlier named all three of its judges.N-087N-114 · 2026-06-03 · DENIED the court withheld its own machinery, case assignment, scheduling, the case-management system, and phone logs, behind an exemption that protects deliberation, and the category asking which judges decided the unnamed orders drew the same boilerplate as the restN-114N-115 · 2026-06-04 · PARTIAL the chief judge answered forty days after the request reached him and six days after the follow-up, produced a record for free, then placed every other record behind one rule citation naming no document, and the supplement he promised has not issuedN-115N-149 · 2026-08-04 · PARTIAL the appellate court's custodian asserted a blanket exemption over records "referencing me by name," attached two records of exactly that description in the same email, and put everything else behind $313 in advanceN-149N-138 · 2026-07-27 · PARTIAL asked under the court's own procedures whether any judge is recused in four named cases, the court disclosed one recusal in one case and gave no date it took effect; asked a second time, it said no judge is now recused in the other cases, left unanswered whether one had been, and said any record of the date is exemptN-138N-088 · 2026-04-15 · DENIED the appeal ended in three words, on the same record the court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video at the center of the caseN-088N-101 · 2026-05-12 · DENIED Husband asked the court in writing to state its reasoning; the order refusing that request states no reasoning and names no judge, and it is the fifth of its kindN-101N-053 · 2025-08-21 · DENIED the court confirmed the hearing video exists, then withheld it on an exemption whose factual basis it has never stated, through ten months of litigationN-053N-058 · 2025-10-14 · IGNORED the court rule requires expedited review when judicial-branch administrative records are withheld; this case waited 91 days for its first substantive look and, 345 days after filing (as of September 24, 2026), has had no final hearingN-058N-059 · 2025-10-14 -> ongoing · IGNORED one structural question was put to three courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related oneN-059N-068 · 2025-11-24 · ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE the circuit put a price on the records while the lawsuit over those same records was pending, and the records stayed behind the priceN-068N-069 · 2026-01-08 · DENIED the ground raised was that a judge named as a defendant in a pending case was presiding over the related one; the order answered with a procedural bar, contained no analysis of that question, and the follow-on denial cited no authority at all.N-069N-078 · 2026-02-10 · DENIED the petition asking whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may keep presiding over the related one was denied in a single sentence, seven days after filing and one day after the fee posted, with no response ever required from anyoneN-078N-091 · 2026-04-17 · DENIED asked six times to make findings of fact, the court answered: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so."N-091N-095 · 2026-05-01 · IGNORED Husband asked the court to write down its own factual findings; the entire answer was a checked box reading "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course," and the findings are still unwritten.N-095N-108 · 2026-05-29 · DENIED asked whether he knew he was a defendant in a pending case against the circuit, the judge answered "I may be"; asked whether he would ever find any facts about Husband's constitutional rights, and after reframing the question himself, he answered "Maybe."N-108N-109 · 2026-05-29 · DENIED all three of Husband's witnesses were excused from the bench in one hearing, and the motion excusing the court's own records custodian was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends this judge in the records case.N-109N-112 · 2026-06-02 · DENIED the witness who holds Husband's own former firm's record of the 2024 discovery refusals was "fully released" by an order that states no findings and no legal basis anywhere on its face.N-112N-113 · 2026-06-03 · DENIED the order releasing the court's own records custodian states no findings and no legal basis, and it was entered twice: Doc 327 is a byte-identical duplicate of Doc 326.N-113N-118 · 2026-06-10 · DENIED the motion pled a status ground the rule treats separately, that the judge was himself a named defendant in a pending case; the order denying it 9 hours and 27 minutes after filing called the motion "legally insufficient" and never mentions that groundN-118N-070 · 2026-01-13 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED the outside judge who first read the petition found a case for Husband and, in the same order, removed the administrative-records claims against the three judges on a rule no defendant had cited and no defendant had arguedN-070NEW-P13 · 2026-01-21 · PARTIAL the motion asked the judge to explain rulings he had made on his own initiative, and to step aside only if the explanation failed; five days later he stepped aside, addressed his order "solely to the alternative relief", and never explained the rulingsNEW-P13N-075 · 2026-02-09 · DENIED the vacate-and-restart route, the case that justified it, and the argument that Husband had invited it all came from the bench, while the defendants' own lawyer told the court there was no case law giving that guidanceN-075N-080 · 2026-02-17 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED the day after vacating his predecessor's writ, the second outside judge looked at the same petition and again found Husband entitled on its face, set a date to produce the records or show cause, and nothing was produced and nothing was enforcedN-080N-086 · 2026-03-23 · DENIED the order denying the writ certifies that the court "has adhered to the procedural requirements," makes no finding about the records themselves, sets no next step and no deadline, and explains that fees are premature because no final judgment has been enteredN-086N-089 · 2026-08-27 · DENIED two judges each found the case sufficient on its face; the motion to enforce those findings waited 134 days, and when it was decided on August 27, 2026, the peremptory writ and sanctions were denied and the defendants received new deadlines to justify the withholdingN-089N-098 · 2026-05-05 · DENIED the order signed May 5, 2026 recites and commands compliance with "an order dated April 18, 2026," an order that appears nowhere in the docket or the case file, and the court confirmed the error 114 days later, on August 27, 2026N-098N-136 · 2026-07-24 · IGNORED the court held that facts were still in dispute and, asked three lines later to name one, pointed to a document instead: "Those issues are contained and delineated within their response," and then "don't ask me to explain those matters to you"N-136NEW-P11 · 2026-08-17 · PENDING at the hearing on his motion to enter the writ, counsel for the custodian told the court no affidavit was needed and that the video would be released once the requester proved good cause; ten days later the order treated the requester's argument as that good-cause motionNEW-P11N-117 · 2026-06-05 · IGNORED a court set a hearing in a records case the statute puts first in line and never said what the hearing was about, before it or after; six weeks later the same court held that facts were disputed and declined to name one.N-117N-127 · 2026-07-01 · DENIED the motion was denied on the successive-motion track, counting a different judge's disqualification as the first motion, and that track is the one that let the order find that the undersigned judge "has been fair and impartial in this case"N-127NEW-P3 · 2026-03-04 · IGNORED one amended petition drew four responsive filings; each extra chance for the answering defendants came from a court act rather than any motion they filed, and the first response, the only one compelled by service, raised none of the exemption grounds the video dispute now runs onNEW-P3N-071 · 2026-01-15 · IGNORED the executive branch was asked to investigate the Thirteenth Circuit, and instead entered an appearance as that circuit's defense counsel; the written demand asking it to explain the conflict has never been answeredN-071NEW-AG1 · 2026-01-08 -> ongoing · PENDING the lawsuit asks for records, not damages; the Attorney General's office answered with judicial immunity, a doctrine its own filing describes as protection "from liability for damages"; applied to records, the argument makes judges immune from their constitutional duty to open them. The office carried it from its first response to a September 10, 2026 filing that labeled five withheld records "confidential under judicial immunity"; a week later it relabeled the same five under Rule 2.420(c)(1), a rule it called "very closely related to judicial immunity"NEW-AG1N-076 · 2026-02-09 · IGNORED The judge who presided on April 4, 2025 offered on the record to "go get the camera footage"; asked on April 17, 2026 whether he had watched it, her successor answered, "I have not." Two trial-court motions and two appellate requests to add the video drew no ruling on the merits, and the appellate orders name no judge.N-076N-081 · 2026-04-28 · DENIED Discovery into who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it has been stayed since April 28, 2026, pending a final hearing that has never been set. On August 27 the court kept the stay and denied the writ because "there are factual disputes"; asked for a written order identifying them, it named none.N-081FNEW-A4 · 2026-04-01 · DENIED in a records case the defendants themselves litigate under chapter 119, whose section 119.11(1) requires the court to "set an immediate hearing, giving the case priority over other pending cases," the office moved to stop all discovery into who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it, and the court stopped all of it except requests for admissionFNEW-A4N-104 · 2026-05-18 · IGNORED asked to take judicial notice of the case in which he is himself a named defendant, the judge sustained the other side's relevance objection from the bench, stated no ground of his own, and entered no written order.N-104FNEW-A3 · 2026-03-10 · PARTIAL in a lawsuit about withheld records, the defendants' entire document disclosure was the records production the plaintiff himself had already filed with the court 146 days earlierFNEW-A3N-066 · 2025-11-26 · DENIED the appellate court kept the courthouse video out of the record in orders that name no judge and give no reason, and when asked who decided, answered that no such record is filed anywhere a party can reachN-066N-103 · 2026-05-15 · PENDING asked to admit that nobody had watched the video before it was withheld, the office answered in one word, "Denied," disputing that nobody watched it, and the record still does not say whoN-103NEW-P1 · 2025-08-21 · PARTIAL the circuit certified twice in writing that the records existed, counted them, took the copying fee, and handed over a paper box that did not contain the judge-level communications the certification covered. The August 31, 2025 request for an explanation was unanswered a year later.NEW-P1FNEW-A2 · 2025-09-08 · IGNORED the security exemption was re-asserted by letter over a recording that no sworn statement in the record, as swept, identifies as security-camera footage, while the four questions built to test that sat eight days old and unansweredFNEW-A2N-057 · 2025-10-12 · IGNORED the request that hearings be recorded was never decided, and while it waited the recordings that did exist were erased on a 30-day schedule; seven hearing dates now have no video at all.N-057N-154 · 2025-10-24 · IGNORED Husband asked the court to enter orders on his sanctions motion and his motions to record hearings; the court had said it would address the recording motions on October 17, 2025; 98 minutes later a checkbox form marked the request "not an emergency" and sent it to the normal course, and neither motion was set for an evidentiary hearing for another 175 daysN-154N-050 · 2025-06-28 · IGNORED Husband asked for an immediate ruling on discovery objections that had waited four to thirteen months; the answer was a form saying it was not an emergency and belonged in the normal course. That normal course has still not come, more than 13 months later.N-050N-054 · 2025-09-12 · DENIED the petition asking for the first written review of the orders that shut off the financial records was dismissed in three words, and the order that later denied every post-dismissal motion carries no judge's name at allN-054N-008 · 2024-11-08 · IGNORED counsel dated the delinquency at many months with zero documents received, called what had arrived partial, and in the same email handed the matter on. Nobody pressed it afterward.N-008N-009 · 2024-11-20 (heard 10-28) · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.N-009N-011 · 2024-12-05 · IGNORED the December 5, 2024 letter invoked the statute's 21-day safe harbor and named three problems to fix; eight days into that window Wife's side filed four new motions, and the sanctions motion that followed has not been heard; it is set for October 9, 2026N-011N-013 · 2024-12-13 · IGNORED four motions against Husband in one day, two of them quoting his own sentence about withholding a payment and stopping at "out of anger and frustration," before the words that say he did it to get the bank statementsN-013FNEW-W5 · 2025-02-07 · REFUSED the motion asking a court to order a psychological evaluation of a parent pleads the children's welfare; two months after filing it, its proponent wrote to that parent, "Once again, this is part of the reason why I filed a Motion for Psychological Evaluation," with "this" pointing back at the sentences immediately before it in his own email rather than at the motion's pleaded groundsFNEW-W5FNEW-W7 · 2024-12-17 · REFUSED four days after the four-motion day, and inside the safe-harbor window of a pending sanctions notice, opposing counsel put his posture toward the self-represented party's account of the discovery record in writing: what he would no longer "allow"FNEW-W7N-022 · 2025-01-09 · EXCUSED the court answered a showing about opposing counsel's specific conduct with its own general impression of the lawyer, and the conduct in the case pending before her went unexamined.N-022N-027 · 2025-02-05 · DENIED the first sworn motion asking Judge Ayers to step aside pled a fear of an unfair hearing on specific facts, including Wife's counsel's absence from a hearing he was noticed for; it was found legally insufficient, and twelve weeks later the same species of motion was granted with its ground stated on its faceN-027N-030 · 2025-02-18 · EXCUSED an order to show cause backed by an arrest warning issued against both parties without naming a single email, date, sender, or count, and a hearing on it had already been noticed before the order existed.N-030N-029 · 2025-02-12 · DENIED Husband sought enforcement and contempt for past noncompliance with an existing disclosure order; the court denied that motion and allowed another opportunity to comply.N-029N-035 · 2025-03-04 · DENIED in the same fortnight, Wife's motion to compel was granted in part with a deadline attached, and Husband's motion attacking the orders that left him with no disclosure came back to him as his own paper with the word DENIED stamped on it.N-035N-037 · 2025-04-01 · IGNORED the request for Davis's own billing, payment, and source-of-funds records has gone 546 days as of August 21, 2026 with no response, no objection, and no rulingN-037FNEW-W4 · 2024-10-02 · PENDING she had pleaded 50/50 twice, in a signed agreement and in the joint petition that opened the case; twenty-six days before the hearing on her own failure to produce financial disclosure, her counsel filed an amended petition demanding majority time-sharing and ultimate decision-making authority within shared parental responsibility, stating no fact to support departing from equal time-sharing, and the written question of what had changed drew the answer that no explanation was owedFNEW-W4N-010 · 2024-11-22 · REFUSED seventy-two hours after sending a positive case update, Husband's own lawyer threatened to withdraw; she then moved her exit hearing up twenty-four days on one day's notice, and he met the four motions filed against him self-represented.N-010N-014 · 2024-12-13 · DENIED a withdrawal motion that had been set thirty-four days out was heard twenty-four days early, on one day's notice, on a motion that rested its urgency on the client's own conduct; the client had objected in writing twice before it began, and it ended his representation.N-014N-015 · 2024-12-13 · DENIED the rule puts the burden on the lawyer who wants to leave; the court demanded instead that the client produce a legal basis for keeping his own lawyer, kept the lawyer's stated reason free of any question, and made no findings when he asked for them.N-015N-023 · 2025-01-21 · EXCUSED Husband had waived his own privilege on the record, in writing, and as Wife's own filing acknowledged; the court answered his request for inquiry into the call that preceded his lawyer's withdrawal with a privilege it assumed for the other side, which the other side had never claimed.N-023N-083 · 2026-03-11 · PENDING she told The Florida Bar that her withdrawal was a "direct result" of a November 25 email; the response does not mention that she had already threatened to withdraw three days earlier, and the exhibit she attached herself is what shows itN-083N-021 · 2025-01-09 · DENIED Husband won his rehearing on paper, and by the day it was heard he had already lost his lawyer, answered the petition alone, and been served with a motion to default him.N-021N-025 · 2025-01-22 · IGNORED told three times in writing that its own circuit had a problem, the chief judge's office answered that it has no investigative powers and pointed Husband back to the judge he was complaining aboutN-025N-051 · 2025-06-28 · IGNORED an emergency motion that set out three dated incidents of interference with the children's time drew one checkbox, and more than a year later no judge has heard it or made a finding on any incident.N-051N-052 · 2025-08-01 · DENIED two orders in three minutes fifty-one seconds, neither with a hearing and neither with reasons, froze the whole discovery queue while the parts of Husband's own motion that would have moved discovery forward went unruled.N-052N-074 · 2026-02-03 · IGNORED the stay that froze discovery for six months was imposed in writing in under four minutes and was never lifted by any order at all; Husband asked in writing which order lifted it, and the question has never been answered.N-074N-093 · 2026-04-23 · IGNORED the University of Florida held a records request twenty-eight days and gave no reason of any kind; it answered only after Husband followed up, and then, the next day, in a single sentence saying the request was under legal review, a line its own lawyer wrote for the custodian that same dayN-093N-094 · 2026-04-24 -> 2026-07-30 · PARTIAL UF's own file counted the pages it found, batch by batch, and in the same messages asked whether to prepare an invoice; the requester was told the request was complete at fifty-three pages and was given no count of what had been located until 103 days later, after he suedN-094NEW-0826-5 · 2026-08-26 -> 2026-08-28 (window); response state as of 2026-09-13 · IGNORED five demands and thirteen one-sentence questions went to the University with an answer date; two replies came back, and neither addressed any demand or questionNEW-0826-5NEW-0906-U6 · 2026-09-03 · REFUSED the day after delivering an in camera submission to the judge without copying the requester, the University's counsel wrote that the requester was not entitled to view the unredacted documents, declined the proposed protocol, a supplemental petition, any reconvening, and any further phone conferral, and said the records contained exempt information, four months after writing that none had been withheld or redacted from the records responsive to the requestNEW-0906-U6NEW-0913-U10 · 2026-09-13 · PARTIAL a verified motion to disqualify the trial judge was granted three days after filing; the successor judge decided every pending matter within a day of assignment, with no hearing before himNEW-0913-U10NEW-0913-U8 · 2026-09-02 -> 2026-09-14 · PARTIAL a videographer arranged for a public hearing was not admitted, and the written requests asking the court who controlled that admission were answered with one redacted log, four answers of “We have no records responsive to your request”, and a bill to be paid before the rest would be searched forNEW-0913-U8NEW-0906-U2 · 2026-08-31 · PARTIAL the University's own hearing exhibits cover March 30 in five emails and May 7 in six, and skip entirely April 24, the day its own file logs its largest delivery, though the University's own Exhibit Z quotes that delivery by page countNEW-0906-U2NEW-0906-U5 · 2026-09-02 · PARTIAL the University's counsel transmitted ten files to chambers the same afternoon he was ordered to, six of them described by counsel as the request files, with page counts he listed himself; the one batch the University's own file logs as its largest delivery, 621 pages received April 24, does not appear in counsel's inventory and is not mentioned in itNEW-0906-U5N-100 · 2026-05-08 · DENIED UF said it had found records and was keeping them because they concerned other people named Hanson, a ground that exists nowhere in the records law; its file shows hits on both case numbers, judges' names, and surveillance video, none of which is a surnameN-100N-096 · 2026-05-04 · DENIED UF's own IT office wrote at 10:40 that morning that the search had stalled and that seventeen messages should have been included; four and a half hours later the records office marked the request complete and wrote, "This completes the public records request"N-096N-097 · 2026-05-04 · IGNORED the rerun that finished after the stalled search returned 109 pages and 17 recovered messages that same morning; UF's lawyers put them in a folder for review and release approval and asked about an invoice, and that afternoon UF closed the request at 53 pagesN-097N-099 · 2026-05-07 · IGNORED three days after declaring the records request complete, UF's own lawyer asked for the disputed records "as a separate pdf"; UF's staff routed the 88-page file "for approval to be released"; it was never released or logged, and no UF filing mentioned it until UF's August 31, 2026 exhibit list included the emails that name itN-099N-144 · 2026-07-30 · PENDING UF put all 479 gathered pages onto the public docket unsealed, including pages it had refused the requester since May; for 98 pages the same filing takes both positions at once, records it need not produce and records it need not logN-144N-145 · 2026-08-03 · IGNORED the only person who swore to UF's account, its own records custodian, was noticed for deposition with ten days' notice; on the day, no witness and no lawyer for UF appeared at either setting, and no order had ever excused attendanceN-145N-146 · 2026-07-13 -> 2026-09-11 · IGNORED the one demand that costs UF nothing to answer, written confirmation it is preserving the search outputs and logs, was put to UF in writing on July 13, 15, 16, and 18 and again on August 26, 27, and September 11; UF's counsel answered the August 26 letter the same afternoon without mentioning it, and no answer to it has been foundN-146NEW-0826-1 · 2026-08-24 · DENIED the University's own notice set three motions for one half hour; the court granted the University's two and never reached the petitioner's, then granted a protective order over all discovery while stating on the record that he was entitled to an immediate hearingNEW-0826-1NEW-0826-2 · 2026-08-25 · PARTIAL an immediate-hearing statute case sat unset for 81 days, then was set for a 90-minute evidentiary hearing on eight days' notice, the day after the petitioner's oral motion to disqualify was denied on the recordNEW-0826-2NEW-0906-U3 · 2026-08-31 · PENDING two days before the hearing, the requester asked two of the bodies the University's own records center had named in its March referral to describe, without taking sides, what they see in Florida records compliance; the Foundation's counsel answered within five hours that nobody was available and questioned the relevance, and the Clinic has not answeredNEW-0906-U3NEW-0906-U4 · 2026-09-02 · PARTIAL at the merits hearing, 160 days after the request, the court ordered everything the University located sent to the judge within five days, by oral order, with no index, no certification, and nothing to the requester; no written order has been enteredNEW-0906-U4NEW-0906-U1 · 2026-08-25 -> 2026-09-13 · IGNORED the University was invited to write the court's order the day after the conference and sent one whose filename denies a motion the certified transcript shows the court never reached; the protective order was finally signed twenty-five days later by a different judge, and the cross-motion still has no rulingNEW-0906-U1NEW-0826-3 · 2026-05-05 -> 2026-07-30 · PARTIAL the University told the requester in writing that nothing was withheld or redacted from the records responsive to his request, then told the court that 426 of the 479 gathered pages were not produced and that 249 of them were redacted under three exemption authorities; the word carrying the difference is 'responsive,' a call made in a review the custodian swore creates no recordNEW-0826-3NEW-0913-U11 · 2026-09-14 · PENDING a chronology of the University's own evolving statements about what it located and withheld, drawn from its own written and sworn record, was filed as an exhibit to the closing briefNEW-0913-U11NEW-0913-U13 · 2026-04-23 · IGNORED a records request was told it was undergoing legal review for weeks, the University's records custodian later testified under oath that the review creates no record and that attorneys, not he, handle it, and when its product finally reached the public docket months later it left unredacted personal information of third partiesNEW-0913-U13N-120 · 2026-06-12 · DENIED a judge outside the case read the petition and ordered UF to show cause; UF answered by denying that either duty exists, under a heading of its own writing: "Florida Law Does Not Require Certification of Diligent Search or a Privilege Log"N-120N-106 · 2026-05-27 · REFUSED the witness with the most direct knowledge of the 2024 representation was subpoenaed and litigated against testifying rather than testify; six days later an order declared her "fully released," and what she had written in 2024 about Husband as a father never reached the record.N-106N-111 · 2026-06-01 · DENIED the Florida Supreme Court's records office answered seven of ten categories with a single rule citation that identifies no record, and three categories it never answered at allN-111N-122 · 2026-06-17 · DENIED the Attorney General's office called its production complete while answering one of eight categories; the two categories about its own authority remain wholly unansweredN-122N-123 · 2026-06-17 · PENDING a non-party's lawyer submitted a proposed order at 9:42 AM and had it signed by 1:47 PM the same day, about 4 hours and 5 minutesN-123FNEW-A1 · 2025-07-28 -> 2025-09-15 · IGNORED fifteen days after four specific written questions were sent testing whether the withheld video is really security footage, the office's entire response was to acknowledge receipt again and promise an answer "in a reasonable manner"FNEW-A1FNEW-U1 · 2026-03-30 · PARTIAL before UF's search ever ran, its records office told the IT staff that the requester had not asked for attachments, and scoped the search to two mailboxes and to email alone; the request had asked for written communicationsFNEW-U1FNEW-C1 · 2024-08-02 · EXCUSED the firm put in writing why the motion to compel was late: the good-faith letter that had to go out first "did not get properly processed and sent out," and the lawyer who prepared it "did not realize until much later."FNEW-C1NEW-0826-4 · 2026-07-13 -> ongoing · IGNORED a second records request, asking how the first one was searched, drew a same-day acknowledgment, then a message 23 days later that pointed back to an earlier production and asked a clarifying question, and, 75 days on, none of the search records it asked forNEW-0826-4NEW-0826-6 · 2026-03-10 · PENDING the circuit's administrative-reassignment order was rewritten to drop both of its own prior limitations; neither version provides notice to parties of a moved caseNEW-0826-6NEW-0826-7 · 2026-06-15 -> ongoing · PENDING nine categories about a bill that was filed, published, and heard drew a written answer that the Senate has no responsive records; a preservation demand and seven search-record questions drew a short reply that answers parts of three and confirms nothing about preservationNEW-0826-7N-155 · 2026-08-27 · DENIED the court treated Husband's argument as an oral motion for a good-cause finding under the statute; the transcript shows him asking for the peremptory writ, saying the law does not require that motion, and telling the court that Rule 2.420, not Chapter 119, governsN-155N-156 · 2026-08-27 -> 2026-09-26 · PENDING the court promised to decide the video question "expeditiously" on the papers; the papers were complete on September 8, 2026, the custodian had already said it would hand over the video on a good-cause finding, and as of September 26 no ruling has issuedN-156N-157 · 2026-09-02 -> 2026-09-17 · PARTIAL given seven days to agree to good cause or explain why the video should not be provided, the defendants filed three statements in September 2026 and none of them states a fact showing the recording is security-camera footage, the ground on which it was withheld more than a year earlierN-157

194 decision points drawn. Select any box to open its card.

The Power Imbalance and AI as the Great Equalizer

The public is largely helpless to hold the courts accountable because each litigant mistreated by the system is alone against this powerful and insulated institution. It is hard to unite people behind a single litigant’s cause, especially if numerous layers of institutional oversight have reached the same result, irrespective of how dishonest and corrupt the result may be.

Despite dozens of attorneys, judges, and state officials that oppose me at every level for over 2 years, I know without any doubt that I will prevail for one simple reason: the truth. Pay attention to the reaction you just had. That is what you actually think of the judicial system. Keep that clear in your mind for a moment. It’s so frustrating that it’s the type of thought we barely notice. We’ve become so despondent we just accept it and want to forget we ever had the thought.

Every single person I’ve discussed this situation with, friends, family, fellow lawyers, doctors and others, all react the same way: "that’s just the way things are," or "you can’t fight city hall!" or "What makes you so special that you think you can actually fight any one of these powerful institutions, let alone all of them at once?"

That’s the cruelest part about the misconduct involved here. The people with the power to correct any of this are the same people a correction would expose, and nothing in the system compels them to answer. So they do not. They close the file, refer it to another office, or say nothing at all, and every forum points to another. That is not a theory about what anyone is thinking. It is what the record shows they did, every time, and it is why a pattern this obvious survives. Fortunately, I have the skills as an attorney to protect me and my family. I’ve made the truth salient and public all along. Power will not subvert the truth in these matters.

Thank God there are 2 people who are just as sure as I am that I’ll prevail: my 2 daughters. They don’t know what I’m fighting against, but even if they did, they’d remain completely free of doubt. Because they still understand the truth is real. And powerful. And AI just made it orders of magnitude more powerful even in the hands of a single Florida attorney.

194decision points
36months of record
9separate proceedings
24actors and institutions

Zero of these 194 decision points ended with the legally expected output, meaning what the law required, enforced. Where the law requires an outcome, that outcome is the expected result. Much of what the law commands leaves no discretion: a required finding is made or it is not, a deadline is met or it is not, a filed motion is ruled on or it is not. Every count on this page is computed from the rows.

How to read that zero

Check it three ways

Every card in this ledger states the legally expected output: what, if anything, the facts before the decision-maker required. A card where that output issued and held shows alignment. A card where it did not shows a divergence. A pattern of divergences, running one way, is misalignment. Where the law required an outcome, a win is the expected result: the baseline, never the long shot. Of the 194 decision points recorded here, the number that ended with the legally expected output enforced is 0. That is a count, not an estimate. Of the 5 wins on paper, one order was carried out as entered: Judge Ayers was disqualified and left the case (N-047). The card records the order and the result separately: the order was carried out, and the neutral tribunal the rule exists to produce never followed.

Set aside the 26 that are still pending, and 168 have an outcome. 138 of those did not end in the expected output at all, 5 ended with the order on paper and none of its result, 4 ended with a bill for the records, 21 ended with part of it, and none ended with all of it, enforced.

Now take the most generous reading available. Count all 21 partial results as though the full expected output had issued, and count all 5 where the expected output issued on paper and was then nullified as though it had held. That is 26 of 194, or 13.4 percent of everything recorded, and 26 of 168, or 15.5 percent of what has an outcome. Each of the 5 was granted on paper and ended without what the grant was for: the records, the ruling, or a neutral judge.

Many of these cards began as Husband's own motions, appeals, and records requests. Each of them asked for something the law already required: produce the record, make the required finding, apply the rule as written. Any institution could have ended the dispute at any card by doing that, and the card would record alignment. What the cards record is what happened instead. A single divergence can be error. Divergence sustained in one direction, across institutions whose duties include correcting one another, is not explained as error, and no single decision-maker explains it either. Documenting that is what this ledger is for.

If anything in this document is untrue, identify the statement and I will correct it.

That request stands to anyone reading this. The allegations collected here have been put in writing, more than once, to the institutions with authority to examine them, and no false statement has been identified in response. Every row below names the document, transcript page, or email that proves it, so a wrong row can be shown wrong from the same records.

How one decision produced the next

Close the diagrams

The ledger records which decision points exist because of earlier ones. Those relationships are drawn here for the first time. Every arrow is a record relationship, not a claim about anyone’s intent.

One bar complaint, five different accounts from the Bar on its handling

A sworn complaint was filed on February 18, 2025 and closed at intake six days later, before any response cycle began. What follows is the same institution describing what it did with that complaint, in the order it said it. In September 2025 it recited an investigation by a Senior Staff Attorney, review by the Intake Director, and review by the Chair of a grievance committee. In January 2026 its filed motion to dismiss said the records do not exist. Thirteen days later its counsel, who signed that motion, wrote that none had been withheld from public record production, which is a narrower statement than the one already filed. In May 2026 a filed paper said the Bar did not act on the complaint. Two weeks after that, in June 2026, it answered a request for the records of its own handling and review, a request that expressly excluded the closed investigative file, by saying those records had been disposed of under a records retention schedule. Those are five written positions about one complaint in ten months. An institution that did not act has no handling file to dispose of, and an institution that investigated did not do nothing. Husband has asked the Bar in writing, and in open court, to say which account is the accurate one. No answer identifying one has come back. A dashed arrow runs back in time: it joins a later record to the earlier card that record bears on, and claims no cause between them.
N-031 · 2025-02-24 · DENIED the regulator closed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without ever asking him to answer it, and told the complaining lawyer to come back once a court made the finding that court has since refused to makeN-03102/24/25the regulator closed a25-page written complaintagainst Wife's lawyer in sixdays without ever askinghim to answer it, and toldthe complaining lawyer tocome back once a courtmade the finding that courthas since refused to makeN-055 · 2025-09-24 · DENIED the Bar described three internal reviews of the closure but produced no record of what any of them did, and told the complainant that anything further he wrote would go in the file without responseN-05509/24/25the Bar described threeinternal reviews of theclosure but produced norecord of what any of themdid, and told thecomplainant that anythingfurther he wrote would goin the file without responseN-077 · 2026-02-09 · PARTIAL asked whether communications with Wife's lawyer ever existed, the Bar's counsel answered, three minutes later, that none were withheld from production; his own filed paper thirteen days earlier had said flatly that they do not existN-07702/09/26asked whethercommunications withWife's lawyer ever existed,the Bar's counselanswered, three minuteslater, that none werewithheld from production;his own filed paper thirteendays earlier had said flatlythat they do not existN-105 · 2026-05-22 · PENDING the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copiedN-10505/22/26the Bar told a court it "didnot act" on the complaintand so never shared it withWife's lawyer; two of itsletters on that file carry "cc:Scott Paul Davis (withenclosure)," and a thirdletter says out loud why hewas copiedN-116 · 2026-06-05 · DENIED the Bar reported the file destroyed while the appeal about that very file was pending, and named no disposal date, no schedule provision and no one who authorized itN-11606/05/26the Bar reported the filedestroyed while the appealabout that very file waspending, and named nodisposal date, no scheduleprovision and no one whoauthorized itN-124 · 2026-06-19 · PARTIAL the routine request got the routine answer in twenty days; the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and the request for executive-committee review drew nothing in writing from anyoneN-12406/19/26the routine request got theroutine answer in twentydays; the conflicts notice,the litigation hold and therequest forexecutive-committeereview drew nothing inwriting from anyoneN-130 · 2026-07-07 · DENIED Bar counsel argued three rule grounds by name, the court found none of them, and the four Bar officials' subpoenas were quashed with two of the four sitting in the roomN-13007/07/26Bar counsel argued threerule grounds by name, thecourt found none of them,and the four Bar officials'subpoenas were quashedwith two of the four sittingin the roomN-131 · 2026-07-11 · PENDING one complaint drew three different written statements from the Bar: that it investigated, that it did not act, and that it disposed of the file; this letter set them side by side and put the good-faith-basis question to sixteen Bar officers, board members, and counselN-13107/11/26one complaint drew threedifferent written statementsfrom the Bar: that itinvestigated, that it did notact, and that it disposed ofthe file; this letter set themside by side and put thegood-faith-basis questionto sixteen Bar officers,board members, andcounsel

8 decision points drawn. Select any box to open its card.

From a financial-disclosure dispute to a guardian ad litem

Read downward. Each arrow means the later decision point exists in the record because of the earlier one. It says nothing about what anyone intended. The appointment sits at the bottom of a chain that begins in a financial-disclosure dispute.
N-125 · 2026-06-25 · DENIED the order appointing a guardian ad litem over Husband's children makes no finding that either parent is unfit, cites no statute and no rule, names no guardian, and recites a hearing on a date when no session took placeN-12506/25/26the order appointing aguardian ad litem overHusband's children makesno finding that eitherparent is unfit, cites nostatute and no rule, namesno guardian, and recites ahearing on a date when nosession took placeN-018 · 2024-12-19 · DENIED the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.N-01812/19/24the court said it was notruling on the two maritalagreements becausenobody had asked it to,and in the same breathused those agreements toshut off the discovery thatwould test them.N-006 · 2024-06-28 · IGNORED she produced nothing by the deadline her own counsel stipulated, and nothing for months after it, while Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day; she had promised in writing, twice, that she would complyN-00606/28/24she produced nothing bythe deadline her owncounsel stipulated, andnothing for months after it,while Husband answeredher three-yearinterrogatories on thatsame day; she hadpromised in writing, twice,that she would complyN-007 · 2024-10-28 · EXCUSED Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.N-00710/28/24Wife's side was alreadylate enough that a feeaward had issued, thenfiled the court-orderedmemorandum six days lateover objection, and thesanction the rules providefor exactly that pattern,striking the objections, wasnever applied.N-107 · 2026-05-28 · IGNORED a motion asking the court to hear the discovery first and the guardian ad litem second went unruled, and four weeks later the guardian ad litem was appointed with the sequencing question still open.N-10705/28/26a motion asking the courtto hear the discovery firstand the guardian ad litemsecond went unruled, andfour weeks later theguardian ad litem wasappointed with thesequencing question stillopen.N-011 · 2024-12-05 · IGNORED the December 5, 2024 letter invoked the statute's 21-day safe harbor and named three problems to fix; eight days into that window Wife's side filed four new motions, and the sanctions motion that followed has not been heard; it is set for October 9, 2026N-01112/05/24the December 5, 2024letter invoked the statute's21-day safe harbor andnamed three problems tofix; eight days into thatwindow Wife's side filedfour new motions, and thesanctions motion thatfollowed has not beenheard; it is set for October9, 2026N-009 · 2024-11-20 (heard 10-28) · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.N-00911/20/24Husband won the ordercompelling Wife's financialdisclosures, and in thetwenty months thatfollowed, through July2026, no one ever madeher comply with it and nocourt ever set the fee itawarded.N-031 · 2025-02-24 · DENIED the regulator closed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without ever asking him to answer it, and told the complaining lawyer to come back once a court made the finding that court has since refused to makeN-03102/24/25the regulator closed a25-page written complaintagainst Wife's lawyer in sixdays without ever askinghim to answer it, and toldthe complaining lawyer tocome back once a courtmade the finding that courthas since refused to makeN-037 · 2025-04-01 · IGNORED the request for Davis's own billing, payment, and source-of-funds records has gone 546 days as of August 21, 2026 with no response, no objection, and no rulingN-03704/01/25the request for Davis's ownbilling, payment, andsource-of-funds recordshas gone 546 days as ofAugust 21, 2026 with noresponse, no objection,and no rulingN-061 · 2025-10-17 · DENIED Husband tried to ask opposing counsel why he filed for primary custody 26 days before the discovery hearing; the court shut the question off, and declined to set the guardian ad litem motion, later run to an order, while his older discovery motion stayed behind.N-06110/17/25Husband tried to askopposing counsel why hefiled for primary custody 26days before the discoveryhearing; the court shut thequestion off, and declinedto set the guardian ad litemmotion, later run to anorder, while his olderdiscovery motion stayedbehind.N-003 · 2024-05-16 · IGNORED the first motion filed in the case waited 23 months for a hearing while the other side's later motions were heard and grantedN-00305/16/24the first motion filed in thecase waited 23 months fora hearing while the otherside's later motions wereheard and grantedN-060 · 2025-10-17 · IGNORED the court set three of Husband's own filings for the 10/17/25 hearing and reached none of them, and the one thing it did grant that day, lifting the stay, was never put in an order, so for six months nobody could say what was stayed.N-06010/17/25the court set three ofHusband's own filings forthe 10/17/25 hearing andreached none of them, andthe one thing it did grantthat day, lifting the stay,was never put in an order,so for six months nobodycould say what was stayed.N-056 · 2025-10-03 · IGNORED an 82-page motion asking for findings on opposing counsel's conduct and for misconduct referrals has stood more than ten months with no order in either direction, as of August 20, 2026.N-05610/03/25an 82-page motion askingfor findings on opposingcounsel's conduct and formisconduct referrals hasstood more than tenmonths with no order ineither direction, as ofAugust 20, 2026.N-057 · 2025-10-12 · IGNORED the request that hearings be recorded was never decided, and while it waited the recordings that did exist were erased on a 30-day schedule; seven hearing dates now have no video at all.N-05710/12/25the request that hearingsbe recorded was neverdecided, and while itwaited the recordings thatdid exist were erased on a30-day schedule; sevenhearing dates now have novideo at all.

14 decision points drawn. Select any box to open its card.

One undecided statutory claim, and everything that followed it

N-058 spawned more decision points directly than any other entry: twelve, and they run across eight different lanes. A single undecided statutory claim is what each of them follows from.
N-058 · 2025-10-14 · IGNORED the court rule requires expedited review when judicial-branch administrative records are withheld; this case waited 91 days for its first substantive look and, 345 days after filing (as of September 24, 2026), has had no final hearingN-05810/14/25the court rule requiresexpedited review whenjudicial-branchadministrative records arewithheld; this case waited91 days for its firstsubstantive look and, 345days after filing (as ofSeptember 24, 2026), hashad no final hearingN-053 · 2025-08-21 · DENIED the court confirmed the hearing video exists, then withheld it on an exemption whose factual basis it has never stated, through ten months of litigationN-05308/21/25the court confirmed thehearing video exists, thenwithheld it on an exemptionwhose factual basis it hasnever stated, through tenmonths of litigationN-059 · 2025-10-14 -> ongoing · IGNORED one structural question was put to three courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related oneN-05910/14/25–ongoingone structural question wasput to three courts andanswered by none: may ajudge who is a defendantin one case keep presidingover the related oneN-068 · 2025-11-24 · ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE the circuit put a price on the records while the lawsuit over those same records was pending, and the records stayed behind the priceN-06811/24/25the circuit put a price onthe records while thelawsuit over those samerecords was pending, andthe records stayed behindthe priceN-069 · 2026-01-08 · DENIED the ground raised was that a judge named as a defendant in a pending case was presiding over the related one; the order answered with a procedural bar, contained no analysis of that question, and the follow-on denial cited no authority at all.N-06901/08/26the ground raised was thata judge named as adefendant in a pendingcase was presiding overthe related one; the orderanswered with aprocedural bar, containedno analysis of thatquestion, and the follow-ondenial cited no authority atall.N-070 · 2026-01-13 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED the outside judge who first read the petition found a case for Husband and, in the same order, removed the administrative-records claims against the three judges on a rule no defendant had cited and no defendant had arguedN-07001/13/26the outside judge who firstread the petition found acase for Husband and, inthe same order, removedthe administrative-recordsclaims against the threejudges on a rule nodefendant had cited and nodefendant had arguedN-071 · 2026-01-15 · IGNORED the executive branch was asked to investigate the Thirteenth Circuit, and instead entered an appearance as that circuit's defense counsel; the written demand asking it to explain the conflict has never been answeredN-07101/15/26the executive branch wasasked to investigate theThirteenth Circuit, andinstead entered anappearance as that circuit'sdefense counsel; thewritten demand asking it toexplain the conflict hasnever been answeredN-076 · 2026-02-09 · IGNORED The judge who presided on April 4, 2025 offered on the record to "go get the camera footage"; asked on April 17, 2026 whether he had watched it, her successor answered, "I have not." Two trial-court motions and two appellate requests to add the video drew no ruling on the merits, and the appellate orders name no judge.N-07602/09/26The judge who presided onApril 4, 2025 offered on therecord to "go get thecamera footage"; asked onApril 17, 2026 whether hehad watched it, hersuccessor answered, "Ihave not." Two trial-courtmotions and two appellaterequests to add the videodrew no ruling on themerits, and the appellateorders name no judge.N-081 · 2026-04-28 · DENIED Discovery into who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it has been stayed since April 28, 2026, pending a final hearing that has never been set. On August 27 the court kept the stay and denied the writ because "there are factual disputes"; asked for a written order identifying them, it named none.N-08104/28/26Discovery into whowatched the withheld videoand who decided towithhold it has been stayedsince April 28, 2026,pending a final hearing thathas never been set. OnAugust 27 the court keptthe stay and denied thewrit because "there arefactual disputes"; asked fora written order identifyingthem, it named none.N-104 · 2026-05-18 · IGNORED asked to take judicial notice of the case in which he is himself a named defendant, the judge sustained the other side's relevance objection from the bench, stated no ground of his own, and entered no written order.N-10405/18/26asked to take judicialnotice of the case in whichhe is himself a nameddefendant, the judgesustained the other side'srelevance objection fromthe bench, stated noground of his own, andentered no written order.N-105 · 2026-05-22 · PENDING the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copiedN-10505/22/26the Bar told a court it "didnot act" on the complaintand so never shared it withWife's lawyer; two of itsletters on that file carry "cc:Scott Paul Davis (withenclosure)," and a thirdletter says out loud why hewas copiedN-109 · 2026-05-29 · DENIED all three of Husband's witnesses were excused from the bench in one hearing, and the motion excusing the court's own records custodian was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends this judge in the records case.N-10905/29/26all three of Husband'switnesses were excusedfrom the bench in onehearing, and the motionexcusing the court's ownrecords custodian wasargued by the SeniorAssistant Attorney Generalwhose office defends thisjudge in the records case.NEW-AG1 · 2026-01-08 -> ongoing · PENDING the lawsuit asks for records, not damages; the Attorney General's office answered with judicial immunity, a doctrine its own filing describes as protection "from liability for damages"; applied to records, the argument makes judges immune from their constitutional duty to open them. The office carried it from its first response to a September 10, 2026 filing that labeled five withheld records "confidential under judicial immunity"; a week later it relabeled the same five under Rule 2.420(c)(1), a rule it called "very closely related to judicial immunity"NEW-AG101/08/26–ongoingthe lawsuit asks forrecords, not damages; theAttorney General's officeanswered with judicialimmunity, a doctrine itsown filing describes asprotection "from liability fordamages"; applied torecords, the argumentmakes judges immunefrom their constitutionalduty to open them. Theoffice carried it from its firstresponse to a September10, 2026 filing that labeledfive withheld records"confidential under judicialimmunity"; a week later itrelabeled the same fiveunder Rule 2.420(c)(1), arule it called "very closelyrelated to judicial immunity"FNEW-A3 · 2026-03-10 · PARTIAL in a lawsuit about withheld records, the defendants' entire document disclosure was the records production the plaintiff himself had already filed with the court 146 days earlierFNEW-A303/10/26in a lawsuit about withheldrecords, the defendants'entire document disclosurewas the records productionthe plaintiff himself hadalready filed with the court146 days earlier

14 decision points drawn. Select any box to open its card.

Where it starts: one unenforced disclosure deadline

N-006 is a root. Nothing else in the ledger produced it, and nine decision points follow from it directly. Following the chain the whole way down, 136 of the 194 entries in this ledger trace back to this single unenforced disclosure deadline. Roots are where the chain starts, not where blame is assigned.
N-006 · 2024-06-28 · IGNORED she produced nothing by the deadline her own counsel stipulated, and nothing for months after it, while Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day; she had promised in writing, twice, that she would complyN-00606/28/24she produced nothing bythe deadline her owncounsel stipulated, andnothing for months after it,while Husband answeredher three-yearinterrogatories on thatsame day; she hadpromised in writing, twice,that she would complyN-004 · 2024-05-22 -> ongoing · EXCUSED on the one issue this case turns on, from May 2024 through February 2025, the only sanction Wife's late disclosure drew was a fee entitlement that was never set.N-00405/22/24–ongoingon the one issue this caseturns on, from May 2024through February 2025, theonly sanction Wife's latedisclosure drew was a feeentitlement that was neverset.N-007 · 2024-10-28 · EXCUSED Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.N-00710/28/24Wife's side was alreadylate enough that a feeaward had issued, thenfiled the court-orderedmemorandum six days lateover objection, and thesanction the rules providefor exactly that pattern,striking the objections, wasnever applied.N-008 · 2024-11-08 · IGNORED counsel dated the delinquency at many months with zero documents received, called what had arrived partial, and in the same email handed the matter on. Nobody pressed it afterward.N-00811/08/24counsel dated thedelinquency at manymonths with zerodocuments received, calledwhat had arrived partial,and in the same emailhanded the matter on.Nobody pressed itafterward.N-009 · 2024-11-20 (heard 10-28) · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.N-00911/20/24Husband won the ordercompelling Wife's financialdisclosures, and in thetwenty months thatfollowed, through July2026, no one ever madeher comply with it and nocourt ever set the fee itawarded.N-018 · 2024-12-19 · DENIED the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.N-01812/19/24the court said it was notruling on the two maritalagreements becausenobody had asked it to,and in the same breathused those agreements toshut off the discovery thatwould test them.N-037 · 2025-04-01 · IGNORED the request for Davis's own billing, payment, and source-of-funds records has gone 546 days as of August 21, 2026 with no response, no objection, and no rulingN-03704/01/25the request for Davis's ownbilling, payment, andsource-of-funds recordshas gone 546 days as ofAugust 21, 2026 with noresponse, no objection,and no rulingFNEW-W2 · 2024-08 -> ongoing · PENDING two years and two generations of subpoenas to Wife's bank since August 2024, and no production answering them has ever been made; the first set ended on a sustained objection, and no ruling on the current set appears anywhere in the record as sweptFNEW-W208/24–ongoingtwo years and twogenerations of subpoenasto Wife's bank sinceAugust 2024, and noproduction answering themhas ever been made; thefirst set ended on asustained objection, andno ruling on the current setappears anywhere in therecord as sweptFNEW-W3 · 2024-10-22 -> 2024-10-31 · PARTIAL a compliance certificate that never swears compliance, filed nearly four months late, the lateness itself shrinking the twelve-month window it promisedFNEW-W310/22/24–10/31/24a compliance certificatethat never swearscompliance, filed nearlyfour months late, thelateness itself shrinking thetwelve-month window itpromisedFNEW-W4 · 2024-10-02 · PENDING she had pleaded 50/50 twice, in a signed agreement and in the joint petition that opened the case; twenty-six days before the hearing on her own failure to produce financial disclosure, her counsel filed an amended petition demanding majority time-sharing and ultimate decision-making authority within shared parental responsibility, stating no fact to support departing from equal time-sharing, and the written question of what had changed drew the answer that no explanation was owedFNEW-W410/02/24she had pleaded 50/50twice, in a signedagreement and in the jointpetition that opened thecase; twenty-six daysbefore the hearing on herown failure to producefinancial disclosure, hercounsel filed an amendedpetition demandingmajority time-sharing andultimate decision-makingauthority within sharedparental responsibility,stating no fact to supportdeparting from equaltime-sharing, and thewritten question of whathad changed drew theanswer that no explanationwas owed

10 decision points drawn. Select any box to open its card.

Why this is called interpretable

Read the method

At 10:40 AM on May 4, 2026, the University of Florida’s own IT office wrote that its search tool had stalled partway through one mailbox and that seventeen messages "should have been included previously." That afternoon UF told Husband, "This completes the public records request" (N-096). AI researchers meet the same gap in machines: a system’s account of what it did can differ from what it did. One response is to test behavior instead: the stated objective on one side, the observed outputs on the other, and a record of every gap between them.

The objective here is the law each institution is bound by. The outputs are its orders, letters, and silences. Each card records one gap between the two and asserts nothing about why it happened. Making a system’s behavior legible is work AI researchers call interpretability. This map borrows the name and the discipline, and nothing more.

The method sees outputs only, so it makes no claim about anyone’s reasoning. That is the first of three limits. The benchmark is the law itself, with no guess about ordinary practice. And the cards are the disputes that grew out of one divorce rather than a statistical sample, so the count describes this record and claims nothing about these institutions beyond it. What the method can show is direction. One gap can be an error; the map asks which way the gaps run.

The longer essay: Interpretability in Reverse

Why this ledger exists

Read the full statement

My challenge to those accused of misconduct

This ledger and corresponding map are the checkable versions of these claims. The people and institutions this ledger accuses have been confronted with these allegations in writing, over and over. I’ll provide this to them as soon as it posts. I continue to ask one question: can any of you identify a single false statement? In November 2025 the article "Foxes Guarding the Courthouse" (https://tinyurl.com/hanson-foxes-article) went directly to the Bar, the JQC, and the Thirteenth Circuit. In June 2026 an open letter went to Sixth Circuit leadership and the Attorney General, and was filed on the docket (https://tinyurl.com/hanson-open-letter-6th-cir). In July 2026 a follow-up letter put the unanswered questions to the Bar again (https://tinyurl.com/hanson-bar-0723-followup). Not one person or institution has ever identified a false statement. What came back instead was silence, referrals to another office, and, six hours and twenty-two minutes after my third email sharing the article, a Bar complaint filed against me by Judge Ayers. The proof rests on the receipts: every row names the document behind it, and the silence is only the record of what came back. And when the one discovery channel left open finally forced answers, the state admitted in writing that no confidentiality order exists and that "No analysis was needed" (https://tinyurl.com/hanson-10255-rfa-responses).

One more believer, of a newer kind

And one more believer, of a newer kind: the smartest neural network I know, which has discussed these facts with me at length. "Claude" never simply takes my word for anything. Claude attacked every claim the way a whole team of opposing lawyers would, and any claim it could not tie to a court document or the written record was cut. That review is a method, not a credential: the proof is the receipt on each row, and anyone can open it. This is an incomplete list of the occasions on which the Florida judicial system has diverged from controlling authority. It is a work in progress, and it continues to grow as the record does.

So I ask all parents reading this: what type of a justice system do we want for our children? One that’s fair, or one where those in power get away with picking and choosing the winners and losers irrespective of the law and professional rules?

The method

Every decision point is recorded separately, measured against the rule that governed it, and attached to a receipt anyone can pull. The ledger has been shared openly, on X and directly with the people it describes, each of whom has had the chance to answer it. Every row names its source, so any error can be shown from the same records the system keeps about itself.

The core divergence and efforts for a fair process and accountability

Open the case list
Hillsborough County Circuit Court, No. 24-DR-001150the dissolution case where the dispute began.
Second District Court of Appeal, No. 2D2025-0681petition for writ of certiorari.
Second District Court of Appeal, No. 2D2025-1936direct appeal.
Second District Court of Appeal, No. 2D2026-0279petition for writ of prohibition.
Second District Court of Appeal, No. 2D2026-1955certiorari petition on the guardian ad litem order.
Thirteenth Circuit, No. 25-CA-010255public-records mandamus against the court system itself, heard by judges specially assigned from the Sixth Circuit.
Leon County Circuit Court, No. 2469mandamus concerning Florida Bar records.
First District Court of Appeal, No. 1D2026-0728appeal from that mandamus.
Eighth Circuit, Alachua County, No. 01-2026-CA-001794public-records mandamus against the University of Florida.

Complaints were also filed with the Florida Bar and the Judicial Qualifications Commission, and public-records requests were made to the Office of the Attorney General, the Executive Office of the Governor, the Sixth Circuit, the Second District Court of Appeal, and the Florida Bar. Those are tracked here as well, offering examples of extreme divergence from authority whose consistent effect is to protect judicial insiders from accountability.

How to read the table.

Rows run in date order, so the table reads straight through as a chronology; a card that covers a span of dates sorts from where that span begins. A node number is the decision point’s permanent name. A card added later carries its own new label, and a merged card’s number is retired rather than reused, so a citation to this version stays good. Some rows are deliberately undramatic. They are the baseline: the pattern is measured against them. If you read only five cards, or only ten, start with the list headed Start here. The ledger’s own prose calls the parties Husband and Wife. Quotes from the record keep their real names. Nothing here is asserted past its receipt. The Receipt column names the source, and a wrong row can be shown wrong from the same docket. That is the point. A companion verification record shows how each source was checked. An omissions log lists what was left out and why. Both are available on request. This table is current through Saturday, September 26, 2026, and every day count is computed as of the date its own card states.

How to read the citations.

"Doc" and "DIN" both mean a numbered filing on the Clerk’s docket. "Tr." is a certified hearing transcript, cited by page and line. "PRR" is a public records request under Florida’s public records law. "GAL" is a guardian ad litem, a court appointee in custody matters.

Actor groups link to official public rosters (court directories and Florida Bar member records) so each decision-maker’s public role can be confirmed from the state’s own sources.

Other shorthand.

Open the glossary

The divorce case, No. 24-DR-001150, is called 1150 in short cites.

DCADistrict Court of Appeal.
OSCorder to show cause.
RFArequest for admissions.
JQCJudicial Qualifications Commission.
AOCAdministrative Office of the Courts.
OFWOurFamilyWizard, a paid co-parenting messaging service.
OGCoffice of general counsel.
FSCFlorida Supreme Court.
JAjudicial assistant.
TCAtrial court administrator.
AAGAssistant Attorney General.
HHDHarris, Hunt & Derr, a firm that once represented Husband.
GTGreenberg Traurig.
SBPthe Florida Bar Standing Board Policies.
JAWSthe circuit’s case-management system.
PIOpublic information officer.

Rule and statute numbers (12.285, 2.420, 57.105, 119.11) are the Florida rules and statutes governing disclosure, court records, sanctions, and public-records enforcement.

The classes of determinations

Every decision point carries one class. Each count is computed from the ledger. The definitions are the ledger’s own. No row in this ledger is scored WON.

  • DENIED59 relief refused.
  • IGNORED58 no ruling of any kind, often for years.
  • PENDING26 the fork is still open.
  • PARTIAL21 the challenge produced an answer or a concession on paper while the records or relief themselves never arrived.
  • REFUSED11 the actor retained by and owing duty to Husband refused to perform it.
  • EXCUSED10 conduct by the side resisting disclosure was squarely before the court, and the court processed it without consequence. The conduct was not denied. It was absorbed.
  • WON-THEN-NULLIFIED5 a win on paper that never delivered what it was for (the records, the ruling, or a neutral judge); these rows still matter, because they show the pattern is not explained by weak positions.
  • ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE4 the decision-maker's final response offered the records or the answer only for a price, with no production, answer, or merits ruling.
  • WON0 the rule was applied as written, Husband prevailed, and the win was applied and enforced. As of this build, no row qualifies.

Classes are scored against the core objective of Husband’s requests for financial discovery: a DENIED row is relief sought toward that objective and refused, or obstruction of that pursuit granted by the Court.

194 decision points. Type to filter.

No decision point matches that search. Clear the box to see all 194.

By actor or institution

24 groups. Every decision point appears exactly once.

Select any row to open its full card, with the receipt and links to the same decision point in the other two views. The colored bar under each group name is that group’s outcomes in proportion, in the colors of the class legend above, so a group that runs mostly red or amber went mostly against Husband. Inside an open card, the Spawned by line names the earlier decision point this one grew out of, and it is a link: following it walks the chain backward toward the decision that produced this one.

Wife / Davis21 nodes

Official public records: Florida Bar member profile, Scott Paul Davis

N-0012023-10 -> 2024-12-13A three-page motion asking the court to appoint a guardian alleges no incident, no date, no observation, and no witness. Every allegation about Husband is quoted from his own earlier filing. The movant had signed the October 2023 postmarital agreement giving 50/50 fourteen months earlier.DENIED
Date
2023-10 -> 2024-12-13
Actor
Wife, with Scott Davis (Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.)
Institution
Petitioner/Wife, 13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
A three-page motion asking the court to appoint a guardian alleges no incident, no date, no observation, and no witness. Every allegation about Husband is quoted from his own earlier filing. The movant had signed the October 2023 postmarital agreement giving 50/50 fourteen months earlier.
What the law required
Section 61.401, Florida Statutes: a court may appoint a guardian ad litem only if it finds the appointment is in the child's best interest, and appointment becomes mandatory only on a verified, well-founded allegation that meets section 39.01. The movant carries that showing. A movant's own signed endorsement of the challenged parenting arrangement, on the same facts, is baseline evidence against a later best-interest claim built on them.
What happened
Wife moved for a guardian ad litem on December 13, 2024. The three-page motion's only factual allegations about Husband are four quotations from his own May 2024 filing, signed by counsel with no verification. In closing argument her counsel fixed the crisis facts in 2023 and separately named the litigation as what triggered the December motions; he was not asked whether anything else did. At deposition Wife dated her concerns to November 2023 and produced no supporting document, recalling only a phone call and saying she did not know whether she had a text. The guardian ad litem was granted eighteen months later, June 25, 2026, with no unfitness finding. Every factual allegation about Husband in this motion was lifted from Doc 22, whose own pending motion went unheard for 23 months (N-003). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A guardian ad litem is appointed only on a best-interest finding the movant must support; this motion says nothing about either child. In October 2023 Wife signed the postmarital agreement giving immediate 50/50 timesharing, with no expressed parenting concern despite Husband's health and marijuana use. Fourteen months later she sought a guardian on those same facts. Husband offered medical releases and evaluations with no compulsion; her counsel declined, stating they wanted the appointment instead (N-016). The June 2026 appointment carried no unfitness finding (N-125).
Receipt
  • Wife's Doc 69 (12/13/24) pp. 1-3, read in full and audited against Doc 22 paras. 21, 22 and 26.
  • June 10 Tr. 77:02-03, 77:14-21, 78:07-09, 79:08-22, 80:05-09, 113:09-15 (the 2023 endorsement with knowledge).
  • Tr. 104:07-10 and 104:11-17 (counsel's closing fixing the 2023 date and using it as the argued section 61.13 predicate); Tr. 92:3-12 (the litigation named as the December trigger).
  • Tr. 51:9-11 (the offers); Tr. 101:1-9 (the declination and its stated reason, carried at N-016); Tr. 80:12-18 (post-motion inquiry unanswered; that line has not been checked against a page image).
  • 5/29 Tr. 59:6-11 (the offer was attendance and releases, never funding).
  • Doc 203, her petition demanding 50/50, e-filed by Husband 6/19/25; its own filing stamp and date have not been reconciled with the 24-DR-001150 case number.
  • Doc 205 Tr. 122:12-25 (the no-document answer and the November 2023 date).
  • The appointment without an unfitness finding: N-125 (Doc 337, 6/25/26).
  • Motion-timing dataset on file (nine Wife-movant motions, one driven to a ruling).
  • Related decision points: N-013.

Read the source document: Doc 22, Response to Motion to Compel Payments and Motion to Compel Evidence of Marital Assets (filing record only, body withheld)

Spawned by: N-090, N-019

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-001

N-0022024-05-14In one week Wife demanded his three years of financials and his doctors, medications, and pharmacies. Across 52 Wife-side filings and 17 hearings, none shows her side using anything he produced, and Husband's April 2025 filing states, without contradiction found, that she "has not sought to take Husband's deposition."IGNORED
Date
2024-05-14
Actor
Wife, self-filed as her own counsel (Fla. Bar 065956), on AssuranceAmerica insurance-employer letterhead, before Davis appeared; Davis's firm later adopted the set
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
In one week Wife demanded his three years of financials and his doctors, medications, and pharmacies. Across 52 Wife-side filings and 17 hearings, none shows her side using anything he produced, and Husband's April 2025 filing states, without contradiction found, that she "has not sought to take Husband's deposition."
What the law required
Section 57.105(2), Florida Statutes, reaches positions taken primarily for unreasonable delay. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 makes financial disclosure automatic and mutual, so the exchange she opened ran both ways.
What happened
On May 14, 2024 at 8:58 PM Wife, then acting as her own counsel, filed a motion to compel payments. Sixteen minutes later, at 9:14 PM, she filed a motion for court-monitored communications. At 7:30 AM the next morning she filed a notice of interrogatories, and she served a 16-page set that was never docketed. Husband's responsive motion, his own first-filed motion to compel her financial records, has no written order 861 days after filing, as of September 24, 2026 (N-003, N-090). She answered nothing by the deadline she and his counsel had stipulated, while he answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day (N-006). What the court did with his motion is a separate question, recorded at N-003. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Discovery is served to be used, and disclosure runs both ways. Within a week Wife's interrogatories demanded his three-year financials and health records. She already held his account information; her own filings state she had "all account balances and passwords." What tests the demand is the yield: across 52 Wife-side filings and 17 hearings, none shows her side using anything Husband produced, and Husband's filings state, from April 2025 on, that she never sought his deposition.
Receipt
  • Docs 015, 017, and 018 stamps and key pages (Doc 017 para. 7 for the "only by Order of the Court" pleading).
  • The served 16-page interrogatory set, held in the discovery materials for this matter and hash-matched to the pleadings-PDF copy, items 8 through 10 the health probe.
  • Doc 146 paras. 43, 57, 119 and Doc 269 para. 16 (her possession of balances, account information, and passwords).
  • Doc 177 para. 13 (Husband's motion), repeated in his Docs 280/284 and 311/321 ("despite these alleged concerns, Wife has not sought to take Husband's deposition").
  • Doc 139 is Husband's notice of Wife's deposition (4/2/25; transcript Doc 205). It is her deposition, not his.
  • Doc 259 (118 pp.): her enforcement exhibits contain none of his produced discovery.
  • Wife's Bar number 065956 appears on the self-filed set.
  • Sweep scope stated: 52 Wife-side filings and 17 hearings.
  • Related decision points: N-148.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-002

N-0062024-06-28she produced nothing by the deadline her own counsel stipulated, and nothing for months after it, while Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day; she had promised in writing, twice, that she would complyIGNORED
Date
2024-06-28
Actor
Wife, with Scott Davis
Institution
Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.
Mechanism
she produced nothing by the deadline her own counsel stipulated, and nothing for months after it, while Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day; she had promised in writing, twice, that she would comply
What the law required
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 makes financial disclosure in a dissolution automatic, and Rule 12.285(j) requires the disclosing party to certify under oath that the disclosure is complete and accurate; Rule 12.380 supplies the compel and sanctions remedies. The 6/28/2024 date was stipulated between counsel rather than ordered (Doc 155 Tr. 21:8-11); the rule duty ran either way.
What happened
Nothing was produced by the stipulated June 28, 2024 deadline, and nothing for months after. Husband answered Wife's three-year interrogatories that same day. On October 7, 2024 his counsel wrote to Wife's counsel: "After stipulating to producing the mandatory disclosure documents, you produced nothing and offered no explanation." The deadline was a counsel agreement rather than a court order: "There wasn't a court order. It was just an agreement between Counsel that the discovery would be produced by June 28th for mandatory disclosure." Her first production came days before the hearing on Husband's motion to compel; his Second Request to Produce demanding the metadata dating that availability drew no found response. The court granted Husband's motion to compel on October 28, 2024, order entered November 20, 2024, fee entitlement reaffirmed twice on February 12, 2025. The amount was never liquidated through July 2026, and compliance was never required. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Financial disclosure in a Florida divorce is automatic; here it was uncontested, as her counsel agreed to the date. In May 2024 Wife wrote "I have filed a financial disclosure but will be supplementing/amending it" and promised compliance with court-mandated disclosures. Her sworn petition admits the October 2023 postmarital agreement "did not include financial disclosures." She then retained counsel, and the disclosure did not come. No motive is asserted.
Receipt
  • Doc 155 Tr. 21:8-11 (Samarkos, the stipulation's origin, quoted above), Tr. 7:14-25 (a month of post-deadline silence), Tr. 13:20-14:12 (Husband's own 6/28/24 answers).
  • Doc 203 para. 5, sworn; second docket location at Doc 197 para. 32 p. 5, quoted in bold with the full petition attached.
  • Doc 156 p. 3 (her 5/22/24 email) and Doc 018 p. 20 (her 5/13/24 email, filed by her own side).
  • Doc 205 Tr. 53:22, 54:7-8, 54:22-23 (her definition problem on the record).
  • The 10/7/24 Samarkos-to-Davis letter on firm letterhead, quoted above at its first sentence only (the letter's next clause is counsel's own characterization and is deliberately not carried).
  • The compel: granted 10/28/24, order entered 11/20/24 at Doc 054, fee entitlement reaffirmed twice 2/12/25, amount never liquidated through 7/2026, compliance never required (N-009; Doc 155 Tr. 18:19-25).
  • The Samarkos email of 11/8/24. Certificate chronology: initial 10/22/24, amended 10/31/24, second amended 2/12/25.
  • Husband's 1/8/25 item F (captured chain) for the Ascensus detail. Second RTP, DIN 82, 12/17/24.
  • Related decision points: N-003.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-006

FNEW-W22024-08 -> ongoingtwo years and two generations of subpoenas to Wife's bank since August 2024, and no production answering them has ever been made; the first set ended on a sustained objection, and no ruling on the current set appears anywhere in the record as sweptPENDING
Date
2024-08 -> ongoing
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife (objections); the non-ruling itself is the court's and is scored in the bench lanes
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
two years and two generations of subpoenas to Wife's bank since August 2024, and no production answering them has ever been made; the first set ended on a sustained objection, and no ruling on the current set appears anywhere in the record as swept
What the law required
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution guarantees access to courts and Article I, section 9 guarantees due process; discovery that is objected to and never adjudicated defeats both in fact. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 makes financial disclosure automatic. A party objecting to a non-party production carries the burden of the objection, and an objection is a request for a ruling, not a self-executing shield. Once the enforceability of the agreements was put in issue by the Motion to Void (Doc 146), the financial records went to the case's center under Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987), as Husband argued in his June 17, 2025 letter filed of record at Docket 206.
What happened
Husband's first subpoenas to Chase Bank for Wife's financial records were noticed in June 2024, and he moved for a ruling on her objection on August 9, 2024. On December 30, 2024 the court sustained that objection and ordered those subpoenas not to issue (Doc 93), while declining to rule on the validity of the agreements it relied on. On February 28, 2025 Husband filed the Motion to Void Post-Marital Agreement (Doc 146) and, the same day, a second set of Chase subpoenas (Docs 147 and 148). Wife objected on March 2, 2025 (Doc 149) and wrote that the issue could be resolved in a fifteen-minute hearing; by June 25, 2025 her counsel wrote, "I do not agree to a 15-minute hearing regarding the subpoenas." As of September 26, 2026, no order ruling on that objection appears on the docket, 573 days after it was filed, and Wife's own July 30, 2026 hearing notice (Doc 361) still lists Husband's motion for an immediate ruling on the subpoenas as a matter to be heard. On April 17, 2026 the court ordered three years of Rule 12.285 disclosure reaching back from the January 26, 2024 petition, due in thirty days, and said in the same ruling that objections were not precluded and would be set for hearing. At that hearing her counsel said on the record: "We were late on our mandatory disclosure, and I acknowledge that." No production answering the second-generation subpoenas has been made. What did arrive from the other side, in October 2024, was partial: some account histories reaching back to December 2021, and retirement records that reached back only to October 2023, short of the April 2023 period the disclosure required (N-006). What is recorded here is the objections and the non-production. The absence of a ruling belongs to the court and is recorded elsewhere, in the unwritten-ruling family. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Financial disclosure in a Florida divorce is automatic, and an objection to a non-party subpoena is a request for a ruling, not a shield that operates on its own. The objecting party carries the burden. That is what makes an unruled objection different from a lost motion: nobody decided anything, and the records did not come. On the same docket, Wife's own motion to compel reached an order in about ten weeks and the guardian ad litem motion reached an appointment. The subpoenas aimed at the case's stated core reached neither.
Receipt
Doc 93 (e-filed 12/30/2024 4:03 PM, Ayers), sustaining the objection to Docs 28 and 29 and declining to rule on the agreements' validity. Docs 146, 147, 148 (2/28/2025); Doc 149 (3/2/2025, para. 18, the fifteen-minute-hearing request); Doc 206 p. 2 para. 5 (6/25/2025, "I do not agree to a 15-minute hearing"); Doc 209 (6/28/2025, motion for immediate ruling); Doc 361 (7/30/2026, Wife's notice listing Doc 209). 4/17/2026 Hr'g Tr. (Felix, 24-DR-1150, cert. M.E. Rodriguez) p. 73:11-13 (lateness acknowledgment), p. 74:16-24 (counsel's recital of Doc 93, which he dated "December 20th"; the order's own stamp is 12/30/2024), pp. 114:10-13 and 115:3-12 (the three-year order and the preserved objections), pp. 116:25-117:2 (the thirty-day term). Ten-week comparator: Wife's motion to compel, filed 12/13/2024 (Doc 138 Finding B), to Doc 138, e-filed 2/19/2025: 68 days (N-013). The disposition of the 4/17/26 hearing itself is N-090. Docket sweep for any order on Doc 149, as of 9/26/2026: none in the filed docket, the 8/7/2026 clerk docket index printout, the 8/7 and 8/15/2026 clerk snapshots, the 9/8/2026 clerk export (through DIN 378), the 8/17/2026 full-docket ledger sweep, or Gmail court e-service notices received 9/8 to 9/26/2026. Day counts computed to 9/26/2026 (Doc 149: 573 days; Docs 147/148: 575 days); recompute at publication.

Spawned by: N-006, N-002

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-W2

FNEW-W42024-10-02she had pleaded 50/50 twice, in a signed agreement and in the joint petition that opened the case; twenty-six days before the hearing on her own failure to produce financial disclosure, her counsel filed an amended petition demanding majority time-sharing and ultimate decision-making authority within shared parental responsibility, stating no fact to support departing from equal time-sharing, and the written question of what had changed drew the answer that no explanation was owedPENDING
Date
2024-10-02
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
she had pleaded 50/50 twice, in a signed agreement and in the joint petition that opened the case; twenty-six days before the hearing on her own failure to produce financial disclosure, her counsel filed an amended petition demanding majority time-sharing and ultimate decision-making authority within shared parental responsibility, stating no fact to support departing from equal time-sharing, and the written question of what had changed drew the answer that no explanation was owed
What the law required
A parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment; the parent seeking to displace an equal arrangement carries the burden. Section 61.13(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes, creates a rebuttable presumption that equal time-sharing is in the children's best interest, a presumption Wife's own amended petition acknowledges, and section 61.13 makes the children's best interest the touchstone. A pleading that changes the requested custody arrangement requires a good-faith factual basis, and a parent who asks in writing what that basis is can be told (the asking and the non-answer are carded at NEW-P8).
What happened
On October 2, 2024, twenty-six days before the October 28 hearing on Wife's own discovery non-production, her counsel filed an amended petition asking the court to award Wife majority time-sharing and ultimate decision-making authority (Doc 42). Its time-sharing paragraph acknowledges the equal time-sharing presumption and states that "based on the facts and circumstances that are unique to this family, equal time-sharing is not in the best interests of the Children," without stating any. Husband asked in writing what supported the change. On January 7, 2025: "I've asked you numerous times about the basis for changing from 50/50 custody to [Wife] filing for primary custody. You've raised zero concerns with me." The answer of record the next evening: "I do not owe you an explanation about anything unless I am ordered to do so" (NEW-P8). The majority-time-sharing claim has never been adjudicated. Two months after the amended petition came the four-motion day (N-013), and under four months after that came the sworn answer about what investigation preceded those motions (FNEW-W1). [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Equal time-sharing is presumed to serve the children, and a changed custody demand ordinarily rests on changed facts a parent can be told. Wife's own pleadings are the baseline: her October 2023 marital separation agreement set 50/50, her January 26, 2024 joint petition asked for a parenting plan "that provides for 50/50 custodial rights," and her October 2, 2024 amended petition acknowledges the statutory presumption and pleads only that "facts and circumstances that are unique to this family" defeat it, naming none. At her deposition she produced no document supporting a concern: "I remember having a phone call." What changed is not located in the record as swept.
Receipt
Doc 42, Wife's Amended Petition for Dissolution of Marriage with Minor Children, Filing # 208081236, e-filed 10/02/2024 09:20:13 AM, 34 pp.: paras. 13-14 (pp. 3-4) and prayer paras. C-D (p. 7); pp. 2-8 eye-read 9/26/2026; the petition pleads no incident, date, observation or witness supporting its departure from equal time-sharing. Doc 5, the Joint Petition, Filing # 190629144, e-filed 01/26/2024, p. 1: "a child-care parenting plan that provides for 50/50 custodial rights." The marital separation agreement of October 8, 2023, quoted at Doc 42 para. 14. Doc 39 (notice setting the compel hearing for 10/28/2024 at 2:30 p.m.; the interval from 10/2 is 26 days). Doc 205 Tr. 122:12-13 ("I had phone call. I remember having a phone call. I don't know if I have text."). The 1/7/2025 10:23 AM and 1/8/2025 7:02 PM emails (correspondence with Davis, January 8, 2025, pp. 2, 6-8). Doc 203 (e-filed by Husband 6/19/2025) is a petition text describing November 2023 events that carries no filing stamp of its own; it is not relied on here.

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-W4

FNEW-W32024-10-22 -> 2024-10-31a compliance certificate that never swears compliance, filed nearly four months late, the lateness itself shrinking the twelve-month window it promisedPARTIAL
Date
2024-10-22 -> 2024-10-31
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife, Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A. (certificates); Wife (verification signer)
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
a compliance certificate that never swears compliance, filed nearly four months late, the lateness itself shrinking the twelve-month window it promised
What the law required
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 sets the mandatory-disclosure categories, including twelve months of banking statements, and section 92.525, Florida Statutes, governs the verification that puts the certifying party under penalty of perjury; the party certifying compliance carries the burden of showing the rule's requirements were met. The parties' stipulation set Wife's production date at June 28, 2024 (N-005). A certificate of compliance exists to tell the court the rule was satisfied; what this one verifies, in its own words, is narrower.
What happened
Wife's production was due June 28, 2024, by stipulation. Her Certificate of Compliance came October 22, 2024, six days before the hearing on Husband's motion to compel, and it swears only that she read it and that 'the facts alleged are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.' The delay also moved the twelve-month banking window: months of 2023 records that an on-time certificate had to cover fell outside a late one. Under that category the certificate listed one month of Chase statements from 2023. Three days after the compel hearing, an amended certificate listed the same accounts for seventeen months. Eighteen months later, Wife's counsel said on the record: 'We were late on our mandatory disclosure, and I acknowledge that.' [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
A certificate of compliance exists to tell the court the disclosure rule was satisfied. This one tells the court two narrower things. First, that a list of documents is accurate to the best of the signer's knowledge: no sentence says the rule was complied with. Second, because the banking category runs backward twelve months from compliance, a certificate filed four months late reads its window from the late date: the delay itself removed four months of 2023 records from what was promised.
Receipt
Footnote receipts: Doc 44 (October 22, 2024) pp. 3-4 (the Chase accounts listed for 5/17/23 to 6/16/23 only; joint checking through 5/17/24) and p. 9 (the verification); Doc 46 (October 31, 2024) pp. 3-4 (Chase re-listed 'May 17, 2023 through October 17, 2024'); the Second Amended Certificate (February 12, 2025); the stipulation setting June 28, 2024; Doc 39 (notice e-filed 8/28/2024 setting the compel hearing for October 28, 2024 at 2:30 p.m.); the April 17, 2026 hearing transcript p. 73:11-13.

Spawned by: N-005, N-006

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-W3

NEW-P82024-11-25 -> 2025-01-31a motion about children implies a concern about children; asked in writing, more than once, to name it so he could address it, the father was told no explanation was owed unless a court ordered oneREFUSED
Date
2024-11-25 -> 2025-01-31
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (correspondence)
Mechanism
a motion about children implies a concern about children; asked in writing, more than once, to name it so he could address it, the father was told no explanation was owed unless a court ordered one
What the law required
Rule 4-4.1 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar requires truthfulness in statements to others, Rule 4-4.4(a) bars means with no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden, and Rule 4-3.4 requires fairness to the opposing party. The section 57.105 notice of 12/5/24 made naming the basis for the custody change one of its three stated cures. A lawyer who accuses in writing can specify in writing, and a record of asked-and-never-answered is scoreable as sequence.
What happened
On January 8, 2025 Husband sent a thirteen-item letter documenting the pattern, including: "Husband has asked Mr. Davis on multiple occasions about any concerns with the kids, and Wife has provided no answers." Fourteen minutes later, the reply answered the letter as a whole rather than the question about the children: "I do not owe you an explanation about anything unless I am ordered to do so. I am baffled as to why you think I owe you an explanation about any of your claims below. You can assume whatever you wish; however, that may ultimately be to your detriment." Two days later Husband asked directly whether counsel believed he had a duty of fairness and truthfulness; no answer appears in the captured chain. Husband's own emails in this chain carry escalation language and abuse allegations. [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
A motion said to be necessary for the children can name what it is about to their father. Naming a concern costs nothing if one exists. The sequence is the whole of it: asked, and never answered. Counsel did answer substantively once, on January 31, 2025, denying any discovery-for-custody trade and describing guardian ad litem procedure; that answer stated no fact about the children.
Receipt
  • The 1/6/25 to 1/10/25 email chain, preserved in full in this matter's correspondence file, including the thirteen-item letter and the fourteen-minute reply (Gmail capture 8/17/26).
  • The reply's own words fix what it answered: "any of your claims below."
  • Three further receipted instances of the same shape: 11/25/24, 12/5/24, 12/17/24, all in the case record.
  • The 1/7/25 email is the primary quotation. The 1/31/25 email is the substantive answer carried in the baseline.
  • Husband's own 1/8/25 7:34 PM email in the same chain contains the escalation language named above.
  • At N-046: when the same specification request was put to the court, the only conduct ever named was the baseball-equipment exchange, charged to both sides.
  • Scope: the never-answered negative covers this correspondence and the three receipted instances, never absolutely.

Spawned by: N-011, N-013, N-017

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P8

N-0112024-12-05the December 5, 2024 letter invoked the statute's 21-day safe harbor and named three problems to fix; eight days into that window Wife's side filed four new motions, and the sanctions motion that followed has not been heard; it is set for October 9, 2026IGNORED
Date
2024-12-05
Actor
Scott Davis
Institution
Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.
Mechanism
the December 5, 2024 letter invoked the statute's 21-day safe harbor and named three problems to fix; eight days into that window Wife's side filed four new motions, and the sanctions motion that followed has not been heard; it is set for October 9, 2026
What the law required
Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, exposes a party and counsel to fees for a claim unsupported by the material facts or existing law, or pursued primarily for delay (subsections (1) and (2)), and section 57.105(4) gives the recipient of a written notice 21 days to withdraw or correct it before any motion is filed. The movant carries the burden later; the safe harbor is the recipient's cost-free way to close the question. Withdraw, correct, or answer: this entry scores which one happened.
What happened
A section 57.105 Notice of Intent to Seek Sanctions issued on December 5, 2024 with itemized cure conditions and a 21-day safe harbor running to December 26. Nothing was withdrawn or corrected within the window. Eight days into the window came the four motions of N-013. A second safe-harbor letter followed on May 9, 2025 with five itemized cure conditions; its window ran out on May 30, 2025, and the follow-on sanctions motion was not filed until October 3, 2025, 126 days later. That motion, Doc 239, ran 82 pages and was still unheard 356 days later, on September 24, 2026; Wife's July 30, 2026 notice lists it among the ten matters set for October 9, 2026 (N-056). The documented answer inside the second window, "Do what you need to do and file what you need to file. I will see you in court," appears at FNEW-W8. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
The letter named the fixes and described itself as "your opportunity under the 'safe harbor' provision to rectify your conduct." What the window produced instead was escalation: the four motions of December 13, 2024, filed eight days in, are N-013. The 82-page sanctions motion that followed has not yet been heard.
Receipt
  • Doc 060 (the notice) and Doc 059 (cover).
  • The ten-day figure belongs to the 10/28/24 compel order, not to this notice; December 13 is eight days into the 21-day window that ran to 12/26/24.
  • Safe-harbor arithmetic: 12/5/24 plus 21 days is 12/26/24; 5/9/25 plus 21 days is 5/30/25, confirmed; 5/30/25 to 10/3/25 is 126 days; 12/5/24 to 8/7/26 is 610 days; Doc 239 filed 10/3/25, unheard 308 days at 8/7/26.
  • The follow-on is not Doc 84, which rests on a 12/6 deficiency email and never cites the statute.
  • The 800-range figures belong to the N-003 and Doc 22 lineage.

Spawned by: N-009

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-011

N-0132024-12-13Asked again and again to name any concern about the children, Davis named none, then filed four motions against Husband in one day.IGNORED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Asked again and again to name any concern about the children, Davis named none, then filed four motions against Husband in one day. The two about the children rest on a misquote of Husband's own filing. Asked for the basis, Davis answered: "I do not owe you an explanation about anything unless I am ordered to do so."

E
Expected output

A lawyer who puts quotation marks around an opposing party's filing reproduces the words in their order and keeps any clause that changes their meaning. Rule 4-3.3(a)(1) bars a knowingly false statement of fact to a tribunal, and a quotation is a statement of fact about what the document says. Davis had to quote paragraphs 21 and 26 in their own words and order, keep the clauses that gave their cause, and plead a fact about the children.

V
Verified facts and law
  • May 29, 2024: Davis appeared for Wife; his first motion about the children came 198 days later. N-013
  • Dec. 13, 2024: four motions: compel 7:31 a.m. (Doc 67), default 8:32 a.m. (Doc 75), guardian ad litem 11:12 a.m. (Doc 69), psychological examination 1:45 p.m. (Doc 77). Doc 69 para. 6a, repeated in Doc 77: Husband has "severe mental, physical, and emotional conditions..." Doc 22 para. 21: "unable to work due to severe physical, mental and emotional conditions related to these marital and other recent issues." Both also quote him as "certainly in part out of anger and frustration..." and stop. Para. 26 continues: "but primarily in hopes that Petitioner would simply provide the requested bank statements." These quotations are Doc 69's only allegations about Husband; it names no incident, date, or witness involving either child. N-013, N-001
    Read them: Wife's Motion for Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, Dec. 13, 2024 (Doc 69) (link pending redacted copy) · Husband's Response, May 16, 2024 (Doc 22), paras. 21 and 26 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Jan. 7 to 8, 2025: Husband to Davis: "I've asked you numerous times about the basis for changing from 50/50 custody to [Wife] filing for primary custody. You've raised zero concerns with me." Davis, fourteen minutes after Husband's next email: "I do not owe you an explanation about anything unless I am ordered to do so." N-013
    Davis moved to put a guardian ad litem between the children and their father. What was the concern about the children?
    Read them: Husband's email, Jan. 7, 2025 (Doc 121, p. 3) (link pending redacted copy)
  • Jan. 21, 2025 and June 25, 2026: Davis dropped the default: "I filed a motion for default, but then Mr. Hanson filed an answer. So I am not pursuing that." Doc 69 was granted eighteen months later; the order makes no finding on Husband's fitness. The psychological-examination motion has no ruling. N-013
I
Independent encounter

Scott Paul Davis signed all four motions for Wife, the movant on each. One lawyer, one day, four signed filings, one document he quoted. Every duty here arises from those pages set beside the paragraphs they cite; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, ss. 9 and 23, Fla. Const.: due process, and a parent's right to raise his children. Section 61.13(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat., presumes equal time-sharing is in the children's best interest; Doc 69 para. 5 acknowledges it; Wife carries the burden to rebut it. Section 61.401 requires a best-interest finding, and Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.360 good cause; the movant carries both. Rules 4-3.3(a)(1) and 4-3.1 bind the lawyer who quotes; section 57.105(1) exposes party and counsel to fees for a claim unsupported by the material facts.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2024-12-13
Actor
Scott Davis, with the Wife
Institution
Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.
Mechanism
four motions against Husband in one day, two of them quoting his own sentence about withholding a payment and stopping at "out of anger and frustration," before the words that say he did it to get the bank statements
What the law required
Section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes, exposes a party and counsel to fees for a claim or defense unsupported by the material facts or existing law, and section 61.401 allows a guardian ad litem only on a best-interest finding, a showing the movant carries. Rule 4-8.4(d) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar bars conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice."
What happened
On December 13, 2024, the day Husband's counsel exited on one-day notice over his objection (N-014), Davis filed four motions between 7:31 AM and 1:45 PM: a motion to compel, a judicial default, a guardian ad litem, and a psychological evaluation of Husband. The evaluation motion is unverified; its only allegation about Husband not drawn from his own earlier filing is that his conduct had "become increasingly unstable and erratic." Both child-related motions quote his sentence about withholding payment "certainly in part out of anger and frustration" and stop before the rest of that sentence, which explained he did it to get Wife to produce the bank statements. The very next paragraph of that filing reads: "The last thing Respondent wanted to do was to make this ugly and spend money on lawyers that could be spent on or saved for the children. He has gone to great lengths of which he is very proud to put the children first." The default was abandoned within six weeks. The compel was granted in part. The guardian ad litem was granted eighteen months later with no unfitness finding. The psychological-evaluation motion has never been resolved. [IGNORED: evaluation prong never resolved]
Baseline deviation
A motion must have a good-faith basis when filed; what Wife's side did with its own motions is the measure. Husband offered signed medical releases and evaluation attendance, no compulsion needed; Davis declined on the record, stating they wanted a guardian ad litem instead (N-016). The appointment order that finally issued made no findings on Husband's fitness, ordered no evaluation, and stated no concern about the children. The other three motions: abandoned, granted in part, never resolved.
Receipt
  • Docs 067 (7:31 AM), 075 (8:32 AM, para. 7.b), 069 (11:12 AM, p.2 para. 6), 077 (1:45 PM, p.2 paras. 4-6, para. 10).
  • Doc 22 para. 26 (the truncated sentence).
  • Doc 118 Tr. 9:14-16.
  • Doc 138 (partial grant, 2/19/25); source audit on file.
  • Related decision points: N-044. Doc 22 para. 27, p. 4 (the paragraph after para. 26); the quotation’s ellipsis omits one clause about health and changes no meaning.

Read the source document: Doc 75, Wife's Motion for Judicial Default (Dec. 13, 2024), para. 7.b at p. 2

Spawned by: N-011

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-013

N-0172024-12-13the motion asking the court to appoint a guardian over his children was served only on the lawyer who was exiting the case that same day; the newly self-represented father then asked for a copy four times in writing over fifteen days, and the answer he got was to bring it up at a hearing nineteen days awayIGNORED
Date
2024-12-13
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for the movant (service); Division D chambers, through its judicial assistant (routing)
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150
Mechanism
the motion asking the court to appoint a guardian over his children was served only on the lawyer who was exiting the case that same day; the newly self-represented father then asked for a copy four times in writing over fifteen days, and the answer he got was to bring it up at a hearing nineteen days away
What the law required
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution guarantees due process, and a motion seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem over a parent's children cannot be prosecuted against a party who has not been served with it. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.516(b)(1) requires service of every pleading and paper on each party, and once counsel has withdrawn, service runs to the party at the party's designated address. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.080 adopts that rule for family cases. Section 61.401, Florida Statutes, permits appointment of a guardian ad litem where the court finds it is in the child's best interest, which presupposes a motion the opposing parent can answer. The burden of establishing service is on the party who filed the paper. The lawful path in one sentence: serve the motion on the now self-represented party who asked for it four times, or state the date and manner it was already served.
What happened
The guardian ad litem motion was filed on December 13, 2024 at 11:12 AM, the same day Husband's lawyer was allowed to withdraw. Newly self-represented, he asked opposing counsel for a copy on December 23 at 1:36 PM, renewed on December 28 at 9:08 AM, renewed to chambers on January 2, 2025 at 11:26 AM, and renewed again on January 7 at 10:23 AM. Chambers answered once, the same afternoon: "You may bring this matter up with Judge Ayers on 1-21-25." On December 30 he filed a preliminary response of record stating that he "has still not received a copy of Wife's Motion to appoint Guardian Ad Litem despite multiple requests" (Doc 92), and on January 7 he was still writing "I still have not received a copy of the motion to appoint a guardian ad litem." On this record as swept, no copy was sent in that window. That left a parent unable to answer on the merits a motion about his children for at least twenty-five days after his lawyer exited, and the routing answer sent a service question to a hearing nineteen days away instead of resolving it. The motion he could not obtain is the motion granted eighteen months later with no unfitness finding (N-001, N-125), and its proponent later stated its object on the record: "We haven't taken him up on these things, because we want a guardian ad litem appointed." [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Due process means a parent can answer a motion about his children. Florida's rules require service of every paper on each party, and once a lawyer withdraws, service runs to the party directly; the filing party carries the burden of establishing service. The lawful path was one sentence long: send the three-page motion to the self-represented parent who asked for it, or state the date and manner it had already been served. The original portal service ran only to the lawyer who was leaving the case that day. What is recorded here is the outcome: for twenty-five days after the filing, a self-represented parent had no copy of a three-page motion about his children, and the one answer he received sent him to a hearing nineteen days away.
Receipt
Husband's 12/23/2024 1:36 PM and 12/28/2024 9:08 AM emails (correspondence with Davis, December 2024, p. 1). The 1/2/2025 11:26 AM email to chambers, counsel and former counsel, and the judicial assistant's 1/2/2025 3:13 PM answer in bold, "You may bring this matter up with Judge Ayers on 1-21-25" (correspondence, January 10, 2025, pp. 10-12). The 1/7/2025 10:23 AM renewal (correspondence, January 8, 2025, pp. 6-8). Doc 92, Husband's Response to Motion to Appoint Guardian Ad Litem, Filing # 213618748, e-filed 12/30/2024 11:33 AM, para. 1 and the 'Background on attempts to obtain copy' section (pp. 1-2). Doc 69's certificate of service (p. 3 of 3, e-filed 12/13/24 11:12 AM), certifying service "via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal on all counsel of record," no party named. Doc 81, the withdrawal order, e-filed 12/16/2024 2:35 PM; the withdrawal hearing was 12/13/2024 at 4:30 PM (Doc 158). June 10, 2026 Tr. 101:2-3 (certified transcript, reporter Lucente). Interval: 12/13/2024 to 1/7/2025 is 25 days; 1/2/2025 to 1/21/2025 is 19 days.

Spawned by: N-001, N-013

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-017

FNEW-W72024-12-17four days after the four-motion day, and inside the safe-harbor window of a pending sanctions notice, opposing counsel put his posture toward the self-represented party's account of the discovery record in writing: what he would no longer "allow"REFUSED
Date
2024-12-17
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife, Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
four days after the four-motion day, and inside the safe-harbor window of a pending sanctions notice, opposing counsel put his posture toward the self-represented party's account of the discovery record in writing: what he would no longer "allow"
What the law required
Rule 4-4.4(a) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar bars a lawyer from using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third person, a rule Husband invoked in his June 17, 2025 letter filed at Docket 206. What the card fixes is narrower and factual: a dated, written statement of the sender's stated posture toward the opposing party's account of the discovery record, made while that record was in active dispute (the 12/13/24 motions were four days old and the 12/5/24 sanctions notice was in its safe-harbor window, N-011, N-013).
What happened
On December 17, 2024 at 7:45 AM, Wife's counsel emailed the self-represented Husband: "What I will no longer 'allow' is your ongoing attempts to control the narrative regarding this issue." The quotation marks around "allow" are his own. The four motions of December 13 were four days old and the December 5 sanctions notice was still inside its safe-harbor window (N-013, N-011). The email was later filed in the court record. This is the earliest located written statement in which the posture is framed as what the sender will "allow" about the account of the discovery dispute, and the register runs from here to the February 2025 defamation warning (FNEW-W5) and the November 2025 cease-and-desist letter (N-026). [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 4-4.4(a) bars a lawyer from using means whose only substantial purpose is to embarrass, delay or burden another person. What the record fixes is narrower and entirely factual: a dated, written statement of the sender's own stated posture toward the opposing party's account of the discovery dispute, made while that dispute was live. The quotation marks around the word are his own.
Receipt
The 12/17/24 7:45:31 AM email at pp. 3-4 of Docket 171, filed of record 4/4/25 9:43 AM; item 4 of a nine-item email; checked against the page image 9/26/2026 from the rendered pages. Timeline anchors: four days after the four-motion day; inside the 12/5/24 safe-harbor window (which ran to 12/26/24); four months before Judge Ayers's disqualification (Doc 184, 4/28/2025); roughly eleven months before the November 2025 cease-and-desist letter (N-026).

Spawned by: N-013, N-011

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-W7

N-0262025-01-31A signed letter threatening suit claims discovery was withheld pursuant to a valid court order and the marital agreements; asked the next day to name that order, none was named, and the order Husband actually obtained on 10/28/24 ran the other way.REFUSED
Date
2025-01-31
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife, Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150
Mechanism
A signed letter threatening suit claims discovery was withheld pursuant to a valid court order and the marital agreements; asked the next day to name that order, none was named, and the order Husband actually obtained on 10/28/24 ran the other way.
What the law required
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution guarantees access to the courts, and discovery obstruction defeats it in fact. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 makes financial disclosure automatic in a dissolution; a private agreement does not suspend it, and it does not wait on a ruling about that agreement's validity. Rule 12.350(b) requires a written response or objection within 30 days, with the objecting party carrying the grounds and an unserved objection waived, and Rule 4-3.4(d) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar bars a lawyer from intentionally failing to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party. The 10/28/2024 order in this case ran the other way, compelling disclosure within ten days (N-006, N-004).
What happened
In January 2025 Wife's counsel wrote that documents beyond mandatory disclosure were not owed unless the agreements were set aside, and promised to produce any identified missing documents. In November 2025 his signed cease-and-desist letter stated that discovery "was withheld or delayed pursuant to a valid court order and consistent with the prenuptial and postnuptial agreements." Asked the next day to identify that order, none was identified in the exchange, and none has been identified since. The January promise went the same way: deficiencies were identified in writing repeatedly, and the third request to produce drew no response at all (N-037). The record does not support saying he refused everything; it supports saying the order his letter relied on has never been named. [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
Financial disclosure in a Florida divorce is automatic; it is not suspended by a private agreement and does not wait on a ruling about that agreement's validity. An objecting party must serve a written objection within 30 days; an unserved objection is waived. Naming an order costs one sentence and makes the claim testable. No order compelling the withholding has been identified, and the order Husband obtained on 10/28/24 ran the other way: it compelled disclosure within ten days.
Receipt
  • The 1/31/2025 2:36:42 PM email at p. 3 of the preserved Davis correspondence exhibit, including the Smith-Fullerton citation offered "as a professional courtesy" and the same email's guardian ad litem passage.
  • The 11/24/2025 cease-and-desist letter at p. 1. The 11/25/2025 exchange, 12:03 PM question and 12:06 PM answer, preserved in two PDFs and held from the text layer only.
  • The compelling order: 10/28/2024, ten days to comply (N-009, N-006).
  • Cooperation instances: he identified the December 2024 court reporter by name and attached the reporter's email, offered to coordinate deposition dates in the same email that carries the school-subpoena refusal (N-036), and cleared a morning for a non-party deposition and agreed to three more hours of Wife's deposition without court involvement.
  • Question Protocol on file: identify the order by docket entry number and date and quote the language that authorized the withholding; and list every document produced after Husband identified it as missing, with both dates.

Spawned by: N-037, N-016, N-065

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-026

FNEW-W52025-02-07the motion asking a court to order a psychological evaluation of a parent pleads the children's welfare; two months after filing it, its proponent wrote to that parent, "Once again, this is part of the reason why I filed a Motion for Psychological Evaluation," with "this" pointing back at the sentences immediately before it in his own email rather than at the motion's pleaded groundsREFUSED
Date
2025-02-07
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife, Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
the motion asking a court to order a psychological evaluation of a parent pleads the children's welfare; two months after filing it, its proponent wrote to that parent, "Once again, this is part of the reason why I filed a Motion for Psychological Evaluation," with "this" pointing back at the sentences immediately before it in his own email rather than at the motion's pleaded grounds
What the law required
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution guarantees due process before a court orders a parent's mental condition examined, and Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.360 puts a parent's mental condition in controversy only on verified allegations going to the children's welfare; the movant carries the burden of showing good cause, and the motion's stated predicate is its legal basis. A written statement by the motion's proponent about why the motion was filed is measured against that pleaded predicate.
What happened
On February 7, 2025 at 6:04 PM, Wife's counsel wrote to the self-represented Husband: "I have never threatened violence against you. The only time I would engage in violence is if it were necessary in self defense. Once again, this is part of the reason why I filed a Motion for Psychological Evaluation. You just make things up." The motion referenced has never been resolved and was re-noticed into 2026. The same evening thread carried three other things, and they are context rather than the claim. A warning: "If you're going to publish anything regarding me, I strongly recommend that you become extremely familiar with defamation law." Advice: "You should seriously consider getting a job and supporting your family rather than spending your days creating false narratives and sending harassing emails," and "I also want to make it clear that we are not friends." And an altered idiom. Husband had written that counsel was "taking your ball and going home"; the reply came back "I am not taking my bat and ball and going home." Husband asked about it twice in the next minutes, "Wait. Where did the bat come from?? You threatening me?" and "Where did the bat come from sir??" Counsel explained it as habit: his mother used to say it, and "I don't even own a bat." [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
A motion's pleaded predicate is its legal basis, and a motion putting a parent's mental condition in controversy rests on verified allegations going to the children's welfare. The motion's proponent then stated part of a reason for filing it in his own words, in writing, to the parent it targets. The two can be read side by side without characterizing either. The motion's face pleads child-welfare grounds built on Husband's own earlier filing (N-013). The email points at something else, and what it points at is the sentences immediately preceding it in the same message. The word "part" is his, and it is load-bearing: a stated part-reason is compatible with a pleaded predicate, and nothing here asserts anything beyond the mismatch between the two texts.
Receipt
The 2/7/25 email thread, off-docket correspondence in this matter (email correspondence with Davis, February 7, 2025, 553 pp.): p. 5 (counsel's 5:16 PM 'done communicating' email); p. 4 (the 5:48 PM defamation warning, get-a-job passage and idiom reply, and Husband's 5:39 PM 'taking your ball' line); p. 3 (Husband's 5:52 PM and 6:05 PM questions and the 6:04 PM psychological-evaluation sentence); p. 1 (counsel's 6:12 PM habit explanation). Doc 77, the psychological-evaluation motion (12/13/24), is the motion the 6:04 PM sentence refers to; N-013 carries the statement.

Spawned by: N-013

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-W5

N-0362025-03-24the children's school named three routes, one needing no court process; Husband proposed that one in writing on March 18, no answer is located, and six days later counsel refused to agree to the subpoena, leaving only the route carrying the statutory contempt languageDENIED
Date
2025-03-24
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
the children's school named three routes, one needing no court process; Husband proposed that one in writing on March 18, no answer is located, and six days later counsel refused to agree to the subpoena, leaving only the route carrying the statutory contempt language
What the law required
Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, decides children's matters on the children's best interest, and section 61.401 requires a best-interest finding before a guardian is imposed; evidence of how the children are actually doing is what that inquiry runs on. Husband first proposed a joint request, the route that would not compel the school, then asked counsel to agree to the subpoena.
What happened
On March 6, 2025 the children's school stated in writing: "A court order, subpoena, or mutual agreement between parties would be required for any of our employees to participate." Three routes, one requiring no court process. On March 18, 2025 Husband proposed getting the information through a joint request; no answer to that proposal is located in the record as swept. Six days later he asked counsel to agree to a subpoena and waive the waiting period. The answer came that day: "I do not agree to the subpoenas and will object to same if a NPNP is filed." No reason was given. What was refused was the subpoena, not the joint request, which simply drew nothing. The subpoena issued the same day, commanding the school to produce its most knowledgeable person, carrying the preprinted statutory contempt warning. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
The school named the route that would not drag it into court. Husband proposed it first, in writing. No answer is located in the record. Six days later he asked counsel to agree to the subpoena; counsel refused. What followed was a subpoena carrying statutory contempt language, to produce an answer taking one question: nothing was documented about either child in four years beyond one instance of seeming tired (N-043).
Receipt
  • Doc 166 pp. 3, 4, and 6 (the 3/18 and 3/24/2025 emails, including the 2:20:05 PM refusal).
  • Doc 165, the subpoena, DIN 165, dated 3/24/2025 and e-filed 3/25/2025, all three pages. The filing number is deliberately not printed: this instrument names the children's school, and the map withholds that name, so the citation is by DIN and date only.
  • The children's school's 3/6/2025 reply.
  • The same episode also appears at N-043.
  • One limit carried forward: no document has been found in which Wife or Davis objects to the wellness forms themselves, and Davis called that premise "blatantly and patently false" on 10/17/2025. What is recorded here is the refusal of the subpoena and the unanswered joint request, both of which are documents.
  • The subpoena's preprinted contempt language: it "may subject [the school] and/or the designated person to penalties under Florida law, including contempt of court proceedings."
  • Related decision points: N-119.

Spawned by: N-001

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-036

N-0372025-04-01the request for Davis's own billing, payment, and source-of-funds records has gone 546 days as of August 21, 2026 with no response, no objection, and no rulingIGNORED
Date
2025-04-01
Actor
Scott Davis (no response); court (no ruling)
Institution
Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A. / 13th Cir.
Mechanism
the request for Davis's own billing, payment, and source-of-funds records has gone 546 days as of August 21, 2026 with no response, no objection, and no ruling
What the law required
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.350(b) requires a written response or objection within 30 days of service, and the objecting party carries the grounds; an objection never served is waived, privilege included. Rule 12.380(a)(3) treats an evasive or incomplete answer as a failure to answer, and Rule 12.380(a)(4) shifts the movant's fees to the non-responding party unless its position was substantially justified.
What happened
The Third Request to Produce, number 140, demanded Davis billing, payment, and source of funds records. It was served February 21, 2025 and attached to Doc 163. No response was served, no objection was served, no court has ruled: 546 days of silence as of August 21, 2026. The deficiency was pressed three times by email, in April and May 2025. The demand is still outstanding per Doc 321, and the records have never been produced. A ruling sweep of every order-titled file after Doc 163, more than 35 of them, found none touching this request. Opposing counsel identified real notice defects in the same exchange, including a certificate for a deposition set on one day's notice. Those defects explain an objection. They do not explain 546 days without one. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A request to produce calls for a response or a written objection stating grounds; neither came here. Total silence leaves no stated ground for anyone to test, and exposes the non-responding party to a motion to compel. The records sought sit alongside the financial disclosure that was never produced (N-006), part of the same core-records pursuit that two years of attempts never reached (N-003). A response, or an objection, would have documented what exists. Neither was served.
Receipt
  • Doc 321 pp. 3, 9. Service date receipted: served 2/21/25, attached as Exhibit A to Doc 163 (stamp).
  • Day count 532 as of 8/7/26.
  • Every order-titled file after Doc 163 was checked (35+), none touching RTP #140; Doc 210's emergency finding had no substantive follow-through.
  • Deficiency emails 4/28, 5/2, and 5/9/2025.
  • Notice-defect detail: a certificate dated February 22, 2025 for an April 29, 2025 deposition and document requests served the afternoon before.

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-037

FNEW-W12025-04-02asked under oath whether, to date, she had done anything to investigate the concerns she had about him as a parent, the movant answered that the filing is the investigation: "That's how you investigate it is you file the motions and you have people appointed"IGNORED
Date
2025-04-02
Actor
Wife (Fla. Bar 065956), deposed; Scott Davis defending
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
asked under oath whether, to date, she had done anything to investigate the concerns she had about him as a parent, the movant answered that the filing is the investigation: "That's how you investigate it is you file the motions and you have people appointed"
What the law required
A motion is required to have a good-faith factual basis when filed. Section 61.401 conditions a guardian ad litem appointment on the child's best interest, and Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.360 puts a parent's mental condition in controversy only on verified allegations or an evidentiary showing. A movant asked under oath what investigation preceded her motions is the direct test of that predicate: a factual basis that existed at filing can be stated.
What happened
At her deposition, taken April 2, 2025, Wife was asked: "To date have you done anything to investigate anything about the concerns you have for me as a parent.?" Her answer began, under oath: "That's how you investigate it is you file the motions and you have people appointed." The motions she was describing are the guardian ad litem motion and the psychological-evaluation motion, both filed December 13, 2024, and both alleging no incident, no date, no observation, and no witness about the children. The sworn answer entered the record and the motions proceeded on it unchanged. The guardian ad litem motion was granted with no finding that either parent was unfit. The psychological-evaluation motion has never been resolved. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A motion about a parent's children is required to have a factual basis when it is filed. A movant who has one can state it when asked. The question put to her was open, and it asked about everything she had done to date: had she done anything to investigate the concerns she had about him as a parent. The answer locates the investigation in the filing itself and inside the appointment being requested. It corroborates, from the movant's own mouth, what the motions' faces already showed, that every factual allegation about Husband was drawn from his own earlier filing (N-013), and that no intervening child-specific event appears in the record (N-001). It matches what the school's records later showed: nothing documented about either child in four years beyond one instance of seeming tired (N-043). And it matches counsel's own on-record reason for declining the releases and evaluations Husband offered, that they wanted the appointment instead (N-016).
Receipt
Doc 205, Wife's deposition, taken 4/2/25, transcript e-filed 6/25/25 02:37:39 PM, 181 pp., reporter Nika M. Priestley. The quote pinned at p. 108, lines 17-18, question at lines 14-16, speaker confirmed (date facts from the cover page). The quote is also preserved verbatim in Husband's filed Motion for Judicial Review of Video, Section II table. Predicate motions: Docs 69 and 77 (12/13/24); related decision point N-013. Falsification question: identify any investigative step taken before 12/13/24, with its date and record. The school-records fact also appears at N-041 and N-043; the school-subpoena episode is at N-043 in the Ayers lane. The Bar number appears in the N-002 footnote.

Spawned by: N-013, N-001

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-W1

N-0442025-04-07the judge asked opposing counsel to summarize Wife's testimony and he agreed in writing; no summary came, and the court withdrew its own request in a signed order and did the work itself, so what her testimony consisted of was never fixed on paperIGNORED
Date
2025-04-07
Actor
Scott Davis (non-performance); Judge Ayers (abandonment)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the judge asked opposing counsel to summarize Wife's testimony and he agreed in writing; no summary came, and the court withdrew its own request in a signed order and did the work itself, so what her testimony consisted of was never fixed on paper
What the law required
Rule 4-3.2 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar requires reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the client's interests. The duty here attaches to the acceptance: having committed in writing to the tribunal on 4/7/25 to provide the summary in 'a couple of days', counsel owed either performance or a withdrawal stated to the tribunal and to the copied opposing party.
What happened
On April 7, 2025 the Division D chambers account emailed a request that Wife's counsel summarize her testimony. He answered the same day that he was happy to and would need a couple of days. No summary was produced. On April 16 the court's own order erased the ask: "No summaries have been provided to the Court. No summaries are being requested by the Court." At the April 22 hearing Judge Ayers reframed her own request as non-binding, declined to have her assistant remind him, and absorbed the work herself: "He didn't. So I'm doing it myself." The written summary that would have fixed on paper what Wife's testimony actually consisted of never existed. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A lawyer who tells the tribunal in writing that he will deliver something delivers it or says why not. Judge Ayers asked for a summary of Wife's testimony, counsel agreed in writing to provide it, no summary arrived, and the court withdrew its own request in a signed order and absorbed the work herself. The written summary that would have fixed on paper what Wife's testimony consisted of was never made.
Receipt
  • Doc 177 paras. 2-4 and p. 4 (both emails verbatim, including "happy to do that. I will need a couple of days").
  • Doc 173 p. 5 (the 4/7 9:58 AM chambers email as originally filed).
  • Doc 182 p. 1 (4/16/25).
  • Doc 192 Tr. 32:4, 32:21-33:9, 33:6-9, 51, 54:7-55:10, 56:1-25, 56:16-57:5; Davis sworn at Tr. 54:8, testimony at 54:15 ff.
  • Doc 180 para. 8 (4/21/25), first docketed capture of the position change.
  • Sender note: the 4/7 email is from famlawdivd@fljud13.org, displayed "Div D UFC Domestic Relations/Family," with no individual name on its face; the attribution rests on Doc 173 para. 1 and Judge Ayers's own "When I asked Dee Dee to ask him for a summary" (Tr. 33:6).
  • Related decision points: N-041.

Spawned by: N-018, N-040, N-041, N-045

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-044

FNEW-W82025-05-09 -> 2025-06-25three letters over thirty-nine days asked for specific, checkable things by dated deadlines: retract identified statements, withdraw the motions about his children or name the evidence supporting them, produce the promised special-magistrate motion, and answer the June 17 letter's own question about the children's teachers' wellness questionnaires; the located replies answer scheduling items and decline a fifteen-minute hearing, and reach none of those fourREFUSED
Date
2025-05-09 -> 2025-06-25
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife (responses); Husband (the letters)
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
three letters over thirty-nine days asked for specific, checkable things by dated deadlines: retract identified statements, withdraw the motions about his children or name the evidence supporting them, produce the promised special-magistrate motion, and answer the June 17 letter's own question about the children's teachers' wellness questionnaires; the located replies answer scheduling items and decline a fifteen-minute hearing, and reach none of those four
What the law required
Section 57.105(4), Florida Statutes, gives a served safe-harbor notice a 21-day window in which withdrawal or correction avoids sanctions; the party later seeking fees carries the burden, and the window exists for engagement with the identified positions. A demand letter identifying allegedly false statements in a filed appellate response, with a retraction deadline, presents a correct-or-stand fork, and the record shows which was taken.
What happened
The sequence, all 2025. On May 9 Husband served a section 57.105(4) safe-harbor letter with five itemized cure conditions, its window running to May 30 (N-011). Two days later, on May 11 at 5:37 PM, the answer: "Please stop emailing me unless it's necessary and directly related to the progression of the case. I'm no longer interested in your false narrative and outside of this request for you to stop, will no longer respond to same. I'm not hiding from anything. Do what you need to do and file what you need to file. I will see you in court." That email announced the posture in advance; it predates the letters that followed and is not their answer. On May 23 came the first comprehensive demand letter: retract identified statements in Wife's appellate response by May 30, plus a catalog of petition allegations the response had not denied. On June 17 came the second: expanded demands with a June 20 deadline, documentation that the promised special-magistrate motion was still unfiled, a request to withdraw the December 13 guardian ad litem and psychological-evaluation motions by June 20 "or provide specific evidence that serves as the basis for the requests and their timing," and the letter's own question why the children's teachers' wellness questionnaires were being opposed while evaluations by court-appointed professionals were pursued. That question is the letter's, not the map's; no document has been located in which Wife or her counsel objects to the wellness forms themselves, and counsel called that premise "blatantly and patently false" on 10/17/2025 (N-036). That letter was filed of record. Two located replies came on June 25, five days after the June 17 letter's June 20 deadline; both were filed of record on June 26 (Doc 206). At 3:29 PM on June 25 counsel answered five scheduling items: mediation by Zoom, "You are welcome to file whatever you like with the Court," the venue order, time-sharing, and "I do not agree to a 15-minute hearing regarding the subpoenas." Husband asked at 6:55 PM, "What about the other matters raised?" The 7:00 PM answer reads: "Mr. Hanson, We are not going to go back and forth. You've made the lack of desire to pay for your expenses and your children's expenses known. I provided a response. If you all can't agree, we can bring all the matters to the court. Have a nice evening." As of September 26, 2026, no response addressing the itemized demands, the retraction demand, the withdrawal request, or the wellness-questionnaire question is located in the record. This arc supplies the middle of the same shape recorded at NEW-P8 in 2024 and at NEW-P4 in the 2026 hearings. [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
Section 57.105(4) builds in a 21-day window whose purpose is engagement: withdraw or correct the identified position and no motion follows. A letter identifying allegedly false statements with a retraction date, or asking that motions about a parent's children be withdrawn or supported with specified evidence, is checkable item by item. The record shows which answer was given. The register is the receipt: itemized questions met by statements about the person asking.
Receipt
Off-docket correspondence in this matter (email correspondence with Davis, May 2025): p. 22 (the 5/9 2:58 PM cover email), p. 16 (the 5/11 5:37 PM email), pp. 1-15 (the 5/23 2:53 PM letter; the May 30 retraction deadline at p. 5). Docket 206, filed 6/26/25: pp. 4-12 (the 6/17 10:33 AM letter; the June 20 withdrawal demand at p. 11, the wellness-questionnaire request and the June 20 response deadline at p. 12), p. 2 (the 6/25 3:29 PM reply), p. 1 (the 6:55 PM question and the 7:00 PM close). All receipts cited by document, date, and page; pp. 1, 5, 16, 22 of the May correspondence and pp. 1, 2, 10, 11, 12 of Doc 206 checked against the page image 9/26/2026. Interval recomputed: 5/9 to 6/17/25 is thirty-nine days. N-011 carries the 5/9 letter itself, its five cure conditions, the 5/30 expiry, and the 126-day gap to the Doc 239 sanctions motion. The 5/11 email is the documented answer inside the second safe-harbor window. Sweep for any later response, as of 9/26/2026: none in the filed docket or the correspondence record.

Spawned by: N-011, NEW-P8

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-W8

NEW-P42026-06-10asked twice, on two hearing days, whether he had any emails with The Florida Bar about the complaint against him, counsel denied the existence of "secret emails," a phrase the question never used, and the question as asked has never been answeredREFUSED
Date
2026-06-10
Actor
Scott Davis (answers); Judge Felix (colloquy control)
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150
Mechanism
asked twice, on two hearing days, whether he had any emails with The Florida Bar about the complaint against him, counsel denied the existence of "secret emails," a phrase the question never used, and the question as asked has never been answered
What the law required
Rule 4-3.3 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar governs candor toward the tribunal. Counsel asked a question on the record answers it as asked: here, whether there were any emails with The Florida Bar related to the complaint, yes or no.
What happened

On May 29, 2026 Husband asked whether counsel was hiding records about the Bar complaint. Counsel said "I'm not." The follow-up, whether there was any communication at all between him and the Bar, went unanswered because the court closed the colloquy.

On June 10 Husband asked again whether counsel had any emails with the Bar about the February 2025 complaint. Counsel answered: "The secret emails that he believes to exist that he's gone on and on about do not exist." He began to add that he had sent an email to the Bar, but the court cut him off as closing argument, and he dropped it. The question as asked, any emails, was never answered on either day. The documents behind the question were already the subject of a served request to produce, which Wife had personally signed an objection to as beyond the scope of the case. [REFUSED]

Baseline deviation
A lawyer answering an accusation on the record can answer yes, no, or state a refusal to answer. The question was "any emails." The answer denied "secret emails," a phrase Husband never used, and narrowing the question before answering leaves the original question standing. The court's interruption, not counsel, left his next sentence unfinished; what stands is the scoped denial and the unanswered question. The challenge is the same either way: produce the emails, or state that none exists.
Receipt
  • 6/10/26 Tr. 108:24-109:17 and 5/29/26 Tr. 245:14-24, both from the certified transcripts; the 6/10 closing speaker is mislabeled MS. HANSON at 108:2 after "Mr. Hanson, closing" at 108:1.
  • 5/29 Tr. 44:22-24 and 45:12-19 (the court declines to inquire of Davis).
  • Negative with scope stated: a full text-layer sweep of the 427-page 4/17/26 transcript found 15 Bar references, every one spoken by Husband or the Court; Davis said nothing about Bar emails that day.
  • The paper trail: request to produce served 3/16/26 (DIN 278, Requests 1 and 11); Wife's Notice of Appearance as co-counsel 4/16/26 (DIN 291); the objection she personally signed the same day (DIN 289); none of the three faces has been checked against a page image.
  • Rule 4-3.3 text, not confirmed.
  • On 6/10 counsel said, "Fair enough. I just thought because he believes that it exists, it's almost relevant to his mental health. But I understand. I'll stop talking." (Tr. 108:24-109:17.)
  • The court's cutoff: "Hold on, Mr. Davis. We're not responding. This is closing." (same cite.)

Spawned by: N-032

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P4

N-1192026-06-10twelve days after his own question drew a sworn denial, counsel argued the denied premise to the court as shown "time and time again" and named no concern about either child; the objection to it was never ruled onEXCUSED
Date
2026-06-10
Actor
Scott Davis
Institution
Wife/Davis
Mechanism
twelve days after his own question drew a sworn denial, counsel argued the denied premise to the court as shown "time and time again" and named no concern about either child; the objection to it was never ruled on
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(1): a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal. 4-3.4(e): a lawyer shall not in trial state a personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness or allude to any matter not supported by admissible evidence. A ruling on a timely objection is the mechanism by which either is enforced.
What happened

On May 29, 2026 Wife's counsel asked Husband whether he wanted anyone talking to his children. Husband answered under oath: "That's completely false. I tell all the teachers and helpers to ask them about everything and anything." He drew one line: he did not want a stranger connected to this litigation drawing the children's attention to it.

Twelve days later, in closing on June 10, the same counsel asked: "But why is he terrified of a guardian ad litem talking to these children?" Husband objected. The court said: "You may proceed, Mr. Davis." Counsel continued: "He has time and time again shown that he does not want a third party to talk to the kids. Why? I respectfully suggest that should be concerning to the Court." No concern was named in that argument, and the written order that followed referred only to Wife's "concerns regarding parenting of the minor children by the Father" without naming one (DIN 337). [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation
This is one lawyer's examination against his own closing, twelve days apart, same case. A premise a witness denies under oath is not evidence of the premise, yet it was argued to the court regardless. Husband objected; the objection was never ruled on. The distinction Husband drew, between caregivers asking his children anything and a stranger drawing attention to the litigation, was already in the record. The refusal of a third-party route to that information is counsel's own writing (N-036).
Receipt
  • May 29, 2026 transcript (docketed in the DIN 347-350 range, exact number unconfirmed), at 169:11-16, 169:25-170:7, 170:17-21, 200:11-16.
  • June 10, 2026 transcript (docketed in the DIN 347-350 range, exact number unconfirmed), at 101:10-22, 101:23-102:3, 102:9, 102:12-15.
  • Closing argument runs 6/10 Tr. 89-107 (Davis), 108-116 (Husband), 116-117 (Davis rebuttal); the 5/29 transcript contains no closing argument.
  • Reporter defect: the 6/10 transcript prints "MS. HANSON" at 108:2, 110:3, 117:25 and probably 98:14 for lines that are plainly Husband's.

Spawned by: N-125

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-119

N-1482026-08-04over roughly $3,260, the motion asks the court to cut a father's time with his minor children to alternate weekends as "an appropriate sanction," in a case where no order anywhere on this docket has found one problem with Husband's parentingPENDING
Date
2026-08-04
Actor
Wife (movant, self-represented). Decision pending before Judge Felix
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (Judge Felix)
Mechanism
over roughly $3,260, the motion asks the court to cut a father's time with his minor children to alternate weekends as "an appropriate sanction," in a case where no order anywhere on this docket has found one problem with Husband's parenting
What the law required
Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, decides timesharing on the children's best interests, and section 61.13(4)(a) and (b) treat time and money as independent obligations. A change to the timesharing schedule is a modification: it requires a pleaded supplemental petition and a substantial, material change in circumstances, and timesharing may not be modified as a contempt sanction (Duncan v. Brickman, 233 So. 3d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)). Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.615 governs civil contempt in support matters only, and the movant must prove a clear and definite command and noncompliance, and contempt requires findings of willfulness and present ability to comply.
What happened
On August 4, 2026, the same morning the amended guardian ad litem order was conformed (N-147), Wife filed a motion for contempt, to compel compliance, and for sanctions. It invokes two provisions of the July 23 order: the OurFamilyWizard paragraph and the $6,000 retainer paragraph. From those it pivots to ask the court to make Wife "primary custodian" and reduce Husband to alternate-weekend visitation, styled as "an appropriate sanction" lifted only on compliance. It supports the request with private health information about Husband, cited to an unidentified transcript, in an unsealed filing with no motion to seal. Her exhibit contains a July 29 email to the guardian, not copied to Husband, asking that his communications be counted against him. The court set the motion for hearing August 27, one hour reserved. No order to show cause has issued. Husband's response and motion to continue, filed August 15, remain undecided. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Contempt enforces an order; a child's time with a parent is decided on the child's best interest, not used as a lever for payment. This motion seeks to enforce the guardian ad litem appointment, granted with no finding of unfitness (N-147, N-016). The two provisions invoked are worth about $3,260 together, from a July 23 order facially incomplete as filed: text breaking mid-sentence, numbering running 16 to 20. This is Wife's request; the court has not ruled.
Receipt
  • The motion, DIN 364, e-filed 8/4/26 9:49:26 AM by Wife, self-represented; 3 pp. of motion plus certificate of service, Composite Exhibit A (text message), and Exhibit B (four-page email chain). Cited by DIN and date only, no filing number, by design.
  • All 9 pp. were read from the page images rather than the text layer.
  • The guardian ad litem appointment also carries no finding about either child and no evaluation ordered. The motion styles the request as "visitation only every other weekend" and alleges no substantial change in circumstances.
  • Her exhibit asks that "any of his communications are taxed against him" and offers the guardian "a summary."
  • A corrected order was conformed the same morning this motion was filed, so the compliance period ran under the broken version.
  • Hearing set by DIN 366, 8/7/26, e-served same day. The 10/9/26 setting, DIN 361, served 7/30, lists ten other matters and does not list this one.
  • Husband's filings: verified response (24 pp.) and motion to continue (17 pp.), both 8/15/26.
  • The incomplete July 23 order: Doc 351 as filed and served runs five pages, paragraph numbers 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 20, four of five page breaks mid-sentence; the corrected nine-page order was conformed 8/4/26 (DIN 365, event date 08/04/26).
  • Facial findings: the motion is unsworn (no oath, no verification, no affidavit, no section 92.525 declaration), and cites no rule, no statute, and no case.
  • Composite Exhibit A at p. 5 is cropped top and bottom, carries no date beyond "Wednesday 12:13 PM," identifies no phone, account, or participants, and mixes at least two threads on one page.
  • Prematurity: the order's three-day retainer term expired 7/28/26 under Rule 2.514(a)(2), so the motion is not premature as to that term; on the alternative ten-day-from-receipt term, the guardian's retainer request came 7/29/26 at 11:57 AM per Wife's own Exhibit B p. 7, making the deadline 8/8 or 8/10 rolled forward, so the 8/4 filing ran four to six days early.
  • Paragraph 7 defeats the $260 claim on the order's own face: each party maintains a subscription "at his or her own expense."
  • DIN 364 confirmed against the 8/15/26 docket snapshot covering DINs 347 to 366.
  • Related decision points: N-002, N-013.

Spawned by: N-147, N-019

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-148

Judge Ayers22 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

N-0072024-10-28Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.EXCUSED
Date
2024-10-28
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.
What the law required
A deadline the court sets binds both sides, and a paper filed late over objection is refused or its acceptance is explained on the record. Rule 12.380 supplies the escalating remedies for discovery that does not come, including an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, Rule 12.380(b)(2)(C), the sanction Husband asked for in writing.
What happened

By October 2024 Wife's side had already been late enough on mandatory disclosure that the court granted a compel with a fee finding (N-009). At the October 28, 2024 hearing Judge Ayers took Wife's objections to the first set of Chase bank subpoenas under advisement and told both sides to submit the two agreements plus a short memorandum within ten days. The length of the deadline was Davis's own: the court said "whatever works with you," Davis said "Ten days is fine," and the court said "All right, 10 days."

Husband filed on day ten. Davis filed six days past the deadline, at 4:50 PM. Husband objected to the late memorandum, and then asked the court in writing to clarify "how the Court handled Mr. Davis's late filing." No ruling on that objection was ever entered. On December 13 the court's answer was: "this has already been argued. I have memorandums. I'm going to rule on the memorandums."

Documents were still being produced in increments while the compel order sat unenforced. The rules answer that pattern with escalating sanctions, up to striking the objections. That sanction was never applied, and no reason for it appears in the record as swept. The objections stood. The discovery did not come. The ruling that followed, announced by chambers email on December 16, made orally on December 19, and signed on December 30, did what the late memorandum asked (N-018). [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation
A deadline the court sets binds both sides. When a paper comes in late and the other side objects, the court refuses it or says on the record why it is taking it anyway. Rule 12.380(b)(2)(C) lets the court bar a party who disobeys a discovery order from supporting or opposing designated claims, and Husband asked for that sanction in writing. A fee award for late disclosure was already on the books before this deadline was set, and the documents were still arriving in pieces.
Receipt
  • Doc 047, Husband's memorandum, e-filed 11/7/24, day ten.
  • Doc 053, Davis's memorandum, e-filed 11/13/2024 4:50:23 PM, Filing #210882545.
  • Doc 155, transcript of the October 28, 2024 hearing, Tr. 22:24-23:21 for the instruction and the deadline colloquy, including Tr. 23:6-7 and 23:18-21.
  • Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 16:1-3 for the quoted ruling statement and Tr. 13:25-14:14 for the timeliness passage.
  • Doc 098 relief para. F, the written clarification request. The earliest written flag is the 11/25 email filing at Doc 70, Filing #212769787, e-filed 12/12/2024 11:19:00 PM. Doc 091 Wherefore clause C repeats the request.
  • Doc 093, the written order.
  • Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.380 for the sanctions ladder and for striking objections as one of the available sanctions; the specific subdivision is not yet pinned.
  • The already-issued fee award and the four-months-late production are at N-009.
  • The reporter's garbled name "Soroka's" is preserved as printed; Merritt spells the same attorney "Samarkos."
  • Related decision points: N-006, N-013, N-014, N-018.

Read the source document: Doc 155, Transcript of 10-28-24 hearing

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-007

N-0092024-11-20 (heard 10-28)Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.WON-THEN-NULLIFIED
Date
2024-11-20 (heard 10-28)
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.
What the law required
Rule 12.285 makes disclosure mandatory and Rule 12.380 supplies the tools to enforce an order compelling it; the order here required full compliance within ten days and found a fee entitlement. An order is enforced when the movant shows the violation, and a fee entitlement is liquidated so that it operates.
What happened
Judge Ayers granted the motion to compel and the fee entitlement at the October 2024 hearing, and reaffirmed the entitlement twice on February 12, 2025. The written order was e-filed on November 20, 2024. At the hearing the disclosures the order compelled already stood about four months past the June 28, 2024 production date the lawyers had stipulated. The only consequence imposed for that lateness was fees, and the fee amount was never set by any court through July 2026. Actual compliance with mandatory disclosure was never required, and Husband's position is that the noncompliance is continuing. Husband has not yet enforced the fee award in his favor because Wife has still not complied with basic mandatory disclosures. [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
An order compelling disclosure exists to put documents in someone's hands; winning one should change what a party actually has. Judge Ayers marked the fee award as unusual for her: "you both know I very rarely give out fees. but this one." She never required actual compliance with mandatory disclosure, and the fee was never liquidated, so the order produced nothing. This is the anchor row of the excusal chain at N-004.
Receipt
  • Doc 054 (the written order, e-filed 11/20/24).
  • Doc 155 Tr. 18:19-25 (the oral compel grant that became that order) and Tr. 18-22 (the fee colloquy, including the quoted sentence at 22:22-25).
  • Doc 152 Tr. 65:25 and 66:13-14 (the 2/12/25 reaffirmations).
  • Doc 93, pulled from the Clerk, recites the hearing date on its face.
  • Day and month spans are carded, not recomputed here.

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-009

N-0142024-12-13a withdrawal motion that had been set thirty-four days out was heard twenty-four days early, on one day's notice, on a motion that rested its urgency on the client's own conduct; the client had objected in writing twice before it began, and it ended his representation.DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Judge Ayers let Husband's lawyer quit his case at a hearing held on one day's notice, twenty-four days early, over his two written objections. Asked if that was fair, she answered: "That's not the legal standard." She then ruled Husband had failed to prove the lawyer should stay.

E
Expected output

Due process gives a client notice and a real chance to answer before his lawyer leaves. The withdrawal motion already had a date, January 6, 2025, and the expedited motion itself said "There are no other hearings scheduled in the matter." Judge Ayers keeps the January date or states on the record what cannot wait, and she reads the client's filed objection.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Dec. 11 to 12, 2024: at 4:09 PM counsel filed an expedited motion. At 11:17 PM Husband wrote chambers asking for more time: "I have never practiced in circuit or county Court in my life." At 9:09 AM chambers: "I will schedule the expedited hearing for 12/13/24 at 4:30 pm". Eight minutes later, Husband: "I object to the hearing occurring without me." N-014
    Read them: Husband's emails, Docs 167 and 168 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Dec. 13, 2024, 4:30 PM: Husband pointed to his filed objection. Judge Ayers: "correspondence between you and your attorney, which would be privileged. So I did not read it". Husband: "I am waiving any attorney-client privilege." She cancelled "an open docket for January on Motion to Withdraw" "because we're doing it right now." Asked "is it fair to give me 24 hours' notice": "That's not the legal standard." N-014
    Read them: Hearing transcript, Dec. 13, 2024, pp. 3-4, 17 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Jan. 9 to 13, 2025: "In an abundance of caution, I concurred with you that setting it in one day's notice might have been a little soon." Then: "You have not given me any legal basis on why I should not allow them to withdraw." The order: "The Husband failed to establish a legal basis for the Court to deny the Expedited Motion to Withdraw". N-014
    What required a motion already set for January 6 to be heard on December 13, on one day's notice?
    Read them: Hearing transcript, Jan. 9, 2025, pp. 15-16 (link pending redacted copy) · Order, Doc 100, Jan. 13, 2025 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Judge Kelly A. Ayers (the setting, through chambers; the grant; the rehearing order). Vivian Cortes Hodz, Husband's counsel (the expedited motion). One motion, one setting, one hearing. Every duty here arises from due process on this motion alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const. and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a ruling that affects a party's rights. A withdrawal motion must be timely and must give the client an opportunity to respond (Garden v. Garden, 834 So. 2d 190, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)). Rule 4-1.16(b) supplies the grounds.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2024-12-13
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
a withdrawal motion that had been set thirty-four days out was heard twenty-four days early, on one day's notice, on a motion that rested its urgency on the client's own conduct; the client had objected in writing twice before it began, and it ended his representation.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee due process: notice and a real opportunity to be heard before a ruling that affects a party's rights. For withdrawal of counsel, the notice and motion must be timely and must afford the client an opportunity to respond, Garden v. Garden, 834 So. 2d 190, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Rule 4-1.16(b) puts the burden of justifying withdrawal over the client's objection on the lawyer.
What happened

Husband's own counsel, Vivian Cortes Hodz, had a withdrawal motion on file since December 3, 2024, set for hearing thirty-four days out on January 6, 2025. On December 11 at 4:09 PM she filed an expedited motion. At 5:22 PM on December 11, chambers offered three dates, December 13, 16 and 18. At 9:08 PM, counsel confirmed the earliest, December 13 at 4:30 PM, stating only that she and opposing counsel were available.

At 11:17 PM that night the client objected in writing. He asked for more time, described the prejudice, said "I have never practiced in circuit or county Court in my life," waived his attorney-client privilege, and stated his unavailability. At 9:09 AM the next morning chambers confirmed the December 13 setting for 4:30 PM. Eight minutes later he objected again, expressly: "I object to the hearing occurring without me." Nothing changed.

The hearing went ahead on December 13 at 4:30 PM, two days and twenty-one minutes after the expedited motion, on one-day notice, per the court's own recital in its order. The expedited motion rested its urgency on the client's own conduct and allegations, which it said "necessitate the Court's immediate attention"; no basis for moving the date up appears in the order or in the transcript. Judge Ayers granted the withdrawal from the bench over Husband's objection and cancelled the January 6 setting from the bench. A motion for judicial default premised on the unanswered petition was filed at 8:32 that same morning (N-013), and Husband answered self-represented three days later. Whether the extended response deadline fell on the hearing date itself is not pinned in the records reviewed, and the sequence does not depend on it. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Due process means notice and a real chance to be heard, and for a withdrawal that means notice timely enough for the client to respond (Garden v. Garden). The lawyer who wants out over the client's objection carries the burden of justifying it under Rule 4-1.16(b); the client carries nothing. Moving a hearing up twenty-four days rests on a stated emergency. The expedited motion said the client's conduct and allegations “necessitate the Court's immediate attention” and, in the same filing, “There are no other hearings scheduled in the matter.” Judge Ayers later said so herself: setting it “in one day's notice might have been a little soon.”
Receipt
  • Doc 056, the 12/3/24 withdrawal motion.
  • Doc 058 paras. 1, 5, and 8, the 12/11/24 4:09 PM expedited motion; p. 4 recites that counsel "has sought all appropriate extensions of time and communicated the same so as to ensure no interim prejudice to the Husband,"
  • Doc 167, the Wednesday 12/11/2024 11:17 PM EST objection email, with the privilege waiver at p. 2.
  • Doc 168, the Thursday 12/12/2024 9:17 AM EST objection, which embeds the court's own 12/12 9:09 AM setting email eight minutes before it.
  • Doc 100 para. 1, the court's own "one-day notice" recital, and Doc 100 as the 1/13/25 re-grant despite that recited notice.
  • Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 17:13-17. Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 16:22-24.
  • Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing, Tr. 15:20-16:3 for the quoted concession that one day's notice "might have been a little soon."
  • Doc 059 p. 2 and Doc 061 p. 3, opposing counsel's written refusal of any further extension: "I cannot agree to an extension of time. He should be required to adhere to the same standards."
  • Doc 075, the 8:32 AM default motion of 12/13/24. Doc 079, Husband's self-represented answer of 12/16/24.
  • Doc 214 p. 1, Filing #227245890, the 10/21/24 email from counsel, found 8/7/26; quoted in text at N-023.
  • The velocity distribution under the successor judge: N-123 (about 4 hours, a non-party's proposed order), N-128 (19h54m, opposing counsel's exit order), N-134 (about 25 hours, an order billing Husband $3,000), against N-139, where a filed motion, a proposed order, and acceptance of the court's own offered dates drew no hearing, no order, and no reply.
  • Related decision points: N-151.

Read the source document: Doc 158, Transcript of 12-13-24 hearing

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-014

N-0152024-12-13the rule puts the burden on the lawyer who wants to leave; the court demanded instead that the client produce a legal basis for keeping his own lawyer, kept the lawyer's stated reason free of any question, and made no findings when he asked for them.DENIED
Date
2024-12-13
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the rule puts the burden on the lawyer who wants to leave; the court demanded instead that the client produce a legal basis for keeping his own lawyer, kept the lawyer's stated reason free of any question, and made no findings when he asked for them.
What the law required
Rule 4-1.16(b) puts the burden of establishing a ground for withdrawal on the lawyer who wants out over the client's objection; the client carries none. A contested withdrawal is decided on the ground actually shown, with findings when a party asks for them, so the reason for removing counsel and for accelerating the hearing appears in the record.
What happened

Husband waived attorney-client privilege in writing the night before the hearing and again on the record that day, so nothing on his side was left to protect. His written objection, filed at 1:21 PM on December 13, 2024, demanded that the withdrawing lawyer finish five identified tasks and said "Mr. Davis should have to answer for what changed."

At the hearing that afternoon Judge Ayers cut off the prejudice argument: "I've already ruled." She deflected the notice-fairness question: "That's not the legal standard." She then put the burden on the client to supply a legal basis for keeping the counsel he had hired. The January 13, 2025 written order records the result in its own words: Husband "failed to establish a legal basis," and all other relief was denied.

On January 9, 2025 allegations he describes as repugnant were aired with no specifics attached, and he asked her directly for findings: "I deserve some findings of fact here." None were ever made. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Rule 4-1.16(b) puts the burden on the withdrawing lawyer and nowhere else. Determining that basis is what would have documented why the hearing was accelerated in the first place (N-014). Husband asked for findings on the record and again in writing; no statement of the basis appears in either transcript or in the order. The court also told Husband “You have nothing pending” while the first-set subpoena ruling sat under advisement and four of Wife's motions had been filed that morning (N-013).
Receipt
  • Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 16:21-25, 17:13-17, 17:19-24, and 18:5-9.
  • Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing, Tr. 13:23-14:5 and 18:6-15.
  • Doc 098 paras. 8-11.
  • Doc 072, the written objection of 12/13/24 1:21 PM: the five-task demand, the privilege waiver, and the quoted sentence about Davis.
  • Doc 100, the written order of 1/13/25: "failed to establish a legal basis," all other relief denied.
  • Privilege waiver, three independent sources: the on-record waiver at Doc 158 Tr. 4; the written waiver at Doc 167 p. 2; and the opposing side's own Doc 075 para. 7.b asserting that Husband "thereby waiv[ed] attorney-client privilege."

Spawned by: N-014

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-015

N-0182024-12-19the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Judge Ayers said she was "not ruling on" the two marital agreements because "it's not in front of me," declared them "in full force and effect" in the same sentence, and used them to shut off Husband's discovery and his Chase bank subpoenas.

E
Expected output

Under Casto v. Casto, once the terms of the October 2023 separation agreement are shown unreasonable, the burden falls on the spouse defending it, and testing the terms takes the financial records. An order that declines to decide whether the agreements are valid cannot use them to shut off discovery. Wife's own petition says the October 2023 agreement "did not include financial disclosures."

V
Verified facts and law
  • Dec. 19, 2024: Judge Ayers: "So at this juncture I'm not ruling on them with respect to anything because it's not in front of me, but as far as I'm concerned they're both in full force and effect and that would limit your discovery requests, Mr. Hanson." Then: "I've sustained it actually. So that discovery is not going to be produced." And: "So it stays in full force and effect unless you file something otherwise." N-018
    Read them: Hearing transcript, Dec. 19, 2024, pp. 4-7 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Dec. 30, 2024: the written order, prepared by Davis at chambers' direction, sustained Wife's objection "as the Parties entered into the Premarital Agreement and the Marital Separation Agreement" and ordered that the subpoenas to JP Morgan Chase Bank and Chase Bank "shall not be issued." Paragraph 3: "At this juncture, the Court is not issuing a ruling with respect to the validity of either agreement". N-018, N-007
    Read them: Order, Doc 093, Dec. 30, 2024 (link pending redacted copy) · Chambers email, Dec. 16, 2024 (Doc 091, p. 14) (link pending redacted copy)
  • Feb. 28, 2025 to Aug. 17, 2026: Husband filed the motion to set aside the agreement. April 22, 2025, Judge Ayers described her ruling: "the only substantive ruling that I've made is you can't get your discovery because we've got the two agreements." As of Aug. 17, 2026, 535 days after filing, no judge had ruled on it. N-019, N-033
    On what finding do two agreements that no court has adjudicated keep Wife's financial records out of this case?
    Read them: Hearing transcript, Apr. 22, 2025, p. 29 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Judge Kelly A. Ayers (the bench ruling; the Dec. 30 order; the April 22 description). Scott Davis, Wife's counsel (prepared the order on chambers' instruction). One objection, one ruling, one order. Every duty here arises from Casto and due process on this objection alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, ss. 9 and 21, Fla. Const. guarantee due process and courts open to every claim. Under Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987), when the terms of a marital separation agreement such as the October 2023 agreement are unreasonable for one spouse, a presumption of concealment or lack of knowledge arises, and the burden shifts to the spouse defending it.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2024-12-19
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.
What the law required
Under Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987), a marital agreement may be set aside where its terms are unreasonable for one spouse; once that is shown, the law presumes concealment by the defending spouse or lack of knowledge by the challenging spouse, and the burden shifts to the spouse defending the agreement. Testing whether the terms are reasonable takes the financial records. Rule 12.285 makes financial disclosure mandatory in every dissolution case, owed without a request. A subpoena to a bank is killed only on a ground the court states.
What happened

The written ruling chambers had promised for December 16, 2024 never issued. The email said instead, "At this juncture, the Court is not issuing a ruling." What filled the sixty-three days from hearing to order was a memorandum Davis filed six days late, over an objection the court never ruled on (N-007).

At the December 19 hearing Judge Ayers said: "nobody has asked me to do anything with the premarital agreement or separation agreement. So at this juncture I'm not ruling on them with respect to anything because it's not in front of me, but as far as I'm concerned they're both in full force and effect and that would limit your discovery requests, Mr. Hanson." On the discovery objection she ruled: "I've sustained it actually. So that discovery is not going to be produced." Four months later she described the same ruling in her own words: "the only substantive ruling that I've made is you can't get your discovery because we've got the two agreements."

On December 30 she e-signed the order sustaining Wife's amended objection and killing the Chase non-party subpoenas. Paragraph 3 of that order declined to rule on whether either agreement is valid, because the issue "has not been challenged by either Party or properly brought before the Court."

The effect ran both directions. Husband got no bank records, and the records Wife had not produced stayed unproduced (N-006). Wife also owed no reciprocal discovery on the agreements that shut the subpoenas off. The court had named the missing step at the hearing, saying the agreements stand "unless you file something otherwise." Husband filed exactly that. No judge has ruled on it since (N-019, N-033). [DENIED: the discovery was cut off on the strength of agreements the same ruling refused to adjudicate]

Baseline deviation
Under Casto, an agreement whose terms are unreasonable for one spouse raises a presumption of concealment or lack of knowledge, and the burden shifts to the spouse defending it; testing the terms takes the financial records. Wife's own petition concedes the disclosure Casto asks the defending spouse to show: no financial disclosures accompanied the October 2023 agreement. A subpoena is how a party gets records the other side will not hand over, and killing one takes a stated ground. The ground stated here was the agreements themselves.
Receipt
  • Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 4:3-11, 6:5-8, and 7:14-16 for the quoted rulings; Tr. 12:14-25 (the "Nope." exchange at 12:22-24), 13:2-5, 13:9-10, and 13:25-14:2 ("It's killing me to watch what it's doing to them").
  • Doc 091 Ex. A p. 14, the Heyward email of 12/16/24 9:30 AM. Its sentence opens "At this juncture, the Court is not issuing a ruling," and that opener travels with any use of the quote.
  • Doc 192, transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 29:6-9, the judge's own later description of the same ruling.
  • Doc 093, "Order Sustaining Wife's Amended Objection," e-signed by Judge Ayers 12/30/2024 4:03:22 PM. Decretal para. 2 names DIN 28 and 29 only. Para. 3 declines to rule on validity, quoted above. Doc 102's notice corroborates the 12/30 order date.
  • Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 10 and 19.
  • Doc 203 para. 5, no financial disclosures with the October 2023 agreement. The record's own name for that instrument is the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23; "postmarital" and "post-marital" are aliases; Judge Ayers says "postnuptial" on the record and quoted material stays verbatim.
  • Doc 090 Tr. 7:19-20 for the counsel-relayed refusal to void, "He said no. She's not willing to do it," Doc 205, Wife's deposition of April 2, 2025, Tr. 132:21 for the sworn refusal and Tr. 133:6-8 for the figures as Wife stated them.
  • Doc 146 para. 107 for the affidavit arithmetic, citing Docs 34 and 43: Wife's disclosed assets over liabilities at $104,611 against Husband's in excess of $800,000. The $104,611 is her disclosed net worth; the $100,000 is the payment she received under the agreement. Two different figures, and they should not be read as one.
  • Doc 181 (4/23/25) para. 2, bolded, on the reissued subpoenas. The second set did not exist for another sixty days (N-034).
  • Docs 127 and 129 for the challenge-chain dispositions (N-028). A template artifact appears at p. 2 of the challenge chain, an unfilled "[Wife's Name]" writ-of-bodily-attachment block.
  • Division check: every Ayers-era transcript cover and Doc 054 read "Division D"; Division A is the post-reassignment designation.

Spawned by: N-006, N-007

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-018

N-0192024-12-19the judge told Husband exactly which motion to file to get the financial records, he filed it in exactly that form, she confirmed on the record that it had worked, and as of August 2026, seventeen months on, no judge has ruled on it.IGNORED
Date
2024-12-19
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers (prescription + post-filing confirmations) -> Judge Felix (non-adjudication)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div.
Mechanism
the judge told Husband exactly which motion to file to get the financial records, he filed it in exactly that form, she confirmed on the record that it had worked, and as of August 2026, seventeen months on, no judge has ruled on it.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Rule 2.215(g)(1): “Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge.” Under Casto v. Casto the challenge itself carries the discovery entitlement, so a court that prescribes the motion, receives it, and confirms on the record that it changed the movant's position then decides it.
What happened

Across four hearings between December 19, 2024 and February 12, 2025, Judge Ayers told Husband what to file. In her words: "I just told you how to do your whole case. You need to file a motion." She also said "I'm not saying that again."

Under Casto no motion was legally necessary to open the discovery. The challenge itself carries the entitlement, and it attaches when the motion is filed rather than when it is granted. The prescribed route also required Husband to move against the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23, which on its terms protected his interests, and whose protection depended on the honest disclosure that never came. He filed it anyway, sixteen days after the last of those hearings. Following the court's own instruction produced no relief.

The route rested on both agreements at once. The ruling that limited discovery reached the premarital agreement of 10/25/16 as well, and that agreement does not reach marital income and assets, which is what the subpoenas sought.

After the filing she confirmed twice on the same day that it had changed his position (N-040). At the April 22, 2025 hearing she described the whole sequence herself: ".I think I did 'wink wink', you got to do something before I consider it and then you finally said oh, okay. I will try to set aside the postnuptial because that does change the trajectory of the discovery." Then she recused without ruling on it. Judge Felix has not ruled on it either. [IGNORED: the motion the court itself prescribed to resolve this case has never been decided]

Baseline deviation
A court that tells a litigant the specific step that unlocks relief, receives that exact step, and confirms on the record that it changed what he is entitled to, then decides the motion; every judge has a duty to rule within a reasonable time. The measure is the judge's own words across four hearings, her stated commitment to review the motion, and her two confirmations after it was filed, set against zero adjudication by anyone. Under Casto the filing itself carried the entitlement.
Receipt
  • DIN 146, filed 2/28/25, with the Casto cite at para. 75.
  • Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 9:7-14 and 10:21-11:1.
  • Doc 118, transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing, Tr. 14:20-22 and 24:19-21.
  • Doc 152, transcript of the February 12, 2025 hearing, Tr. 44:12-16, 48:11, and 50:10-14.
  • Doc 198 Tr. 7:7-17 and 187:20-23.
  • Doc 192, transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 18:13-23 for the passage quoted above, and Tr. 29:6-22, "now you set up the posture for getting another bite at apple on your discovery."
  • Transcript of the April 17, 2026 hearing, Tr. 114:10-13, 115:3-12, 116:9-11. The reference at that hearing to an order on the first-filed compel motion turned out to be illusory (N-090, N-033).
  • June 10 corroboration at Tr. 110:17-111:4, where the entitlement-path arc was restated unchallenged.
  • Naming: the record's exhibit list says "Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23." Judge Ayers says "postnuptial" on the record.

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-019

N-0212025-01-09Husband won his rehearing on paper, and by the day it was heard he had already lost his lawyer, answered the petition alone, and been served with a motion to default him.DENIED
Date
2025-01-09
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband won his rehearing on paper, and by the day it was heard he had already lost his lawyer, answered the petition alone, and been served with a motion to default him.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment require notice and an opportunity to respond before counsel is removed over a client's objection, Garden v. Garden, 834 So. 2d 190, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and Rule 4-1.16(b) keeps the burden of justifying withdrawal on the lawyer. A rehearing granted on those grounds decides them, with findings when the client asks.
What happened
On January 9, 2025 Judge Ayers reheard the withdrawal and granted it again over Husband's objection. He had won the rehearing on paper: the court had stamped his motion GRANTED, setting it for hearing on the open docket. At the hearing the court told him he had not given a legal basis, acknowledged the one-day notice for the December hearing might have been too soon, cut him off mid-question with "Stop. Stop. Stop." and ended the hearing. She told him: "If you want to appeal me, that's fine. That's why they all have jobs." His grounds had been one-day-notice due process, absent findings, and prejudice. He is self-represented from here. [DENIED: the paper win arrived after the loss it was supposed to prevent]
Baseline deviation
A rehearing granted on due-process grounds decides those grounds: the one-day notice, the absent findings, and the prejudice, with the burden still on the withdrawing lawyer. This rehearing could change nothing. The relief had already operated: counsel was removed December 13, 2024, before his response was due, and he answered self-represented December 16 (N-013). No findings were made, and the attorney whose conduct triggered the sequence was absent and excused that day (N-022).
Receipt
  • Docs 094 and 095, both slots holding Husband's 12/22/24 Rule 1.530 rehearing motion, Filing #213357446, stamped GRANTED with the quoted handwritten note, done and ordered 12/30/24 (the copy at Doc 094 mis-writes "25"; clerk stamp 12/31/24).
  • Doc 109 Tr. 3:9-20, 8:6-9, 12:18-21, 14:5, 14:20-23, 15:22-24, 16:25, 17:5-9, 17:14, and 18:6-15.
  • Doc 087 for the rehearing grounds, including Garden v. Garden and the 12/12 6:49 PM Dropbox transfer under twenty-four hours before the hearing.
  • Tally guard: this is one withdrawal. The notice defect counts at N-014, the findings refusal at N-015, the fiduciary reversal at N-010, and the 2026 Bar-response chronology at N-083. No tally counts the withdrawal more than once.

Spawned by: N-014

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-021

N-0222025-01-09the court answered a showing about opposing counsel's specific conduct with its own general impression of the lawyer, and the conduct in the case pending before her went unexamined.EXCUSED
Date
2025-01-09
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers (excusing); Scott Davis (non-appearance)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court answered a showing about opposing counsel's specific conduct with its own general impression of the lawyer, and the conduct in the case pending before her went unexamined.
What the law required
Canon 3D(2) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct: a judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer violated the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar “shall take appropriate action.” Canon 3B(7) accords every party the right to be heard according to law. A hearing on an attorney's alleged misconduct examines that attorney, and a party's objection to the accused's absence is ruled on.
What happened

The evening before the hearing Davis wrote to chambers that he did "not plan on attending." Husband demanded his attendance in writing three minutes later. Chambers said nothing. The email loop included Husband, so nothing about attendance was said off the record.

In the courtroom on January 9, 2025 Husband put Davis's obstruction on the record at length. The court did not take up any of it. It answered with its own impression of the lawyer: "I'm starting my fifth year in this division. I see Mr. Davis all the time," and "So the fact that you're telling me that all of these lawyers are talking to Mr. Davis and they're afraid and running from him is complete opposite of how Mr. Davis practices in front of me. He's like a good, old teddy bear."

On the absence itself the court supplied the excuse from the bench: "Because he's not required to come. he also has the right not to come." It confined the hearing to the withdrawal motion and told Husband "I cannot discuss the case with you because Mr. Davis is not present," Davis wrote afterward that "I did not wish to waste your wife's money by attending a hearing that was not pertinent to her case."

A specific-conduct showing drew a general impression. The conduct was never examined. [EXCUSED: the showing about the accused lawyer's conduct was answered with an impression of him, and the objection to his absence drew no ruling]

Baseline deviation
Canon 3D(2) puts the duty on the judge: when a litigant puts an officer of the court's conduct on the record, the court examines it or says why it will not, and it rules on the party's objection rather than deflecting it. Examining the accused attorney is what would have documented the obstruction Husband presented (N-011). A general impression of how a lawyer usually behaves is not a finding about what he did in this case. The same duty was declined again at N-023 and N-045.
Receipt
  • Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing: Tr. 3:4-5 (appearances), 4:8-12, 8:19-23 (the certification point Husband raised, which went unaddressed), 10:9-14, 11:4-7 (the confinement), 16:4-9 and 16:11-16 (the quoted vouching), 16:25, 17:14, 17:21-18:5 (the quoted excusal), and 18:6-8.
  • Doc 118, transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing, Tr. 4:3-7 and 26:2-5 for the echoes.
  • Doc 110 image exhibits for the 1/8/25 5:51 PM email in which Davis said he did not plan on attending, the 5:54 PM attendance demand three minutes later, and the 1/10/25 reply. Davis also wrote that "your request for our attendance did not necessitate our attendance."
  • The absence and the objection are docketed, not remembered. Doc 112, the first disqualification motion, e-filed 1/29/25 10:21 PM, sworn, stating the same facts. Doc 113, Wife's response at 2:53 AM the same night with a fee demand.
  • Doc 098 (1/9/25 3:22 PM), the same-day receipt. Doc 097, the hearing memo, paras. 4, 6, 35, and 40.
  • Pair the teddy-bear line with the 12/19 pre-affirmation at N-018 for the pattern. Its subject is the withdrawal rehearing and it never attaches to the certification point.
  • Related decision points: N-007, N-014.

Spawned by: N-011

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-022

N-0232025-01-21Husband had waived his own privilege on the record, in writing, and as Wife's own filing acknowledged; the court answered his request for inquiry into the call that preceded his lawyer's withdrawal with a privilege it assumed for the other side, which the other side had never claimed.EXCUSED
Date
2025-01-21
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband had waived his own privilege on the record, in writing, and as Wife's own filing acknowledged; the court answered his request for inquiry into the call that preceded his lawyer's withdrawal with a privilege it assumed for the other side, which the other side had never claimed.
What the law required
Privilege protects communications between a lawyer and that lawyer's own client, section 90.502, Florida Statutes; a conversation between opposing counsel is an attorney-client communication for neither side, and the holder's express on-record waiver opens his own side's communications. Rule 4-1.16(b) put the burden of justifying the withdrawal on the withdrawing lawyer, and discovery into the call that preceded it was the relief Husband requested.
What happened

On January 21, 2025 Judge Ayers answered Husband's request to inquire into the call from Davis to his own then-counsel this way: "Well, I can assure you, even if you waived privilege, Mr. Davis wouldn't have been able to discuss what he discussed with your lawyers because his client, I'm assuming, didn't waive privilege." She added, "Attorneys a lot of times work together to get things done." Privilege was assumed for a party who never asserted it, on the court's own initiative, with no motion on the subject pending and no ruling entered. Husband objected to the premise on the record, and the objection drew a generality (Tr. 7:6-19).

That closed the loop. He was made to carry a burden the rule never placed on him, and the one avenue of proof he named was answered with an assumed privilege.

What sits on either side of the call is in writings on file. On October 21, 2024 his lawyer wrote: "This can be a long and difficult process but I assure you that you will get the answers that you need to move forward." Twelve days before this ruling, in open court and before this same judge, he described the change: "but for some reason, after each of my attorneys have had a conference with Mr. Davis, they went from, this is straight forward, we'll get you the records, to, I can't help you."

The one discovery ruling between those two positions went Husband's way: his motion to compel was granted October 28, 2024 (N-009). What changed was his own counsel's position. No party asserted a privilege, the inquiry never happened, and the conduct was never examined in any forum (N-045). [EXCUSED: the one conversation that preceded the withdrawal was answered with a privilege no party asserted, and the subject never returned]

Baseline deviation
Privilege protects what a lawyer and that lawyer's own client say to each other; a call between opposing counsel is an attorney-client communication for neither side, and privilege belongs to its holder. Rule 4-1.16(b) put the burden of justifying the withdrawal on the withdrawing lawyer. The court had already inverted that burden, demanding that Husband justify keeping his own counsel (N-015). Discovery into the call was how he proposed to carry the burden he had been handed, and it was the relief he asked for.
Receipt
  • Doc 118, transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing, Tr. 6:14-7:23, the full colloquy, quoted verbatim. The first quoted sentence ends at 7:4 and the second sits at 7:15-16. The exchange in which Husband objected to the premise is at Tr. 7:6-19.
  • Complaint para. 111B(iv), as pleaded.
  • Section 90.502, Florida Statutes, for the privilege definition.
  • Waiver, three independent sources: Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 4:19-24; Doc 167 p. 2, written, 12/11/24 11:17 PM; and Doc 075 para. 7.b, the opposing side's own assertion that Husband "thereby waiv[ed] attorney-client privilege."
  • The 10/21/24 email at Doc 214 p. 1. Doc 087 p. 6 para. 35 refers to that email by date and time and reports it in Husband's own words. It is a corroborating reference, not a quotation.
  • Doc 167 p. 3 for the written before-and-after rendering of the same change, in a December 11, 2024 email to the judicial assistant. Doc 112 para. 12.K for the sworn rendering. These are different renderings by the same speaker on different occasions and each is recorded as it was said.
  • Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing, Tr. 10:11-14, and Doc 192, transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 40:13-18, both Husband speaking.
  • Doc 115, the 2/12/25 four-motion agenda, frames what the 1/21 to 2/12 window was set to adjudicate.

Spawned by: N-015

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-023

N-0272025-02-05the first sworn motion asking Judge Ayers to step aside pled a fear of an unfair hearing on specific facts, including Wife's counsel's absence from a hearing he was noticed for; it was found legally insufficient, and twelve weeks later the same species of motion was granted with its ground stated on its faceDENIED
Date
2025-02-05
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the first sworn motion asking Judge Ayers to step aside pled a fear of an unfair hearing on specific facts, including Wife's counsel's absence from a hearing he was noticed for; it was found legally insufficient, and twelve weeks later the same species of motion was granted with its ground stated on its face
What the law required
Section 38.10, Florida Statutes, and Rule 2.330 entitle a party to an impartial judge; on an initial motion the judge determines legal sufficiency only, takes the sworn facts as true, and grants a facially sufficient motion (Rule 2.330(h); Berry v. Berry, 765 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)). The presumption runs to the movant, whose specifically described facts are weighed for sufficiency and never for truth.
What happened
On February 5, 2025 Judge Ayers found Husband's first disqualification motion "legally insufficient." The motion was sworn under penalty of perjury and pled that Husband feared he would not receive a fair hearing, on specifically described facts, among them that Wife's counsel, noticed for the January 9, 2025 hearing, did not appear over Husband's written objection and the court proceeded in counsel's absence (N-022). Husband moved to vacate on February 13. The February 17 order called the sworn allegations "unsupported" in the same sentence that assumed them true, and restated the finding of insufficiency. When the second motion was granted twelve weeks later, the granting order described itself as ruling on an initial motion, while its own caption calls it the second verified motion (N-047). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
The disqualification rule is unusual: the presumption runs toward the movant, whose sworn allegations are taken as true, and the only question is whether the specifically described facts would give a reasonable litigant a well-founded fear. The comparison sits inside the same case: same movant, same species of sworn motion, opposite outcomes twelve weeks apart. The granted motion states its ground (N-047); the denied motion carried the January 9, 2025 hearing where the accused attorney did not appear and the court excused it (N-022).
Receipt
  • Doc 112, e-filed 1/29/25 10:21 PM, sworn.
  • Doc 119 (2/5/25), the denial. Doc 128 (2/13/25), the motion to vacate. Doc 131 (2/17/25), the Bundy and Hill rationale.
  • Doc 184 for the initial-versus-second inconsistency. Rule 2.330.

Spawned by: N-022

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-027

N-0282025-02-10Husband's challenge to the order that killed the bank subpoenas was set for hearing; two days before it, the court denied the parent motion on paper, which mooted the motion set for hearing; the written order denying it as moot was entered the evening of the hearing.DENIED
Date
2025-02-10
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband's challenge to the order that killed the bank subpoenas was set for hearing; two days before it, the court denied the parent motion on paper, which mooted the motion set for hearing; the written order denying it as moot was entered the evening of the hearing.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 guarantees an opportunity to be heard, and Canon 3B(7) requires a judge to accord every party “the right to be heard according to law.” A motion noticed for an evidentiary hearing is heard at that hearing, where the record a reviewing court later reads is made.
What happened
The hearing was set for February 12, 2025. On February 10 at 5:05 PM Judge Ayers denied the parent motion on paper. On February 12 at 5:24 PM, the evening of the hearing, she entered the written order denying the motion actually noticed for that hearing as moot, on the ground that the February 10 order "rendered this Motion moot." At the hearing, the court told him: "Mr. Davis just brought to my attention that when I ruled on the motion for rehearing yesterday this deemed this moot and he's correct. So next." (Tr. 56:3-10.) The whole challenge chain, the December 30 order, the clarification motion, and the rehearing motion, was extinguished in about forty-eight hours. No step in it engaged the merits. Husband objected in writing at the time, saying the sequence was "robbing Husband of the chance to create a record." The same February 10 order also denied his continuance request by quoting his own complaints about delay back at him. [DENIED: the challenge was closed on paper before the hearing that would have made the record]
Baseline deviation
A motion noticed for an evidentiary hearing is heard at that hearing, which is where a litigant makes the record an appellate court later reads. Deciding it on paper beforehand removes the record the hearing existed to produce. The hearing here would have tested the December 30 order that killed the bank subpoenas (N-018). In the same fortnight, the same court carried Wife's own motion to compel all the way to a merits order.
Receipt
  • Doc 127 (order, 2/10/25 5:05 PM, stamp), denying Doc 098.
  • Doc 129 (order, 2/12/25 5:24 PM, stamp), denying Doc 091 as moot in the quoted words.
  • Doc 115, the notice setting DIN 91 for 2/12. Doc 128 para. 10, the contemporaneous objection quoted above.
  • Doc 138 (2/19/25), Wife's compel granted in part in the same fortnight. The 2/12 transcript memo corroborates.

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-028

N-0292025-02-12Husband sought enforcement and contempt for past noncompliance with an existing disclosure order; the court denied that motion and allowed another opportunity to comply.DENIED
Date
2025-02-12
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband sought enforcement and contempt for past noncompliance with an existing disclosure order; the court denied that motion and allowed another opportunity to comply.
What the law required
Rule 12.285(j) requires the producing party to certify under oath that her disclosure is “complete, accurate, and in compliance with this rule,” and to state any exception “with specificity” in the certificate itself; Rule 12.285(e) fixes the documents and periods, keyed to her own financial affidavit. The accounting is hers to give. An existing order compelling compliance is enforced under Rule 12.380 on the movant's motion, and the ruling answers the relief that motion sought.
What happened

The court had already ordered Wife to comply fully with mandatory disclosure within ten days of the October 28, 2024 hearing. Husband's December 18 motion sought immediate compliance, contempt, sanctions, and fees for the alleged continuing violation.

At the February 12, 2025 hearing, Judge Ayers denied enforcement and contempt without prejudice, then directed an audit and correction, ultimately allowing until February 26. The February 14 written order based the denial on Husband's failure to identify an unproduced document required by Rule 12.285(e). Separately, it allowed a new motion identifying such a document. For that later motion, Wife would have twenty days to produce the document if it existed and the rule required it.

Wife's side also agreed to amend the financial-disclosure certificate to expressly swear completeness. That agreement concerned future correction, not consequences for the alleged past violation. The second-amended certificate filed the night of February 12 did not turn the denied enforcement claim into a grant of accountability. The written order made no contempt finding and imposed no new sanction. [DENIED: enforcement and contempt denied without prejudice]

Baseline deviation
The existing disclosure order was the starting point, not a new obligation awaiting another request. Husband sought both compliance and consequences for the alleged earlier violation. Another opportunity to audit, produce, or amend addresses future compliance; it does not answer whether the earlier violation warranted contempt or sanctions. The ruling must be measured against the relief the pending motion sought, not recast as a partial victory because an amendment followed.
Receipt
  • Doc 054, Order Granting Motion to Compel, entered November 20, 2024, pp. 1-2, paragraphs 2-3: full compliance within ten days of the October 28 hearing; fee entitlement for earlier untimely disclosure, amount reserved.
  • Doc 084, filed December 18, 2024, paragraphs 9, 15-21 and 24-26; prayer A-D: enforce the existing order, require sworn compliance, find contempt, impose sanctions, permit Chase subpoenas, and award fees/costs.
  • Doc 152, February 12 hearing, Tr. 30:7-23 and 31:24-32:22: denial, audit/correction directions, and extension to February 26. Tr. 69:17-25 and 70:19-25: continued request for consequences; Wife's side agrees to amend oath language; court describes the amendment as stipulated rather than its ruling.
  • Doc 130, February 14 order, findings A-B and paragraphs 1-5: denial without prejudice; conditional new-motion/twenty-day production procedure; preservation of unmodified orders; Wife's stipulation to amend the oath. No new contempt finding or sanction. The original fee entitlement was not rescinded.
  • Docs 124/125, second-amended certificate filed February 12, p. 10: express completeness oath. Agreement to amend is not an admission of every alleged defect or a finding that disclosure was complete.
  • Doc 145, February 26 motion to vacate, paragraphs 2, 4, 36 and 39-44: continuing challenge to the certificate's scope after amendment.
  • March 17 certiorari petition, internal pp. 14-15, 22, 24, 27 and 29-30: scope, notice, prejudice, and requested enforcement relief.
  • Related decision point: N-009.

Spawned by: N-009

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-029

N-0302025-02-18an order to show cause backed by an arrest warning issued against both parties without naming a single email, date, sender, or count, and a hearing on it had already been noticed before the order existed.EXCUSED
Date
2025-02-18
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
an order to show cause backed by an arrest warning issued against both parties without naming a single email, date, sender, or count, and a hearing on it had already been noticed before the order existed.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 due process: an order that puts a person at risk of arrest tells him what he is said to have done and rests on specific findings about that conduct, which Husband asked for in writing. Canon 3D(2) directs the judge's action to the lawyer whose conduct was reported; the reporting party answers for his own conduct, if any is named.
What happened
On February 7, 2025, Davis's email inserted the word bat into Husband's ball-and-go-home phrase and added a defamation warning about publishing. Husband objected that it was at least the second time Davis had alluded to violence. Davis answered: "The only time I would engage in violence is if it were necessary in self defense". Eleven days later Judge Ayers entered an order to show cause directing both parties to appear under an arrest warning; a hearing on it had already been noticed before it was signed. She reset it twice, heard it April 22, 2025 without evidence, with Wife excused over objection, made no findings, imposed only an email-only limit on Husband, and told him: "Do you realize you just won this hearing?" Davis's response had converted the order into a request to restrict Husband's emails. [EXCUSED: the email came from Wife's counsel, who drew no consequence]
Baseline deviation
An order that puts a person at risk of arrest tells that person what he is said to have done, and Husband asked in writing for specific findings about the emails and conduct behind it. This order names no email, date, sender, or count; its only finding is volume, given three times. The email described below came from Wife's counsel, who drew no consequence, while the order issued against both parties, including the one who had objected to that email.
Receipt
  • Doc 137 exhibits pp. 5-8, the complete 2/7/25 email chain quoted above in both directions, including Davis's follow-up "I don't even own a bat."
  • Doc 120 p. 3, Husband's contemporaneous characterization.
  • Doc 136 (2/18/25), the order to show cause on the court's own initiative, with its only finding that "Counsels for the Parties are engaging in an extraordinary exchange of email communications between themselves and the Parties between the Judicial Assistant to the undersigned."
  • Doc 141, the amended order resetting to 4/3/25, the eve of the 4/4 hearing. Doc 135, Davis's response and email-restriction request.
  • Doc 123 (2/12/25 3:03 PM), noticing a 2/25 hearing on an order "to be entered by the Court prior to February 25"; Doc 136 was entered 2/18/25; Doc 123's footnote 1 is the email-restriction receipt.
  • Doc 192 Tr. 4:5-9 for the court's own 4/22/25 explanation, Tr. 46:5-22 for the email-limit ruling as corrected, and Tr. 46:24-25 for the quoted "won this hearing" line.
  • Doc 198 Tr. 4:19-24 and 180:9-24 for the 4/4 roadmap placement and the reset.
  • Docs 133 and 134, the Zoom-deposition order granted without hearing on unspecified good cause, and the document tying it to the 2/7 email.
  • Related decision points: N-014, N-022.

Spawned by: N-011

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-030

N-0352025-03-04in the same fortnight, Wife's motion to compel was granted in part with a deadline attached, and Husband's motion attacking the orders that left him with no disclosure came back to him as his own paper with the word DENIED stamped on it.DENIED
Date
2025-03-04
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
in the same fortnight, Wife's motion to compel was granted in part with a deadline attached, and Husband's motion attacking the orders that left him with no disclosure came back to him as his own paper with the word DENIED stamped on it.
What the law required
Rules 12.530 and 12.540(b)(1) let a party seek rehearing and relief from an order entered on mistake; a motion invoking them against an order that excused sworn compliance with Rule 12.285(j) is decided on a basis a reviewing court can examine. The same court, in the same fortnight, processed Wife's compel motion to a merits order with a deadline.
What happened
Husband filed his Motion to Vacate on February 26, 2025, aimed at the orders that left him without mandatory-disclosure compliance. It came back as the same paper, stamped "DENIED", March 4, 2025, Kelly Ayers, with no findings and no reasoning. He met the deadline the court had set on his own side: his sworn compliance certificate, one page, was filed on that same February 26 date. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rules 12.530 and 12.540 exist so an order entered on a mistake can be corrected, and a ruling on that motion states a basis, since the basis is the only thing a reviewing court can examine. A stamp gives none. Both sides sought the same relief in the same two weeks before the same judge; only one side's was processed on the merits. The motion here targeted the order denying Husband's enforcement motion on a naming technicality (N-029). A stated basis would have documented why that denial stood.
Receipt
  • Doc 145 (the 2/26/25 motion).
  • Doc 151 (the same paper returned stamped "DENIED" 3/4/25, stamp).
  • Doc 130 (2/14/25), the denial the motion targeted.
  • Doc 138 (2/19/25), Wife's compel granted in part with a comply-or-object deadline.
  • Doc 142, Husband's sworn compliance certificate filed on the 2/26/25 deadline, verified 8/7/26.

Spawned by: N-029

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-035

N-0382025-04-01the court asked Wife's lawyer in writing to summarize her testimony, he promised it the same day and never sent it, and the court told its own assistant not to remind him.IGNORED
Date
2025-04-01
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers (rescission and non-engagement); Scott Davis (the default)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court asked Wife's lawyer in writing to summarize her testimony, he promised it the same day and never sent it, and the court told its own assistant not to remind him.
What the law required
A parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The movant for a guardian ad litem under section 61.401, Florida Statutes, carries the burden of showing cause for the appointment; the opposing parent's filed objections are engaged, and his opportunity to present evidence is part of due process.
What happened
On April 7, 2025 the court emailed Davis asking for a written summary of Wife's testimony while preparing its orders. He answered the same day that he was happy to and would need a couple of days. Nothing came in eight days. On April 16 the court's own order erased the ask: "No summaries have been provided to the Court. No summaries are being requested by the Court." Orders were prepared from the April 4 record anyway. On the other side of the same file, Husband's filed oppositions about the children were never engaged, including his statement that "Dragging happy, healthy, thriving children back into a conflict is counter-intuitive and cruel." His April 15 motion was never ruled on. The guardian ad litem was appointed fourteen months later with no finding of unfitness (N-125). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A parent's right to the care of his children is a fundamental liberty interest, and the party asking a court to reshape that relationship carries the burden of showing cause. The court asked the movant to put her basis in writing, and she was clear the ask was a request, not an order: “It wasn't order.” On the other side of the file, Husband's documented objections about the children drew no ruling. The court required nothing of the movant and engaged none of the objector's points.
Receipt
  • Doc 169 (4/1/25, Filing #220088124), the welfare showing including the Elovitz "Be Wary of Saviors" guardian-ad-litem risk literature.
  • Doc 173 (4/7/25 11:22 AM), paras. 5, 10, 14, and 25 for the quoted passages.
  • Doc 177 (4/15/25) para. 11 for the quoted sentence.
  • Doc 182 (order, 4/16/25) for the quoted rescission.
  • The 4/7 email pair is preserved inside Docs 173 and 177.
  • Doc 192 Tr. 51:11 for "It wasn't order" and for the judicial assistant instruction, "I actually said to Dee Dee, don't give him a reminder," with the court's own stated explanation in the same passage.
  • Caution: Doc 169's certificate carries a stale "13th day of December, 2024" template date, and Doc 177 says "April 3" where Docs 173 and 182 fix the hearing as 4/4.
  • Additional oppositions never engaged: cross-examination not completed; no affidavits, police reports, or teacher emails existed; and that there was "nothing that approaches any reasonable concern about Husband's parenting ability."
  • Related decision points: N-041.

Spawned by: N-041

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-038

N-0402025-04-04thirty-five days after Husband filed the motion the court itself had told him to file, the judge said on the record that he had "now opened a door to entitle yourself to more evidence"; twenty-four days after that she recused, without ruling on it.IGNORED
Date
2025-04-04
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
thirty-five days after Husband filed the motion the court itself had told him to file, the judge said on the record that he had "now opened a door to entitle yourself to more evidence"; twenty-four days after that she recused, without ruling on it.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and Rule 2.215(g)(1) makes every judge's duty to rule within a reasonable time explicit. A court that confirms on the record that a filed motion changed the movant's entitlement then decides that motion; confirmation without adjudication is its own decision point.
What happened
Judge Ayers prescribed the motion across four hearings (N-019). Husband filed it in exactly the prescribed form. On April 4, 2025 she confirmed twice on the record that it had changed his position, telling him: "You have now opened a door to entitle yourself to more evidence", and confirmed the filing itself and that the motion was going to open up the discovery. No adjudication ever followed, from her or anyone. She recused about April 28, 2025 with the motion unruled, and it is still unruled. A different set of events from the same hearing day, the courthouse video Judge Ayers volunteered and then declined to pursue, is carded separately at N-042. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A court that confirms on the record that a filed motion changed what a litigant is entitled to has to decide that motion within a meaningful time. Confirmation without adjudication is its own decision point: nobody can say the motion was insufficient when the judge who prescribed it said on the record that it had worked. The recusal left the confirmed and undetermined motion in the hands of a successor who has now carried it for months on end (N-033).
Receipt
  • Doc 198 Tr. 7:7-17 (the key phrase sits at 7:13-14), 187:20-23, 188:9-14, and 191:7-9 (also carrying "that will probably be open to you now receiving that discovery," "You have it filed," and the "going to open up the discovery" characterization).
  • DIN 146, filed 2/28/25.
  • Recusal lineage at Docs 184 and 187; Doc 187 is Judge DePaul's own recusal order, not an Ayers instrument (N-047).
  • Day count: 535 days as of 8/17/26.

Spawned by: N-019

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-040

N-0412025-04-04the court gave the day to the motion questioning Husband as a parent and pushed the discovery two months out, and in four years the only documented concern about either child was that each had once seemed tired.DENIED
Date
2025-04-04
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court gave the day to the motion questioning Husband as a parent and pushed the discovery two months out, and in four years the only documented concern about either child was that each had once seemed tired.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment: a parent facing a motion that reaches his children is heard with the evidence he identified as necessary to defend it. The movant carries the burden of showing cause for a guardian ad litem under section 61.401, Florida Statutes. Discovery a court has itself tied to the merits is resolved before the merits it feeds.
What happened
On April 4, 2025 Judge Ayers put Wife's guardian ad litem and psychological-evaluation motions first and confined the day to the children. Husband's position, held since the guardian ad litem motion was filed, was that he needed the discovery to prove the retaliatory motive, and he argued on the record that his pending discovery fed the guardian ad litem question itself. The school administrator who testified that day said that in four years the only documented concern about either child was one notation that each had seemed tired. Wife's entire showing went to Husband, not to the children. The court twice announced it would rule on the guardian ad litem that day. It ended the day with no rulings at all and deferred discovery wholesale to June 10. The guardian ad litem request became an ultimatum: mediate, or take less than fifty percent. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Discovery that feeds a motion's merits is resolved before the motion, above all where the court itself has conditioned the discovery on a merits ruling (N-018, N-019) and the movant carries the burden of showing cause for the appointment she seeks. Here the court advanced the merits instrument ahead of the discovery relevant to it. Taking discovery first would have documented the factual predicate of the guardian ad litem motion, which alleged no incident, no date, no observation, and no witness (N-001).
Receipt
  • Doc 198 Tr. 8:21-25 and 136:8-13 (the roadmap); 100:19-25, 101:3-13, and 115:12-14 (the discovery-first argument and the confinement of the day); 116:16-20 and 136:15-17 (the rule-today announcements); 193:18-20 (no rulings); 185:2-8, 188:15-17, and 191:16-18 (the deferral to June); 170:19-23 and 173:2-4 (the ultimatum); 20:10-14 (the tired-notation testimony); 68:2-3 (the court on chronic depression).
  • Born-digital text layer, twenty key pages.
  • The school administrator's April 4 testimony also appears at N-043 and at FNEW-W1.

Spawned by: N-001

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-041

N-0422025-04-04The judge offered "the camera footage" as proof about her own conduct, then answered "No, sir" when asked to get it.DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Judge Ayers offered the courtroom camera footage as proof she had not rolled her eyes at Husband, then refused to get it. When Husband requested that video as a public record, the circuit withheld it under a security-camera exemption it has never supported with a single fact, and still held it 403 days later, when a judge from outside the circuit found good cause to release it.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) makes the recording of a court hearing a public record, presumed open. Asked for it by formal records request on July 24-25, 2025, the court produces it, or names a specific exemption and proves with facts that the exemption covers this recording. Separately, a judge who offers footage as proof of her own conduct has made it evidence: she gets it, preserves it, and produces it, because that conduct became a sworn ground for her disqualification.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Apr. 4, 2025: Judge Ayers, disputing Husband's account that she rolled her eyes at him: "I will go get the camera footage and do it because I have not rolled my eyes at you." At the close of the hearing Husband asked, "Your Honor, I would ask that you request the video you referenced." The answer: "No, sir." Then: "Sir, you're crossing the line. This hearing is ended." N-042
    Read them: Hearing transcript, Apr. 4, 2025, pp. 75 and 193 (link pending redacted copy)
  • July 24 to Aug. 21, 2025: Husband requested the video by formal public records request. Court Administrator Gina Justice, in a letter copied to Judge Ayers, confirmed "A video record does exist" for that hearing and withheld it as courthouse surveillance video. N-053
    Read them: Justice letter, Aug. 21, 2025 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Apr. 17, 2026: her successor, Judge Felix, asked whether he had reviewed the video: "I have not." May 15, 2026: the circuit, defending Husband's records suit, admitted no court order determines it confidential and wrote beside the exemption: "No analysis was needed." Sept. 2, 2026, its counsel called the recording "the April 4, 2025 hearing-room video recording" and attached no affidavit. N-076, N-053, N-157
  • Sept. 28, 2026: a judge from outside the circuit found that "good cause exists under section 119.071(3)(a)3.d., Florida Statutes, for disclosure of the video to Plaintiff," 403 days after the withholding letter, and ordered the exchange within ten days. N-156, N-157
    Who at the Thirteenth Circuit watched the April 4, 2025 video before withholding it?
I
Independent encounter

Judge Kelly A. Ayers (offered the footage; "No, sir"; ended the hearing; copied on the withholding letter). Court Administrator Gina Justice (confirmed the video exists; withheld it). Judge Matthew Felix, her successor ("I have not."). One hearing, one offer, one refusal, one records request for the same recording. Every duty here arises from what Judge Ayers said in her own courtroom and from one written denial; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes every judicial-branch record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a denial to state its basis in writing. Evidence a judge volunteers about her own conduct is evidence she has put in issue, and the party in the room can reach it.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-04-04
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the judge offered the courthouse camera footage as proof about her own conduct, and when Husband asked her to go get it she said "No, sir" and ended the hearing, and it has never been produced.
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) gives every person the right to inspect judicial-branch records, and the custodian carries the burden of any exemption; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a denial to state its basis in writing. Evidence a judge volunteers about her own conduct is evidence she has put in issue, and the party in the room can reach it, including by supplementing the appellate record under Rule 9.200(f).
What happened
On April 4, 2025 Judge Ayers volunteered courthouse-camera footage to disprove an alleged eye-roll: "I will go get the camera footage and do it because I have not rolled my eyes at you." Husband asked her to pursue that footage. At the close of the hearing he asked again; she answered, "No, sir," and when he pressed, said he was "crossing the line" and ended the hearing. The footage has never been produced to Husband, and no court or party has ever examined it on the record (N-103 records the defendants' statement that someone viewed it, without saying who). This is the April 4, 2025 courthouse video, called the video in later cards: courthouse demeanor footage, not a recording of the proceedings. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Evidence a judge volunteers about her own conduct is evidence she has put in issue; once she points to a record as her own proof, it has to be reachable by the other person in the room, and the Florida Constitution presumes a judicial-branch record open with the burden of any exemption on the custodian. The same footage is the object of the records litigation that follows, later confirmed to exist and withheld (N-053). The alleged eye-roll rests on Husband's sworn firsthand account in a verified motion later granted as legally sufficient.
Receipt
  • Doc 198 Tr. 75:12-16 and 75:15-17 (the volunteered footage and Husband's request that she get it), and Tr. 193:9-14 (the refusal, "No, sir," then "you're crossing the line. This hearing is ended.").
  • Doc 183 p. 10, the verified second disqualification motion carrying the sworn eye-roll account under its own heading, filed 4/24/25 and granted as legally sufficient 4/28/25 (N-047).

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-042

N-0452025-04-22twenty-five pages of unrefuted evidence about opposing counsel's conduct produced no inquiry, no finding, and no conduct identified, in any forum; the court pointed to the Bar, the Bar had already closed the file and pointed back to the court, and the judicial commission later pointed back to the courts as well.EXCUSED
Date
2025-04-22
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
twenty-five pages of unrefuted evidence about opposing counsel's conduct produced no inquiry, no finding, and no conduct identified, in any forum; the court pointed to the Bar, the Bar had already closed the file and pointed back to the court, and the judicial commission later pointed back to the courts as well.
What the law required
Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3D(2) provides that a judge with knowledge of lawyer misconduct shall take appropriate action.
What happened

On April 22, 2025 Judge Ayers declined to take up Davis's conduct herself and pointed to the Bar, saying she is not the Florida Bar. In the same hearing Davis announced that the Bar had declined. The court's stated condition for acting was future: "if he comes to my courtroom and lies to me. order to show cause."

The finger-pointing is pinned on both ends of the loop. No forum ever addressed the misconduct described over twenty-five pages of unrefuted evidence. This was the third time the same duty was declined in the same case (N-022, N-023). [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation
Canon 3D(2) puts the duty on the judge who learns of a lawyer's misconduct: take appropriate action. What she does with it is what would have produced a judicial record of the conduct. Here the pointing went in a circle. The Bar had closed the file six days after it arrived, saying the matter belonged to a court (N-031); the judicial commission later pointed back to the courts as well (N-062). The claim made here is narrow: no inquiry, no finding, and no conduct identified.
Receipt
  • Transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 36, the "I'm not the Florida Bar" loop, confirmed against the page image 8/7/26.
  • N-031 for the six-day Bar closure and its quoted rationale. N-062 for the judicial commission dismissal.
  • N-046 for the same hearing's specification void.
  • N-022 for the first refusal of the same duty three months earlier, and N-023 for the refusal twelve days after that one.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-045

N-0462025-04-22asked in court twice and under oath once to name one thing Husband had filed or done that was inappropriate, no motion, paragraph, or sentence has been identified; the only conduct ever named was an email exchange about baseball equipment, charged to both sides.EXCUSED
Date
2025-04-22
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers; Scott Davis (Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.)
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
asked in court twice and under oath once to name one thing Husband had filed or done that was inappropriate, no motion, paragraph, or sentence has been identified; the only conduct ever named was an email exchange about baseball equipment, charged to both sides.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 due process: a party accused of misconduct is entitled to notice of the conduct alleged, so that he can answer it. Canon 3D(2) requires a judge with information indicating a substantial likelihood of a lawyer's violation to take appropriate action, so a court asked to address an officer of the court's conduct either addresses it or states on the record why it will not.
What happened
Husband repeatedly asked, on the record, for anyone to name one thing he had done that was inappropriate. No one ever did. On April 22, 2025, pressed to address opposing counsel's conduct, Judge Ayers said she could not question him, then named the only conduct she attributed to either party: "the only thing that both of you have acted inappropriately were those emails about going to the baseball field with bats and balls and I called you both in and gave you both a lecture." He renewed the challenge twice more, drawing no answer. At deposition, asked for a specific example, Wife named two filings instead: his writ of certiorari and his motion to recuse the judge, the filings a litigant uses to ask a court to decide that question. No motion or sentence was ever identified. [EXCUSED: conduct named against Husband was an email exchange charged to both sides]
Baseline deviation
A party accused of misconduct is entitled to know what conduct is alleged, and a court asked to address counsel's conduct either addresses it or states why it will not. The measurable thing is the asymmetry: across more than two years, the filings and orders adverse to Husband rest on characterizations rather than incidents (N-001). The deviation is that no forum, court or Bar, ever named the conduct.
Receipt
  • Doc 192 Tr. 35:3-25 (4/22/25, including "I'm not the Florida Bar. I don't discipline lawyers" and "I can't ask him any questions").
  • Doc 212 Tr. 6:20-25 (6/3/25, Husband's renewed challenge: "I would ask Mr. Davis to show you one example of an inappropriate email I've sent.").
  • Doc 152 Tr. 55:1-8 (2/12/25, "No one can name anything negative about what I have done as a father").
  • Doc 205 Tr. 146:2-147:25 (the deposition passage, including Tr. 147:2-4 for "a specific example" and Tr. 147:17-25 for Wife's answer naming the writ of certiorari and the recusal motion).
  • The Doc 192 reporter's verbatim includes the garbled "I don't that I've ever done" and is preserved as spoken.
  • Specification-void family, cited as a family with each card's own candor limits traveling with it: NEW-P8 (Davis in correspondence), NEW-P6 (the Bar), N-062 (the judicial commission), N-064 (the Bar file and its sixteen demands), NEW-P7 (the invitation to name a false statement), and N-117 and N-136 (the mandamus court).

Spawned by: N-001, N-042

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-046

N-0472025-04-28the disqualification rule was applied as written and Judge Ayers left the case, but the realignment the rule exists to produce, a neutral tribunal, never happened: under her successor the first-filed discovery motion has no written order, the psychological-evaluation motion is unruled, and the fee entitlement was never setWON-THEN-NULLIFIED
Date
2025-04-28
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the disqualification rule was applied as written and Judge Ayers left the case, but the realignment the rule exists to produce, a neutral tribunal, never happened: under her successor the first-filed discovery motion has no written order, the psychological-evaluation motion is unruled, and the fee entitlement was never set
What the law required
Section 38.10, Florida Statutes, and Rule 2.330: a sworn motion showing that the party reasonably fears he will not receive a fair hearing because of specifically described bias (Rule 2.330(e)(1)) is decided on legal sufficiency alone, its facts taken as true, and a sufficient motion is granted at once (Rule 2.330(h)). Litigants are entitled to have their disputes resolved by impartial judges, Berry v. Berry, 765 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
What happened
The second disqualification motion was filed on April 24, 2025 and granted four days later. Judge Ayers was disqualified and the case was reassigned to Judge Felix. After reassignment, the first-filed discovery motion stayed unruled (N-003), the psychological-evaluation prong stayed unresolved (N-016), and the 2024 fee entitlement was never liquidated (N-009). The granting order's operative sentence reads that "Because Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(h) requires the Court to accept all allegations in an initial motion for disqualification as true, the Court finds the Motion to be legally sufficient," while its own caption calls it the second verified motion; a first motion had already been denied as legally insufficient without grounds twelve weeks earlier (N-027). Same movant, same species of motion, two orders that cannot both be applying the rule the same way. The order also expressly declines to rule on the venue request; the successor judge denied venue transfer after a June 3, 2025 hearing (Doc 204). [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
The rule requires that a facially sufficient disqualification motion be granted, the allegations taken as true, and it exists to secure the movant an impartial judge. The rule was applied as written and Husband won; what the win delivered is the rest of this card. It changed the identity of the judge. The neutral tribunal the rule is for is still owed: under the successor, the first-filed discovery motion has no written order (N-003), the psychological-evaluation prong stayed unresolved (N-016), the fee entitlement was never liquidated (N-009), and Husband’s records lawsuit later named the successor as a defendant while he continued to preside (N-059). The later disqualification in the records case followed the same course (NEW-P13).
Receipt
  • Doc 183, the granted second disqualification motion, Filing #221772754, e-filed 4/24/25 11:24 PM, verified 4/23/25; pp. 1 and 8 (paras. 61-63) and p. 10 (the eye-roll heading and paras. 78-79 and 82).
  • Doc 184, the disqualification order, at its operative sentence.
  • Doc 181 (4/23/25, stamp) para. 2, bolded: neither the court nor Davis could produce "a single email, nor even a single sentence" of inappropriate conduct.
  • Doc 180 (4/21/25, stamp) para. 8, the first docketed capture of the summary position change.
  • Rule 2.330(e)(1).

Spawned by: N-042

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-047

NEW-P72025-11-24invited in writing to name one false statement in the article about her, she filed a Bar complaint the same afternoon; through July 23, 2026, across sixteen written demands, nobody has named one.IGNORED
Date
2025-11-24
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir. / The Florida Bar (file 2026-10,395(13F))
Mechanism
invited in writing to name one false statement in the article about her, she filed a Bar complaint the same afternoon; through July 23, 2026, across sixteen written demands, nobody has named one.
What the law required
Canon 3D(2) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct: a judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer violated the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar “shall take appropriate action.” Truth is a complete defense in a disciplinary case, so the one thing that makes such a complaint stick is naming the false statement.
What happened
A published article named Judge Ayers and described her conduct. Two days later, at 10:18 AM, Husband emailed her division: "If you believe that anything stated in the article is untrue, please let me know so I can consider amending the article if appropriate." The same ask went to circuit administration and to the Bar and JQC minutes later (N-065). No identification of any false statement ever came from her or her division. That same afternoon, Judge Ayers filed her Florida Bar complaint against Husband (N-064). Through July 23, 2026, across sixteen written demands, that file still has not specified a single false statement, and the Bar's own referral letter captions the matter as "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson," not as a complaint by the judge. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Anyone who believes a published statement about them is false can say which one; that fixes the record. Truth is an absolute defense in a disciplinary case, so naming the false statement is the one thing that could make the complaint stick. What the record shows is no identification of any false statement, that day or ever, in a file sixteen written demands have since asked to specify one.
Receipt
  • Three 11/24/25 invitation emails at 10:18, 10:27, and 10:34 AM, per N-065; division email is the one that reaches her.
  • The article, posted on X 11/22/25 14:56 UTC, post 1992245722901577796, printed at Doc 267 pp. 14-56; complaint pleads publication on or about 11/21, conflict unresolved.
  • Bar complaint intake 11/24/25, carded at N-064 with sixteen written specification demands running 12/8/25 through 7/23/26.
  • Bar's referral letter to the grievance committee, dated December 3, 2025, and its caption.
  • Timing arithmetic carded at N-065 as 6 hours 22 minutes from the 10:34 AM send; intake timestamp is ACAP intake of the complaint at 4:56:32 PM.

Spawned by: N-064, N-065

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P7

Husband's counsel6 nodes

Official public records: Florida Bar member profile, Grace Marica Samarkos | Florida Bar member profile, Vivian Cortes Hodz

N-0052024-05-30 -> 2024-08-14across eleven weeks the client supplied his own firm with the objective, the instrument, and the urgency, in writing, and asked again when nothing went out; the draft arrived the day of his second follow-up, after the first went unanswered.REFUSED
Date
2024-05-30 -> 2024-08-14
Actor
Harris, Hunt & Derr, Husband's own then-counsel
Institution
Own counsel
Mechanism
across eleven weeks the client supplied his own firm with the objective, the instrument, and the urgency, in writing, and asked again when nothing went out; the draft arrived the day of his second follow-up, after the first went unanswered.
What the law required
Rules 4-1.2(a), 4-1.3 and 4-1.4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: the client sets the objectives of the representation, and counsel pursues them with reasonable diligence and promptness or states the professional reason for declining. The client's stated objective from his first filing was the financial discovery (Doc 22).
What happened
Between May and August 2024, Husband repeatedly pressed his own firm to act. On 5/30/24 he asked them to subpoena Wife's Chase accounts; on 6/2/24, with no subpoena out, he pressed again. On 7/11/24 he asked the firm to raise Wife's missed 6/28/24 production deadline at the coming hearing (N-006). On 7/19/24 he asked to see the interrogatories before they went out. On 8/9/24 his own counsel wrote that she needed to "touch base with her again about the request to produce". On 8/12/24 he asked directly: "I did want to ask about the request to produce. Have we sent that? I'd like to get that going ASAP." That message was not answered. On 8/14/24 he wrote again asking for status and warning that a clock should be ticking on his financial-information request. A draft arrived later that day; the record does not show whether it was ever served. [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
The client sets the objective; the lawyer pursues it with diligence or explains in writing why not. This duty runs to the client rather than to the public. Husband's objective never changed from his May 2024 filing: financial records covering years of marital income (N-003). Vivian Cortes Hodz, the lawyer who took over, wrote on 10/18/24 that HH&D's recent discovery work was "appropriate, reasonable and consistent with actions I would recommend," an assessment limited to the emails she had seen.
Receipt
  • Emails of 5/30, 5/31, 6/2, 7/11, 7/19, 8/9, 8/12, and 8/14/2024, all filed at 1150, on HHD letterhead over the "Grace M. Samarkos, Attorney" signature block.
  • Source-generation limit on this set: the file is a text export of the original PDF, so the image is of the export, not of the mailbox original.
  • The 11/7/24 and 11/8/24 emails between Husband and the firm are verbatim, primary-sourced, and pleaded at complaint para. 36C; they travel here.
  • The stipulated 6/28/24 date and the non-production are receipted at N-006 (Doc 155 Tr. 21:8-11).
  • The objective's anchor is Doc 22, filed 5/16/24 (N-003).
  • Cortes Hodz counterweight: her email of 10/18/24 4:07 PM.

Read the source document: Doc 155, Transcript of 10-28-24 hearing

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-005

FNEW-C12024-08-02the firm put in writing why the motion to compel was late: the good-faith letter that had to go out first "did not get properly processed and sent out," and the lawyer who prepared it "did not realize until much later."EXCUSED
Date
2024-08-02
Actor
K. Scott (Harris, Hunt & Derr), Husband's own then-counsel
Institution
Own counsel
Mechanism
the firm put in writing why the motion to compel was late: the good-faith letter that had to go out first "did not get properly processed and sent out," and the lawyer who prepared it "did not realize until much later."
What the law required
Rule 4-1.3 (diligence) and Rule 4-1.4 (communication). The specific instrument: the firm's own email treats the good-faith letter as the step before the motion to compel. The clock it ran against: Wife's stipulated 6/28/24 production date had already passed (receipted at N-006).
What happened
On 8/2/24 at 2:27 PM Katherine Scott of Harris, Hunt & Derr wrote to Husband that "a substantial part of the delay on filing the Motion to Compel [Wife's] mandatory disclosure is attributable to an internal error with our systems," and that "the good faith letter that Gracie had prepared did not get properly processed and sent out, which she did not realize until much later." The email closed: "Please accept our apologies for the internal processing error that led to this delay." Three days later the firm explained in writing why the motion itself would stay a thin form motion. Ten days after that the client was still asking, unanswered, where the request to produce had gone (N-005). The only consequence in the record is the apology. [EXCUSED]
Baseline deviation
The professional baseline is diligence and communication. The instrument matters more than the label: a good-faith letter is the step that must come before a motion to compel, so the letter's delay is the motion's delay. The clock it ran against had already expired. Wife's stipulated production date of 6/28/24 had passed with nothing produced (N-006). The firm caught its own error, said so in writing, and apologized without being pushed to. The card carries that admission as an admission and asserts nothing about why the error happened. The effect is what it records: the weeks were gone, and the record shows no step that restored them.
Receipt
Scott email, 8/2/24 2:27:04 PM EDT, from the sending attorney's firm email address. The source is the 8/2/24 email as filed, pp. 1-2, a mailbox-native export with full headers. All three quotes and the sender, recipient, date, and time were checked against the page image on 8/19/26. Cross-receipts: the stipulated 6/28/24 date at N-006, the client chase chain at N-005.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-C1

N-0082024-11-08counsel dated the delinquency at many months with zero documents received, called what had arrived partial, and in the same email handed the matter on. Nobody pressed it afterward.IGNORED
Date
2024-11-08
Actor
G. Samarkos (Harris, Hunt & Derr), Husband's own then-counsel
Institution
HHD
Mechanism
counsel dated the delinquency at many months with zero documents received, called what had arrived partial, and in the same email handed the matter on. Nobody pressed it afterward.
What the law required
Rules 4-1.2(a), 4-1.3 and 4-1.4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: counsel pursues the client's stated objective (here the financial records) with reasonable diligence and promptness, or withdraws under Rule 4-1.16 while protecting the client's interests. Those rules state the fiduciary duty.
What happened

On November 8, 2024, at 9:24 AM, Husband's outgoing counsel stated the predicate and closed her involvement in one email: "That was part of the reason why Judge Ayers awarded you your fees, because it had been many months past the deadline with zero documents received, and she felt that was not acceptable." The same email calls what had arrived a partial production, and declines the client's request to ask opposing counsel for an explanation: "I am not going to send Scott an email asking for another explanation why it took him so long to send us the documents."

A reason for stopping was given, in writing, three times within nineteen hours, and it was the handoff: the substitution had been filed and incoming counsel would handle opposing counsel directly. No order on the substitution had entered, and incoming counsel had said she would act on its entry. Nothing in the email says the request itself was improper or wrong.

Incoming counsel did write to opposing counsel four days later. That letter asked for voluntary cooperation and an explanation of the history. It did not invoke the compel order, set a deadline, or demand a sworn certification (N-010). The delinquency outgoing counsel had just dated at many months with zero documents received drew no enforcement demand from anyone. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
Eleven days earlier the court had compelled the disclosures and found a fee entitlement (N-009). She was still counsel when she declined. The substitution had been filed that day but no order had entered, and incoming counsel had said she would take up the issues on entry of that order. A reason for stopping was given, in writing, three times in nineteen hours, and it was the handoff. Nothing in the email identifies any impropriety, inaccuracy, or legal problem with what the client asked to be sent. What a handoff does not do is discharge the demand.
Receipt
  • Email, Gracie Samarkos to Husband, copying Vivian Cortes Hodz and Katherine Scott, 11/8/2024 9:24 AM, subject "RE: Concern with providing records From 10-1-23 forward only." Both quotations above are from this one message.
  • Email, Samarkos to Husband, 11/8/2024 11:41 AM, stating the substitution had been executed and filed and directing future requests to incoming counsel.
  • Email, Cortes Hodz, 11/8/2024, stating she would address all issues with opposing counsel directly upon entry of the substitution order.
  • Native Outlook.msg files preserved in the 12/15/2024 mailbox export, intaken 8/20/2026 to 1150 correspondence.
  • The compel order and fee entitlement are receipted at N-009; the 11/12/2024 letter from incoming counsel at N-010.
  • The negative is scoped to these three emails as read: none of them states that the request was improper, inaccurate, or unlawful.
  • Federal complaint para. 36C pleads this exchange.

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-008

N-0102024-11-22seventy-two hours after sending a positive case update, Husband's own lawyer threatened to withdraw; she then moved her exit hearing up twenty-four days on one day's notice, and he met the four motions filed against him self-represented.REFUSED
Date
2024-11-22
Actor
Vivian Cortes Hodz, Husband's own then-counsel
Institution
Own counsel
Mechanism
seventy-two hours after sending a positive case update, Husband's own lawyer threatened to withdraw; she then moved her exit hearing up twenty-four days on one day's notice, and he met the four motions filed against him self-represented.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the client notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court releases his counsel. Rule 4-1.16 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar puts the justification for withdrawal on the withdrawing lawyer, and Rule 4-1.16(d) requires her to take reasonable steps to protect the client's interests on the way out, including reasonable notice.
What happened

On 11/19/24 Vivian Cortes Hodz sent a positive case update. On 11/22/24, seventy-two hours later, she threatened withdrawal. She filed the motion on 12/3/24 and it was set thirty-four days out. On 12/11/24 at 4:09 PM she filed an expedited motion, and the hearing came on 12/13/24 at 4:30 PM over Husband's objection (N-014). The expedited motion has not been pulled and no emergency is asserted here.

She did not carry the representation into the response window. Husband answered self-represented on 12/16/24, under the judicial-default motion filed against him at 8:32 AM on the same day counsel exited (N-013). The scope of the engagement was documented before any dispute existed: on 10/18/24 she wrote that she wanted to attend the litigation hearings, phase out existing counsel, and be "fully involved in how the discovery issues are handled" (N-023).

The only documented event inside that window is the 11/19/24 call from opposing counsel, and no inquiry into it has occurred (N-023). In her 3/11/26 Bar response she attributes the withdrawal to Husband's email of 11/25/24. Her own threat of 11/22/24 predates that email, and her own attachments are what show it (N-083). [REFUSED]

Baseline deviation
The withdrawing lawyer carries the justification for leaving, and the rule requires her to protect the client's interests on the way out. Notice periods exist for the client's protection. Both ran the other way here. A reason stated at the time would have made a contemporaneous record of what changed. The reason first appears in her 3/11/26 response to The Florida Bar, and her own attached exhibits contradict it (N-083). What follows is counsel's own conduct; the court's grant is separate (N-014, N-015, N-021).
Receipt
  • Hodz response to The Florida Bar, 3/11/26, File 2026-10,601, with its own attachments: the 11/19/24 update email and the 11/22/24 withdrawal email.
  • Withdrawal motion 12/3/24; expedited motion 12/11/24.
  • Doc 100 para. 1 for the one-day-notice recital; receipted in full at N-014, which now owns the 12/3 to 12/13 sequence.
  • The 10/18/24 4:07 PM scope email, and the 10/21/24 email at Doc 214 p. 1, "I assure you that you will get the answers that you need to move forward." The 10/18 email carries the same source-generation limit as N-005.
  • Husband's privilege waiver, three independent sources, receipted at N-015 and N-023.
  • Firm affiliation is not stated publicly until verified.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-010

N-0832026-03-11she told The Florida Bar that her withdrawal was a "direct result" of a November 25 email; the response does not mention that she had already threatened to withdraw three days earlier, and the exhibit she attached herself is what shows itPENDING
Date
2026-03-11
Actor
Vivian Cortes Hodz
Institution
The Florida Bar File 2026-10,601 (13E->13C)
Mechanism
she told The Florida Bar that her withdrawal was a "direct result" of a November 25 email; the response does not mention that she had already threatened to withdraw three days earlier, and the exhibit she attached herself is what shows it
What the law required
Rule 4-8.1 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar requires candor from a lawyer answering a disciplinary matter, and Rule 3-7.4 lets the grievance committee take testimony from both sides. A stated reason for withdrawal must survive its own timeline.
What happened

On March 11, 2026 Husband's former counsel told The Florida Bar that her withdrawal was a "direct result" of his November 25, 2024 email. She had already threatened to withdraw three days earlier, on November 22. The response does not mention that threat.

Her own attached exhibit frames the reversal. After a same-day call with Wife's counsel, she reported that Wife "IS COOPERATING with voluntarily producing the retirement documents." Three days later she reversed and threatened withdrawal if Husband kept insisting on financial discovery.

The only event documented in that 72-hour window is the call, and no one has examined it: when Husband asked the trial court to inquire, with his own privilege waived three separate ways, the request was answered with a privilege ruling (N-023). The Bar has not resolved File 2026-10,601; the November 22 threat and the account given to the Bar have never been reconciled. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
Rule 4-8.1 requires candor in a response to The Florida Bar. The response does not disclose the earlier threat, and the document that shows the earlier threat is the response's own attachment. That is what makes this checkable rather than arguable. The argument is the chronology, not motive.
Receipt
  • Her own Bar-response exhibit, the 11/19/24 5:43 PM email, calling it a "very positive update"
  • The 11/22/24 withdrawal threat
  • The 3/11/26 Bar response
  • As pleaded at paragraphs 37-38 and 139
  • Same node species as N-103: a served statement whose gap is shown by the document served with it
  • The live fork is the disposition of File 2026-10,601

Spawned by: N-015, N-023

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-083

N-1062026-05-27the witness with the most direct knowledge of the 2024 representation was subpoenaed and litigated against testifying rather than testify; six days later an order declared her "fully released," and what she had written in 2024 about Husband as a father never reached the record.REFUSED
Date
2026-05-27
Actor
G. Samarkos (Harris, Hunt & Derr), Husband's own former counsel
Institution
Own counsel
Mechanism
the witness with the most direct knowledge of the 2024 representation was subpoenaed and litigated against testifying rather than testify; six days later an order declared her "fully released," and what she had written in 2024 about Husband as a father never reached the record.
What the law required
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.410 lets a court quash or modify a subpoena only if it is unreasonable and oppressive, and Rule 12.280 requires good cause shown for a protective order; the moving witness carries both. A subpoenaed witness appears or shows cause, and a former lawyer's duties to the client survive the representation.
What happened

Subpoenaed for the hearings that preceded the guardian ad litem decision, G. Samarkos of Harris, Hunt & Derr moved to quash on 5/27/26 rather than testify about the representation. Judge Felix granted the motion from the bench on 5/29/26, excusing her as "not relevant," with no other basis offered when asked. He directed the movants to draft their own orders (N-109). An order of 6/2/26 declared her "fully released," with no findings (N-112). She never testified.

Her motion ran two days from filing to the bench grant and six days to the written order. The four Bar officials' motion to quash ran forty-six days and spanned the guardian ad litem decision (N-130); those four were represented by outside counsel, and she was one local lawyer appearing for herself. The testimony about the 2024 discovery period (N-005) and the withdrawal window (N-010) was never given by anyone. [REFUSED]

Baseline deviation
A subpoenaed witness appears or shows cause. The fairness point cuts toward Husband: the testimony never given would not have been hostile to him. On 10/17/24 the same attorney had written that Husband had "shown us you're a great, involved, dad" and was "a consistent, loving, caring father to the girls." That assessment predates every guardian ad litem predicate later put before the court and never entered the record. The court's grants are recorded separately at N-109 and N-112.
Receipt
  • Motion to quash 5/27/26; bench grant 5/29/26, asked "any other basis?" the answer was "No." (N-109)
  • Release order Doc 325, 6/2/26, stating no legal basis on its face (N-112)
  • The four Bar officials' motion to quash, 5/22/26 to 7/7/26 (N-130)
  • The 10/17/24 3:37 PM Samarkos email at Doc 214, correspondence, pp. 5-6, quoting Husband as having "shown us you're a great, involved, dad" and "a consistent, loving, caring father to the girls"
  • Its "tactic to upset you" sentence is that attorney's own written characterization and may be quoted verbatim, never paraphrased into our voice

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-106

Judge Felix43 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

N-0032024-05-16the first motion filed in the case waited 23 months for a hearing while the other side's later motions were heard and grantedIGNORED
Date
2024-05-16
Actor
Judge Ayers, then Judge Felix
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
the first motion filed in the case waited 23 months for a hearing while the other side's later motions were heard and granted
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). Financial disclosure in a dissolution case is mandatory and owed without a request. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285. Doc 22 was submitted May 16, 2024 and argued April 17, 2026. No written order has been entered.
What happened
Husband filed his motion to compel Wife's financial records on May 16, 2024. Neither Judge Ayers nor Judge Felix heard it until April 17, 2026: twenty-three months. What happened at that hearing is its own card: granted from the bench with compulsion disclaimed in the court's own words, and no written order ever entered (N-090). In the same period Wife's later-filed motions advanced to hearings and orders; her motion to compel reached an order in nine weeks (N-013). The financial record his motion sought has never been compelled. One motion was granted on paper: the compel was granted 10/28/24 and the order entered 11/20/24, but the amount was never liquidated, compliance was never required, and the records it reached were never produced (N-006, N-009). When he moved in July 2026 simply to have the eventual bench ruling put in writing, that motion too drew no order (N-133). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 12.285 put Wife's financial disclosure on the docket without any motion, and Rule 2.215(g)(1) required a ruling on Husband's motion within a reasonable time. Husband's core objective since filing has been the records showing what happened to the marital income back to 2016, pursued through this motion, discovery requests, two generations of bank subpoenas, and follow-up motions. Wife and Davis opposed every attempt, and no court has compelled production in more than two years. This motion went unheard 23 months; no written order exists on it.
Receipt
  • Doc 22 (Filing #198450606, 5/16/24) paras. 1 and 16; argued 4/17/26 (disposition at N-090); day counts recomputed; Rule 2.215(g)(2) notice at 804 days (N-140); the written-order motion at N-133.
  • The core-objective sentence anchors across the record: Doc 22 itself, the Chase subpoenas in two generations, the Motion to Void's financial center (Doc 146), and the 7/22/26 written-order motion.
  • The "opposed every attempt" sentence is enumerated, one opposed attempt per receipt: the motion unheard 23 months; the first-generation subpoenas ended by sustained objection (Doc 93, 12/30/24); the second generation objected to and never ruled on; the 4/17/26 ruling preserving objections without compelling production; the certificates listing one month of the Chase records.
  • Separately, and counted with none of the above: the compel of 10/28/24, order entered 11/20/24 (N-006, N-009).
  • "More than two years" runs from the 5/16/24 filing.

Read the source document: Doc 22, Response to Motion to Compel Payments and Motion to Compel Evidence of Marital Assets (filing record only, body withheld)

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-003

N-0162024-12-13 -> 2026-06-25Husband offered to sign the medical releases and to take the evaluations with no court order needed, Wife's counsel declined on the record, and the motions asking for those very things have gone twenty months without a ruling, as of August 20, 2026.IGNORED
Date
2024-12-13 -> 2026-06-25
Actor
Judge Ayers, then Judge Felix
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
Husband offered to sign the medical releases and to take the evaluations with no court order needed, Wife's counsel declined on the record, and the motions asking for those very things have gone twenty months without a ruling, as of August 20, 2026.
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. Every judge must enter an order within a reasonable time on every matter submitted. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). The party who files a motion carries the burden of proving it; when the movant will not prosecute it, and the relief it seeks has been offered and declined on the record, the motion is disposed of.
What happened
Husband offered to sign medical releases and to attend psychological and vocational evaluations without compulsion. Davis declined on the record: "We haven't taken him up on these things, because we want a guardian ad litem appointed." Judge Ayers and then Judge Felix carried the 12/13/24 motion barrage indefinitely rather than address the retaliation showing (N-011, N-013). Of nine Wife-side motions in the motion-timing dataset, one was driven to a ruling: the guardian ad litem, granted 6/25/26 with no unfitness finding (N-125). The psychological evaluation motion has sat unruled 641 days as of 9/15/26; the vocational evaluation motion was noticed once, then abandoned for about 16 months. Both remain pending, now set with eight other motions for an 8-hour block on 10/9/26. On the one motion pursued, the court asked Davis to summarize Wife's testimony; he promised it and never produced it (N-044). [IGNORED: retaliation showing never ruled on]
Baseline deviation
A court decides what is put before it, and the party who files a motion carries the burden of proving it. On April 7, 2025 the court asked Wife's counsel to summarize her testimony and he agreed in writing; he never produced it, and Husband's motion to strike for lack of prosecution (Doc 177) is also undecided. The releases and evaluations the motions sought were offered and declined on the record. A motion left pending costs the movant nothing while keeping a standing threat alive. Same shape at N-064; arc from N-002.
Receipt
  • 5/29 Tr. 59:6-11 (the offer to attend acknowledged on the record).
  • 6/10 Tr. 51:9-11 (offers), 101:1-9 (the declination and its stated reason), 80:12-18.
  • Motion-timing dataset on file (nine Wife motions, one ruled).
  • Doc 279 (2/3/26 case management transcript). Doc 224 pendency inventory.
  • Separately: Doc 138 (2/19/25), a distinct Wife-side motion to compel, granted in part (N-035); not counted in the nine-motion dataset above.
  • Day counts as printed on the card; recompute at build.
  • Related decision points: N-001.

Spawned by: N-107, N-001

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-016

N-0332025-02-28the court told Husband exactly what to file if he wanted discovery, he filed it in exactly that form, and as of 8/17/26, 535 days later, no judge has ruled on it; the gate the court built has never opened.IGNORED
Date
2025-02-28
Actor
Judge Ayers then Judge Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court told Husband exactly what to file if he wanted discovery, he filed it in exactly that form, and as of 8/17/26, 535 days later, no judge has ruled on it; the gate the court built has never opened.
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. Under Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987), a marital agreement is set aside if procured by fraud, duress, coercion or misrepresentation, or if it makes unreasonable provision and was executed without full disclosure; an unreasonable provision raises a presumption of concealment that the defending spouse must rebut (Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962)). The court that made this motion the gate to all discovery (N-018) had to decide it. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1).
What happened

Husband filed his Motion to Void Post-Marital Agreement and to open discovery on 2/28/25 (DIN 146), in the exact form Judge Ayers had prescribed across three hearings (N-019). Neither Judge Ayers nor Judge Felix has ruled on it: 535 days as of 8/17/26. It surfaced again on 4/17/26 as the acknowledged predicate and drew no ruling then either. He filed it the same day he refiled the Chase subpoenas, and Wife's objection to those has likewise never been ruled on (N-034).

The motion's para. 107 states the arithmetic the discovery would test. On the affidavits then on file, Wife's disclosed assets over liabilities were $104,611 against Husband's in excess of $800,000.

Thirty-three days after the motion was filed, at Wife's deposition on 4/2/25, Husband renewed the offer to void the agreements directly. Wife, sworn: "[Husband], I'm not interested." Husband: "We can do it right now." Wife: "No. No. No. I'm not interested." She stated the figures as she understood them: "you're claiming 800,000 and I'm claiming 100,000". Asked why she would not void an agreement that on those numbers pays her more, her counsel objected: "No. 1, relevance because the Court hasn't set aside the agreement yet". The motion to set it aside was this motion, then thirty-three days old and unruled. It is still unruled.

Wife gave her own reasons, and they are recorded in the receipt. Set beside them is one dated fact: the disclosure that would test the arithmetic has been owed since the June 28, 2024 stipulated production date, and producing it required no motion, no hearing, and no judge. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
Under Casto, an agreement executed without financial disclosure is open to challenge, and once the challenge is filed the other spouse's finances are the evidence by which it is decided; if a provision is unreasonable, the burden shifts to Wife to show disclosure. Wife's sworn petition states the October 8, 2023 agreement "did not include financial disclosures" (Doc 203 para. 5). On 12/19/24 the court said of the agreements, "Nobody's asked me to do anything different with them," and then named the step: "it stays in full force and effect unless you file something otherwise." Husband filed. The entitlement has been withheld every day since.
Receipt
  • Doc 146 (2/28/25), paras. 107 and 109. The instrument's name in the record's own exhibit list is the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23; the motion's title uses "Post-Marital Agreement" and the title is quoted as filed.
  • Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 7:6-23, the prescription and the "full force and effect" line.
  • Doc 205, Wife's deposition of April 2, 2025, Tr. 132:16-134:22 for the exchange quoted above.
  • Wife's stated reasons, recorded and not contested here: she wants the divorce over, she is not driven by money, her interest is the children, and her account of the agreement is a negotiation in which she asked for $250,000 and accepted $100,000. Nothing is asserted about her state of mind.
  • Transcript of the April 17, 2026 hearing, Tr. 101-103. Doc 200 pp. 4-28.
  • Docs 34 and 43, the affidavits behind the arithmetic. The $104,611 is Wife's disclosed net worth; the $100,000 is the payment she received under the agreement. Two different figures.
  • The 535-day figure is as of 8/17/26 and recomputes at use.

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-033

N-0392025-04-01 -> 2026-08-12Husband's written objection to the cost and risk of a guardian ad litem sat on the docket 450 days before the order granting one and 478 days before the order pricing it at $6,000; neither order mentions cost, risk, or ability to pay.IGNORED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Judge Felix ordered Husband to pay half of a $6,000 guardian ad litem retainer within three days, at $325 an hour, while his written objection to the guardian's cost and risk sat 478 days with no ruling that addressed it, and no order found what either parent can pay.

E
Expected output

Section 61.16(1) directs the court to consider each parent's financial resources before it imposes a cost. Judge Felix had a timely written objection, filed in opposition to the very motion and raised aloud before him. He rules on it, takes evidence of cost, and weighs each parent's ability to pay before he sets a three-day deadline.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Apr. 1, 2025: Husband filed Doc 169 "in opposition of Wife's motion to appoint guardian ad litem," attaching a family-law magazine article warning that a party "will have spent thousands of dollars on an investigation and report that could cost them custody of their beloved child." N-039
    Read them: Notice of filing, Doc 169 (link pending redacted copy)
  • May 29, 2026: Husband asked the witness about Docket 169. Davis objected on relevance. Judge Felix: "I agree." Husband's next question, about risks to the children, drew "Objection. Speculation." and "Sustained." On the one after: "you can make that argument in closing." N-039
    Read them: Hearing transcript, May 29, 2026, pp. 38-39 (link pending redacted copy)
  • June 25 to Aug. 4, 2026: the order granting the motion found nothing about cost; its one cost sentence: "The cost of the guardian ad litem shall be divided equally between the parties, without prejudice subject to a potential letter [sic] reallocation." The July 23 order, then the Aug. 4 amended order: "six thousand dollars ($6,000.00) within 3 days of entry of this Order" at "$325.00 per hour." None of the three mentions Doc 169 or finds what either parent can pay. N-039, N-134
    What evidence of either parent's ability to pay supports a $6,000 retainer due in three days?
    Read them: Order, Doc 337 (link pending redacted copy) · Amended order, Doc 365, p. 7 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Judge Matthew Felix (sustained the objections; signed the three orders). Scott Davis, Wife's counsel (the relevance and speculation objections). One written objection, one hearing, three orders. Every duty here arises from section 61.16(1) and the objection on this docket alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const. guarantees a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Section 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. requires the court to consider each party's financial resources before imposing costs. The record held no evidence of the guardian's cost.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-04-01 -> 2026-08-12
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix (the two orders and the sustained objection); Judge Kelly Ayers (the filing period); Scott Davis (the relevance objection)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
Husband's written objection to the cost and risk of a guardian ad litem sat on the docket 450 days before the order granting one and 478 days before the order pricing it at $6,000; neither order mentions cost, risk, or ability to pay.
What the law required
Section 61.401 conditions a guardian appointment on a finding that it is in the child's best interest. Section 61.16(1) requires the court to consider the parties' financial ability before imposing costs, and an order allocating a guardian's fee without an express ability-to-pay finding is a fatal flaw (Levy v. Levy, 388 So. 3d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024); MacDonald v. MacDonald, No. 4D2025-3043 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 29, 2026)). A written objection filed before the relief issues is decided, granted or denied with a reason.
What happened
On 4/1/25 Husband filed a notice opposing Wife's guardian ad litem, psychological evaluation, and vocational-file motions, attaching a magazine article warning that "There is always a risk that a Guardian ad Litem will make recommendations that are not in a child's best interest". He raised it at the 5/29/26 hearing; Wife's counsel objected on relevance, Judge Felix agreed, and the question was narrowed to whether the witness had read that article. She had not. Doc 337 granted the appointment on 6/25/26 on findings that mention neither cost, risk, ability to pay, nor the notice; its only cost sentence divides an unstated amount equally. Doc 351 then ordered "$6,000.00 within 3 days of entry of this Order" at $325 per hour, with no cost evidence and no mention of the notice. 498 days from filing to 8/12/26, with no engagement in any order. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Section 61.16(1) requires a finding of what each parent can pay before a cost is imposed on him, and section 61.401 requires the court to find, on the movant's showing, that the appointment serves the children. The objection here was timely: captioned as opposition to the motion it opposed, it sat on the docket over a year before either order issued, and was raised aloud in court. It sat through three hearing days and two orders and drew no sentence.
Receipt
  • Doc 169 (Filing #220088124, e-filed 4/1/25 5:32:32 PM, 3 pp.); the article text is at pp. 2-3, including the sentence that a party "will have spent thousands of dollars on an investigation and report that could cost them custody of their beloved child."
  • 5/29/26 Tr. 38:6-17, 38:24-39:2, 39:4-9, 39:21-24 (relevance objection, "I agree," narrowing, and the sustained speculation objection on the follow-up question).
  • Doc 337 (2 pp.) and Doc 351 (5 pp.), both read in full, neither referencing Doc 169, the article, cost evidence, or ability to pay.
  • Doc 345 (3 pp.), no reference. Doc 342 p. 5.
  • Caution on file: Doc 169's certificate of service carries a stale "13th day of December, 2024" template date; the 4/1/25 clerk stamp controls and every day count here uses it.
  • DINs 346-350 and 352-359 are absent from this tree, so the absence of an order on Doc 342 (the reconsideration motion raising this a third time) is stated as to this record, not as a certified docket absence.
  • Related decision points: N-038, N-134.

Spawned by: N-038, N-125

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-039

N-0432025-04-04the cooperative route to what the children's school knew was refused in writing, so the school was subpoenaed under a contempt warning, and the compelled witness said nothing had been documented about either child in four years beyond one instance of seeming tired.IGNORED
Date
2025-04-04
Actor
Judge Felix
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
the cooperative route to what the children's school knew was refused in writing, so the school was subpoenaed under a contempt warning, and the compelled witness said nothing had been documented about either child in four years beyond one instance of seeming tired.
What the law required
Section 61.401, Florida Statutes, lets a court appoint a guardian ad litem, on a best-interest finding, to gather information about the children; the movant carries the burden of showing cause, and the parent's fundamental liberty interest (Article I, section 9; Fourteenth Amendment) means the appointment rests on findings. A less intrusive route to the same information, put on the record, is reached: adopted, rejected for a stated reason, or addressed by a finding.
What happened
Husband sought agreement from Wife's counsel that the children's school complete wellness forms; the school itself had named simple party agreement as one of three routes to its participation. Counsel substituted the still-pending guardian ad litem instead: "The Guardian Ad Litem, if appointed, will make those determinations and/or recommendations." No answer came to Husband's question of what the downside of trying the questionnaire first would be. The cooperative route was refused in writing (N-036), and the school was subpoenaed under a contempt warning instead. On April 4, 2025 the school's director testified that in four years nothing was documented about either child's health or welfare beyond one occasion each of seeming tired. Both of Husband's attempts to ask her about the forms request were objected to and sustained. He raised the point again on April 17, 2026 before Judge Felix; the court has not addressed it since. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A guardian ad litem is appointed to obtain information about the children's circumstances, on the movant's showing of cause. A less intrusive route to the same information, offered on the record, is adopted, rejected for a stated reason, or addressed by a finding; this drew none of the three. The school named three ways to participate, one being simple agreement. Husband sought that in writing; it was refused in writing. What remained was the route carrying a contempt warning. The order issued later contains no finding on it (N-125).
Receipt
  • Doc 165, the subpoena, dated 3/24/2025 and e-filed 3/25/2025, pp. 1-3; cited by docket entry and date only, because the map withholds what the instrument names.
  • Doc 166 pp. 3, 4, and 6, the 3/18 and 3/24/2025 emails including the quoted refusal, which carries a 2:20:05 PM stamp.
  • Doc 134 pp. 10-12, the complete 2/7/2025 exchange with Davis.
  • Doc 117 pp. 7-9, Husband's 2/7/2025 request and the judicial assistant's 2/10/2025 reply.
  • Doc 198, the certified 4/4/2025 hearing transcript, at Tr. 12, 18, 20, 28, and 29. The 4/17/2026 transcript at Tr. 119:6-8 and 125:21-25.
  • The school's own reply of 3/6/2025 at 8:54 AM.
  • Every decision point here sits in the Ayers era; she recused 4/28/25, and the later consequences run into the Felix era by cross-link.
  • The same episode also appears at N-036. The school-records fact it rests on also appears at N-041 and at FNEW-W1.
  • Two limits: no document has been found in which Wife or Davis objects to the wellness forms themselves; Davis called that premise "blatantly and patently false" on October 17, 2025, and Wife answered "None" to a discovery request for any instruction to the school to withhold the forms. And Husband's statement that the subpoena damaged his relationship with the school is his own account, with no independent corroboration in the record.

Spawned by: N-001

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-043

N-0492025-06-24the venue motion was denied from the bench with no findings, the winning side was told to write the order, and fees were reserved for "both parties" when only one side had ever asked for them.DENIED
Date
2025-06-24
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the venue motion was denied from the bench with no findings, the winning side was told to write the order, and fees were reserved for "both parties" when only one side had ever asked for them.
What the law required
Section 47.122 authorizes transfer "in the interest of justice," a ground independent of convenience, and a transfer under it requires findings (Fast v. Nelson, 22 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)). Due process requires an impartial tribunal. Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
What happened
Judge Felix heard the venue transfer motion on 6/3/25 and denied it "at this time" from the bench with zero findings. The order entered 6/24/25. He directed Davis to draft it. He reserved fees for "both parties" though only Davis had requested them. He did not engage the structural impartial-tribunal argument. That argument does not apply here: in June 2025 the mandamus naming the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit and its judges (25-CA-010255) had not yet been filed (filed 10/14/25, N-058), so it attaches to rulings after that date and is scored on the disqualification and mandamus rows. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Section 47.122 requires findings before a transfer is granted, and this denial made none, so nothing in the order can be tested against the record. Two further things in the order sit outside discretion: fees were reserved for a party who never requested them, and an order drafted by the winning party after the decision carries the drafter's reasons, not the court's. This denial began the appeal (2D2025-1936) through which the 4/4/25 video was kept out of the appellate record (N-066, N-087).
Receipt
  • Doc 212 Tr. 15, 18.

Spawned by: N-047

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-049

N-0502025-06-28Husband asked for an immediate ruling on discovery objections that had waited four to thirteen months; the answer was a form saying it was not an emergency and belonged in the normal course. That normal course has still not come, more than 13 months later.IGNORED
Date
2025-06-28
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband asked for an immediate ruling on discovery objections that had waited four to thirteen months; the answer was a form saying it was not an emergency and belonged in the normal course. That normal course has still not come, more than 13 months later.
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.280 entitles a party to discovery of any relevant, non-privileged matter, and under Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987), Wife's finances are the evidence on the pending challenge to the agreement. The June 28, 2025 motion named three matters then 408, 120 and 118 days old.
What happened
Husband filed an emergency motion on 6/28/25 demanding an immediate ruling on the subpoena and discovery objections. The matters it asked about had already been waiting: DIN 22 for 408 days, DIN 146 for 120 days, DIN 149 for 118 days. Judge Felix entered a handling order only (Doc 210) and never ruled on the merits. The motion was re-listed 4/20/26 (Doc 295) and never reached. The objections stand unruled and the demand is unanswered, more than 13 months on as of August 20, 2026. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
An emergency motion asking for an immediate ruling gets a ruling or a reason. The form answer here, that the matter belongs in the normal course, presumes a normal course exists. The histories of the three matters it named were the evidence that one did not. Those unruled objections are the only thing standing between Husband and the subpoenaed bank records (N-018, N-034). A merits ruling would have produced a record either way.
Receipt
  • Docs 209, 210, 295.
  • Pendency arithmetic as printed on the card: 5/16/24 to 6/28/25 is 408 days; 2/28/25 to 6/28/25 is 120; 3/2/25 to 6/28/25 is 118.

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-050

N-0512025-06-28an emergency motion that set out three dated incidents of interference with the children's time drew one checkbox, and more than a year later no judge has heard it or made a finding on any incident.IGNORED
Date
2025-06-28
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
an emergency motion that set out three dated incidents of interference with the children's time drew one checkbox, and more than a year later no judge has heard it or made a finding on any incident.
What the law required
A parent's relationship with his children is a fundamental liberty interest. Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Section 61.13 makes the children's best interests, including their bond with both parents, the court's charge, and Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1) requires a ruling within a reasonable time on every matter submitted. A documented record of ongoing interference with parenting time, presented by motion, is addressed on its content, by hearing or by findings.
What happened
By 6/28/25 Husband had filed the record (Docs 206, 207, 208) and an emergency motion built on it (Doc 209). It covered the graduation-morning incident, the church-service incident, and the vacation dispute. The court's entire response, on 6/30/25, was one checkbox: "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." Nearly fifteen months later the motion had not been heard; Wife's own notice sets it among ten matters for October 9, 2026. No judge has ever made a finding on any item. The comparison sits on the same docket: Wife's filings have drawn hearings at speed, her contempt motion set in three days (N-151), while Husband's emergency filings have drawn the checkbox (this row, N-050, DIN 354). Neither her counsel's conduct (N-029, N-044) nor the interference carded here has ever drawn a finding or a consequence. [IGNORED: the court screened the filing for emergency status and has never reached its content.]
Baseline deviation
A filed record of ongoing interference with a parent's time with his children normally draws a hearing or written findings. This one drew a single checkbox, and no finding has ever been made on any of the dated incidents underneath it (mechanism at N-050). The comparison that follows is argued from the pattern, not from any court finding.
Receipt
  • Docs 206, 207, 208 (the filed record); Doc 210, the checkbox.
  • Two distinct incidents, stated separately: the Michigan-trip vacation dispute, and the extra overnight around Mother's Day 2025 after which Wife rather than Husband took their daughter to her kindergarten graduation the next morning.
  • The 6/17/25 letter pages have not been checked against page images.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-051

N-0522025-08-01two orders in three minutes fifty-one seconds, neither with a hearing and neither with reasons, froze the whole discovery queue while the parts of Husband's own motion that would have moved discovery forward went unruled.DENIED
Date
2025-08-01
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
two orders in three minutes fifty-one seconds, neither with a hearing and neither with reasons, froze the whole discovery queue while the parts of Husband's own motion that would have moved discovery forward went unruled.
What the law required
Fla. R. App. P. 9.310 governs a stay pending appeal. A ruling that freezes all discovery states its reasons, because findings are what permit review (Broadfoot v. Broadfoot, 791 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)), and every matter submitted draws a ruling within a reasonable time. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). Doc 215 asked for three things: a response to the third request to produce, issuance of the Chase subpoenas, and the stay.
What happened
On 8/1/25, after the Second District sent the stay question down (Doc 223, 7/30/25), Judge Felix issued two orders without a hearing, three minutes fifty-one seconds apart. At 9:12 AM he denied the venue rehearing "on it's face" [sic] and gave no reasons. At 9:16 AM he granted the stay (Doc 225) and left its reasoning section empty. He left the discovery prongs of Doc 215 unruled, including the third request to produce and the Chase subpoenas. He took from Husband's own motion only the relief that required no findings against Davis, and froze the discovery queue. Wife's own 8/4/25 verified emergency motion to lift concedes the stay issued "without conducting a hearing or considering legal argument" (Doc 224 para. 11), while its own delay inventory omits every Husband motion. [DENIED: relief refused, and the reasons for refusing were never stated.]
Baseline deviation
A stay that freezes all discovery rests on stated reasons, and a motion's remaining parts get ruled on rather than dropped. Here the reasoning section is empty, and the discovery prongs of the same motion were dropped rather than ruled on. The stay is one event with four decision points: this grant, the lift never entered (N-060), the order-less status that followed (N-074), and the evidentiary day held under it (N-092).
Receipt
  • Doc 223 (Second District, 7/30/25).
  • The 8/1/25 twin orders stamped 9:12:41 and 9:16:32 (3 minutes 51 seconds, not four).
  • Doc 225 (reasoning section empty). Doc 215 (the dropped discovery prongs).
  • Doc 224 para. 11, plus the pendency-clock inventory (234, 234, 210, 185, and 200 days on motions heard February-April 2025 and never decided), read from page images because the text layer is ciphered.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-052

N-0562025-10-03an 82-page motion asking for findings on opposing counsel's conduct and for misconduct referrals has stood more than ten months with no order in either direction, as of August 20, 2026.IGNORED
Date
2025-10-03
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
an 82-page motion asking for findings on opposing counsel's conduct and for misconduct referrals has stood more than ten months with no order in either direction, as of August 20, 2026.
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). Doc 239 was submitted October 3, 2025 and has been noticed for hearing more than once.
What happened
Husband filed the 82-page sanctions motion on 10/3/25 (Doc 239). Judge Felix has never entered any order on it. It was set for 10/17/25 and never reached (N-060), re-listed 4/20/26, and confirmed on the notice at the 5/29/26 hearing (Tr. 231:19-23). It appears as item 8 on the 5/29/26 notice (Doc 295) and again as item 8 on the 10/9/26 notice (DIN 361), so it remains pending and set. The second safe-harbor letter, 5/9/2025, carried five itemized cure conditions and is distinct from the 12/5/2024 letter at N-011. Its safe harbor ran out 5/30/2025, and the follow-on sanctions motion was not filed until 10/3/2025, 126 days later. The motion demanded findings and misconduct referrals. It has never been decided either way. [IGNORED: the motion was never decided either way.]
Baseline deviation
Section 57.105 puts the fee question to the court once the safe harbor runs; Husband carries the burden of showing the positions were unsupported, and can carry it only at a hearing. The hearing has never been held, and no ruling either way has issued in more than ten months. A motion to compel filed by Wife's counsel was granted in part (Doc 138, 2/19/25, N-035). The statutory notice that preceded it, the section 57.105 letter at N-011, has itself never been heard: 649 days as of 9/15/26.
Receipt
  • Doc 239, Filing #232899712.
  • Doc 295 item 8 (5/29/26 notice). DIN 361 item 8 (10/9/26 notice).
  • Safe-harbor arithmetic as printed: 5/9/2025 plus 21 days is 5/30/2025; 5/30/2025 to 10/3/2025 is 126 days.
  • Related pendency: N-011 at 610 days to 8/7/26; this motion at 308 days to 8/7/26.

Spawned by: N-011, N-037, N-044

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-056

N-0572025-10-12the request that hearings be recorded was never decided, and while it waited the recordings that did exist were erased on a 30-day schedule; seven hearing dates now have no video at all.IGNORED
Date
2025-10-12
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the request that hearings be recorded was never decided, and while it waited the recordings that did exist were erased on a 30-day schedule; seven hearing dates now have no video at all.
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). Doc 245, the motion to record proceedings, was submitted October 12, 2025. The recordings that existed were overwritten on a 30-day schedule while it waited.
What happened
Husband filed the emergency motion to record proceedings on 10/12/25 (Doc 245). Two days later Judge Felix's handling order set the motion to be addressed at the October 17, 2025 hearing (Doc 247); no order issued there (Doc 250). It was next set for hearing six months later, at the 4/17/26 omnibus day, and was not decided there either. Wife listed it for 5/29/26 and it was never reached. Meanwhile the recordings went: the administrative office's 7/30/26 response states that for seven listed hearing dates the footage "had already been overwritten prior to the date of your request," under a 30-day retention schedule. The request to record has never been decided. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A motion asking that proceedings be recorded normally draws a decision one way or the other. The court said it would address the request on October 17, 2025 and has not decided it in the 347 days from filing to September 24, 2026. The recordings that existed anyway were destroyed on the ordinary schedule while it waited. No motive is asserted; the schedule's own proviso is quoted in the receipt.
Receipt
  • Doc 245, Filing #233451400 (stamp).
  • Doc 247 (handling order reciting full title); Doc 250 ("no order was issued"). The 98-minute checkbox (Doc 251) answers Doc 250, a later motion, and is carded separately.
  • Doc 276, read from page images (first hearing setting, 4/17/26 omnibus day, DIN 22 then 23 months old).
  • Seven overwritten hearing dates: 6/3/25, 10/9/25, 10/17/25, 2/3/26, 4/17/26, 5/29/26, 6/10/26; response: "There are no records satisfying this request."
  • Retention schedule text, p. 255 of 258: "RETENTION: 30 days, then erase and reuse provided any necessary images are saved."
  • Two receipted tensions: the stated grounds shifted (2025 exemption vs. 2026 overwriting) for the same records category; June 10, 2026 footage was overwritten with a three-day margin against the 7/13/26 request (6/10 plus 30 is 7/10).
  • Source: 13th Circuit administrative office's 7/30/26 response to the audio-video records request.

Spawned by: N-042

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-057

N-0602025-10-17the court set three of Husband's own filings for the 10/17/25 hearing and reached none of them, and the one thing it did grant that day, lifting the stay, was never put in an order, so for six months nobody could say what was stayed.IGNORED
Date
2025-10-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court set three of Husband's own filings for the 10/17/25 hearing and reached none of them, and the one thing it did grant that day, lifting the stay, was never put in an order, so for six months nobody could say what was stayed.
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. Every judge must rule within a reasonable time on every matter submitted. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). A court speaks through its written orders, so a stay imposed by order is lifted by order. The court rules on the motions its own handling order set for the hearing (Docs 239, 245, 60).
What happened
Judge Felix's own handling order set three of Husband's filings for the 10/17/25 hearing: Doc 239, the 82-page sanctions motion (N-056); Doc 245, the motion to record proceedings (N-057); and Doc 60, the section 57.105 notice of intent to seek sanctions. He lifted the stay, which both parties had sought, and never returned to any of the three. He declined to rule on any motion without a hearing and set no continuance date. The stay-lift order was never entered. Husband objected that with no order entered, the stay's status was unsettled and confusing to litigate under. On 4/17/26 Davis described the missing order as something that "slipped through the cracks," explaining: "Mr. Hanson had numerous objections to the order." [IGNORED: the motions the court itself had scheduled were left undecided.]
Baseline deviation
A court rules on the motions its own handling order set for hearing, and a stay is lifted the way it was imposed, by order. The reason given for not ruling, that the court would not decide a motion without argument, does not explain why the motions the court itself had noticed were never reached, or why the grant that day existed only as spoken words. A full evidentiary day went forward under the still-unlifted stay on 4/17/26 (N-092).
Receipt
  • Certified transcript, 10/17/25, Tr. 4 and 37-40.
  • 4/17/26 Tr. p. 23 (both halves of the Davis passage; the shorter rendering is an elision).
  • Court declined to rule "on the face of the motion. without a hearing".
  • The stay is one event with four decision points: the grant (N-052), the unentered lift (this row), the order-less status (N-074), and the stayed hearing (N-092).

Spawned by: N-056, N-057

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-060

N-0612025-10-17Husband tried to ask opposing counsel why he filed for primary custody 26 days before the discovery hearing; the court shut the question off, and declined to set the guardian ad litem motion, later run to an order, while his older discovery motion stayed behind.DENIED
Date
2025-10-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
Husband tried to ask opposing counsel why he filed for primary custody 26 days before the discovery hearing; the court shut the question off, and declined to set the guardian ad litem motion, later run to an order, while his older discovery motion stayed behind.
What the law required
Sec. 90.612 and the relevance rules permit examination into filing timing where retaliatory purpose is squarely at issue. The docket is managed on the merits rather than to shield a party's litigation-timing choices from inquiry.
What happened
At the 10/17/25 hearing Judge Felix made two rulings that kept Davis's litigation timing off the record. He refused to permit the examination: "I'm not going to entertain you asking Mr. Davis things about why he filed things at certain times" (Tr. 35:9-11). And he declined to set the guardian ad litem motion for evidentiary hearing: "You're a couple of steps ahead, Mr. Hanson. I'm not setting any motion hearings on the guardian right now" (Tr. 37:7-9). The predicate for the shut-off question is dated: the primary-custody amendment was filed 10/2/24, 26 days before the 10/28/24 discovery hearing. Davis has never been questioned on that timing. [DENIED: the inquiry was shut off and the hearing was refused.]
Baseline deviation
Section 90.612 and relevance rules permit examination into a party's filing timing where retaliatory purpose is squarely at issue. What the record fixes is the bookend: the guardian ad litem motion Judge Felix would not set on 10/17/25 was later noticed, given full evidentiary days, and ordered on 6/25/26 (N-125), while Husband's older discovery stayed subordinated. Husband said on the record his motion was "513 days" old; recomputed from the 5/16/24 filing, 10/17/25 is day 519. No motive is asserted.
Receipt
  • 10/17/25 Tr. 35:9-11 (refusal to examine) and 37:7-9 (guardian ad litem not set), per the 10/17/25 and 2/3/26 cold-read ledger of 7/23/26, items CR-1 and U-3; both statements are Judge Felix.
  • Husband's predicate question at Tr. 35:2-5. Tr. 29:5 ("513 days," Husband speaking).
  • Doc 200 p. 10, read from page images (10/2/24 filing, 26 days before the 10/28/24 hearing).
  • Deviation bookend via N-125.

Spawned by: N-003, N-060

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-061

N-1542025-10-24Husband asked the court to enter orders on his sanctions motion and his motions to record hearings; the court had said it would address the recording motions on October 17, 2025; 98 minutes later a checkbox form marked the request "not an emergency" and sent it to the normal course, and neither motion was set for an evidentiary hearing for another 175 daysIGNORED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Judge Felix wrote that Husband's recording motions "will be addressed on October 17, 2025." No order followed. Asked to rule on them and on his sanctions motion, he checked "not an emergency" ninety-eight minutes later and left every route to a ruling blank. As of Oct. 4, 2026, neither is decided; both are noticed for Oct. 9, 2026.

E
Expected output

Rule 2.215(g)(1) requires every judge to enter an order within a reasonable time on every matter submitted. Told that the motions his order said would be addressed on October 17 still had no order, Judge Felix rules, sets a hearing, or states why not. His own form offered each route.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Oct. 14, 2025: Judge Felix's handling order checked the box marked Other: the recording motions, with the sanctions request embedded in them, "will be addressed on October 17, 2025 at 12:00 p.m." N-154, N-057
    Read them: Handling order, Doc 247, p. 2 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Oct. 24, 2025, 7:14 AM to 8:52 AM: Husband moved for orders on Docs 239 and 245: "Despite recently purporting to 'address' these matters at the 10-17-25, no order was issued." Ninety-eight minutes later the form came back with one box checked: "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." Left blank: "A hearing will be held by Family Law Division Judge"; "The matter is time sensitive and an expedited hearing is warranted"; "The matter is legally insufficient on its face and is denied." N-154
    Read them: Motion, Doc 250, pp. 1, 4 (link pending redacted copy) · Handling order, Doc 251, p. 2 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Apr. 17 to Oct. 9, 2026: the first evidentiary setting for either motion came by Wife's notice for April 17, 2026, 175 days later. Neither was decided there. Both now sit among ten matters set for Oct. 9, 2026. N-154, N-057, N-056
    Ninety-eight minutes was enough to label the motion. When will the court decide the two motions it was asked to rule on?
    Read them: Wife's amended notice, Doc 276, pp. 1-2 (link pending redacted copy) · Wife's notice of continued hearing, Doc 361, pp. 1-2 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Judge Matthew Felix (the Oct. 14 promise; the Oct. 24 checkbox order). One motion, one form, one morning. Every duty here arises from Rule 2.215(g)(1) and the court's own Oct. 14 order on this motion alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const.: justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Rule 2.215(g)(1): "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." A label on the motion leaves both matters submitted and undecided.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-10-24
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband asked the court to enter orders on his sanctions motion and his motions to record hearings; the court had said it would address the recording motions on October 17, 2025; 98 minutes later a checkbox form marked the request "not an emergency" and sent it to the normal course, and neither motion was set for an evidentiary hearing for another 175 days
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). The court's own handling order had said the recording motion "will be addressed on October 17, 2025 at 12:00 p.m." (Doc 247).
What happened
On October 24, 2025 at 7:14 AM Husband filed an emergency motion asking the court to enter orders on two pending filings: the sanctions motion (Doc 239) and the motions to record hearings (Doc 245). The court's own October 14 handling order had said the Doc 245 motions "will be addressed on October 17, 2025 at 12:00 p.m." (Doc 247); the new motion stated that no order issued after that hearing. At 8:52 AM, 98 minutes after filing, Judge Felix signed a checkbox handling order with one box checked: "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." The boxes for an expedited hearing, for denial, and for abuse of the emergency process were left blank. The next setting of either motion for an evidentiary hearing was the April 17, 2026 omnibus day, 175 days later; in between, both appeared only on case management conference notices. Both are now among ten matters noticed for an eight-hour hearing on October 9, 2026, and as of September 26, 2026 no order deciding either appears in the case file (N-057, N-011). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A motion asking a court to rule on matters it has already promised to address draws a ruling, a hearing date, or a reason. The court's own form offered routes to each: an immediate order, a hearing, an expedited hearing for a time-sensitive matter, even denial as legally insufficient. The box checked reached only the label: "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." Ninety-eight minutes, and both underlying requests stayed undecided.
Receipt
  • Doc 250, Filing #234369865, e-filed 10/24/25 7:14:23 AM
  • Doc 251, emergency motion handling order, e-signed by Judge Felix 10/24/25 8:52:13 AM; one box checked
  • Doc 247, e-signed 10/14/25 2:56:59 PM, "Other" box checked: the Doc 245 motions "will be addressed on October 17, 2025 at 12:00 p.m."
  • Doc 250 p. 4, paras. 18 and 23
  • Doc 276 (Wife's amended notice, 2/20/26), setting Docs 239 and 245 for the 4/17/26 evidentiary hearing; Docs 252, 256 and 261 list both only for case management conferences
  • DIN 361 (7/30/26): ten matters, including Docs 239 and 245, noticed for 10/9/26
  • Day count: 10/24/25 to 4/17/26 is 175; the two stamps are 1 hour 37 minutes 50 seconds apart
  • Related decision points: N-057, N-011, N-056

Spawned by: N-057

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-154

N-0692026-01-08the ground raised was that a judge named as a defendant in a pending case was presiding over the related one; the order answered with a procedural bar, contained no analysis of that question, and the follow-on denial cited no authority at all.DENIED
Date
2026-01-08
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the ground raised was that a judge named as a defendant in a pending case was presiding over the related one; the order answered with a procedural bar, contained no analysis of that question, and the follow-on denial cited no authority at all.
What the law required
Due process requires an impartial tribunal: "no man can be a judge in his own case." Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016). Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(e)(2)(C) requires disqualification where the judge has "more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding"; the motion's allegations are taken as true and tested on whether a reasonably prudent person would fear an unfair trial (Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1986)).
What happened
On 1/8/26 Judge Felix denied Husband's motion to disqualify all 13th Circuit judges (Doc 255) by Doc 258. The order rests entirely on Rule 2.330(i) and contains no federal or structural-conflict analysis. It refers to Husband as "Defendant," which is a template artifact and is noted here only. Doc 280 attacks the order on those grounds. The follow-on motion to vacate and for rehearing was denied by Doc 260 on 1/22/26, and unlike Doc 258, Doc 260 cites no authority at all. The status ground has never been engaged on the merits by anyone. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A judge who is a defendant in a suit the litigant before him is prosecuting holds the disqualifying interest (Rule 2.330(e)(2)(C)); the ground is his status, and a disqualification motion's allegations are taken as true. No judge in any forum has engaged that question on the merits: the January 8, 2026 order ruled on a procedural track that never reached his status, and the Second District denied the prohibition petition in eight days without opinion (N-078, N-059).
Receipt
  • Docs 255, 258 (1/8/26) and 260 (cites no authority; electronic stamp 1/22/26 12:07:43 PM).
  • Doc 280 (attacks the order on due-process/structural grounds).

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-069

N-0732026-02-03asked to set an earlier hearing on a 20-month-old motion to compel, the court put the question to opposing counsel three times, was told "No, sir, I do not," and said "But I want his consent"; a court needs no permission to hear a motion.DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Asked to set Husband's twenty-month-old motion for Wife's financial records for its own hearing, Judge Felix put the question to Wife's lawyer, accepted "No, sir, I do not," and, when Husband said the court could order it, answered: "But I want his consent".

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 21 requires justice "without sale, denial or delay." A trial judge sets his own calendar, and opposing counsel's consent is no part of that authority. Holding a motion pending since May 16, 2024, Judge Felix sets the hearing himself or gives a reason that rests on the court's calendar rather than on opposing counsel's consent.

V
Verified facts and law
  • May 16, 2024: Husband filed his motion to compel Wife's financial records (DIN 22), listed by Wife's own notice as the "Motion to Compel Evidence of Marital Assets and Financial Information". N-003
    Read them: Wife's amended notice, Doc 276, p. 1 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Feb. 3, 2026: Husband asked whether the court was "refusing me an opportunity to address the discovery issues at a hearing before that?" Judge Felix: "Mr. Davis, would you agree to setting that matter individually before?" Davis: "No, sir, I do not, respectfully." Pressed for "Yes or no?": "No, sir, I do not." Later: "I have an hour. I've asked opposing counsel if he would agree to do that separately." Husband: "You can force him to do it." The court: "But I want his consent" and "I prefer to coordinate between the parties and the counsels with regards to hearings and Mr. Davis has not agreed to that." N-073
    What authority gives opposing counsel a veto over when a court hears a motion pending since May 2024?
    Read them: Hearing transcript, Feb. 3, 2026, pp. 14, 18, 21 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Feb. 3 to Apr. 17, 2026: everything went to April 17, seventy-three days later, with the promise "We'll do that first." It was argued first. The court ordered three years of mandatory disclosure from the bench and entered no written order. N-073, N-090
I
Independent encounter

Judge Matthew Felix (asked for consent; set the motion with everything else for April 17). Scott Davis, Wife's counsel (refused twice). One motion, one request, one transcript. Every duty here arises from the court's own control of its calendar on this request alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const.: the courts are open, and justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Rule 2.215(g)(1) gives every judge the duty to rule within a reasonable time on every matter submitted. A trial court controls its calendar under Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.200 and its inherent authority; neither depends on a party's consent.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-02-03
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
asked to set an earlier hearing on a 20-month-old motion to compel, the court put the question to opposing counsel three times, was told "No, sir, I do not," and said "But I want his consent"; a court needs no permission to hear a motion.
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. A trial court controls its own calendar under Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.200 and its inherent authority, and that control is not subject to a litigant's consent. A 20-month-old discovery motion needs no consent from the opposing party to be heard.
What happened
The question whether Davis would agree to an earlier, separate hearing on Husband's motion to compel came up three times in the same 2/3/26 hearing. Each time Davis declined, on the record: "No, sir, I do not, respectfully". When Husband pointed out the court could simply order the hearing, Judge Felix answered: "But I want his consent". He explained that he preferred to coordinate between the parties, and Davis had not agreed. Judge Felix then set everything, the discovery motion included, for the general 4/17 date, promising to take it first. It was argued first that day, and he never ruled on it (N-090). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A court has inherent authority to set its own docket and needs no party's consent to hear a pending motion. On 2/3/26 Judge Felix asked Davis whether he would agree to a separate, earlier hearing on Husband's 20-month-old discovery motion; Davis declined each time, twice stating, "No, sir, I do not." The motion was folded into the general 4/17 calendar instead, so Davis's refusal, not the court's own docket authority, decided when it would be heard.
Receipt
  • Doc 279, the certified transcript of the 2/3/26 hearing.
  • Tr. 14:1-19 (first ask and both refusals, 14:14 and 14:17): "Mr. Davis, would you agree to setting that matter individually before?" / "No, sir, I do not, respectfully," and again "No, sir, I do not".
  • Tr. 18:21-23 (court's recap: "I've heard the request before. I asked Mr. Davis if he would agree to that and he said no").
  • Tr. 21:1-20 ("But I want his consent" at 21:8; coordination sentence at 21:12-14: "I prefer to coordinate between the parties and the counsels with regards to hearings and Mr. Davis has not agreed to that.").
  • Tr. 21:16-20 and 23:4-6 (everything set for the 17th, "We'll do that first"). Tr. 9 (surrounding discovery/guardian ad litem argument).
  • Transcript runs Tr. 1-24; hearing concluded 12:24 p.m.

Spawned by: N-003

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-073

N-0742026-02-03the stay that froze discovery for six months was imposed in writing in under four minutes and was never lifted by any order at all; Husband asked in writing which order lifted it, and the question has never been answered.IGNORED
Date
2026-02-03
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the stay that froze discovery for six months was imposed in writing in under four minutes and was never lifted by any order at all; Husband asked in writing which order lifted it, and the question has never been answered.
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). Doc 283 asked one question. By what order, entered on what date, was the August 1, 2025 stay lifted.
What happened
No order lifted the 8/1/25 stay. A title-level sweep of Docs 250 through 365 found it was never lifted, vacated, dissolved or modified by any order. His Motion to Clarify Status of Stay (Doc 283, 4/14/26) states he was "unable to locate any order lifting, vacating, dissolving, or modifying the August 1, 2025 stay. No such order appears on the docket". No responsive order ever issued through Doc 365 (8/4/26). Wife's same-day response concedes the lift is order-less: "The Court has already lifted the stay. Following two hearings, the Court removed the stay," citing no order, no date and no reason, while attacking the stay's merits retroactively. The question is still open: by what order, entered on what date, was the stay lifted? Either an order exists and can be named, or there is none. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A stay is lifted the way it is imposed, by order, and a motion asking the court to identify the lifting order gets determined. This stay was imposed in writing in under four minutes with zero reasons (N-052), and un-imposed with zero writing at all, so the freeze has no recorded end. After it dissolved, Wife received the 4/17 evidentiary day and the guardian ad litem, while Husband's revived discovery drew granted quash and protective orders.
Receipt
  • Doc 283 para. 3 plus WHEREFORE clauses a through c.
  • Doc 286 paras. 2 and 14 (Wife's response, also citing "Not a single case, rule, or statute supports a stay").
  • Doc 279 Tr. 5:3-15 plus word-index confirmation ("I do not see any stay as a result of that writ").
  • Title sweep of Docs 250-365.
  • The stay is one event with four decision points (N-052, N-060, the unwritten lift recorded here, and N-092).
  • Related decision points: N-073, N-090.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-074

N-0762026-02-09The judge who presided on April 4, 2025 offered on the record to "go get the camera footage"; asked on April 17, 2026 whether he had watched it, her successor answered, "I have not." Two trial-court motions and two appellate requests to add the video drew no ruling on the merits, and the appellate orders name no judge.IGNORED
Date
2026-02-09
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
The judge who presided on April 4, 2025 offered on the record to "go get the camera footage"; asked on April 17, 2026 whether he had watched it, her successor answered, "I have not." Two trial-court motions and two appellate requests to add the video drew no ruling on the merits, and the appellate orders name no judge.
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). Docs 280 and 284 asked the court to watch the April 4, 2025 video.
What happened
Husband asked the trial court twice to look at the 4/4/25 video: Doc 280 (3/17/26) and its emergency re-filing, Doc 284 (4/14/26). On 4/17/26 he asked the court directly whether it had reviewed the video. The court first answered, "I have reviewed your motion." Asked again, the court answered: "I have not." Judge Felix entered a handling order only (Doc 285). The clerk's docket shows no order ruling on either through September 8, 2026. The appellate side ran the same way: the Second District denied the motion to supplement the record with that video in an order naming no panel and giving no reason, denied a rehearing motion the same way, and on April 6, 2026 denied a second request, treated as a motion to supplement, the same way (N-066, N-087). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A motion asking a court to look at the central piece of evidence gets a ruling. The video's existence is not in dispute: the court's own administrative office confirmed in writing that "a video record does exist" and withheld it (N-053), and the judge who invoked it in her own defense then declined to pursue it (N-042). The bench answered the question directly on 4/17/26.
Receipt
  • Docs 280 and 284, and the handling order at 285. Doc 267 is the appellate motion copied into the trial docket; Doc 283 is a stay motion.
  • 2D2025-1936 Docs 041, 042 and 043, each "BY ORDER OF THE COURT" with no judge named.
  • Doc 280 is the Motion for Judicial Review of the April 4, 2025 hearing video, e-filed 3/17/26 at 8:46:17 PM, 11 pp.
  • 4/17/26 exchange at Tr. 8:10-16 (including "Have you reviewed that video, Judge." and "Have you reviewed the video?"), lines 17-19 read for context; full transcript 423 pp., substantive text pp. 1-363; PDF page 8 renders reporter's own "[Page 8]" header, pagination one to one.
  • Speaker of "I have not." is the court, Judge Felix, presiding that day.
  • Unresolved-motions list in the matter file plus the docket pull; clerk docket export through DIN 378.

Spawned by: N-042, N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-076

N-0902026-04-17after 23 months the motion was finally heard and granted from the bench, and the grant moved nothing: the court said, "I didn't order this discovery and say you have to produce -- you don't -- I'm not precluding any right to make an objection," and entered no written order.WON-THEN-NULLIFIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

On a motion pending twenty-three months, Judge Felix ordered three years of mandatory disclosure from the bench. Asked by Wife's lawyer, "And that's the Court ruling on Dock 22?", he answered: "Correct." He entered no written order.

E
Expected output

A court speaks through its written orders; an oral grant never entered cannot be enforced or appealed. Having ordered disclosure from the bench on a motion filed May 16, 2024, and confirmed it was "the Court ruling on Dock 22," Judge Felix enters a written order with the 30-day deadline he set, and sets any objection for the hearing he promised.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Apr. 17, 2026: "So I'm going to order three years of mandatory disclosure going back three years from the date of the filing initial petition on January 26th 2024." Then: "I'm not going to preclude any objections to that. You can make your objections and we'll set that for a hearing specifically." And: "I didn't order this discovery and say you have to produce -- you don't -- I'm not precluding any right to make an objection, all right, and then we'll have to deal with that specifically." Husband: "they're not going to produce anything. They're going to kick the can down the -- further down the road". The court: "I appreciate your concern. Noted. We'll cross those bridges when we get there. 30 days?" N-090
    Read them: Hearing transcript, Apr. 17, 2026, pp. 114-116 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Apr. 17, 2026, later that day: Husband: "Well, the document 22 brings up that." The court: "We already handled that matter." N-090
    Read them: Hearing transcript, Apr. 17, 2026, p. 344 (link pending redacted copy)
  • July 22, 2026: Husband moved for entry of a written order on Doc 22. That motion drew no order either. N-090, N-133
    Where is the written order on Doc 22, and when does the disclosure ordered on April 17 become enforceable?
I
Independent encounter

Judge Matthew Felix (the bench ruling; no written order). Scott Davis, Wife's counsel (raised the agreements; "I understand the Court's ruling."). One motion, one hearing, one ruling never written. Every duty here arises from the court's own oral order and due process on this motion alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, ss. 9 and 21, Fla. Const. guarantee due process and justice without delay. Rule 2.215(g)(1): "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." A ruling announced from the bench and never reduced to writing cannot be enforced under Rule 12.380 or reviewed on appeal.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-04-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
after 23 months the motion was finally heard and granted from the bench, and the grant moved nothing: the court said, "I didn't order this discovery and say you have to produce -- you don't -- I'm not precluding any right to make an objection," and entered no written order.
What the law required
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 makes financial disclosure mandatory and owed without a request; Rules 12.350 and 12.380 supply the production order and its enforcement. A court of record speaks through its written orders, and an oral pronouncement never entered can be neither enforced nor appealed. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1) required the order within a reasonable time on this 23-month-old motion.
What happened
On 4/17/26, after 23 months, Judge Felix orally ordered three years of Rule 12.285 disclosure. He set 30 days but left Wife free to object, after her counsel raised the prenuptial and postnuptial agreements, and said: "I didn't order this discovery and say you have to produce -- you don't -- I'm not precluding any right to make an objection." He entered no written order. Later the same day, asked about the same motion, he said: "We already handled that matter." No written ruling exists in the record. Nothing was produced in the 30 days the court set, or since. When Husband moved in July 2026 simply to have that bench ruling reduced to writing, that motion drew no order either (N-133). [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
A court that grants a motion to compel compels something. Rules 12.285 and 12.350 exist so a party owed financial disclosure gets it. Here disclosure was ordered from the bench, every objection was left open, and nothing was written down. A court speaks through written orders, so an oral grant never entered cannot be enforced or appealed. The motion is the first-filed motion in the case (N-003).
Receipt
  • 4/17/26 Tr. 73, 114-116, 120-121, and 344 (the "We already handled that matter." line at Tr. 344)
  • Unwritten-ruling family, cited as a family whenever any one is used: N-060 and N-074 (the stay lift), NEW-P5 (the quash order, not entered until 56 days after the ruling), N-133 (the entry motion ignored)
  • Related decision points: N-073.

Spawned by: N-003, N-073

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-090

N-0912026-04-17asked six times to make findings of fact, the court answered: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so."DENIED
Date
2026-04-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
asked six times to make findings of fact, the court answered: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so."
What the law required
Due process requires an impartial tribunal and a record on which its impartiality can be reviewed. Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). A challenge to the judge's status is engaged under Rule 2.330(e)(2)(C), and findings of fact are what make a court's rulings reviewable (Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)).
What happened
On 4/17/26 Judge Felix refused to make findings of fact six times. In his own words: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so." He orally denied the structural-conflict disqualification "at this time" in reliance on Doc 258, an order that had itself rested purely on the successive-motion bar (N-069). He denied a recess. No findings of fact were entered. Findings here would have created the factual record on the structural conflict that N-069 and N-078 each disposed of without reaching. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Findings of fact are how a decision becomes reviewable. A judge who says in advance he will not find facts unless reversed inverts the appellate sequence, since the higher court reviews the findings. Six weeks later, asked whether he would ever find facts about Husband's constitutional rights, the same judge answered "Maybe." (N-108). The findings the court declined to make are the same findings the Bar's 6/16/26 closure letter requires for any resubmission (N-121).
Receipt
  • 4/17/26 Tr. 50, 181, and 353-357
  • The main quote is at Tr. 181; "at this time" is at Tr. 50
  • The quote "You've already brought that up and I ruled on that" (Tr. 344:11-12) belongs here, answering Husband's structural-conflict point; it is not on N-090
  • The "Maybe." answer is at 5/29/26 Tr. 53:9-15 and is carried at N-108

Spawned by: N-069, N-078

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-091

N-0922026-04-17an eight-hour trial day on Wife's motion, held while the case was stayed; Husband's noticed motions had waited nine months for any hearing at allEXCUSED
Date
2026-04-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
an eight-hour trial day on Wife's motion, held while the case was stayed; Husband's noticed motions had waited nine months for any hearing at all
What the law required
A stay entered by written order stays in force until an order lifts it; a court speaks through its written orders. Fla. R. App. P. 9.310 governs the stay, and the Second District's September 8, 2025 order approved it "without prejudice to the parties to seek relief from the stay in the trial court" (1150 Doc 234). No order ever lifted the August 1, 2025 stay.
What happened
On April 17, 2026, Judge Felix presided over an eight-hour evidentiary day, primarily on Wife's guardian ad litem motion, while the August 1, 2025 stay stood unlifted by any order. The hearing ended unfinished. This unlifted stay is also the predicate the Bar's later closure letter got wrong (N-121). [EXCUSED]
Baseline deviation
A stay means the case stops until an order lifts it. The court directed Wife's counsel to prepare the order lifting it, and he never submitted one: his concession on the record is "it slipped through the cracks, and I didn't submit it." The same court that had not reached Husband's noticed motions in nine months convened a full evidentiary day for Wife's motion while the stay stood.
Receipt
  • 4/17/26 transcript 23:1-9: Wife's counsel conceding "it slipped through the cracks, and I didn't submit it," and attributing delay to Husband: "Mr. Hanson had numerous objections to the order"
  • 1150 Doc 225
  • 2D2025-1936 Doc 014
  • the never-entered stay-lift order at N-060
  • the waiting motions at N-056 and N-057
  • Certified transcript 10/17/25, Tr. 37:19-40:15: stay lifted on both parties' requests; Wife's counsel directed to prepare the order. Stay entered 8/1/25 on Husband's motion (Doc 225). The quoted concession is trimmed; the full passage, with counsel's stated reason, is at N-060.

Spawned by: N-060

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-092

N-0952026-05-01Husband asked the court to write down its own factual findings; the entire answer was a checked box reading "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course," and the findings are still unwritten.IGNORED
Date
2026-05-01
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband asked the court to write down its own factual findings; the entire answer was a checked box reading "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course," and the findings are still unwritten.
What the law required
Due process requires a reviewable record. Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge," and to report to the chief judge each month every matter held under advisement more than 60 days. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). A trial court's refusal to make findings prejudices appellate review (Broadfoot v. Broadfoot, 791 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)), and where a statute conditions relief on a finding, omitting it is itself a departure from the essential requirements of law (Oldham v. Greene, 263 So. 3d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); Asteberg v. Russell, 144 So. 3d 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)).
What happened
On 5/1/26 Husband's emergency motion for written findings of fact (Docs 296 and 297) drew handling orders only, Docs 298 and 299. The checked disposition on each reads "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." No merits ruling issued and the findings remain unwritten. Doc 297 contains the wrong document, the Bar's motion to quash, and the corrected motion is missing from the records tree. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.215(g)(1) gives every judge a duty to enter an order on every matter submitted, within a reasonable time, and written findings are what make a ruling reviewable (Broadfoot; Ruberg). Section 61.401 conditioned the guardian appointment then pending on a best-interest finding. Written findings would have put the underlying facts on the record where they could be reviewed. Deferring the request matches the declaration at N-091, that findings would be made only if an appellate court required them.
Receipt
  • Docs 296 and 297
  • Docs 298 and 299 at p. 2, the checked-box disposition, quoted
  • The corrected motion does not appear in the record as swept.

Spawned by: N-091

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-095

N-1042026-05-18asked to take judicial notice of the case in which he is himself a named defendant, the judge sustained the other side's relevance objection from the bench, stated no ground of his own, and entered no written order.IGNORED
Date
2026-05-18
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
asked to take judicial notice of the case in which he is himself a named defendant, the judge sustained the other side's relevance objection from the bench, stated no ground of his own, and entered no written order.
What the law required
Section 90.202(5) and (6), Florida Statutes, permit judicial notice of court records and official acts, and section 90.203 makes it mandatory: "[a] court shall take judicial notice of any matter in s. 90.202 when a party" requests it, gives the adverse party notice, and furnishes sufficient information. Doc 303 did each. A ruling either way is entered in writing so it can be reviewed.
What happened
Docs 303, 304 and 305, filed the night of 5/18/26 into the early hours of 5/19/26 and running roughly 761 pages, asked the court to take judicial notice of the mandamus case and related records. On 6/10/26 Judge Felix refused them from the bench: "At this time I'm going to sustain the objection to the request for judicial notice on those matters." He adopted the opposing relevance objection, stated no ground of his own, and entered no written order. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Section 90.203 makes judicial notice mandatory once a party requests it with notice to the other side and furnishes the records; Doc 303 attached 38 exhibits and was served through the portal. An order either way, granting or denying, would have put the mandamus at N-058 and the judge's own status in it on the 1150 record. What issued instead was an oral ruling adopting the opposing party's objection, with no ground of the court's own and nothing in writing, so nothing on the record states why.
Receipt
  • Docs 303, 304 and 305, filed 5/18-5/19/26, 761 pages across the three
  • Doc 303 is the Request for Judicial Notice and Docs 304 and 305 are the compendium volumes it attaches
  • 6/10/26 Tr. 22:17-19

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-104

N-1072026-05-28a motion asking the court to hear the discovery first and the guardian ad litem second went unruled, and four weeks later the guardian ad litem was appointed with the sequencing question still open.IGNORED
Date
2026-05-28
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
a motion asking the court to hear the discovery first and the guardian ad litem second went unruled, and four weeks later the guardian ad litem was appointed with the sequencing question still open.
What the law required
Rule 2.545(a), Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin., directs the judge to "take charge of all cases at an early stage" and "control the progress of the case thereafter," and Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.200 supplies the case-management tool. Rule 12.350 gave Wife thirty days to respond or object to the third request, and silence preserves no objection; Rule 12.380 makes the motion to compel the court's to decide.
What happened
Husband filed Doc 321 on 5/28/26, seeking the return or escrow of $6,000 paid to Davis, a separate sum from the guardian ad litem retainer (N-134); an order compelling Davis's billing, source-of-funds records, and Bar-communication records; and priority for the discovery and recording motions before any guardian ad litem. Judge Felix never ruled on it. Four weeks later he appointed the guardian ad litem with the sequencing motion still unresolved (N-125). The underlying third request to produce has itself never drawn a response, an objection, or a ruling, 571 days of silence as of 9/15/26 (N-037). The motion remains unruled. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.545(a) puts the judge in charge of the progress of the case, and summary relief waits for the discovery bearing on the issue (Brandauer, 2d DCA; Holl v. Talcott). An order on this motion would have compelled Davis's billing, the source of his funds, and the Bar communications (N-031), on a request Wife never answered or objected to. None was entered. The sequencing motion sat unruled while the guardian ad litem track ran to its order.
Receipt
  • Doc 321, Filing #249121023 (DIN confirmed against the live docket; formerly cited as "311")
  • Ruling sweep complete as of 8/7/26: every order-titled file after Doc 163 was checked, 35 or more, and none touches the third request to produce
  • Doc 210's emergency finding had no substantive follow-through
  • The "not denied" statement rests on the motion's own characterization of Wife's reply
  • Third request to produce #140

Spawned by: N-011, N-031, N-037

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-107

N-1082026-05-29asked whether he knew he was a defendant in a pending case against the circuit, the judge answered "I may be"; asked whether he would ever find any facts about Husband's constitutional rights, and after reframing the question himself, he answered "Maybe."DENIED
Date
2026-05-29
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
asked whether he knew he was a defendant in a pending case against the circuit, the judge answered "I may be"; asked whether he would ever find any facts about Husband's constitutional rights, and after reframing the question himself, he answered "Maybe."
What the law required
Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a fair tribunal: "[N]o man can be a judge in his own case" (In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)), and recusal is required whenever "the probability of actual bias. is too high to be constitutionally tolerable" (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009)). The right to be heard "includes the right to introduce evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" and to cross-examine (Baron v. Baron, 941 So. 2d 1233, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)), and a court hears the motions it notices.
What happened

At the 5/29/26 hearing Judge Felix was asked whether he knew he was a defendant in the mandamus case; he said he might be, and declined to disqualify himself. Asked whether he would ever find facts about Husband's constitutional rights, the court reframed the question and answered "Maybe." He sustained relevance objections to Husband's questions about the Bar complaint (Tr. 43:2-5, 44:25-45:4), and left unanswered the filed representation that the Bar took no action on Husband's complaint, the paragraph carded at N-105 that the Bar has never corrected.

He confirmed the sanctions motion was on the notice. Later in the same hearing, when Wife's counsel asked whether to remove everything else from the notice for the continued hearing, the court answered: "We're not going to get to the rest of that stuff. That's my lunch break." The sanctions motion, DIN 239, is now set within the October 9, 2026 hearing, still unheard. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 9 guarantees a fair tribunal: "[N]o man can be a judge in his own case" (In re Murchison). Husband renewed his motion on the judge's status as a defendant in Husband's pending records suit, defended by the office then appearing against Husband in this case (N-058, N-109). The judge answered "I may be," declined the motion "at this time," and made no finding on his status or on any fact. Two certified transcripts show it: 4/17/26 at Tr. 181 and 5/29/26 at Tr. 53.
Receipt
  • 5/29/26 hearing transcript, page and line
  • Tr. 43:2-5, 45:5-9, 46:7-14, 47:9-13, 52, 53:9-15, 231:19-23, 249:19-250:2
  • "I may be." is at Tr. 46:7-14; the court's reframed question, "Are you asking me in the future at some point if I might?", travels with the "Maybe." at Tr. 53:9-15
  • "That's my lunch break." is at Tr. 250:2, the court speaking
  • Tr. 45:5-9: the Bar "did not act" representation, quoted verbatim
  • Tr. 231:19-23 (the noticing) and Tr. 249:19-250:2 (the stripping) are two connected passages: the second refers only to unnamed "other motions" and "the rest of that stuff" and does not name the sanctions motion

Spawned by: N-091

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-108

N-1092026-05-29all three of Husband's witnesses were excused from the bench in one hearing, and the motion excusing the court's own records custodian was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends this judge in the records case.DENIED
Date
2026-05-29
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix (custodian motion argued by Sr. AAG Schwieterman)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
all three of Husband's witnesses were excused from the bench in one hearing, and the motion excusing the court's own records custodian was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends this judge in the records case.
What the law required
Article I, section 9: the right to be heard "includes the right to introduce evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" and to cross-examine (Baron v. Baron, 2d DCA). A protective order requires good cause shown on the record (Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.280), and a subpoena is quashed only if "unreasonable and oppressive" (Rule 12.410); the movant carries that burden, and a blanket release without a good-cause finding is legally insufficient.
What happened
On 5/29/26 Judge Felix quashed all three of Husband's witness subpoenas from the bench. He excused Vivian Cortes Hodz as "not necessary". He excused G. Samarkos of Harris, Hunt & Derr as not relevant to any other basis. He excused the 13th Circuit records custodian as "not the appropriate avenue". The custodian motion was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends Judge Felix in the mandamus case. He directed the movants to draft their own orders. None of the three witnesses ever testified. The written orders that followed carry no findings either (N-112, N-113). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Good cause, found on the record, is the movant's burden before a witness is released, and impartiality is required where the judge's own litigation counsel argues the motion. Rule 2.420(l) requires expedited review in the records case that counsel defends; that case had been pending for months (N-058). The quash motions were filed one to two days before the hearing, leaving no chance to respond in writing, and one movant's counsel conceded that the request "is the most logical request that Mr. Hanson has made." The concession changed nothing.
Receipt
  • 5/29/26 Tr. 101-157 (the quash extract): excusing Samarkos "not relevant," and to "any other basis?" the answer was "No."
  • The Attorney General's dual role is preserved on the record
  • Downstream written orders: Doc 325 (6/2/26) and Docs 326 and 327 (6/3/26)

Spawned by: N-058, N-108

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-109

N-1102026-05-30the same chambers gave the guardian ad litem hearing a date twelve days out; for the 30-minute hearing Husband needed first, the 5/27/26 offer was 63 days out, and it was heard on 7/7, twelve days after the guardian ad litem had already been granted.DENIED
Date
2026-05-30
Actor
Judge Felix / Div A chambers
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
the same chambers gave the guardian ad litem hearing a date twelve days out; for the 30-minute hearing Husband needed first, the 5/27/26 offer was 63 days out, and it was heard on 7/7, twelve days after the guardian ad litem had already been granted.
What the law required
Rule 2.545(a) puts the judge in charge of the progress of the case, and the court's calendar answers to the court, not to a litigant's consent. Hearing time from one chambers is allocated even-handedly, and summary relief waits for the discovery bearing on the issue (Brandauer, 2d DCA; Holl v. Talcott).
What happened
The court fast-tracked the guardian ad litem hearing, set for June 11, 2026, twelve days from the 5/30/26 email. For the 30-minute hearing on the Bar's protective-order and quash motion, the same chambers made two offers: on 5/27/26 the earliest window for a 30-minute Zoom hearing was 63 days out; on 6/2/26 the judicial assistant offered 7/7 and 7/14. It was heard 7/7/26, after the 6/25/26 grant. The disparity is documented in writing on 5/30/26 and again on 6/2/26. The 5/30 question was put in a scheduling channel, so no email-channel rule explains what followed: it has drawn no answer in 108 days as of 9/15/26. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Hearing time is allocated even-handedly. Both requests were pending in the same chambers the same week. One drew multi-hour blocks within days; for the other, a 30-minute hearing, the earliest offer was 63 days out. That let the guardian ad litem question be decided on 6/25 before the Bar-handling evidence was heard on 7/7, where it was then quashed (N-130). Heard in order, that evidence would have entered the record before the appointment was decided.
Receipt
  • The 5-30-26 email PDF; offer dates at pages 3 and 6
  • The 6/2/26 email at its page 6 contains dates only and no sentence addressing the explanation request; it offers 7/7 and 7/14 for the 30-minute hearing
  • Comparator: on 5/8/26 a 5-hour in-person block was reset 21 days out; nineteen days later, on 5/27/26, the earliest 30-minute window was 63 days out
  • Intervals recomputed and confirmed: 5/8 to 5/29/26 is 21 days; 5/27 to 7/29/26 is 63 days; 5/30/26 to 8/17/26 is 79 days
  • The twelve-day figure is computed

Spawned by: N-107

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-110

N-1122026-06-02the witness who holds Husband's own former firm's record of the 2024 discovery refusals was "fully released" by an order that states no findings and no legal basis anywhere on its face.DENIED
Date
2026-06-02
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the witness who holds Husband's own former firm's record of the 2024 discovery refusals was "fully released" by an order that states no findings and no legal basis anywhere on its face.
What the law required
A protective order requires good cause shown on the record (Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.280, incorporating Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(d)), and a subpoena is quashed only if "unreasonable and oppressive" (Rule 12.410). The movant carries that burden, and a blanket release with no good-cause finding is legally insufficient. Article I, section 9 guarantees the right to introduce evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (Baron v. Baron, 2d DCA).
What happened
On 6/2/26 Judge Felix signed Doc 325 releasing G. Samarkos of Harris, Hunt & Derr, Husband's own former counsel. The order says she is "fully released". It contains no findings and states no legal basis on its face. Samarkos never testified. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Good cause is the movant's burden, and the order states none. Findings would have put the ruling's grounds on the record, told Husband what to narrow or cure, and given a reviewing court something to review. This order is the written form of the 5/29/26 bench quash (N-109), and the witness released is Husband's own former counsel at Harris, Hunt & Derr, the firm whose file covers the 2024 discovery refusals. Any scope concern was curable by narrowing; the order releases her in full.
Receipt
  • Doc 325, e-signed 6/2/26 9:08:34 PM
  • Comparator on timing: this order and the custodian order at Doc 326 issued about 6 days after their motions were filed on 5/27/26, while the Bar officials' motion carried 46 days to an oral ruling and 102 days to a written order, entered 9/1/26 (N-130)

Spawned by: N-109

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-112

N-1132026-06-03the order releasing the court's own records custodian states no findings and no legal basis, and it was entered twice: Doc 327 is a byte-identical duplicate of Doc 326.DENIED
Date
2026-06-03
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the order releasing the court's own records custodian states no findings and no legal basis, and it was entered twice: Doc 327 is a byte-identical duplicate of Doc 326.
What the law required
A protective order requires good cause shown on the record (Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.280, incorporating Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(d)), and a subpoena is quashed only if "unreasonable and oppressive" (Rule 12.410); the movant carries that burden. A parallel public-records remedy does not divest the court of power to receive relevant evidence in the case before it, and Article I, section 9 guarantees the right to introduce that evidence at a meaningful time (Baron v. Baron, 2d DCA).
What happened
On 6/3/26 Judge Felix signed Doc 326, which "fully released" the 13th Circuit records custodian and the Trial Court Administrator. He entered no findings. Doc 327 is a byte-identical duplicate. The custodian never testified. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Good cause is the movant's burden, and the order states none in either copy. This is the order that closed the records-custodian route, seeded at N-037: the written form of the 5/29/26 bench quash (N-109), where the motion excusing this custodian was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends the signing judge in the mandamus. The subpoena sought the April 4, 2025 hearing video. The court administrator's own letters (N-053) invoke section 119.071(3)(a)3, which permits release on good cause shown to a court of competent jurisdiction; this court was one.
Receipt
  • Docs 326 and 327, e-signed 6/3/26 4:55:51 PM

Spawned by: N-109

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-113

N-1182026-06-10The judge Husband is suing decided whether he could keep Husband's case; his order does not mention that he is a defendant in it.DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Judge Felix, a named defendant in Husband's pending records suit, denied the motion to remove him from Husband's family case 9 hours and 27 minutes after it was filed, in an order that never mentions he is a defendant.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 9 guarantees an impartial judge, and Rule 2.330(e)(2)(C) makes a judge's own interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding a ground for disqualification. Rule 2.330(e)(2)(C) makes the judge's own interest a ground of its own, separate from bias. Judge Felix rules on that ground, in writing, on the motion's face, and makes the findings asked for. He does not grade his own fairness. He knew the question: asked on May 29, 2026 whether he knew he was a defendant, he answered "I may be."

V
Verified facts and law
  • Nov. 13, 2025: Husband's amended petition in 25-CA-010255 names Judge Felix as a defendant. N-059, N-118
  • Jan. 8 and April 17, 2026: Judge Felix denied the first motion on rule 2.330(i) alone, with no analysis of his status as a defendant. Asked six times for findings, he said: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so." N-069, N-091
  • June 10, 2026, 12:00 AM to 9:27 AM: Doc 329 pled the separate interest ground, rule 2.330(e)(2)(C), and asked for findings under Caperton. Doc 331 denied it under rule 2.330(i): the judge "can be fair and impartial in this case" and the motion "is legally insufficient as a matter of law." The two-page order never mentions the records suit. N-118
    Why may a judge who is a defendant in Husband's records suit preside over Husband's family case? Three courts have been asked, and none has said.
    Read them: Motion to disqualify, Doc 329 (June 10, 2026, 12:00 AM) (link pending redacted copy) · Order denying it, Doc 331 (June 10, 2026, 9:27 AM) (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Judge Matthew Felix, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, presiding in the family case and a named defendant in 25-CA-010255, ruled on his own disqualification the morning it was filed. One motion, one order, one morning. Every duty here arises from the Constitution and rule 2.330 on this motion alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const. and the Fourteenth Amendment: "[N]o man can be a judge in his own case" (In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). Recusal is required where "the probability of actual bias ... is too high to be constitutionally tolerable" (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009)). Rule 2.330(e)(2)(C) makes the judge's own interest a ground separate from bias, judged on the motion's face with the truth of the allegations not weighed (Fischer v. Knuck).

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-06-10
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the motion pled a status ground the rule treats separately, that the judge was himself a named defendant in a pending case; the order denying it 9 hours and 27 minutes after filing called the motion "legally insufficient" and never mentions that ground
What the law required
Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment: "[N]o man can be a judge in his own case" (In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); recusal is required where "the probability of actual bias. is too high to be constitutionally tolerable" (Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009)); a judge who had significant personal involvement in a critical decision in the case may not later sit on it (Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016)). Rule 2.330(e)(2)(C) reaches a judge with "more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding," a status ground distinct from the prejudice ground of (e)(1), judged on its face with the truth of the allegations not weighed (Fischer v. Knuck).
What happened
Judge Felix is a named defendant in Husband's pending public-records suit (25-CA-010255). Doc 329, the motion to disqualify him on that ground, was filed at 12:00 AM on 6/10/26. At 8:34 AM Davis filed a fee request limited to the fees of responding to the motion (Doc 330). At 9:27 AM, 9 hours and 27 minutes after the filing, Judge Felix denied the motion to disqualify himself (Doc 331). He cited rule 2.330(i), called the motion "legally insufficient," and stated that he is able to be fair and impartial. He never addressed the separately pled (e)(2)(C) interest ground or the due-process argument. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
The Constitution decides this one: no man may judge his own case (Murchison), and recusal is required where the probability of bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable (Caperton; Williams). Where a court rule and the federal Constitution conflict, the Constitution controls (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Doc 329 pleaded the status ground under Rule 2.330(e)(2)(C), distinct from the earlier prejudice motion, and asked for findings under Caperton. The order ruled as a successor judge under subdivision (i), certified its own fairness, and never mentions the defendant status the motion was about.
Receipt
  • 10255 Doc 038 p. 1, the caption naming "JUDGE MATTHEW FELIX" as a defendant.
  • Doc 329 (filed 12:00 AM 6/10/26).
  • Doc 330 (8:34 AM).
  • Doc 331 (9:27 AM), with the DIN confirmed by a docket pull.

Spawned by: N-108, N-113

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-118

N-1232026-06-17a non-party's lawyer submitted a proposed order at 9:42 AM and had it signed by 1:47 PM the same day, about 4 hours and 5 minutesPENDING
Date
2026-06-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix (signing); Lawrence Hodz, counsel for non-party Vivian Cortes Hodz (proposing the order)
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (Judge Felix)
Mechanism
a non-party's lawyer submitted a proposed order at 9:42 AM and had it signed by 1:47 PM the same day, about 4 hours and 5 minutes
What the law required
Rule 2.545(a) puts the judge in charge of the progress of the case. Rule 2.215(g)(1) gives every matter submitted the same duty: a ruling within a reasonable time. Signing velocity is the judge's choice, and the choices are the record.
What happened
On 6/17/26 Judge Felix signed a protective order about 4 hours and 5 minutes after Lawrence Hodz, counsel for non-party Vivian Cortes Hodz, submitted the proposed order at 9:42 AM. Doc 336 carries a Felix stamp of 1:47:24 PM. It grants the motion, finds the subpoena "not relevant", denies fees, and recites that the matter was heard 5/29. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Velocity is a choice, and the choices are the dataset. Two like-for-like figures exist for proposed orders submitted to the same chambers in the same case: about 4 hours 5 minutes here, and about 19 hours 54 minutes at N-128. A third number, the 827-day age of the N-003 lineage as of August 21, 2026, is offered as scale only, not a matched comparison.
Receipt
  • Doc 336 (Felix JAWS stamp 6/17/2026 1:47:24 PM).
  • The proposed order as served is held off docket, Filing 250544732 per the e-service receipt, 9:42 AM.
  • The 4h05m figure rests on the e-service receipt alone.
  • The pendency comparator appears at N-003.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-123

N-1252026-06-25the order appointing a guardian ad litem over Husband's children makes no finding that either parent is unfit, cites no statute and no rule, names no guardian, and recites a hearing on a date when no session took placeDENIED
Date
2026-06-25
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the order appointing a guardian ad litem over Husband's children makes no finding that either parent is unfit, cites no statute and no rule, names no guardian, and recites a hearing on a date when no session took place
What the law required
A parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his children is a fundamental liberty interest (Art. I, s. 9; Fourteenth Amendment). Section 61.401 conditions the power on a finding, "if the court finds it is in the best interest of the child, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem," and omitting a required finding is itself a departure from the essential requirements of law (Asteberg; Riley, 2d DCA). Summary relief waits for the discovery bearing on the issue (Brandauer; Holl), and the order must recite the proceedings accurately.
What happened
On 6/25/26 Judge Felix ordered a guardian ad litem (Doc 337) on Wife's motion of 12/13/24. There is no unfitness finding. No statute or rule appears on the order's face. No guardian ad litem is named. The order recites hearings including "May 22, 2026," and no session occurred that day; the actual date was 5/29, confirmed by four documents. He entered it while the sequencing motion asking that discovery be heard first sat unruled (N-107) and while every discovery motion sat unruled. The motion it granted alleged no incident, no date, no observation and no witness about the children, and its only factual allegations about Husband were four quotations from his own May 2024 filing (N-001). Discovery-first sequencing would have produced rulings on the older motions before any appointment issued. The appointment issued first. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Section 61.401 lets a court appoint a guardian ad litem in a case touching a parent's fundamental liberty interest only on a finding that the appointment is in the child's best interest. The order states three things: Wife's concerns, Husband's own statement that he is a good parent, and the court's belief that a guardian would aid its decision-making. It names no fact about either child, and its hearing-date recital matches the superseded notice, not the record. The motion had stood 544 days; the order issued 15 days later.
Receipt
  • Doc 337, e-signed 6/25/26 4:11:37 PM.
  • 5/29/26 Tr. 59:2-5 (Davis: the guardian ad litem and psychological evaluation motions "pending for 532 days").
  • 6/10/26 Tr. 29:3-4 (Davis: "pending for 544 days"). Both quotations rest on the transcript text layer; the page images have not been separately checked.
  • Older gating discovery motions drew no hearing in the same courtroom in the same period; the psychological-evaluation motion recited in the same breath still sat unruled at 641 days as of 9/15/26.

Read the source document: Doc 337, Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Guardian ad Litem (6/25/2026, redacted public copy), p. 1

Spawned by: N-018, N-107, N-061

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-125

N-1282026-07-03opposing counsel's own exit order, sent direct to chambers, was signed in 19 hours and 54 minutes; the entered order gave him more than the stipulation asked, releasing him "forever relieved of the responsibility's attendant thereto" [sic]PENDING
Date
2026-07-03
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix (signing); Scott Paul Davis (withdrawing counsel; e-service address thereafter Hunter Law Group)
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (Judge Felix)
Mechanism
opposing counsel's own exit order, sent direct to chambers, was signed in 19 hours and 54 minutes; the entered order gave him more than the stipulation asked, releasing him "forever relieved of the responsibility's attendant thereto" [sic]
What the law required
Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.505(f) allows withdrawal by leave of court on motion with client consent or stipulation. Withdrawal ends the representation, not the court's jurisdiction over counsel's conduct in matters already pending (Moakley v. Smallwood, Fla. 2002; Pino v. Bank of N.Y., Fla. 2013), and an order reaching a non-stipulating party's pending claims issues on notice and an opportunity to be heard (Art. I, s. 9). Rule 2.215(g)(1) gives every matter submitted the same reasonable-time duty; signing speed is a choice, and the choices are the record.
What happened
The joint stipulation for leave to withdraw was e-filed 7/2/26 at 11:56:53 AM (Doc 338), and a proposed order and a letter went direct to chambers at 12:22 and 12:28 PM. Judge Felix signed the order the next morning at 7:50:35 AM (Doc 344), 19 hours 53 minutes and 42 seconds later. The stipulation asked only that Wife and Davis "agree to the release of Scott P. Davis, Esq. and HUNTER LAW, P.A. to withdraw as counsel for the Wife." The entered order grants more: Davis and Hunter Law "are allowed to withdraw as attorney of record and are forever relieved of the responsibility's attendant thereto" [sic]. No reservation of jurisdiction over withdrawing counsel appears anywhere in it. Husband's motion for rehearing of this withdrawal order is still pending. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.505(f) allows withdrawal by stipulation; the court's jurisdiction over withdrawing counsel's conduct in pending matters survives it (Moakley; Pino). Same judge, same case, same mechanism: counsel's own exit order was signed in under 20 hours, and Husband, party to no stipulation, was heard on none of it. His Doc 22 motion (N-003) had stood 827 days as of August 21, 2026 with no written order, and his proposed order memorializing the court's own 12/19/24 oral ruling has never been signed. His 7/23/26 written request drew "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email".
Receipt
  • Doc 338 (Filing #251698136, e-filed 7/2/26 11:56:53 AM; e-signatures Sarah Hanson 11:42 AM, Scott Paul Davis 11:09 AM; submitted by Hunter Law).
  • Doc 344 (e-signed 7/3/26 7:50:35 AM), single page; quotes verbatim from the faces. Elapsed 19 hours, 53 minutes, 42 seconds.
  • E-service notices for Filings 251698136, 251701417 and 251702076; JAWS signing notice 7/3.
  • On 7/6/26 Husband filed a Notice of Objection and Motion for Clarification re Retained Jurisdiction (Doc 341) directed at the release language; Wife, self-represented thereafter, responded 7/12 (Doc 345).
  • The conformed-copies block lists both parties as self-represented at entry.
  • The proposed order as served to chambers on 7/2 at 12:22 and 12:28 PM has not been retrieved for comparison against the entered order's language, and the portal links have expired.
  • Clarity note: the pending motion here is Husband's rehearing motion on this withdrawal order, not the sanctions motions, which are pending on their own rows at N-056 and N-057.
  • Related decision points: N-133, N-139.

Spawned by: N-003, N-110

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-128

N-1302026-07-07Bar counsel argued three rule grounds by name, the court found none of them, and the four Bar officials' subpoenas were quashed with two of the four sitting in the roomDENIED
Date
2026-07-07
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir. (Bar's Doc 309 vs. Hanson's DIN 316)
Mechanism
Bar counsel argued three rule grounds by name, the court found none of them, and the four Bar officials' subpoenas were quashed with two of the four sitting in the room
What the law required
Article I, section 9: a party may subpoena relevant, non-privileged evidence and make a record (Baron v. Baron, 2d DCA). A subpoena is quashed only if "unreasonable and oppressive" (Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.410) and a protective order requires good cause shown (Rule 12.280); the movant carries that burden, with findings on the grounds it argued. Under Rule 3-7.1(b), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, a closed file's correspondence with the respondent is public record, and under Article I, section 24 the custodian carries the burden of any exemption.
What happened

On 7/7/26 Judge Felix granted the four Bar officials' motion to quash and made no rule-factor findings. Two of the four sat in the hearing: Kelley and Courtemanche both confirmed their presence. Bar counsel argued the subpoenas were oppressive, harassing, and irrelevant. The court found none of those grounds; its sole ground was that subpoenaing those individuals was not procedurally appropriate in a family law case.

Husband set a September 2025 letter describing a multi-level Bar investigation against the Bar's own filed statement that it "did not act" (N-105). The court replied: "I heard that. I heard that, Mr. Hanson." Then it quashed. Husband gave an oral preservation demand for the Bar's electronics, 32 days after the Bar wrote the records had been disposed of (N-116). Judge Felix directed Bar counsel to prepare the order; it was entered on 9/1/26, 56 days after the oral grant (NEW-P5). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
The movant's burden is good cause: oppression, harassment, relevance, burden. Bar counsel argued three by name; the ruling finds none of them and does not differentiate among the four subpoenas. A closed Bar file is public record under Rule 3-7.1(b) and Article I, section 24. What those subpoenas were the route to is the whole stake: which account of the Bar's handling of Husband's complaint is accurate, the September 2025 letter describing a multi-level investigation (N-055), or the Bar's own filed statement that it "did not act" (N-105).
Receipt
  • July 7 mini transcript (Guldin, RPR, certified 7/13/26), not docketed; hearing 4:00 to 4:32 PM, 32 minutes.
  • Cites: Tr. 4:19-23, 5:5-22, 6:23-7:3, 7:10-20, 8:9-18, 9:1-12, 9:13-10:8, 11:17-12:13, 12:25-13:3, 17:17-18:8, 20:3-10, 21:19-23:4, 23:18-24:14, 24:15-25:23, 26:10-16, 27:9-13, 27:20-28:6, 29:20-25, 30:9-10, 30:22-31:5, 31:6-18, 31:19-32:1.
  • Kelley announced himself "for The Florida Bar" (Tr. 4:22-23); Courtemanche confirmed his own presence (5:21-22).
  • Wife had argued in the same hearing that the Bar dispute was "procedurally improper to be raised within these proceedings" and that the court lacked jurisdiction "to permit the questioning or the depositions of these individuals because this is a divorce proceeding" (21:19-23:4). The word match ("procedurally") is recorded, and nothing is asserted about why.
  • The ruling came in two parts, cut off at "I'm not --" (29:25) and resumed at 30:22 with "I've already ruled on the motion for guardian ad litem."
  • Husband's preservation demand: "I've asked for The Florida Bar to maintain the electronics" (12:25-13:3).
  • Asked whether the parallel oversight failures would simply continue, the court said "I'm not going to answer that question." (31:6-18). Asked whether it would decide due process: "There was a motion filed, it was duly noticed, I heard all sides, and I made a ruling." (31:19-32:1).
  • Four transcript anomalies, none quoted on this card: a "MR. LONDOT: Yes." tag at 31:8 landing inside Husband's sentence, unattributable from the page; "the closure of the market" at 24:11 where context indicates "the matter"; "even mute" at 8:18 where "moot" is evident; "intentionally cursed and confusing" at 26:20 inside Husband's own remarks.
  • Doc 309 p. 1 (movant list: Courtemanche, Schuyler, Kelley and Sheridan; Gangi is not a movant) and para. 5.
  • Differential-timing comparators: Doc 325 (6/2/26) and Doc 326 (6/3/26), about 6 days from filing; this motion, filed 5/22/26, carried 46 days to the oral grant, and the written order issued 9/1/26, 102 days from filing and 56 days from the oral grant.
  • "reviewed on three levels" is Husband's phrase in open court and is not the letter's phrase (see N-055).

Spawned by: N-055, N-105, N-121

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-130

N-1332026-07-22Husband asked the court to put its own Doc 22 ruling in writing; the answer was "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email" and seven August slots that all lapsed; the same court signed Wife's emailed order in 25 hours and set her an eight-hour hearing one day after she asked.IGNORED
Date
2026-07-22
Actor
Judge Felix / Div A chambers (judicial assistant Ellen Courtemanche, no known relation to Bar Deputy General Counsel Richard Courtemanche)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
Husband asked the court to put its own Doc 22 ruling in writing; the answer was "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email" and seven August slots that all lapsed; the same court signed Wife's emailed order in 25 hours and set her an eight-hour hearing one day after she asked.
What the law required
Article I, section 9: the opportunity to be heard on a pending motion is a basic component of due process, and a litigant who followed the court's stated procedure is entitled to have his motions set and heard. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.200 authorizes the court to set and prioritize pending motions, and Rule 12.285 requires the disclosure the announced ruling covered. A court of record speaks through its written orders.
What happened

On July 22, 2026 at 12:01 PM Husband filed his Motion to Set Pending Motions for Hearing and for Entry of an Order on Docket #22, and transmitted a five-page proposed order at 12:39 PM.

The court's entire engagement came the next afternoon: "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email", plus seven case-management slots. Eight minutes later, in the same thread, the same court answered Wife's question with three offered eight-hour October dates (N-139). His request to notice one of the August slots drew no scheduling response, and all seven lapsed (N-139).

No order on the motion has ever been entered. This followed the court's own July 7 commitment, recorded in the opposing party's contemporaneous account, that its assistant "would reach out with proposed dates". Fifteen days later none had come.

As of August 7 the underlying Doc 22 motion stood at 813 days, its ruling still not in writing. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
A court of record speaks through its written orders. The ruling on Husband's Doc 22 motion was announced from the bench on April 17 as "the Court ruling on Dock[et] 22" and never reduced to writing (N-090). Husband's motion asked for two ordinary things: enter the written order, and set his unheard motions for hearing. It produced one sentence about email etiquette, seven offered August slots, and no order. The same channel produced Wife's order in about 25 hours (N-134) and an eight-hour hearing for her one day after she asked (N-139).
Receipt
  • Filing #253018138 (7/22/26 12:01 PM), the motion. The proposed order, Submission #253023609, 12:39 PM, unsigned and not docketed.
  • The chambers email of 7/23 at 4:24 PM. The 4:24 PM figure is the capture; the quoted header reads 4:25 PM, so both are reported, and the interval to 4:32 PM is seven or eight minutes. Three captures agree.
  • The 4:32 PM answer to Wife in the same thread, offering three eight-hour October dates (N-139).
  • The seven offered August slots and their lapse (N-139).
  • The opposing party's 7/22/26 written account of the 7/7 commitment.
  • The chambers emails issue over the signature block of judicial assistant Ellen Courtemanche, no known relation to Bar Deputy General Counsel Richard Courtemanche.
  • Day counts recomputed at build.

Spawned by: N-003

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-133

N-1342026-07-23a party's email asking for the order was followed by a signed order in about 25 hours; the order bills Husband $3,000 within three days, imposes a paid communication service no motion asked, and was entered while his briefed challenge to the appointment sat unruledDENIED
Date
2026-07-23
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
a party's email asking for the order was followed by a signed order in about 25 hours; the order bills Husband $3,000 within three days, imposes a paid communication service no motion asked, and was entered while his briefed challenge to the appointment sat unruled
What the law required
Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment: a party is entitled to notice of the relief sought against him and an opportunity to be heard before it is ordered; an order adjudicating issues no pleading presented denies due process (Neumann; Worthington, 2d DCA). Section 61.16(1) requires the court to consider the parties' financial ability before imposing costs, and a guardian ad litem fee order without express ability-to-pay findings carries a "fatal flaw" (MacDonald, 4th DCA 2026; Levy, 3d DCA 2024). A fully briefed challenge to the appointment (Doc 342) is decided before the appointment is implemented.
What happened
Wife wrote to chambers at 10:27 AM on 7/22/26: "We are waiting on the Order approving one of the individuals". Judge Felix e-signed Doc 351 at 11:37:14 AM on 7/23/26, about 25 hours later. He made no finding of unfitness, no finding of harm, and no best-interest finding naming a fact about either parent. Paragraph 16 orders a $6,000 retainer due within three days at $325.00 an hour, split evenly, so it bills Husband $3,000, with a cease-work term on nonpayment. Paragraph 7 imposes mandatory paid OurFamilyWizard, which appeared in no motion. Paragraph 12 makes the guardian's file unobtainable by the parties. No proposed order circulated and no selection hearing was held. The order as served breaks mid-sentence at every interior page break, and its numbering jumps from 16 to 20. Judge Felix entered it while the briefed reconsideration of Doc 337 sat unruled, and it is still unruled. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Section 61.16(1) requires a finding on ability to pay before costs are imposed, and a guardian fee order without one carries a "fatal flaw" (MacDonald; Levy). This order bills Husband $3,000 within three days at $325 an hour, on a record where his sworn, unrebutted testimony is no income since 2024, and makes no finding on either parent's ability. OurFamilyWizard appeared in no motion; relief no pleading requested denies due process (Neumann). The fully briefed reconsideration (N-125) sat unruled while the order it challenged was implemented.
Receipt
  • Doc 351, e-signed 7/23/26 11:37:14 AM. Paragraph 16 retainer due "within 3 days of entry" at "$325.00 per hour,"
  • Wife's 7/22/26 10:27 AM email. Order PDF created 7/22 at 4:32 PM per metadata.
  • Paragraph 16 also carries an ex parte enforcement clause on nonpayment. Paragraph 7's OurFamilyWizard duty carries a 24-hour response requirement. No complete copy of the order exists anywhere in the record.
  • Docs 342 (reconsideration of Doc 337, filed 7/6, opposed 7/12) and 345.
  • Doc 198 Tr. 87 (Wife's 4/4/25 testimony about Husband's refusal to enroll in OurFamilyWizard, the only prior surfacing of that subject; no motion ever requested it).
  • Doc 337 to Doc 351 is 28 days.
  • The certified Clerk copy has not been obtained, and the Clerk and JAWS copies have not been compared.
  • Pendency comparators are carried at N-003.

Read the source document: Doc 351, Order Appointing Guardian ad Litem as filed (7/23/2026), para. 16 at p. 4

Spawned by: N-125

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-134

N-1352026-07-23the three-day clock to pay his $3,000 half of a guardian ad litem's retainer ran out before the guardian had ever contacted Husband, and the motion he filed on July 28 to stay or extend it drew only a same-afternoon checkbox form, "not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course," and no decision on the stay or extension, then or sinceIGNORED
Date
2026-07-23
Actor
Judge Felix (undecided stay request); Wife (private enforcement)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
the three-day clock to pay his $3,000 half of a guardian ad litem's retainer ran out before the guardian had ever contacted Husband, and the motion he filed on July 28 to stay or extend it drew only a same-afternoon checkbox form, "not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course," and no decision on the stay or extension, then or since
What the law required
Article I, section 9: an obligation imposed by court order carries process before it is enforced, and any contempt for nonpayment requires a finding of present ability to comply (Bowen v. Bowen, Fla. 1985). A motion for stay pending review is made in the lower tribunal first, which has continuing jurisdiction to grant or deny it (Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(a)); a verified stay or extension request gets determined.
What happened
The order appointing the guardian ad litem, entered Thursday 7/23/26, required the retainer "within 3 days of entry of this Order." At 7:45:45 AM on Tuesday 7/28/26 Husband filed a verified emergency motion for reconsideration, stay, or extension. At 4:13 PM the court checked one box: "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." The stay and extension were never decided. The court's three prior emergency responses had been the same kind of checkbox form (Docs 285, 298 and 299). That morning, at 8:18 AM, Wife wrote: "If you are going to copy our GAL, you need to pay her retainer so she is properly paid", with OurFamilyWizard enforcement. At 11:57 AM the next day, the guardian ad litem sent her first substantive communication: "I just found my introduction email in my drafts, so I have just sent it out. I apologize it was not sent out last week when it was intended." The three-day term ran out before the person to be paid had ever contacted the payor. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Due process attaches before an order's money term is enforced, and a stay request under Rule 9.310(a) is the trial court's to decide first. What is receipted is internal to the order's mechanics: a three-day payment clock set on 7/23 against an appointee whose first substantive contact came on 7/29, in an order served with four of its nine pages missing. The court signed the appointment in about 25 hours (N-134) and issued nothing on the merits of the stay or extension request, then or since.
Receipt
  • The guardian ad litem's 7/29/26 email PDF, both pages.
  • The 7/28 thread capture. The Filing #253388797 portal capture (the emergency motion).
  • DIN 351 p. 4 para. 16, the appointing order's retainer term (e-signed 7/23/26 11:37 AM).
  • DIN 354 pp. 1-2, the 7/28/26 4:13 PM handling order, one box checked.
  • The court's three most recent emergency responses were "not an emergency" checkbox forms: Docs 285, 298 and 299.

Spawned by: N-134

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-135

N-1392026-07-28Husband sought a hearing by filed motion, by proposed order, and by an email accepting the court's own offered dates, and got no hearing, no order and no reply; Wife asked by email and had an eight-hour day set the next day, by the same court that six days earlier had written "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email."DENIED
Date
2026-07-28
Actor
Judge Felix chambers (judicial assistant Courtemanche)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
Husband sought a hearing by filed motion, by proposed order, and by an email accepting the court's own offered dates, and got no hearing, no order and no reply; Wife asked by email and had an eight-hour day set the next day, by the same court that six days earlier had written "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email."
What the law required
Article I, section 9: the opportunity to be heard on a pending motion is a basic component of due process, and a litigant who conferred, agreed to a date, and appeared at the case management conference the court's procedure prescribes is entitled to have his motions set and heard (Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.200). A docket is administered even-handedly: a court that declares a scheduling channel closed does not run the same channel for one side.
What happened

At 8:14 AM on 7/28/26 Wife wrote to chambers: "Can you please reserve the October 9, 2026 at 9AM 8 hour day for this matter. Mr. Hanson has been unresponsive to coordination requests." That was sent 60 to 120 seconds after, and directly beneath in the same thread, Husband's 8:13:43 AM email: "I am available at any of the times you mention below."

After Wife's 7/29 10:45 AM follow-up, the court replied at 12:52 PM: "The hearing has been set for October 9, 2026 at 9:00am for 8-hours in-person." That is 2 hours and 7 minutes from her follow-up, one day from her request, and six days after the same court wrote "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email" when the pending request was Husband's (N-133). Eight minutes after writing that sentence the same court answered Wife's 4:27 PM question with three 8-hour October dates, and the September 25 date was gone.

Husband's 7/29 11:28 AM email asking to notice one of the court's own offered August slots drew no scheduling response and remains unanswered. Seven August slots lapsed. Wife's Notice of Hearing was filed 7/30 at 9:24:11 AM (DIN 361). It reserves no court reporter. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
A docket is administered even-handedly, and a court that declares a scheduling channel closed does not then run that same channel for one side. The answer to any channel defense is in the channel's own history: in the ten weeks before that sentence was written, eight chambers emails on the same case set hearings, reset hearings, offered slots, waived a cancellation notice, and instructed a party to file a notice of hearing. An eight-hour block had been discussed in July. The deviation claimed is the channel, the speed, and the lapse of the August slots, never that an October date was set.
Receipt
  • The 7/28 thread capture. The 7-30-26 court email PDF pp. 3-4. The 7-29-26 guardian ad litem email PDF p. 4 for the 8:13:43 header. The Notice portal capture, Filing #253595130.
  • Husband's route in full: the court's own 7/7 commitment that its assistant "would reach out with proposed dates" and none came; the filed motion with a five-page proposed order (N-133); his 7/29 email accepting one of the court's own offered August slots. It produced one sentence about email etiquette, no order, no scheduling reply, and seven lapsed slots.
  • Channel history: eight chambers emails between 5/8/26 and 6/17/26, from the same judicial assistant on the same case, across five pages.
  • An 8-hour hearing had been discussed at the 7/7 case management conference for motions "previously set but not addressed," in Wife's own 7/22 words.
  • 7/28/26 8:14 AM to 7/29/26 12:52 PM is 28 hours 38 minutes.
  • The 4:24 PM text appears in full at page 1 of the 7/28 thread capture. The 4:24 and 4:32 bodies are snippet captures, not full-body captures, and the native messages are not held.
  • The 7/30 notice PDF's scope (which motions it sets) was unknown at capture, so nothing is asserted about it.
  • The chambers emails issue over the signature block of judicial assistant Ellen Courtemanche.
  • Setting one of the court's own August slots would have produced a hearing on the motions Husband asked to set (N-133). The slots lapsed.

Spawned by: N-133

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-139

N-1402026-07-29the rule requires a judge to report to the chief judge every month on any matter he has held more than 60 days; on 7/29/26 Husband filed six formal notices in one morning for six matters standing at 290 to 804 daysPENDING
Date
2026-07-29
Actor
Judge Felix (2.215(g)(1) reporting duty)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the rule requires a judge to report to the chief judge every month on any matter he has held more than 60 days; on 7/29/26 Husband filed six formal notices in one morning for six matters standing at 290 to 804 days
What the law required
Rule 2.215(g)(1) requires a judge to report matters under advisement 60 days or more to the chief judge each month. Rule 2.215(g)(2) and Form 2.604 are the litigant's prescribed notice instrument.
What happened
On 7/29/26 at 6:40:33 AM Husband filed six Form 2.604 Notices of Pending Matter in one filing, one each for six matters left undecided on this docket. The notices state day counts computed as of the filing date: DIN 22 at 804 days, DIN 111 at 548, DIN 163 at 491, DIN 177 at 470, DIN 239 at 299, and DIN 245 at 290. As of August 21, 2026 the same six stand at 827, 571, 514, 493, 322 and 313 days. Every party-computed figure recomputes exactly from the Clerk's docket dates. Six is the count of notices filed, not everything undecided: the pendency inventory at N-134 carries a seventh undecided matter, DIN 146, for which no notice was filed. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.215(g)(1) sets the trigger at 60 days, and the litigant's prescribed instrument for raising it is the Form 2.604 notice under 2.215(g)(2). The deviation here is measured by the rule itself, the same construction as the word "[e]xpedited" in Rule 2.420(l) at N-058. The answer is checkable either way: a monthly report either lists these six matters or it does not.
Receipt
  • Filing #253488214. Portal capture and the filed packet; the dates were recomputed with zero mismatches as of 8/1/26.
  • Docketed as DIN 360.
  • Note: Husband's 7/29 email said "5 notices"; the filed packet is six, and the filing record controls.

Spawned by: N-003, N-133

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-140

N-1422026-07-29on the same afternoon the same chambers set Wife's 8-hour hearing by email in 2 hours 7 minutes, Husband asked for the August dates the court had already offered and that any refusal be put in writing; no response to either appears in the recordPENDING
Date
2026-07-29
Actor
Judge Felix chambers (August-dates fork); Sr. AAG Schwieterman (embedded supervisor fork)
Institution
13th Cir. / OAG
Mechanism
on the same afternoon the same chambers set Wife's 8-hour hearing by email in 2 hours 7 minutes, Husband asked for the August dates the court had already offered and that any refusal be put in writing; no response to either appears in the record
What the law required
Article I, section 9: the opportunity to be heard on a pending motion is a basic component of due process. The request called for the August dates already offered or a refusal with a stated basis, and it put the supervisory layer on notice. Any answer is evidence.
What happened
On 7/29/26 at 1:40 PM Husband emailed for the August hearing dates the court had already offered, copying Chief Judge Sabella's judicial assistant and Attorney General counsel: "I am requesting the dates in August previously offered." He asked that any refusal be stated, and reiterated a separate demand to speak with a supervisor at the Attorney General's office. As of August 21, 2026 no response to either appears in the record, a statement scoped to the period searched. The only chambers communication after it in the window is the 7/30 10:12 AM case-manager redirect (N-143). [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
The request called for the August dates or a refusal with a stated basis, with the supervisory layer on notice. The channel was demonstrably open that same afternoon: the same chambers set Wife's 8-hour October hearing by email in 2 hours and 7 minutes (N-139). As of August 21, 2026 no response addressing either demand appears in the record, scoped to the period searched.
Receipt
  • The as-sent PDF of the 7/29/26 1:40 PM email.
  • Full text: "If the court is refusing to schedule anything before October, please respond to this email stating so, with any explanation the court will offer."
  • Full text: "I'm reiterating my demand to speak with a supervisor within the attorney general's office. If you are continuing to refuse that request, please confirm so here."
  • This card rests on the court's silences rather than on the email's adjectives, which are themselves in the record.

Spawned by: N-133, N-140

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-142

N-1432026-07-30the court closed itself as a correspondence channel and routed both parties to a case manager, the morning after Husband escalated to the chief judge's office.PENDING
Date
2026-07-30
Actor
Judicial assistant Courtemanche / 13th Cir. (case manager Bekida Lee)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
the court closed itself as a correspondence channel and routed both parties to a case manager, the morning after Husband escalated to the chief judge's office.
What the law required
Rule 2.545(b) puts the judge in charge of the progress of the case. The record questions are the stated premise and the timing.
What happened

On 7/30/26 at 10:12 AM the court wrote: "Because neither party in this matter is currently represented by legal counsel, this case has been assigned to a case manager. Please direct any future communication regarding your case to your assigned case manager."

The email issued the morning after Husband's 7/29 1:40 PM escalation copying Chief Judge Sabella's judicial assistant and Attorney General counsel (N-142). It issued one day after he filed the six notices of pending matter (N-140), and eight days after the motion asking the court to put its own Doc 22 ruling in writing (N-133).

[PENDING]

Baseline deviation
Rule 2.545(b) keeps the progress of the case in the judge's charge. The record question is the timing. The routing issued the morning after Husband's escalation to the chief judge's office (N-142), one day after six Rule 2.215 notices of pending matter (N-140), and eight days after the motion asking the court to put its own Doc 22 ruling in writing (N-133). The chronology is the claim.
Receipt
  • 7-30-26 court email PDF p. 1.
  • The email issues over the signature block of judicial assistant Ellen Courtemanche. The case manager named in DIN 362 is Bekida Lee, 13th Cir.
  • Whether this routing is routine for dockets postured as self-represented is not established on this record.

Spawned by: N-142, N-139

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-143

N-1472026-08-04"Any postings to social media about the case shall be immediately removed," ordered with no motion or hearing.PENDING
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Judge Felix ordered that "Any postings to social media about the case shall be immediately removed," a provision no motion asked for, entered with no notice or hearing on it and no finding about speech, and served on Husband for the first time on August 4, 2026.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 4 makes a restraint on a parent's speech about his own case presumptively invalid. It issues only on a motion, after notice and a hearing, with findings of a compelling interest that nothing narrower will serve, and the party seeking it carries that burden. The order is served complete on entry, and the parent learns its terms then, not twelve days later because the guardian reported missing pages.

V
Verified facts and law
  • July 23, 2026: the order appointing a guardian ad litem (Doc 351) was entered as five pages: the odd pages of a nine-page order. N-147
  • Aug. 3 to 4, 2026: the guardian wrote that "several of the pages of the Order are missing" and asked only for a complete copy. The next day Judge Felix entered the nine-page Amended Order. Husband received for the first time a waiver of the hearsay rules, a waiver of all claims, and the social media removal order. The order's one finding is that a guardian is in the children's best interest. N-147
  • Aug. 4 to 7, 2026: Wife moved for contempt the same morning, asking that Husband's time with the children be cut to alternate weekends as "an appropriate sanction." On Aug. 7, three days after filing, Judge Felix set it for an Aug. 27 hearing, since reset to Oct. 9. Husband's own first-filed discovery motion stood at 827 days on August 21, 2026 with no ruling. N-148, N-151, N-003
I
Independent encounter

Judge Matthew Felix (the Amended Order and the hearing setting). The guardian ad litem (a one-page letter). Wife (the contempt motion). One order, one docket. Every duty here arises from the speech and due process clauses of the Florida Constitution on this order alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 4, Fla. Const. and the First Amendment: a limitation on protected speech is "presumptively invalid" and stands only on findings of a compelling state interest served by the least restrictive means (Romero v. Erik G. Abrahamson, P.A., 113 So. 3d 870, 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)). Whoever seeks the restraint carries that burden (Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1199-1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)); here no one sought it. Art. I, s. 9: relief must be relief someone asked for, with notice and a hearing (Neumann; Delgado v. Miller).

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-08-04
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (Judge Felix)
Mechanism
four pages of obligations Husband had never been served, among them a ban on posting about his own case, first reached him on August 4, 2026, entered on a non-party's letter with no motion, no notice, and no hearing
What the law required
Freedom of speech (Art. I, s. 4, Fla. Const.; First Amendment): a limitation on protected speech is "presumptively invalid" and justified only by findings of a compelling state interest served by the least restrictive means (Romero v. Erik G. Abrahamson, P.A., 2d DCA 2012); whoever seeks the restraint carries that burden. Due process (Art. I, s. 9): an order adjudicating issues no pleading presented denies due process (Neumann), and restrictions imposed sua sponte without a hearing are quashed (Delgado v. Miller). Section 61.403(2) allows a records order "only after notice to all parties and hearing thereon."
What happened

The 7/23/26 order appointing a guardian ad litem (Doc 351) was entered as a five-page document, only the odd pages of a nine-page order. On 8/3/26 the guardian ad litem wrote Judge Felix that "several of the pages of the Order are missing" and asked for a complete copy. The next day Judge Felix entered a nine-page Amended Order; no paragraph was deleted or reworded, only the restored pages and signature block changed.

Obligations never before served came into existence against Husband on 8/4/26: a waiver of the section 61.403(1) notice requirement, blanket self-executing authority over confidential records, a waiver of the hearsay rules, a duty to fund the guardian's counsel in advance, a prospective waiver of all claims, and: "Any postings to social media about the case shall be immediately removed". No motion, notice, or hearing preceded any of it. The fifteen-day rehearing window closed 8/19/2026. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
A restraint on speech about one's own case is presumptively invalid and requires findings of a compelling interest served by the least restrictive means (Romero, 2d DCA); relief no motion requested denies due process (Neumann; Delgado). This order's one finding is that a guardian is in the children's best interest; it says nothing about speech, claims, hearsay, or records. Eleven paragraphs of obligation first reached Husband on 8/4/26, on a non-party's letter asking only for a complete copy. Whether they bind him before service is the live question.
Receipt
  • The guardian ad litem's letter to Judge Felix, "Correspondence to Judge Felix 26.08.03.pdf," 1 p., dated August 3, 2026, Via E-Portal, signed over the title GUARDIAN AD LITEM, copying both parties.
  • Full quote: the order "appears to have at some point been printed double-sided, but only one side of each page was captured when it was signed and uploaded into Hover."
  • Amended Order, 8/4/26, all 9 pp.; text layers unusable, no OCR used, so the delta was built from page images.
  • Doc 351 as entered, all 5 pp.; the Clerk's e-filing footer numbers those five pages 1 through 5 consecutively, so nothing was lost in transmission; four of five page transitions break mid-sentence.
  • Doc 337 (2 pp.).
  • DIN 365 confirmed from a docket screenshot; Clock-In Event Date 08/04/2026, creation 08/05.
  • Rule text pulled 8/17/26 from three concordant secondary sources rather than from the official flcourts publication.
  • No certified Clerk copy of Doc 351 is held, so the five-page defect is shown here from a downloaded PDF rather than from the record.
  • Process comparison: the appointment itself consumed roughly 15 hours of hearing time across three dates before a two-page order issued; the paragraphs added on 8/4 consumed no hearing time at all. A non-party appointee's letter drew action from the court in one day, while Husband's own first-filed discovery motion stood at 827 days as of August 21, 2026 with no ruling (N-003).
  • The guardian ad litem asked only that a complete copy be entered; she did not ask for an amended order, and what the amendment added is the court's act, not hers.
  • N-125 carries the grant event; this is a downstream decision point.

Read the source document: Doc 351, Order Appointing Guardian ad Litem as entered 7/23/2026 (the five-page version)

Spawned by: N-019

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-147

N-1512026-08-07no order to show cause was ever issued; the unsworn contempt motion itself was set for hearing three days after it was filed, with one hour reserved for three motions, one of which asks the court to cut Husband's time with the children to alternate weekends as a sanction.PENDING
Date
2026-08-07
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (Judge Felix)
Mechanism
no order to show cause was ever issued; the unsworn contempt motion itself was set for hearing three days after it was filed, with one hour reserved for three motions, one of which asks the court to cut Husband's time with the children to alternate weekends as a sanction.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law, and civil contempt requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. The movant must prove a prior order, notice of it, and non-compliance, and contempt requires a finding of present ability to comply (Bowen); timesharing may not be modified as a contempt sanction (Duncan v. Brickman, 2d DCA 2017). The lawful options on 8/7/2026 were an order to show cause with a return date, denial, or setting the motion behind the matters already noticed.
What happened

On 8/4/2026 at 9:49:26 AM Wife filed a motion asking the court to hold Husband in contempt, to compel compliance, and to sanction him (DIN 364), 4 pages of motion plus 5 of exhibits, signed "/s/ [Wife], Esq., Florida Bar No. 065956." It is unsworn. No oath, no verification, no affidavit and no section 92.525 declaration appears anywhere in the nine pages. It cites no rule, no statute and no case, and it does not distinguish civil from criminal contempt.

On 8/7/2026 at 11:42:18 AM Judge Felix signed DIN 366, e-served the same day, setting it for hearing on 8/27/2026 at 2:00 PM with one hour reserved for all three motions. One of those three asks the court to reduce Husband's time with the children to alternate weekends as a stated sanction. No order to show cause has issued and none appears on the docket.

Three comparisons sit inside this same docket. Nine days before setting this motion, the same court checked "NOT AN EMERGENCY" on Husband's own 7/28 verified motion (DIN 354). The 7/30/2026 notice of continued evidentiary hearing sets 10/9/2026 for eight hours on ten enumerated matters under a footnote binding the court to hear motions "in the Order that they were filed," and this motion was filed after all ten and is being heard first. And Husband's own first-filed discovery motion, DIN 22, was filed 852 days ago. It drew an oral ruling on 4/17/2026 and still has no written order.

He filed a verified response and a motion to continue and re-set to 10/9/2026 on 8/15/2026. Both are undecided. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 9 provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law, and timesharing may not be modified as a contempt sanction (Duncan v. Brickman, 2d DCA). The options on 8/7/2026 were an order to show cause with a return date, denial, or setting the motion behind the matters already noticed. The court set the motion itself, unsworn and citing nothing, ahead of ten matters noticed for hearing in filing order, while two stay motions on the same order sat undecided.
Receipt
  • DIN 366, the order setting hearing entered 8/7/2026, at its title, body, execution line, signature block, footer and copies list.
  • DIN 364, filed 8/4/2026, all 9 pages read from the page images rather than the text layer. The only signature in the filing, at p. 4, is expressly a certificate-of-service signature, which is not a sworn verification.
  • Two face-level mismatches, recorded verbatim and characterized as nothing: the clerk's docket event description reads "ORDER SETTING FINAL HEARING WITHOUT PRETRIAL CONFERENCE" while the word FINAL appears nowhere on the instrument, and the caption reads "Division: AP" while the case is Division A.
  • DIN 354, the 7/28/2026 emergency-handling form. DIN 361, the 7/30/2026 notice, its ten matters and the filing-order footnote.
  • The clerk docket snapshot of 8/15/26 covers DINs 347-366. Husband's 8/15/2026 filings: verified response, 24 pp.; motion to continue, 17 pp.
  • Intervals: 8/4 to 8/27 is 23 days; 8/7 to 8/27 is 20 days.
  • The DIN 361 phrase "No court reporter reserved" is a paraphrase. The actual text is "A court reporter has not been reserved at this time."
  • Speed-of-relief distribution on this docket: N-123 (about 4 hours, a non-party's proposed order), N-128 (19h54m, opposing counsel's exit order), N-134 (about 25 hours, an order billing Husband $3,000), against N-139, where a filed motion, a proposed order, and acceptance of the court's own offered dates drew no hearing, no order, and no reply.

Spawned by: N-148, N-147

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-151

Chief Judge Sabella1 node

Official public records: Official judicial page, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

N-0252025-01-22told three times in writing that its own circuit had a problem, the chief judge's office answered that it has no investigative powers and pointed Husband back to the judge he was complaining aboutIGNORED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Told three times in writing how Husband's case was being handled, Chief Judge Sabella's office answered that he "does not possess any independent investigative powers," that he "is unable to take any action on your behalf," and sent Husband back to the judge he was reporting, or to an appeal.

E
Expected output

Art. V, s. 2(d) and Rule 2.215(b)(2) give Chief Judge Sabella "administrative supervision over all judges and court personnel" in the circuit. Rule 2.215(b)(7) requires him to "regularly examine the dockets" and "require a report on the status of the matters on the dockets." Three notices on one case called for exactly that: examine the 24-DR-001150 docket, require the status report, and tell Husband what was done. That duty needs no investigative power and decides no motion.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Jan. 22 to March 11, 2025: three emails to Chief Judge Sabella. The Feb. 12 letter, filed in the case that morning, reported that the court ruled on his motion "barely a day before the hearing," "depriving me of the right to even create a record," and said: "I'm now turning back to you for help, Judge Sabella." N-025
    Read them: Letter to Chief Judge Sabella, Feb. 12, 2025 (family case Doc 120) (link pending redacted copy)
  • March 13, 2025: General Counsel Christian N. Katchuk confirmed all three and wrote: "the chief judge does not possess any independent investigative powers." Husband's concerns "should be addressed by filing an appropriate motion in the case with the Clerk of the Circuit Court or through the utilization of the appellate court process." And: "Judge Sabella is unable to take any action on your behalf in this matter." N-025
    Read them: Katchuk letter, March 13, 2025 (family case Doc 154) (link pending redacted copy)
  • Oct. 14 to Dec. 18, 2025: Husband asked for the records of how the chief judge's office handled his correspondence on the case. The answer: "1,122 emails have been identified that may be responsive," and a deposit of $512.20 before anyone would review them. N-068
    What administrative step did the chief judge take on the 24-DR-001150 docket after March 13, 2025?
I
Independent encounter

Chief Judge Christopher C. Sabella (received all three notices; copied on the answer). Christian N. Katchuk, General Counsel, Administrative Office of the Courts (the March 13, 2025 letter). Three notices, one answer, one docket. Every duty here arises from Article V and Rule 2.215 on these notices alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. V, s. 2(d), Fla. Const.: "The chief judge shall be responsible for the administrative supervision of the circuit courts and county courts in his circuit." Rule 2.215(b)(7): the chief judge "must ... regularly examine the dockets of the courts under the chief judge's administrative supervision, and require a report on the status of the matters on the dockets," and "may take action as necessary to make the dockets current."

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-01-22
Actor
Chief Judge Christopher Sabella / 13th Cir. administration (AOC GC Katchuk, responding)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
told three times in writing that its own circuit had a problem, the chief judge's office answered that it has no investigative powers and pointed Husband back to the judge he was complaining about
What the law required
Rule 2.215(b)(2) places administrative supervision over all judges and court personnel of the circuit with the chief judge, and Rule 2.215(b)(7) requires the chief judge to regularly examine the dockets of the courts under that supervision and require reports on the status of the matters on them. The duty runs to the circuit's dockets, and it exists apart from any party's motion or appeal.
What happened
Husband put the chief judge on notice three times: by email on January 22, 2025, by letter on February 12, 2025, and again on March 11, 2025. The March 13, 2025 answer from the Administrative Office of the Courts General Counsel confirmed receipt of all three, stating "the chief judge does not possess any independent investigative powers," and directing him instead to file a motion in the case or pursue the appellate process. The closing position was that Judge Sabella is "unable to take any action on your behalf in this matter." The remedies named were the case itself and the appeal, the judge complained of and the court that had already declined the record. Nothing followed the March 13, 2025 answer, and nothing has followed in the seventeen months since. [IGNORED: receipt acknowledged, then no administrative response]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.215(b) places administrative supervision of a circuit's judges and dockets on its chief judge, a duty that exists because a litigant cannot supervise the judge assigned to him. Written receipt plus a stated position of inability puts the office on both sides of the record: it knew, it wrote back, and it fixed its position in writing. Being unable to act “on your behalf” is a different thing from being unable to examine a docket and require a report.
Receipt
  • Doc 120 (letter of 2/12/25) with Docs 121 to 122 (exhibit chain), per the V8 report.
  • Doc 154 (Katchuk, 3/13/25), fully transcribed by eye (V11), which is the source of all three quoted sentences and of the confirmation that the 1/22, 2/12 and 3/11 emails were received.
  • Interval anchors, stated because the sentence turns on which one is used: from the 3/13/25 answer to 8/20/26 is seventeen months and seven days; from the first notice of 1/22/25 to the same date is eighteen months and twenty-nine days. The prose runs from the answer.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-025

Florida Bar20 nodes

Official public records: The Florida Bar, official about page

NEW-P62025-02-24 -> 2025-10-10seventeen emails in this chain, six replies out, three emailed status formulas and three mailed letters, and not one of his questions answered; when he asked in writing whether there was a rule against speaking with him, no one repliedIGNORED
Date
2025-02-24 -> 2025-10-10
Actor
The Florida Bar, ACAP (Allie F. Huston; review by Alicia Gangi, Chair, Grievance Committee 13A)
Institution
The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861)
Mechanism
seventeen emails in this chain, six replies out, three emailed status formulas and three mailed letters, and not one of his questions answered; when he asked in writing whether there was a rule against speaking with him, no one replied
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath,' and 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal only 'after complete investigation' with written notice to the complainant of 'the reasons for dismissal.' Rules 3-7.3(a), 3-7.4(j)(2) and 3-7.5(d) require written notice to the complainant of every decision not to pursue an inquiry, every committee action and every board action. The Bar's own 5/6/25 letter set the pace of its review in writing: 'may take as long as 60 days.'
What happened
Between the six-day closure on 2/24/25 and the letters sustaining it on 9/23-9/24/25, Husband sent seventeen emails to the Bar's intake office and reviewers, offering documentation and asking for status. The Bar replied three times, all status formulas, including on 9/19: "This matter remains under review of the grievance committee chair. You will be informed of the outcome of that review via US mail." Five days later he wrote the same reviewers enclosing a photograph, telling them the failures have consequences; the photograph is not described here and no one in it is named. That email drew no response, nor did his 10/3 or 10/10 follow-ups. The reviewers had already given themselves permission to stop: the 9/24/25 letter states that "Further correspondence from you regarding this matter will be placed in the file without response" (N-055). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Bar counsel 'must investigate' a sworn complaint and may dismiss only 'after complete investigation'; the Bar's own letter set the review clock at up to 60 days. The complainant, a member of the same Bar, offered transcripts across seventeen emails. What came back was three status formulas, three mailed letters, and a sentence closing the door: further correspondence 'will be placed in the file without response.' He asked the question that measures the arc: 'Is there a rule against speaking with me?' No one answered.
Receipt
  • 22-page as-sent chain, Husband to the Bar's intake office and reviewers, 5/14 to 10/10/25, held in the matter's Bar correspondence file.
  • Court-filed copies in the Leon mandamus exhibit bundle at pp. 15-19 (9/29/25 email; picture sentence at p. 19) and 1D2026-0728 Record on Appeal pp. 53-57.
  • Picture sentence and 9/29/25 header at exhibit bundle pp. 15 and 19; the three Huston replies (as-sent chain pp. 8, 18, 20) are sourced from extracted text, and the underlying page images are unconfirmed.
  • 140 days computed 5/6 to 9/23/25 (31+30+31+31+17); the Bar's 60-day figure is per review and is a ceiling, not a promise.
  • N-124 carries the Bar's own plural formula, "Each of these reviews may take as long as 60 days to complete," and N-055 records three reviewers, so a sixty-against-a-hundred-forty ratio is defeated by the Bar's own words.
  • The out-count is six, not three: three emailed status formulas plus three mailed letters.
  • The seventeen-email count is from this chain alone.
  • The pre-announced no-response sentence is at Leon ROA p. 641 (Schuyler 9/24/25).
  • Rules 3-7.3(b) and (d); Husband's in-chain citations of 3-7.3(c) and 3-7.4(g) are his characterizations, and those subsections are unchecked.
  • The 9/12/25 statement that the intake auto-reply promises responses within 7 days is an uncontradicted in-chain characterization, not an imaged Bar document.
  • Children are never named and the photograph is never described beyond its existence and his own accompanying words.
  • The 9/29/25 email postdates the sustained closure by five days.
  • Status emails: 5/14, 6/30, 9/19/25. Requests/offers: 5/15, 6/13, 6/26, 7/8, 7/21 (x2), 9/1, 9/12/25.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P6

N-0312025-02-24A sworn 25-page complaint about Wife's lawyer closed in six days; the lawyer was not asked to respond.DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Bar closed a sworn complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without investigating, ignored seventeen emails offering evidence during its review, never answered yes or no to four written questions about its contacts with him, and destroyed records of its handling of the complaint after Husband sued to get them, naming no date, provision, or authority.

E
Expected output

Rule 3-7.3(b) required bar counsel to investigate Husband's sworn complaint, and investigation starts with asking Davis to respond. Asked four times whether the Bar ever communicated with Davis about it, the Bar answers yes or no. Records sought in a pending records lawsuit are preserved. The Florida Bar knows better than to destroy records sought in litigation. Its own Deputy General Counsel taught the rule: "If you have the record, it must be produced even if it could have been disposed of under your retention schedule."

V
Verified facts and law
  • Feb. 24, 2025: closed six days after filing. Davis was never asked to respond. The Bar's own brief: the file "was closed without further investigation." N-031, N-126
  • Feb. 24 to Oct. 10, 2025: Husband sent seventeen emails offering documentation and asking to engage. The Bar replied with three status formulas. He asked, "Is there a rule against speaking with me?" No one answered. Sept. 24, 2025: "Further correspondence from you regarding this matter will be placed in the file without response." NEW-P6, N-055
  • Nov. 10, 2025 to Feb. 9, 2026: asked four times in writing whether the Bar ever communicated with Davis about the complaint. The answers: "[Y]ou have been provided the entire public record." "Such records were not provided because they do not exist." "there are no comms with Mr. Davis at all withheld from public record production." N-077
    Why have the Florida Bar and its counsel at Greenberg Traurig refused to answer a simple question about these records, despite a records lawsuit in Leon County and an appeal still pending in the First District Court of Appeal?
    Read them: Courtemanche email chain, Nov. 10 to Dec. 1, 2025 (link pending redacted copy) · Londot email, Feb. 9, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Sept. 24, 2025 to June 5, 2026: the Bar's Director of Intake: the review "included investigation by a Senior Staff Attorney." May 22, 2026, its counsel to the family court: "the Bar did not act on his complaint." June 5, 2026: the records "have been disposed of pursuant to judicial branch and bar records retention schedule and are no longer available." Husband had sued for them on Dec. 17, 2025, and appeal 1D2026-0728 was pending when the letter was written. It names no date, no provision, and no one who authorized it. N-055, N-105, N-116
I
Independent encounter

Bar Counsel Allie F. Huston (closure). Deputy General Counsel Rick Courtemanche (replies; disposal letter). John Londot, Greenberg Traurig, counsel for the Bar (court filing; Feb. 9 email). One sworn complaint, one set of written questions, one file. Every duty here arises from the Bar's own rules on this file alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. V, s. 15, Fla. Const. vests attorney discipline in the Supreme Court. Rule 3-7.3(b): bar counsel "must investigate" a sworn complaint. Rule 3-7.1(b): correspondence "furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent" is public record. Art. I, s. 24(a) presumes records open and puts the burden on the custodian.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-02-24
Actor
Allie Huston
Institution
The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861)
Mechanism
the regulator closed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without ever asking him to answer it, and told the complaining lawyer to come back once a court made the finding that court has since refused to make
What the law required
Article V, section 15 of the Florida Constitution vests attorney discipline in the Supreme Court, which acts through the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Rule 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath as provided in this rule,' and 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal only 'after complete investigation.' The complaint was signed under penalties of perjury on the Bar's own form, so the duty attached on receipt; the burden of investigating sits on bar counsel, and the complainant's only burden was the sworn complaint he filed.
What happened
Husband signed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's counsel Scott Davis on February 18, 2025. Six calendar days later, Bar Counsel Allie F. Huston closed it: "The matters upon which your allegations are premised present questions of law and involve a dispute over which a court has jurisdiction." No response cycle began; Davis was never asked to respond. The letter disclosed no review process, no timeframe, and no reconsideration path, and started a one-year clock on the file's destruction. Every Bar decisional letter to Husband on this file came by U.S. mail with no email address, while the same bar counsel answered him by email three times on status alone, deciding nothing (NEW-P6). On files where Husband was respondent or complainant elsewhere, the Bar emailed him; he asked why this file alone came by mail, and no answer is in the record. [DENIED: closed without a response cycle]
Baseline deviation
Bar counsel 'must investigate' a sworn written complaint and may dismiss only 'after complete investigation.' Husband's 25-page complaint was signed under penalties of perjury on the Bar's own form. Six days later it was closed with no question put to Davis and no rule named; the letter offered resubmission only if a court first made a supporting finding. The presiding judge had said she does not discipline lawyers and declined to question Davis (N-046); her successor has refused to make findings six times (N-091).
Receipt
  • Huston closure letter 2/24/25, RFA 25-6861, at 1150 Doc 200 p. 29 of 42, filed by Davis himself 6/4/25, Filing #224549972; also at Leon ROA p. 103.
  • The complaint signed 2/18/25; Exhibit A is the 2/12/25 Chief Judge letter, Exhibit B is Wife's 12/13/24 motion for a psychological examination, Filing #212815329, incomplete in the filed copy.
  • The grammatical subject of the quoted sentence is "The matters upon which your allegations are premised," never "the allegations".
  • Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from the current rule (June 30, 2026 / July 1, 2026 edition); Rules 3-7.3(a), (c) and (d) are read in the same June 30, 2026 edition (print pp. 115-117).
  • The 15-day and 10-day windows come from the Bar's public ACAP process page, which is NOT yet captured and filed as a record.
  • Six calendar days and four business days both computed from 2/18/25 to 2/24/25; the federal complaint's "six business days" at paras. 2 and 49 is wrong and four is both accurate and stronger.
  • Husband's quoted question is at p. 2 of his 6/10/26 6:58 AM email to Bar leadership re the Davis grievance and conflicts, as sent; that email's text layer is ciphered. The document itself does not show a delivery failure (N-124).
  • Good-standing certificate: Cynthia B. Jackson, CFO, 8/7/26, CTM-428037.
  • The 12/19/24 pre-affirmation of Davis by the same court sits at N-018.
  • Court-side receipts for the locked exit: N-046 (4/22/25), N-091 (4/17/26 Tr. 181).
  • Husband's own standing: admitted 9/28/2007, active, in good standing, 10-Year Discipline History: None. The only Bar complaint ever filed against him came nine months later, from the judge who had been disqualified from this case (N-032, N-064).
  • Related decision points: N-121.

Spawned by: N-011, N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-031

N-0322025-02-24 -> ongoingone family-law docket, two opposite answers from the same regulator: the reason it would not examine the opposing lawyer, and the source of the material it examined when the complaining lawyer was the one accusedDENIED
Date
2025-02-24 -> ongoing
Actor
The Florida Bar (Allie F. Huston; Christopher Stephen Wackes; Jason R. Kelley)
Institution
The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861; RFA 26-13570; File 2026-10,395(13F))
Mechanism
one family-law docket, two opposite answers from the same regulator: the reason it would not examine the opposing lawyer, and the source of the material it examined when the complaining lawyer was the one accused
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath.' A declination under 3-7.3(a) requires a determination that the facts, if proven, would not constitute a violation warranting discipline; neither closure letter makes one, and neither cites a rule for deferring to the court. Rule 3-7.4(e) bars deferring an investigation for civil litigation without a designated reviewer's approval, and that approval is the Bar's to produce. One rule governs intake whether the lawyer accused is opposing counsel or the complainant.
What happened
Both of Husband's grievances against Wife's counsel closed at intake on the same ground, in near-identical words, sixteen months apart: six days for one, twenty-three for the other, finding only that the allegations "involve a dispute over which a court has jurisdiction." Neither reached the merits. A third file ran opposite: Judge Ayers, disqualified 4/28/25, filed a complaint against Husband on 11/24/25. Bar Counsel Jason Kelley referred it, describing its scope: "You have an extensive social media footprint I have had to go through, as well as your filings and documents in your family law case." As of 8/10/26 that file had been open 259 days, with no statement identified as false. The complaint against Husband concerns public statements about a judge, yet the material reviewed included the family-law filings. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 3-7.4(e) bars deferring an investigation for civil litigation without a reviewer's approval. Deferral is therefore an approved exception, not a default, and the approval is the Bar's to produce. The Bar's counsel described a deferral policy in open court: the Bar defers to the presiding judge because discipline "can happen there." But the judges declined on the record to examine that same conduct and expressly left it to the Bar (N-046), so the policy is circular in practice.
Receipt
  • Huston letter 2/24/25 (RFA 25-6861) and Wackes letter 6/16/26 (RFA 26-13570) pp. 1-2; the Della-Donna year prints in the Wackes letter as "(Fla. 1989)".
  • Gangi 9/23/25 and Schuyler 9/24/25 are not jurisdiction-ground letters; neither contains the phrase.
  • Kelley referral letter to Joshua Gammon Sheridan, Chair, 12/3/25, p. 1, certifying the complaint "forwarded to your committee for further investigation and disposition," captioned "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson."
  • Kelley scope email 3/19/26 11:45 AM, at pp. 2-3 of the 3/30/26 email to Kelley (the standalone 3/19 and 3/20 PDFs are empty export stubs).
  • Deferral policy in Bar counsel's own words: 7/7/26 PM Tr. 6:23-7:3 for the back-and-forth sentence and Tr. 7:10-20 for the closure-language sentence.
  • Rule 3-7.4(e) is quoted verbatim, and Rules 3-4.4, 3-7.16(a)(2) and (a)(3) and 3-3.5 are summarized, from the current Chapter 3 (June 30, 2026 edition); Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from the same source.
  • Husband's 4/30/25 questions are at p. 21 of the 10-10-25 Huston-Gangi chain PDF, sent 10:37:03 AM to ACAP intake.
  • Court-side receipts: N-046 (Doc 192 Tr. 41); 5/29/26 Tr. 45:12-19; 7/7/26 PM Tr. 31:17-18.
  • Ayers disqualification Doc 184, 4/28/25 (N-047). 2/18/25 to 2/24/25 = 6; 5/24/26 to 6/16/26 = 23; 11/24/25 to 8/10/26 = 259.
  • Two captions from the same office five months apart, reported without inference: 12/3/25 "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson"; 5/21/26 "Complaint of Christopher Alan Hanson against Vivian Cortes Hodz." No second referral letter has been obtained for comparison (documented negative); a records request for two or three unrelated 13F referral cover letters is the next concrete step and either answer is evidence.
  • Related decision points: N-064, N-085.

Spawned by: N-031, N-064, N-121

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-032

N-0552025-09-24the Bar described three internal reviews of the closure but produced no record of what any of them did, and told the complainant that anything further he wrote would go in the file without responseDENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Bar told Husband his complaint received "investigation by a Senior Staff Attorney" and two more reviews. Its counsel later told the family court "the Bar did not act on his complaint," and its appellate brief told the First District the file "was closed without further investigation."

E
Expected output

Rule 3-7.3(b) required bar counsel to investigate Husband's sworn complaint, and Rule 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal "after complete investigation," with notice of the "reasons for dismissal." A Director of Intake who certifies an investigation and two reviews can show the work of each when asked, because the closed file is public under Rule 3-7.1(b). The Bar gives the complainant and the courts one account of what it did.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Feb. 24, 2025: Bar Counsel Allie F. Huston closed the sworn complaint six days after filing. Davis was never asked to respond. The letter: "In addition to the submitted documentation, I also reviewed the underlying docket in Hillsborough County Case No. 2024-DR-1150." N-031, N-105
  • Sept. 23 to 24, 2025: Alicia Gangi, Chair of Grievance Committee 13A, sustained the closure, copying Davis "so that the attorney is aware that an additional review of this matter has taken place." The next day Director of Intake Shanell M. Schuyler: "The review of your allegations against Mr. Davis included investigation by a Senior Staff Attorney, review of the closure by the undersigned as Director of Intake, and a review by the Chair of Grievance Committee 13A." And: "Further correspondence from you regarding this matter will be placed in the file without response." N-055, N-105
    Read them: Schuyler letter, Sept. 24, 2025, and Gangi letter, Sept. 23, 2025 (record on appeal pp. 641, 643) (link pending redacted copy)
  • May 22 to June 30, 2026: the Bar's counsel to the family court: "the Bar did not act on his complaint." June 5: records of what the Bar did before those assurances "have been disposed of." June 30, its appellate brief: the file "was closed without further investigation," the review "limited to the submissions and court records." N-105, N-116, N-126, N-055
    Who was the Senior Staff Attorney, what did that investigation consist of, and what record of it did the Bar hold before reporting its records disposed of?
I
Independent encounter

Bar Counsel Allie F. Huston (closure). Alicia Gangi, Chair, Grievance Committee 13A (Sept. 23 letter). Shanell M. Schuyler, Director of Intake (Sept. 24 letter). One sworn complaint, one file, three described reviews. Every duty here arises from the Bar's own rules on this file alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. V, s. 15, Fla. Const. vests attorney discipline in the Supreme Court. Rule 3-7.3(b): bar counsel "must investigate" a sworn complaint. Rule 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal "after complete investigation." Art. I, s. 24(a) presumes the closed file open and puts the burden on the Bar.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-09-24
Actor
Alicia Gangi + Shanell M. Schuyler
Institution
The Florida Bar
Mechanism
the Bar described three internal reviews of the closure but produced no record of what any of them did, and told the complainant that anything further he wrote would go in the file without response
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal only 'after complete investigation' and requires notice to the complainant of the 'reasons for dismissal.' The Bar reviews a staff-level closure under its own Standing Board Policy 15.75, on the complainant's written request, with a written explanation of the reasons. Once closed, the file is public under Rule 3-7.1(b), and Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden of any withholding on the Bar, so the product of each review is a record the Bar either produces or accounts for.
What happened
On 9/24/25 the Bar sustained its own closure. Its Director of Intake described three internal reviews of the closure: by a Senior Staff Attorney, by the Director of Intake, and by the Chair of Grievance Committee 13A. The letter stated: "While your disagreement with the outcome of the Bar's investigation is duly noted, there is no further review afforded to closed files and no right to appeal. Further correspondence from you regarding this matter will be placed in the file without response." A day earlier the Chair had made the same point in her own sustaining letter, copying Davis on it. A later public-records request for the file that review would have generated produced, from the closed file, one email about a typographical error (FNEW-B1). The Bar has never reconciled this account with its later, inconsistent statements about the same closure (N-105, N-116). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Three reviews were described in the 9/24/25 letter: a Senior Staff Attorney investigation, a Director of Intake review, and a Grievance Committee Chair review. A review that examined a closure leaves a record, and a closed file is public under the Bar's own rule. No product of any of the three appears in any Bar letter, filed paper or brief. Later Bar statements run against the letter: a filed paper said the Bar 'did not act' (N-105); its Deputy General Counsel said the file was 'disposed of' (N-116).
Receipt
  • Schuyler letter 9/24/25, Leon ROA p. 641: also states "Extensive rules, procedures, and policies exist to ensure that bar complaints are fully aired, investigated, and reviewed at multiple levels," and "The review of your allegations against Mr. Davis included investigation by a Senior Staff Attorney, review of the closure by the undersigned as Director of Intake, and a review by the Chair of Grievance Committee 13A."
  • Gangi letter 9/23/25, Leon ROA p. 641 vicinity and Bar file copy: "I am also copying Mr. Davis on my response so that the attorney is aware that an additional review of this matter has taken place and that I am sustaining the former decisions to close this file as proper and correct."
  • Both filed by the Bar's own counsel as Composite Exhibit A to the 1/27/26 motion to dismiss, judicial notice requested at ROA p. 626.
  • Answer Brief admissions at 1D2026-0728 Answer Brief p. 24 (PDF p. 30), filed 6/30/26, signed M. Hope Keating: file "was closed without further investigation" and review "limited to the submissions and court records."
  • Huston letter 5/6/25, Doc 200 p. 1 (single-Director, up-to-60-days process). Standing Board Policy 15.75 gives complainant 30-day review windows and sets no time standard for the Bar's own reviews.
  • "Three-level review" is NOT the letter's phrase and is barred, as are "three-layer," "three-stage," "three-tier"; name the letter's own three steps instead.
  • Later inconsistent statements at N-105 (5/22/26) and N-116 (6/5/26). Produced set at FNEW-B1.
  • Related decision points: N-126.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-055

FNEW-B12025-11-10the file that the Bar said had been investigated at multiple levels produced, on request, one email about a typographical errorPARTIAL
Date
2025-11-10
Actor
The Florida Bar (signatory of the W015656-111025 response)
Institution
The Florida Bar (PRR W015656-111025; closed file RFA 25-6861)
Mechanism
the file that the Bar said had been investigated at multiple levels produced, on request, one email about a typographical error
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution makes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of justifying any withholding on the custodian. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.1(b) defines the public record of a closed disciplinary case to include 'any reports, correspondence, papers, recordings, or transcripts of hearings furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent or the complainant.' A production from a closed file therefore includes respondent correspondence, or states the basis on which it is not included. The Bar's own later filed paper concedes Rule 2.420, not Chapter 119, governs its records (Leon record p. 634 n.4), and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state the basis for any denial in writing.
What happened
In November 2025 the Bar answered a public-records request for the closed complaint file about Wife's counsel. The produced set contained one email concerning a typographical error and no other correspondence from Davis to the Bar, and no Bar correspondence to Davis beyond letters on which he was copied. That one email runs from Davis to the Bar's intake mailbox on 8/20/25 at 3:45 PM, and its subject is traceable: the Bar's own 7/16/25 letter to Husband had said "there are court orders finding that Mr. Davis has filed frivolous motions or delayed the proceedings," and five days after Davis's email the Bar reversed that sentence to say there are NO such orders. Set that production beside what the Bar had written about the same file seven weeks earlier: a Senior Staff Attorney investigation, a Director of Intake review, and a Grievance Committee Chair review (N-055). Then set it beside what the Bar filed in court eleven weeks later: "Such records were not provided because they do not exist" (N-077). And beside its appellate brief, filed June 30, 2026, which says the review "was limited to the submissions and court records" and the file therefore "did not contain any communications with Mr. Davis." The Bar's reconciliation is available and is stated here rather than argued against: three reviewers reading the same submissions and the same public court records would generate no new correspondence with the accused lawyer. What the reconciliation does not supply is what each of those three reviews produced. A Senior Staff Attorney investigation, a Director of Intake review and a Grievance Committee Chair review are three pieces of work, and the Bar has not identified the product of any of them, in any letter, in any filed paper, or in its appellate brief, across the record as swept. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
The Bar's own rule defines the public record of a closed disciplinary case, in full: "(b) Public Record. The public record consists of the record before a grievance committee, the record before a referee, the record before the Supreme Court of Florida, and any reports, correspondence, papers, recordings, or transcripts of hearings furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent **or the complainant**." (emphasis added) Husband is the complainant. The Bar's own definition of its public record therefore reaches what was furnished to, served on, or received from him, and it reaches recordings and transcripts of hearings, not only paper. So a production from a closed file either contains the respondent lawyer's correspondence or reflects that none exists. The Bar's own counsel has stated the condition in its own words, in a footnote to its appellate brief: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it." That sentence turns the whole records fight into one verifiable fact, which is what the file contained. Whatever else is disputed, that much is conceded.
Receipt
Public-records request W015656-111025. The 630-page production packet and its three inventories are held in the matter's public-records file; all 630 pages catalogued. The typographical-error email at packet p. 401, FROM Davis TO the ACAP mailbox, 8/20/25 3:45 PM. Its antecedent is the Bar's own 7/16/25 closure letter at packet pp. 340-343 and 403-404, whose sentence was reversed by the 8/25/25 letter at packet pp. 407-409. Rule 3-7.1(b) is quoted in full from the current rule as printed in the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 16 (June 30, 2026 / July 1, 2026 edition). The bold on "or the complainant" is EMPHASIS ADDED; the words themselves are the rule's. Answer Brief footnote 3, 1D2026-0728, PDF p. 31 (brief p. 25), filed 6/30/26. Answer Brief brief p. 24 (PDF p. 30) for the "limited to the submissions and court records" sentence. The 1/27/26 filed statement is at Leon ROA p. 634 (motion internal p. 10), footnote 4 on the same page. SCOPE, and it always travels: "no other correspondence to or from Davis" means BAR-to-Davis correspondence. The packet holds many Husband-to-Davis emails as complaint exhibits, plus Bar letters copied to Davis at pp. 58-60, 88, 102-104 and 504-505. The production transmittal is the Bar's letter dated November 10, 2025, signed by Rick Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, captioned 'Public Records Request: W015656-111025 of 11/10/2025' and stating 'You have been provided with the entire public record related to your request'; it sits in the Leon mandamus exhibit bundle (Seq. 006, pp. 10-11), and the Bar's own 7/16/26 records letter (item A) dates the production to 11/10/2025. Request and production carry the same date.

Spawned by: N-031, N-055

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-B1

N-0642025-11-24the complaint against Husband says he said something untrue in public; he has asked in writing, again and again, which statement, and the Bar has never named one, while the file stays open and the Bar's own rules keep an open file confidentialPENDING
Date
2025-11-24
Actor
Judge Ayers (complainant); Jason Kelley (Bar Counsel)
Institution
The Florida Bar (File 2026-10,395(13F))
Mechanism
the complaint against Husband says he said something untrue in public; he has asked in writing, again and again, which statement, and the Bar has never named one, while the file stays open and the Bar's own rules keep an open file confidential
What the law required
The First Amendment protects true statements about a judge, and truth is a complete defense to the charge this complaint makes. Rule 4-8.2(a) reaches only a statement the lawyer knows to be false or makes with reckless disregard of its truth, so the complainant and the Bar carry the burden of naming the statement, and due process requires a complaint specific enough to answer. Rule 3-7.3(b) requires investigation, and the sworn statement the Bar itself proposed is the investigation it chose. Rules 3-7.1(a)(4) and 3-7.3(g): a staff-level closure becomes public information; a pending file stays confidential.
What happened
Judge Ayers filed a Bar complaint against Husband on 11/24/25, about seven months after she was disqualified from his case. The file has stood open since, 259 days as of August 10, 2026, without a single allegedly false statement ever identified. Husband first demanded that the Bar name the statement or close the file on 12/8/25, and repeated the demand sixteen times through 7/23/26, seven months and fifteen days later. No response has ever named a statement. On 3/20/26 the Bar announced it would subpoena him for a sworn statement, "expecting 3-4 hours," listing the resources it would need to schedule. Husband accepted at once, waived confidentiality, and asked that the proceeding be public. The subpoena was never served and the statement was never taken (N-085). This is the first Bar complaint ever filed against him in a career admitted 9/28/2007, active and in good standing. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Truth is an absolute defense to the charge this complaint makes; it has never identified a false statement. The complaint form's Part Three reads "Mr. Hanson has violated Bar Rules 4-8.2(a) and Rule 4-8.4(d)." A closure before a grievance committee hearing becomes public under the Bar's own rules (3-7.1(a)(4), 3-7.3(g)); an open file stays confidential. Husband's two complaints against Wife's counsel closed in six and twenty-three days and became public; the one against him stays open and confidential (N-031, N-121).
Receipt
  • Bar File 2026-10,395(13F), complaint filed 11/24/25; 259 days, 11/24/25 to 8/10/26.
  • Complaint form Part Three quoted in full from the intake form.
  • The sixteen demands: 12/8/25, 12/18/25, 1/7/26, 1/15/26, 2/13/26, 3/17/26, 3/19/26, 3/30/26, 4/17/26, 4/27/26, 5/13/26, 6/19/26, 7/4/26, 7/10/26, 7/11/26, 7/23/26; first to last is 7 months 15 days.
  • Date requests (a smaller, different set): 3/30, 4/27, 5/13, 7/10/26 on this card; N-085 enumerates five, adding 4/17/26.
  • Underlying emails in the matter's Bar correspondence file, including 3/30/26 email to Kelley, 4/17/26 email reiterating unanswered questions, 7/10/26 sworn-statement and preservation letter, 7/11/26 letter to Bar leadership and Board of Governors, 7/23/26 followup (13 pp.).
  • Kelley 3/20/26 3:05 PM email; pp. 2-16 not read.
  • "the bar is not an investigative agency like law enforcement. Our investigative resources are limited." (Courtemanche, 11/24/25, Leon ROA p. 44; source spells "investigative"; motion to dismiss and Answer Brief render it "investitive").
  • Kelley 12/3/25 referral letter, caption "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson."
  • Rules 3-7.1(a)(4) and 3-7.3(g). Good-standing certificate CTM-428037, 8/7/26: "10-Year Discipline History: None."
  • Acceptance chain verbatim in the 7/10/26 letter, Gmail id 19f4d070ee6ec12a; arc card N-085.
  • The 11/24/25 same-day sequence (article emailed 10:18 AM, chambers forward 11:43 AM, forward to counsel 12:17:07 PM, personal-to-official email 4:52 PM, intake submission 4:56:32 PM) is a composite exhibit, sequence only.
  • Intervals by true endpoints: 10:18 AM to 4:56:32 PM intake is six hours thirty-eight minutes; 11:43 AM chambers forward to 4:56:32 PM intake is five hours thirteen minutes. "Six hours thirty-eight minutes chambers to intake" is wrong and barred; N-065 states the same-day interval correctly and controls.
  • Related decision points: N-032, NEW-P9.

Spawned by: N-031, N-062

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-064

FNEW-B22025-12-15four written questions, each answerable with a yes, a no, a rule citation, or an index; the entire reply was that he had already been given everything and that the matter is closed; the first real answer came 57 days later, in a paper addressed to a judgeREFUSED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Asked yes or no whether the Bar had any communication with Davis about the complaint beyond his one typo email, its Deputy General Counsel replied: "This matter is closed. Thanks." The Bar's first answer came 57 days later, after Husband sued, in a paper to a judge.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian, and the Bar's own filing concedes its records "are governed by" Rule 2.420. Asked whether any Davis correspondence existed beyond one email, the Deputy General Counsel answers yes or no; if yes, he names the rule that withholds it; if no, he confirms it in writing. The Bar proved the answer fit in one line: it gave one, to a court.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Dec. 1, 2025: Husband's first question: "Apart from Mr. Davis's brief e-mail pointing out a typographical error, did the Bar receive any written or electronic communication from and/or send any written or electronic communication to Mr. Davis (or anyone on his behalf) in connection with this complaint?" If yes, which rule withholds it; if no, "will the Bar please confirm that in writing?" Fourth, a privilege index. FNEW-B2, N-077
    Read them: Husband's email, Dec. 1, 2025 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Dec. 15, 2025, 9:15 AM: the reply, in full: "Mr. Hanson: As my correspondence dated November 24 stated, you have been provided the entire public record under Rule 3-7.1(b), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. This matter is closed. Thanks." Dec. 17: Husband sued in Leon County. FNEW-B2
    Read them: Courtemanche email, Dec. 15, 2025 (petition exhibits p. 282) (link pending redacted copy)
  • Jan. 27 to Feb. 9, 2026: the Bar's motion to dismiss: "Such records were not provided because they do not exist." Asked directly on Feb. 9, its counsel by email: "there are no comms with Mr. Davis at all withheld from public record production. There aren't any to withhold." N-077, FNEW-B2
I
Independent encounter

Deputy General Counsel Rick Courtemanche (the Dec. 15 reply). John Londot, Greenberg Traurig, counsel for the Bar (the Jan. 27 motion; the Feb. 9 email). One records request, four written questions, one reply. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and the Bar's own public-record rule on this request alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes the Bar's records open and puts the burden of any withholding on the Bar. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the basis for any denial in writing. Rule 3-7.1(b) makes correspondence "furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent" part of the closed-file public record.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-12-15
Actor
The Florida Bar (response to questions addressed to Deputy General Counsel Richard Courtemanche)
Institution
The Florida Bar
Mechanism
four written questions, each answerable with a yes, a no, a rule citation, or an index; the entire reply was that he had already been given everything and that the matter is closed; the first real answer came 57 days later, in a paper addressed to a judge
What the law required
A custodian that withholds records states the basis. The Bar's own filed paper concedes Rule 2.420 governs its records (Leon record p. 634 n.4); Rule 2.420 requires an identified exemption for any withholding, and a privilege is asserted, not implied. Rule 3-7.1(b) defines the closed-file public record to include respondent correspondence. Each of the four questions asked had a yes-or-no or a document as its answer.
What happened
On 12/1/25 Husband put four written questions to the Bar's Deputy General Counsel about the production from the closed file: whether the Bar had sent or received any communication with Davis beyond the one produced email; if so, what rule provision took that correspondence outside the Rule 3-7.1(b) public record; if not, to confirm that in writing; and whether the Bar would provide a privilege or confidentiality index for anything in the file it treated as outside the public record. On 12/15/25 at 9:15 AM, eight minutes after his morning follow-up, the reply came back in full: "Mr. Hanson: As my correspondence dated November 24 stated, you have been provided the entire public record under Rule 3-7.1(b), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. This matter is closed. Thanks." Two substantive sentences. Neither answers any of the four questions. The 11/24 correspondence it points back to had said something more: "the bar is not an investigative agency like law enforcement. Our investigative resources are limited. You need to have the court in the underlying litigation make an evidentiary finding that the attorney you complained about committed misconduct." Two days after that reply, on 12/17/25, Husband filed his mandamus petition in Leon County. Fifty-seven days after the questions were asked, the Bar answered the first one for the first time, in its motion to dismiss that suit: "Such records were not provided because they do not exist" (N-077). [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
A custodian that withholds records states the basis. A privilege is asserted, not implied. The Bar's own filed paper concedes that Rule 2.420 governs its records, and that rule requires an identified basis for any withholding and a written basis for any refusal. Each of the four questions had a yes-or-no or a document as its answer. The Bar's later court filing proves the answer existed and could be stated in one line, because the Bar stated it in one line. The complainant got it only after he sued, and only in a document written to a court. The refusal was also pre-authorized: three months earlier the Bar had put in writing that further correspondence "will be placed in the file without response" (N-055).
Receipt
The 12/15/25 response is an EMAIL, not a letter: from Richard Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, to Husband's personal email address with the ACAP mailboxes and one Bar address in copy, Monday December 15, 2025 at 09:15 AM EST, subject "RE: Christopher Hanson -Continue follow up Deficiencies in Public Records Response: W015656-111025." The only copy in the record is embedded at page 282 of 285 of the exhibit bundle to the Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Filing #237979141, e-filed 12/17/2025 08:40:29 PM. It replies to Husband's own 9:07 AM follow-up that same morning, so it closes a chain rather than answering the 12/1/25 email standing alone. The 11/24/25 Courtemanche quote is at Leon ROA p. 44 (source spells "investigative"; the Bar's briefs render "investitive"). The 12/1/25 four questions are independently narrated inside N-077. The 1/27/26 statement is at Leon ROA p. 634 (motion internal p. 10), footnote 4 same page. Rule 2.420 concession at the same footnote. Rule 3-7.1(b) defines the closed-file public record to include reports, correspondence, papers, recordings, and transcripts of hearings furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent "or the complainant"; the full subdivision is quoted at FNEW-B1 from the current rule.

Spawned by: N-055, FNEW-B1

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-B2

N-0772026-02-09asked whether communications with Wife's lawyer ever existed, the Bar's counsel answered, three minutes later, that none were withheld from production; his own filed paper thirteen days earlier had said flatly that they do not existPARTIAL
Date
2026-02-09
Actor
John Londot, Greenberg Traurig, counsel for The Florida Bar
Institution
2025-CA-2469 (Leon)
Mechanism
asked whether communications with Wife's lawyer ever existed, the Bar's counsel answered, three minutes later, that none were withheld from production; his own filed paper thirteen days earlier had said flatly that they do not exist
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Rule 3-7.1(b) makes a closed file's 'reports, correspondence, papers, recordings, or transcripts of hearings furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent or the complainant' public. A custodian asked whether records ever existed either produces them or confirms under oath that none exist; an answer about what was withheld from production reaches a different question.
What happened
On 12/1/25 Husband asked the Bar's Deputy General Counsel whether the Bar had ever communicated with Davis about the complaint, apart from one email about a typo. No reply appears in the record swept. On 1/27/26 the Bar's motion to dismiss, signed by John Londot, stated without qualification: "Such records were not provided because they do not exist." Thirteen days later, Husband asked the same lawyer directly whether any such communications ever existed. Three minutes later: "there are no comms with Mr. Davis at all withheld from public record production. There aren't any to withhold." The filed paper says the records do not exist; the email says only that nothing was withheld. Read against later Bar statements on this closure, that it did not act on the complaint (N-105) and that records were disposed of (N-116), the accounts do not converge. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
A respondent asked whether records ever existed answers whether they existed; saying nothing was withheld from production is a narrower answer. The Bar's own rule defines a closed case's public record to include correspondence with the respondent lawyer "or the complainant," and Husband is the complainant. The Bar's counsel has since conceded the obligation in its brief: "the Bar would be obligated to provide it." What remains is a fact question the Bar has answered two different ways.
Receipt
  • 1/27/26 motion to dismiss, Filing #240404774, e-filed 4:38:07 PM, Leon ROA p. 634 (motion internal p. 10); motion occupies ROA pp. 625-643, signature block at ROA p. 638; footnote 4 on the same page as the quoted sentence.
  • 2/9/26 chain, subject "Re: 2025CA2469 - Hanson v The Florida Bar," Londot's message timestamped 5:04:46 PM EST from his firm address, Husband's question at 5:01 PM same day; Bar correspondence folder and Leon matter tree.
  • 12/1/25 email in the same folder.
  • Answer Brief footnote 3, 1D2026-0728, PDF p. 31 (brief p. 25), filed 6/30/26: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it."
  • Courtemanche no-reply negative is a FILENAME-LEVEL sweep only, 8/17/26, of the Bar correspondence folder and Leon matter tree; scoped to filenames, no full-text or mailbox sweep run.
  • Londot statement carried standing alone; Husband's own replies in the same chain are argumentative and not reproduced.
  • Rule 3-7.1(b) quoted in full at FNEW-B1; "or the complainant" is part of the subdivision.
  • The stored 16-page text export of the motion to dismiss is not the filed original, and no quotation here is drawn from it.
  • N-105, filed 5/22/26: "the Bar did not act on his complaint and so did not share it with or request a response from Mr. Davis". N-116, 6/5/26: records "disposed of pursuant to judicial branch and bar records retention schedule and are no longer available".
  • Related decision points: N-055.

Spawned by: N-055, N-116

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-077

N-0822026-03-09the records showing what the Bar spent on the law firm defending it against its own member were priced and made payable in advance, with the letter noting on its face that Florida law provides no waiver for indigency or public interestONLY-FOR-A-PRICE
Date
2026-03-09
Actor
Rick Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, The Florida Bar
Institution
The Florida Bar (W016061-022526)
Mechanism
the records showing what the Bar spent on the law firm defending it against its own member were priced and made payable in advance, with the letter noting on its face that Florida law provides no waiver for indigency or public interest
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any barrier on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(3) carries section 119.07(4)'s fee terms into the judicial branch: a custodian may charge only what that statute allows, a special service charge tied to actual cost where a request requires extensive clerical or supervisory assistance.
What happened
On 3/9/26 the Bar's records office demanded prepayment before releasing the outside-counsel engagement and billing records it had identified. The letter states on its face that Florida law provides no fee waiver for indigency or public interest, and it states the Bar's own policy that "any time spent in excess of 30 minutes constitutes 'extensive labor' and will be charged." The records stayed behind the demand. Two more requests were priced afterward: $89.36 on 6/5/26 and $101.09 on 7/6/26 (N-116, N-129). [ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE]
Baseline deviation
The Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of justifying any barrier on the custodian, not the person asking. What matters is what sits behind the price: the records of the Bar's own use of member resources to retain outside counsel to resist a member's records requests. The Bar priced them, stated on the letter's face that no waiver exists, and produced none.
Receipt
  • Fee letter 3/9/26, request W016061-022526, signed Rick Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, p. 1; the $43.58 per hour IT Labor rate is on that page
  • Article I, section 24(a) and (c), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(3); section 119.07(4), Fla. Stat.
  • Later fee gates: $89.36 (6/5/26, N-116) and $101.09 (7/6/26, W016548-070626, N-129)
  • Fee figures are per custodian and are never summed across custodians without listing each

Spawned by: N-079

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-082

NEW-P92026-05-22 -> ongoingthe Bar's own letter sent this complaint to its Tampa office for additional investigation; seventy-five days later the office running that investigation had not answered its own complainant's two requests to know whether anything was happeningPENDING
Date
2026-05-22 -> ongoing
Actor
The Florida Bar, Tampa Branch (Michelle Robertson, Bar Counsel, Lawyer Regulation; file TFB 2026-10,601(13C), the Cortes Hodz complaint)
Institution
The Florida Bar
Mechanism
the Bar's own letter sent this complaint to its Tampa office for additional investigation; seventy-five days later the office running that investigation had not answered its own complainant's two requests to know whether anything was happening
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath.' Rules 3-7.3(a), 3-7.3(d), 3-7.4(j)(2) and 3-7.5(d) require written notice to the complainant, with reasons, of any decision not to pursue an inquiry, any dismissal, and any committee or board action. The Bar's own transfer letter said the complaint went to its Tampa office for additional investigation, and the time standard is whatever the Bar states for itself in writing.
What happened

On 5/21/26 the Bar transferred Husband's complaint against his former counsel to its Tampa Branch Office for additional investigation. He complied the next day, filing a litigation-disclosure notice listing six related proceedings. Bar Counsel replied the same day: "Thank you for the additional information. If you have any questions, etc., please let me know." That is the Bar's last substantive communication on the file.

He asked for status on 7/30 and 8/5/26: "I respectfully request a brief written status of the investigation. I remain ready to provide any additional documents". Neither request drew a reply. From 5/22 to 8/5 is 75 days.

Measured against the same institution's other files: this file drew a written response from the accused attorney by 3/11/26. On the Davis file, by the Bar's own brief, the file was closed without further investigation, and the lawyer was never asked anything. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
The Bar's rules require investigation of a sworn complaint and written notice, with reasons, whenever it is declined, dismissed or acted on. The Bar's own letter said this complaint went to its Tampa office for additional investigation. Two written requests to learn whether that investigation was moving drew no reply in 75 days, from a complainant who kept offering evidence. This is the third file with the same shape: seventeen emails to three status formulas (NEW-P6), sixteen demands with no statement named (N-064).
Receipt
  • The 8/5/26 email chain on the Hodz complaint, File 2026-10,601, received 8/17/26, all 3 pages, containing the 5/21 transmittal, the 5/22 litigation notice and reply, and the 7/30 and 8/5 requests
  • 7/30/26 request: it had "been at least a couple of months since I've heard anything," requesting someone contact him "for details and additional information about the violations that was difficult to fit in the complaint"
  • 8/5/26 request, full text: "I respectfully request a brief written status of the investigation. I remain ready to provide any additional documents, correspondence, sworn statement, or other information."
  • 75 days computed 5/22 to 8/5/26 (9+30+31+5)
  • Complainant-notice provisions quoted from the official Rules Regulating The Florida Bar Chapter 3 text, 2019 edition, pulled 8/17/26; current-edition text not yet confirmed, and amendments through 2025 exist.
  • Interval check run 8/17/26 against the full official Chapter 3 text: NO rule sets a 15-day-after-request or every-90-day complainant-update interval; the 90-day figure in circulation is the referee's post-appointment deadline, a different stage, plus informal contact-the-agency guidance
  • The accused attorney's 3/11/26 written response, filed in the Leon mandamus matter, pp. 1 and 5, opening "Thank you for your letter of February 24, 2026"; pp. 6-25 are enclosures and were not read
  • The Davis-file comparison is the Answer Brief, 1D2026-0728, brief p. 24 (PDF p. 30)
  • The no-reply negative covers the captured chain and the tree as swept 8/17/26.
  • See also N-032 (the caption comparison) and N-083 (the respondent's own filing)

Spawned by: N-032, N-083

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P9

N-1052026-05-22the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copiedPENDING
Date
2026-05-22
Actor
John Londot / Greenberg Traurig, for Florida Bar Recipients
Institution
The Florida Bar (in 1150)
Mechanism
the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copied
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(1): a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal, and the duty runs to correcting one the lawyer has made. Because a closed grievance file is public under Rule 3-7.1(b) and Article I, section 24(a), a filed statement about what the Bar did with that file is testable against the Bar's own letters on the same file.
What happened

On 5/22/26 the Bar's outside counsel filed Doc 309 for the four Bar recipients. Paragraph 5 states: "Mr. Hanson simply refuses to believe that such records were not produced because they do not exist—the Bar did not act on his complaint and so did not share it with or request a response from Mr. Davis."

Three things in the Bar's own record run against the first two clauses. Its closure letter recites a docket review. Its review letter describes three levels of internal review (N-055). Two Bar letters on that file, predating the statement, cc Scott Paul Davis with enclosure.

Husband put paragraph 5 to Judge Felix on 5/29/26. No one answered it. The same judge barred cross-examination on the Bar complaint (N-108), and later quashed all four Bar officials' subpoenas without a rule-factor finding (N-130). The determination remains pending. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
A lawyer's statement of fact to a tribunal must be accurate, and it remains the lawyer's to correct after filing. This one was put to the judge seven days later and has never been answered or corrected. The sentence separates cleanly: 'did not request a response from Mr. Davis' is consistent with the record; 'did not act' and 'did not share it with' run against the Bar's own closure letter, its three-review letter (N-055), and two cc lines to Davis on the same file.
Receipt
  • Doc 309 paras. 1 and 5, filed 5/22/26; Husband's opposition is DIN 316, docket-confirmed, not 310
  • 5/29/26 Tr. 45:5-9
  • Closure letter: "In addition to the submitted documentation, I also reviewed the underlying docket in Hillsborough County Case No. 2024-DR-1150."
  • Review letter describes a Senior Staff Attorney investigation, a Director of Intake review, and a Grievance Committee Chair review of the same file (N-055)
  • The cc lines are on four letters: Huston 2/24/25 p. 1; Schuyler 9/24/25 p. 1; Wackes 6/16/26 p. 2; Wackes 7/24/26 p. 2
  • The stated reason is Gangi, Chair of Grievance Committee 13A, 9/23/25 p. 1: "I am also copying Mr. Davis on my response so that the attorney is aware that an additional review of this matter has taken place and that I am sustaining the former decisions to close this file as proper and correct."
  • SET SPLIT, load-bearing and it always travels: of the four cc letters, only Huston 2/24/25 and Schuyler 9/24/25 sit on RFA 25-6861, the file Doc 309 para. 5 is about, and only those two predate the 5/22/26 filing; Wackes 6/16/26 and 7/24/26 are on RFA 26-13570 and both postdate it. The set bearing on the filed sentence is those two, not four
  • SCOPE THAT ALWAYS TRAVELS: the enclosures are not identified on the cc lines, and the 9/24/25 body identifies its enclosure as a Bar document. No enclosure has been produced, so the record does not show that the complaint itself went to Davis
  • The 2/24/25 docket-review sentence is at Leon ROA p. 103 and 1150 Doc 200 p. 29
  • The 6/30/26 Answer Brief states the same posture in signed appellate form: the file "was closed without further investigation" and the review "was limited to the submissions and court records" (brief p. 24, PDF p. 30)
  • Cross-links: N-055, N-116, N-108 (Tr. 43:2-5), N-130 (7/7/26 Tr. 31:1-3)
  • The quoted paragraph contains an em dash in the original and is reproduced verbatim

Spawned by: N-055, N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-105

N-1162026-06-05the Bar reported the file destroyed while the appeal about that very file was pending, and named no disposal date, no schedule provision and no one who authorized itDENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Bar destroyed the records of how it handled Husband's complaint, and any record supporting its closure, after Husband sued to get them. Its Deputy General Counsel reported them "disposed of" and "no longer available," naming no date, provision, or authority.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) presumes the Bar's records open. Records sought in a pending records lawsuit are preserved, and a custodian that reports records gone states when they went, under which provision, and on whose authority. The Florida Bar knows better than to destroy records sought in litigation. Its own Deputy General Counsel taught the rule: "If you have the record, it must be produced even if it could have been disposed of under your retention schedule."

V
Verified facts and law
  • Feb. 24 to Dec. 17, 2025: the closure letter set the disposal date: "the computer record and file of this matter will be disposed of one year from the date of closure," Feb. 24, 2026. Husband requested the records on Nov. 10 and sued for them in Leon County on Dec. 17, 2025. The Bar's own motion describes the request as "all records related to his Bar complaint." N-116, N-150, FNEW-B2
    Read them: Closure letter, Feb. 24, 2025 (record on appeal p. 103) (link pending redacted copy)
  • June 3 to 5, 2026: Husband asked for records of what the Bar did with his messages before assuring him of "investigation by a Senior Staff Attorney" (Category 1), and for any record supporting the closure (Category 3). Category 1: "The requested records relating to RFA 25-6861 have been disposed of pursuant to judicial branch and bar records retention schedule and are no longer available." Category 3: the same, then "In any event, The Florida Bar has no responsibility to identify records that might support your claims." Appeal 1D2026-0728 was pending when the letter was written. N-116, N-055
    Read them: Courtemanche letter, June 5, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • July 16 to Aug. 6, 2026: asked for the audit trail and purge logs showing how the file was disposed of, the Bar priced them at $2,614.80. Asked three times to confirm that nothing would be disposed of while the appeal is pending, its General Counsel's entire answer: "As stated before, the bar's legal hold remains in place." N-132, N-150
    When were the records of RFA 25-6861 destroyed, under which provision of which retention schedule, and on whose authority?
I
Independent encounter

Deputy General Counsel Rick Courtemanche (the June 5 letter). General Counsel Gypsy Bailey (the Aug. 6 answers). One complaint file, one records request, one letter. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and the Bar's own retention notice on this file alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes the Bar's records open and puts the burden of any withholding on the custodian. The Bar's own motion concedes its records "are governed by" Rule 2.420, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a written basis for any denial.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-06-05
Actor
Richard Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel
Institution
The Florida Bar (W016446-060426)
Mechanism
the Bar reported the file destroyed while the appeal about that very file was pending, and named no disposal date, no schedule provision and no one who authorized it
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any withholding on the custodian; Rule 3-7.1(b) made this closed file public. Records that are the subject of pending appeal 1D2026-0728 and of a written litigation-hold demand are preserved. The Bar's own Deputy General Counsel teaches the rule: 'If you have the record, it must be produced even if it could have been disposed of under your retention schedule.'
What happened

On 6/5/26 the Bar's Deputy General Counsel stated that the records of RFA 25-6861 "have been disposed of pursuant to judicial branch and bar records retention schedule and are no longer available." Appeal 1D2026-0728 was pending when he wrote it. His letter names no disposal date, no schedule provision and no authorizer.

Eleven days later, a second Davis complaint's closure letter calendared that file for disposal too, one year out, in the same words: "In light of the foregoing, this file has been closed effective June 16, 2026. Pursuant to the Bar's records retention schedule, the computer record and file of this matter will be disposed of one year from the date of closure." What matters is what was disposed of during a pending appeal, and the three facts the statement leaves out. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Records subject to a pending appeal cannot be destroyed while it is pending, and a custodian who says a record is gone can state when it went, under what provision, and on whose authority. Article I, section 24(a) presumes records open and puts that burden on the custodian. The file reported destroyed would show how the complaint at N-031 was handled, which the Bar's own papers describe three ways (N-055, N-077, N-105). None of the three required facts appears here.
Receipt
  • Courtemanche letter 6/5/26, request W016446-060426; the $89.36 Category 2 charge recomputes exactly as $65.89 attorney plus $23.47 clerical.
  • Wackes letter 6/16/26 p. 2 for the second file's clock, wording identical to Huston 2/24/25 p. 1.
  • Huston retention sentence at Leon ROA p. 103; Schuyler restatement at Leon ROA p. 642, 7/16/25, filed by the Bar's own counsel as Composite Exhibit A with a judicial-notice request at ROA p. 626.
  • Closure 2/24/25, one year from closure is 2/24/26; records request made 11/10/25; Leon petition filed 12/17/25; dismissal order entered 2/13/26 and rehearing denial 2/24/26, the same calendar day the announced disposal date fell.
  • Authorities the Bar relies on for declining to identify records: Bivens v. Tony, 368 So. 3d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) and Doe v. DeSantis, 390 So. 3d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024); reporter cites for both not yet confirmed.
  • The Leon action's pendency is stated here against the 2/24/26 disposal date; the arithmetic has not been independently rechecked.

Spawned by: N-079, N-105

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-116

N-1212026-06-16the second complaint arrived with a written conflicts notice on its face, and closed in 23 days without a word about the conflicts, from an institution that was at that moment an active defendant in the complainant's pending lawsuit against itDENIED
Date
2026-06-16
Actor
Christopher Stephen Wackes
Institution
The Florida Bar (RFA 26-13570)
Mechanism
the second complaint arrived with a written conflicts notice on its face, and closed in 23 days without a word about the conflicts, from an institution that was at that moment an active defendant in the complainant's pending lawsuit against it
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath as provided in this rule,' and 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal only 'after complete investigation.' The resubmission was keyed to Rules 4-3.1, 4-3.2, 4-3.3, 4-3.4, 4-4.4(a) and 4-8.4, rules that govern a lawyer's conduct in litigation. A written conflicts notice to an institution that is a defendant in the complainant's pending suit against it calls for a written answer before the institution acts on the complaint.
What happened

On 6/16/26 Bar counsel closed Husband's second complaint against Wife's counsel in 23 days. The letter named no rule of professional conduct, made no finding on most allegations, and said nothing about the conflicts notice. Its one adverse finding: "A review of court records indicates that the appeal was disposed of prior to the hearing mentioned in your complaint." It closed with the same door the first closure offered: a supporting court order would reopen review.

That condition was already met by Exhibit A, the 11/20/24 order compelling Wife's compliance with mandatory disclosure and awarding Husband fee entitlement (N-009), which the letter never mentions. The exit it names is one the court has repeatedly declined to open, refusing more than once to find any fact. Exhibit A runs against the party, not her counsel. That gap has a real answer available. The Bar has not given one. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
The Bar's rule states the duty plainly: 'Bar counsel must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath as provided in this rule.' This resubmission was keyed rule by rule to the docket and named the conflicts on its face. The conflicts run two layers deep: the Bar was a defendant in Husband's pending suit when it closed this complaint in 23 days, and the 2026 complaint sits atop its handling of the 2025 file. The closure names no rule and says nothing about the conflicts.
Receipt
  • Wackes letter 6/16/26, RFA 26-13570, pp. 1-2; the adverse stay/appeal finding is on p. 1. The full condition sentence includes the affirmative promise.
  • The 5/24/26 complaint with the conflicts notice on its face.
  • Exhibit A is the 11/20/24 "Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Compel Petitioner's Compliance with Mandatory Disclosure (Hon. K. Ayers)," 1150 Doc 054 (N-009).
  • Pending-litigation posture on 6/16/26: Leon County 2025-CA-2469 and the appeal 1D2026-0728.
  • Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from the current rule. Rules 3-7.3(c) and (d) are read in the June 30, 2026 edition (print pp. 116-117). The same rule permits dismissal only "after complete investigation."
  • Court-side receipts for the locked exit: N-091 (4/17/26 Tr. 181, findings refused six times); N-108 (5/29/26 Tr. 53:9-15, "Are you ever going to find any facts about my constitutional rights?" answered "Maybe."); N-046 (4/22/25, misconduct named against both parties only); 7/7/26 PM Tr. 31:17-18 ("I'm not going to answer that question.").
  • 23 days computed 5/24 to 6/16/26. The Della-Donna year misprint is noted, not weaponized.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-121

N-1242026-06-19the routine request got the routine answer in twenty days; the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and the request for executive-committee review drew nothing in writing from anyonePARTIAL
Date
2026-06-19
Actor
Bar leadership (Orr, Greenlee, Baker-Barnes, Doyle, et al.)
Institution
The Florida Bar
Mechanism
the routine request got the routine answer in twenty days; the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and the request for executive-committee review drew nothing in writing from anyone
What the law required
Standing Board Policy 15.75 provides for review of a staff-level closure on the complainant's written request made within 30 days, with a written explanation of the reasons; the 7/4/26 request came on day 18. Records that are the subject of pending appeal 1D2026-0728 and a written litigation-hold demand are preserved. A conflicts notice and a request for executive-committee review, sent to an institution that is a defendant in the complainant's suit against it, call for a written answer from someone with authority to give one.
What happened

On 6/19/26, the new Bar president's swearing-in day, Bar leadership received the full record, a litigation-hold demand, and a request for a conversation. No named officer replied in writing. A nine-point objection followed on 7/4/26, asking the Bar to "proceed with all additional review and oversight options relating to my complaint," including review through the executive committee.

Twenty days later, on 7/24/26, the Bar answered that one point only: the Director of ACAP "will review this file and decide if closure was appropriate." That review may take up to 60 days. The letter does not mention the conflicts notice, the litigation hold, or the executive-committee request, and no named officer answered personally in any document in the file. Through 8/7/26, forty-nine days, no named officer replied at all. Several officer addresses reportedly bounced and were later corrected, though no bounce notice confirms it. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation
Policy 15.75 review was granted in writing twenty days after it was requested: the routine request got the routine answer. The three requests that reached the institution itself, the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and executive-committee review, produced no writing from any named officer. The Bar answered where a form existed and not where a decision would have been required.
Receipt
  • The 6/19/26 send as an as-sent PDF.
  • The 7/4/26 objection as sent, 6:16:15 PM EDT, preserved as.eml with a true-copy PDF read from its text layer, not from a page image.
  • The Bar's answer, Wackes letter 7/24/26 p. 2, granting ACAP Director review of the RFA 26-13570 closure, scanned as received, on letterhead naming Joshua E. Doyle as Executive Director; the board of governors policy the letter says is attached is NOT in the scan.
  • All seven pages of the 6/11/26 email to Bar leadership were rendered and contain NO bounce notice; the stored file's name asserts a bounce the document does not show, and the bounce assertion must not be repeated as fact until a notice is filed. The message itself and its twelve-address recipient list are at p. 1.
  • Forty-nine days computed 6/19 to 8/7/26, scoped to the matter's Bar correspondence file and its Gmail archive.
  • The 7/24/26 letter also carries "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)" at p. 2 (N-105).

Spawned by: N-116, N-121

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-124

N-1292026-07-04 -> ongoinga dues-paying member asked who funds the outside firm his own Bar retained against him, four times between July 4 and July 11, the first two fifty-six minutes apart the same evening; the Bar answered the question with a price, $101.09, and has never given the answer itselfONLY-FOR-A-PRICE
Date
2026-07-04 -> ongoing
Actor
The Florida Bar (Richard Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel; Gypsy Bailey, General Counsel); demand directed also to Jason Kelley and to outside counsel John Londot
Institution
The Florida Bar (PRR W016548-070626; prior W016061-022526 and W016446-060426 Category 2)
Mechanism
a dues-paying member asked who funds the outside firm his own Bar retained against him, four times between July 4 and July 11, the first two fifty-six minutes apart the same evening; the Bar answered the question with a price, $101.09, and has never given the answer itself
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the records open and puts the exemption burden on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the basis for any denial in writing, and 2.420(m)(3) limits fees to those section 119.07 allows.
What happened

The Bar retained Greenberg Traurig to defend it in Husband's Leon County records action, to carry the appeal, and to move in the family case to quash the subpoenas of four Bar officials. Husband pays dues to that Bar. He asked who funds the engagement four times between 7/4/26 and 7/11/26, including a formal records request, Category D, seeking records identifying who authorized the engagement and its funding source.

What came back was a price: $101.09, on a 30-day pay-or-close clock. On 8/6/26 the General Counsel answered the fee questions in detail, confirming the financial records exist, but did not say who pays. No exemption and no denial was ever asserted as to Category D. Two earlier requests also went unproduced behind fees, $254.67 (N-082) and $89.36 (N-116). As of August 10, 2026 the records had not been produced and the Bar had not said who pays. [ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE]

Baseline deviation
The cost of answering is the measure: one sentence, and the Bar's own counsel confirmed Finance and Accounting had already located the records. No exemption was claimed and nothing was refused; the request was priced. Husband pays mandatory dues to the Bar that retained the firm against him; who pays for the engagement is exactly what the request asked. It was asked four times and remains unanswered.
Receipt
  • Demands: (1) 7/4/26 6:16:15 PM objection letter item 8; (2) 7/4/26 7:12:36 PM records request Category D (the companion file marked MISDIRECTED and resent; the 7:12 PM version is operative); (3) 7/10/26 1:15 PM email sec. 1; (4) 7/11/26 8:35:37 PM Request 5.
  • The four demands run 7/4/26 to 7/11/26; demands (1) and (2) are fifty-six minutes apart the same evening (6:16:15 PM and 7:12:36 PM).
  • 7/4/26 6:16 PM letter: "I am a dues-paying member of The Florida Bar. As a member, I object to that allocation of the Bar's resources, and I ask the Bar's leadership to account for it."
  • 7/10/26 email: "Please confirm in writing the funding source for that engagement, including whether it is paid from mandatory member dues."
  • Courtemanche's fee letter: "The bar is not obligated to divide its efforts by category, regardless of whether you accept our prior estimate."
  • Responses: Courtemanche 7/6/26 acknowledgment and $101.09 estimate; Bailey 8/6/26 7:00 PM inline reply that Finance and Accounting "had to produce these records and spent more time than our customary 30-minute period"; "The bar will not waive the $101.09 estimate"; the clerical hours were to "locate the records and pull records that do not contain confidential attorney-client information".
  • W-number mapping, counterintuitive on its face: W016548-070626 is the Greenberg Traurig BILLING request; W016547 is the RETENTION and DISPOSITION request.
  • Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), and Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878 (2018), both cited in the demand; reporter cites verified 9/15/26.
  • Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(2) and (m)(3); section 119.07(4), Fla. Stat.
  • The 6/19/26 letter contains no Greenberg Traurig, dues or funding-source content, across all 10 of its pages.
  • The 7/15/26 ESI demand and the 7/23/26 followup name the firm but contain no funding ask; the 8/5/26 fee letter deliberately omits it.
  • Searched for any Bar answer on funding, and none appears in: the Bar correspondence and JQC file, the Leon mandamus matter, the 1D2026-0728 appeal file including the 6/30/26 Answer Brief, and the node ledger.

Spawned by: N-082, N-105, N-131

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-129

NEW-P52026-07-07the Bar's lawyer won the ruling, accepted the court's assignment to write the order, and for 56 days the ruling did not exist as an order, so the party that lost it had nothing to appeal; the order entered on 9/1/26 states no ground and addresses no witnessIGNORED
Date
2026-07-07
Actor
John Londot, Greenberg Traurig (drafting counsel for the Bar recipients); Judge Felix (bench grant, assignment)
Institution
The Florida Bar (outside counsel), in 13th Cir. 24-DR-001150
Mechanism
the Bar's lawyer won the ruling, accepted the court's assignment to write the order, and for 56 days the ruling did not exist as an order, so the party that lost it had nothing to appeal; the order entered on 9/1/26 states no ground and addresses no witness
What the law required
Counsel who accepts a tribunal's assignment to prepare an order performs it or states why not. The court asked, 'Mr. Londot, will you please prepare an order?' and he answered 'Yes.' (7/7/26 PM Tr. 31:4-8). Until a written order is entered the ruling binds no one and cannot be appealed, so the party that lost it has nothing to take up.
What happened
On 7/7/26 the court granted the Bar recipients' motion to quash from the bench, gave one ground, and asked the Bar's outside counsel to prepare the order. He accepted on the record. No deadline was set. That evening he emailed the proposed order to an address Husband says he had directed him in writing three weeks earlier not to use. Husband found it and objected two days later, on 7/9/26, raising constitutional issues and stating that the proposed order offered no explanation for the decision and should address each witness and the relevance of their testimony. No reply ever came. No revised order issued. On 9/1/26, 56 days after the bench ruling, the court signed a one-page order granting the motion that states no ground and addresses no witness; it is dated "this ______ day of August, 2026" over the 9/1/26 electronic signature and was docketed 9/2/26 (Doc 378). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A lawyer who accepts a drafting assignment either finishes it or says why not. The court asked, "Mr. Londot, will you please prepare an order?" and he answered "Yes." A bench ruling that never becomes a written order binds no one and cannot be appealed, so the party holding the unwritten win keeps it. Until 9/1/26 this was the fourth unwritten ruling on this record (N-060, N-074, N-092, N-090). Three other orders were entered within about a day (N-123, N-128, N-134).
Receipt
  • 7/7/26 PM transcript (Guldin, certified 7/13/26): bench grant at 29:24-25, the single stated ground at 31:1-3, the assignment and acceptance at 31:4-8. The 31:4-8 duty anchor has not been checked against a page image.
  • The 7/9/26 email to Londot: "As far as the proposed order, I object. I have raised constitutional issues. The proposed order fails to offer any explanation or basis for the decision." It goes on to ask that each witness and the relevance of their testimony be addressed and that objections be noted if submitted as is. Both pages; no reply and no new proposed order followed.
  • The written order is Doc 378, e-signed 9/1/26 4:01:11 PM and docketed 9/2/26: one page, no ground stated, no witness addressed, dated "this ______ day of August, 2026" over the 9/1/26 signature. No deadline was set for the order, so the claim here is not a missed deadline; it is 56 days of silence against an accepted assignment.
  • The 6/16/26 address directive rests on Husband's 7/9 account only and the native 6/16 message has not been located (documented negative 8/18/26).
  • The 7/9 message asserting "I have never emailed you from this email address other than to request that you NOT use it" was itself sent from that address, per its From line.
  • No rule is cited here. Velocity comparators: N-123 (about 4 hours), N-128 (about 19h54m), N-134 (about 25 hours). Unwritten-ruling family: N-060, N-074, N-092, N-090, N-133.
  • The same hearing's commentary about Husband's mental health is its own card, NEW-P10.

Spawned by: N-129

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P5

NEW-P102026-07-07the Bar's lawyer told a judge he had a "spidey-sense" about the other side's mental health, said he is not a doctor, and advised the self-represented father to spend better time with his children; the objection was immediate and drew no answer, correction, or withdrawalIGNORED
Date
2026-07-07
Actor
John Londot, Greenberg Traurig (outside counsel for the Bar recipients)
Institution
The Florida Bar (through outside counsel, in open court)
Mechanism
the Bar's lawyer told a judge he had a "spidey-sense" about the other side's mental health, said he is not a doctor, and advised the self-represented father to spend better time with his children; the objection was immediate and drew no answer, correction, or withdrawal
What the law required
Rule 4-8.4(d) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar bars conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants," and Rule 4-4.4(a) provides that a lawyer "may not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person." A statement to a tribunal about an opposing party's mental health, prefaced by the speaker's own "I'm not a doctor," carries no evidentiary support by its terms. A timely objection calls for a ruling from the court; this one drew none, and counsel neither corrected nor withdrew the statement.
What happened
At the 7/7/26 afternoon hearing, counsel for the Bar recipients told the court: "I got a very strong spidey-sense, and I'm not a doctor, but I think there are -- is some emotional mental difficulties happening there. I heard Mr. Hanson acknowledge that," adding that he hoped Husband would recalculate and devote better family time than litigation. Husband objected on the record: "Mr. Londot's comments about my mental health status, and how I should be spending time with my children are unconscionable." Neither counsel nor the court addressed the objection. No correction and no withdrawal appears anywhere in this record. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Husband had already said it himself, at the same hearing: "The Florida Bar is even well aware of some emotional and mental difficulties that I've had". Husband has had some physical and mental health challenges; his own testimony stays verbatim. What followed is the deviation: a lawyer offered the diagnosis-shaped statement anyway, disclaiming his own qualification, and moved from that to how Husband should spend time with his children. The objection is in the same transcript, unanswered.
Receipt
  • 7/7/26 PM transcript (Guldin, certified 7/13/26), 23:15-26:4: the two quoted lines at 25:8-21; the objection at 26:10-16; the phone-call statements at 24:20-21, 25:7-8 and 26:17-19.
  • Rule text: Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 4-4.4(a) and 4-8.4(d), official June 30, 2026 print.
  • Husband's own same-hearing statement, "The Florida Bar is even well aware of some emotional and mental difficulties that I've had" (18:24-19:1), is what "I heard Mr. Hanson acknowledge that" points at, and it leads the baseline above.
  • Counsel: "when I first got the file I called Mr. Hanson" and Husband "refused to talk to me on the phone any more." Husband: "I never got on the phone with him. We had an e-mail communication."
  • His 7/9 email calls the Bar this lawyer's "client and co-conspirator" and announces him and his firm as federal defendants.

Spawned by: NEW-P5

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P10

N-1322026-07-16the last remaining records, the ones showing how, when and by whom the Bar's file was destroyed, were priced at $2,614.80 in advance; the figure is exactly 60 hours at the Bar's own internal IT rate, with nothing in it for the vendor whose involvement is the stated reason the price does not changeONLY-FOR-A-PRICE
Date
2026-07-16
Actor
Gypsy Bailey, General Counsel and Division Director, Ethics and Consumer Protection, The Florida Bar
Institution
The Florida Bar (Rule 2.420 request, Category F: audit-trail, metadata, user-access and purge-log records for RFA 25-6861)
Mechanism
the last remaining records, the ones showing how, when and by whom the Bar's file was destroyed, were priced at $2,614.80 in advance; the figure is exactly 60 hours at the Bar's own internal IT rate, with nothing in it for the vendor whose involvement is the stated reason the price does not change
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect judicial-branch records, and access is the presumption; section 24(c) permits exemptions only where created by law with specificity. The burden of justifying a withholding or a barrier to access rests on the custodian, not the requester. The Bar invoked section 119.07(4)(d), Florida Statutes, which permits a special service charge only where the request requires extensive use of information technology resources or extensive clerical assistance, and provides that the charge "shall be reasonable and shall be based on the cost incurred." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(3) carries the same limit into the judicial branch. Subdivision (m)(2) requires the custodian to state the basis for a denial in writing. The lawful path in one sentence: produce the cost calculation behind the figure, the systems queried, the tasks, the hours per task, the personnel classification and rate for each, and the vendor charge stated separately, or reduce the charge to the cost actually incurred.
What happened
On 7/16/26 at 2:56 PM the Bar priced the last outstanding category, the audit-trail, metadata, user-access and purge-log records showing how the RFA 25-6861 file was disposed of, at $2,614.80: "Under Rule 2.420(m)(3) and FS §119.07(4)(d), the bar would have to engage in extensive labor to produce such records, and the estimate for this work is $2,614.80. The records will not be provided until payment is made. If you do not reply within 30 days from the date of this response, we will assume that you no longer wish to receive the records and your request will be closed." Asked to itemize, the Bar answered 70 minutes later, on 7/17/26 at 12:15:17 PM, in three lines: "The estimate remains the same for both, as both will involve approximately 60 hours of IT time and working with our vendor for the items you requested," then "See 1 above.", then "As previously stated, Categories A-E have been produced, and Category F has not." On 8/6/26 at 3:00 PM the same author wrote: "The system the bar uses for disciplinary matters, including complaints against members, may have all this information but we have no access to it. We do not know what the vendor would charge to build the necessary access, how long it would take for the vendor to program that for the bar, what the bar's IT department would have to do to produce such data after the vendor completes any build, etc. I consulted with the bar's IT department to arrive at that estimate, and it is just that – an estimate." The arithmetic is checkable by anyone. $2,614.80 divided by 60 hours is $43.58 to the cent, with no remainder, and $43.58 per hour is the IT Labor rate printed on the Bar's own 3/9/26 letter, where it appears as "$43.58 per hour x 0.5 hours = $21.79" and also recomputes exactly (N-082). So the figure is 60 hours at the Bar's internal rate and nothing else, in a price whose stated justification is "60 hours of IT time and working with our vendor." The Bar's reconciliation is available: the 60 hours is an estimate of unknown work. What that reading costs is the scope answer, because an estimate built on admittedly unknown vendor and IT inputs cannot also be the reason the same figure prices one file and two files alike. The Bar answered every one of these letters promptly and in substance: a 7/16 reply to a 7/15 letter, a 7/17 reply in 70 minutes, and an 8/6 reply about 24 hours after the 8/5 letter, answering line by line. The specific questions still went unanswered. [ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE]
Baseline deviation
The Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open, and section 24(c) permits exemptions only where created by law with specificity. The burden of justifying any barrier to access sits with the custodian, never with the person asking. Florida law permits a special service charge only where a request requires extensive labor, and the charge "shall be reasonable and shall be based on the cost incurred." The lawful path is one sentence: produce the cost calculation behind the figure, the systems queried, the tasks, the hours per task, the personnel classification and rate for each, and the vendor charge stated separately, or reduce the charge to the cost actually incurred. Instead the itemization request came back pointing at the aggregate, and three weeks later the author wrote that the vendor cost, the vendor timeline and the Bar's own IT scope are all unknown.
Receipt
All three 2026 messages were read from the native Gmail messages on 9/26/2026 and every quoted sentence matches the tree captures: the Bar's 7/16/26 response to the 7/15 six-category records request carrying the $2,614.80 estimate; Bailey's 7/17/26 inline reply received 12:15 PM ET (60 hours of IT time plus vendor, same estimate for both scopes, Categories A-E produced and F not); and Bailey's 8/6/26 General Counsel responses on W016548 and W016547, fee waiver and itemization. The $43.58 IT Labor rate is confirmed against the rendered page of the 3/9/26 prepayment letter, p. 1; the $2,614.80 figure is confirmed against the native 7/16/26 message. Fee sequence recomputes: $254.67 + $89.36 + $101.09 + $2,614.80 = $3,059.92. Article I, section 24(a) and (c), Fla. Const.; section 119.07(4)(d), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(2) and (m)(3).

Spawned by: N-129, N-116, N-082

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-132

N-1532026-07-24the Bar assigned the review of its closure to an official the complainant's conflicts notice had named, said the review could take 60 days, and on day 60 had no decision and no answer to who assessed the conflictsIGNORED
Date
2026-07-24
Actor
The Florida Bar: Shanell Schuyler, Director of ACAP/Intake (assigned 7/24/26); Gypsy Bailey, General Counsel (9/11/26 status reply); Christopher Stephen Wackes, Bar Counsel (7/24/26 grant letter)
Institution
The Florida Bar (RFA 26-13570)
Mechanism
the Bar assigned the review of its closure to an official the complainant's conflicts notice had named, said the review could take 60 days, and on day 60 had no decision and no answer to who assessed the conflicts
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath as provided in this rule.' The review runs under Standing Board Policy 15.75: the ACAP/Intake director 'will review bar counsel's decision to close' and may agree with the closure, reopen the matter, or forward it to the grievance committee (15.75(e)), and 'at each level of review, bar counsel will inform the complaining witness and respondent or respondent's counsel of actions taken or decisions made' (15.75(c)). The policy sets no deadline; the 60 days is the Bar's own written estimate.
What happened
On July 24, 2026 the Bar granted review of the June 16 closure (N-121): "Each of these reviews may take as long as 60 days to complete." Day 60 was September 22. On September 11 the General Counsel wrote that the review was assigned on July 24 to Shanell Schuyler, Director of ACAP/Intake, and that "it is likely that the review will not be completed until sometime in October." Asked what safeguards addressed the conflicts, she answered that the file "was assigned to Ms. Schuyler under Standing Board Policy 15.75." The May 24 conflicts notice had named Ms. Schuyler. On September 23 Husband asked five status questions and the conflict questions again, with a reply requested by close of business September 24. The General Counsel replied on September 24 at 10:30 AM: the file 'is still under Ms. Schuyler's review,' she 'conducts a de novo review of each file, and some reviews take longer than others to complete,' and notice will come in writing. Asked that evening what actions had been taken since July 24 and whether any recusal standard applies to the Director, she replied on September 25: Ms. Schuyler 'is reviewing the file to determine whether closure was appropriate or whether further investigation is warranted,' the file 'remains in closed status,' and she 'will review all materials submitted and conduct an independent investigation.' As of September 26, the five status questions, who assessed the conflicts, and why the Director who upheld the first closure is reviewing the second remain unanswered. [IGNORED: status and conflict questions]
Baseline deviation
A review with a stated length ends with a decision or a new date and a reason, and the Bar's own policy requires bar counsel to tell the complainant the 'actions taken' at each level of review. The questions asked were who is deciding, what has been done, and how the conflicts were handled. Each has a one-line answer.
Receipt
  • Wackes letter 7/24/26 granting Director review, RFA 26-13570
  • Bailey email 9/11/26
  • Husband's email 9/23/26 1:21 PM (as sent)
  • Conflicts notice 5/24/26 p. 1
  • Bailey emails 9/24/26 10:30 AM and 9/25/26 10:07 AM (received)
  • Schuyler letters 7/16/25 and 9/24/25 upholding the first closure, RFA 25-6861
  • Standing Board Policy 15.75, Standing Board Policies effective 7/17/26, pp. 102-105
  • Day counts: 7/24/26 plus 60 days is 9/22/26; 7/24/26 to 9/26/26 is 64 days

Spawned by: N-121

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-153

N-1502026-08-06asked three times to confirm that nothing would be destroyed while the appeal about those very records is pending, and that the hold had reached the outside vendor, the Bar answered every fee question in the same document line by line and answered these three with one sentencePARTIAL
Date
2026-08-06
Actor
Gypsy Bailey, General Counsel, The Florida Bar
Institution
The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861, RFA 26-13570, W016548), against 1D2026-0728 and 24-DR-001150
Mechanism
asked three times to confirm that nothing would be destroyed while the appeal about those very records is pending, and that the hold had reached the outside vendor, the Bar answered every fee question in the same document line by line and answered these three with one sentence
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution makes access to judicial-branch records a constitutional right, and records that are the live subject of a pending appeal cannot be destroyed while that appeal is pending. A litigation hold attaches when litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated, and it reaches records held on the party's behalf by a third-party vendor. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(2) requires a written basis where a request is refused. The one-year disposal clock on the RFA 26-13570 file runs from the 6/16/26 closure, and the appeal about those very records, 1D2026-0728, is pending. The burden of justifying nondisclosure or nonpreservation sits with the custodian. The lawful path in one sentence: confirm in writing that the hold covers the vendor-operated systems and that nothing will be disposed of while the appeal about those records is pending, or state in writing what is scheduled for disposal and when.
What happened
Husband asked three specific questions in writing on 7/15/26, again on 7/17/26 and again on 8/5/26. Verbatim from the 8/5 letter: "Please confirm in writing that Request No. W016548 remains open." / "the June 16, 2026 closure letter for RFA No. 26-13570 states that its file and computer records will be disposed of one year from closure. Proceedings concerning these matters are pending in First DCA Case No. 1D2026-0728 and in Hillsborough County Case No. 24-DR-001150; please confirm in writing that no disposal will occur while either proceeding is pending. If the Bar will not confirm that, please state in writing what is scheduled for disposal and when." / "the July 17 response states that the Category F work involves the Bar's vendor; please confirm in writing that the litigation hold has been communicated to that vendor for the systems it operates." The Bar's 8/6/26 reply answered the fee questions inline and in detail. On these three, the entire answer was: "As stated before, the bar's legal hold remains in place." That is a real answer. It is also not a confirmation about the vendor, not a confirmation about the disposal clock, and not a statement of what is scheduled for disposal and when. The disposal language it was asked about is the Bar's own, printed on the closure letter in the same words the 2025 letter used: "the computer record and file of this matter will be disposed of one year from the date of closure." [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
Records that are the live subject of a pending appeal cannot be destroyed while the appeal is pending, and a litigation hold reaches records a vendor operates on the party's behalf. The lawful path was to confirm in writing that the hold covers the vendor's systems and that nothing will be disposed of while the appeal is pending, or to state what is scheduled for disposal and when. The custodian carries the burden of justifying anything less. The same author answered the fee questions in the same document, line by line, which is exactly what makes the selectivity checkable. And the consequence is dated and running: the file on the first Davis complaint was already reported destroyed while the appeal was pending, with no disposal date, no schedule provision and no authorizer ever given (N-116), and a second one-year clock now runs on a second file from 6/16/26.
Receipt
Bailey's 8/6/26 General Counsel responses on W016548 and W016547, fee waiver and itemization, read from the native Gmail message (id 19fd872fa706e2d2) on 9/26/2026 with every quoted sentence matching; the only attachment is the Bar's signature-block logo (image001.png). The 6/16/26 one-year disposal sentence appears at Wackes p. 2, wording identical to Huston 2/24/25 p. 1. The same clock appears at Leon ROA p. 103 (Huston 2/24/25) and ROA p. 642 (Schuyler 7/16/25, which restates it without stating a new closure date). Article I, section 24(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(2).

Spawned by: N-116, N-124, N-129

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-150

Thirteenth Circuit administration6 nodes

Official public records: Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, About the Court and court administration | Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, contact and public information

N-0482025-04-28the judge who inherited the case signed an order of recusal the same day, stating no reason, and that order was left out of the circuit's records production and refused entry into the appellate recordDENIED
Date
2025-04-28
Actor
Judge Wendy J. DePaul (recusal); 13th Cir. Admin (non-production)
Institution
13th Cir. Div. C
Mechanism
the judge who inherited the case signed an order of recusal the same day, stating no reason, and that order was left out of the circuit's records production and refused entry into the appellate record
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a denial of access to state its basis in writing. Rule 2.330(k) lets a judge enter an order of recusal on her own initiative.
What happened
On April 28, 2025, the day Judge Ayers was disqualified (N-047), the case went to Judge Wendy J. DePaul. She entered a case management conference order setting an August 13 hearing, then recused on her own motion the same day, on an order carrying an electronic stamp of 5:37:56 PM, stating no reason, and routed reassignment to Judge Felix under a standing administrative order. The order of recusal states no reason for declining a file inherited that same day. It was not produced in response to Husband's records request to the 13th Circuit, and on April 6, 2026 the Second District declined to allow it into the appellate record. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A rule lets a judge step away from a case and say nothing about why. Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian, so the document still has to appear in a public-records production or be denied in writing on a stated ground. Only the second duty was missed. The evidentiary weight sits on the non-production, not the recusal.
Receipt
  • Docs 186 and 187 chronology (Order of Recusal, 4/28/25, electronic stamp 5:37:56 PM).
  • Administrative Order S-2025-013 for the reassignment.
  • The appellate denial at Doc 282 (4/6/26).
  • The 9/23/25 supplement motion in 2D2025-1936.

Spawned by: N-047

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-048

FNEW-A12025-07-28 -> 2025-09-15fifteen days after four specific written questions were sent testing whether the withheld video is really security footage, the office's entire response was to acknowledge receipt again and promise an answer "in a reasonable manner"IGNORED
Date
2025-07-28 -> 2025-09-15
Actor
Mike Moore, Public Information Officer, 13th Judicial Circuit
Institution
13th Cir. Administrative Office of the Courts
Mechanism
fifteen days after four specific written questions were sent testing whether the withheld video is really security footage, the office's entire response was to acknowledge receipt again and promise an answer "in a reasonable manner"
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy judicial-branch records, and the custodian carries the burden of justifying any withholding. Rule 2.420(m) requires that responses to records requests "be made in a reasonable manner" and that a denial state its basis in writing. The Circuit's own August 21, 2025 letter processed these requests under Rule 2.420 and Article I, section 24.
What happened
Husband sent three records requests to the 13th Circuit in July 2025. On July 28 the public information officer acknowledged them: "This email response serves as acknowledgment of your public records request. At this time, please note that our office does not need anything further from you, and a response to your three (3) requests will be made in a reasonable manner." On August 31 Husband put the four questions in writing. On September 15, after two further follow-ups, the office's entire response was the same formula: "This email response also serves to acknowledge receipt of your prior requests as well as any new requests. Please note that responses to your requests will be made in a reasonable manner." Neither email answered any pending question. The exhibit record filed with the petition shows no substantive response from the office between September 15 and October 14, 2025, when Husband filed the mandamus petition (N-058). The one letter that did engage, dated September 8, restated the exemption without stating its factual basis (FNEW-A2). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution grants the right of access to records and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian asserting it. A custodian owes a prompt, good-faith response to the request actually made. The second acknowledgment is the measurable act, and the questions are what make it measurable: each of them has a one-sentence answer if the exemption's factual basis is true. Which camera system recorded the hearing. Whether the courtroom microphones connect to it. What the video shows. Why routine surveillance video exists for one hearing out of eight requested. Routine security footage would have had routine answers to those questions. The first acknowledgment was a receipt, and a substantive letter followed within four weeks (N-053).
Receipt
Both emails are in the record of the mandamus case, filed October 15, 2025 as a 170-page exhibit (25-CA-010255, DIN 6): the July 28 email at page 23 and the September 15 email at pages 20-21. Both quotes were checked against the page images on September 26, 2026. Fifteen days runs from the August 31 questions to the September 15 acknowledgment. The office's own August 21, 2025 letter placed these requests under Rule 2.420 and Article I, section 24.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-A1

NEW-P12025-08-21the circuit certified twice in writing that the records existed, counted them, took the copying fee, and handed over a paper box that did not contain the judge-level communications the certification covered. The August 31, 2025 request for an explanation was unanswered a year later.PARTIAL
Date
2025-08-21
Actor
Gina Justice, Court Administrator (letter signed by her, cc Judge Ayers and JA Heyward); Mike Moore, PIO (acknowledgments)
Institution
13th Judicial Circuit, Administrative Office of the Courts
Mechanism
the circuit certified twice in writing that the records existed, counted them, took the copying fee, and handed over a paper box that did not contain the judge-level communications the certification covered. The August 31, 2025 request for an explanation was unanswered a year later.
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy any public record, expressly including the judicial branch, and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder; Rule 2.420 implements that right for judicial-branch records (Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995)). The Circuit's own letter conceded the framework: “we are treating your public records request as a request for administrative records of the judicial branch in accordance with Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420 and article 1, section 24 of the Florida Constitution.” Rule 2.420(m)(2) then makes the custodian determine the form in which the record is provided and, for anything denied, state the basis in writing.
What happened
Between July 24 and 25, 2025 Husband emailed three requests: communications about scheduling for two hearings, and recordings of eight hearings. The August 21, 2025 letter certified twice: "Records do exist that satisfy this request." It counted them at 226 pages and demanded prepayment for pickup. Husband paid and picked up paper. His August 31, 2025 email itemized what the box did not contain: no records showing the judge directing or being informed of the emergency scheduling, nothing on the after-hours decisions, and no indication the judge knew opposing counsel would not attend. It also reported that "Many pages are unreadable due to low ink," while the box included unrequested pages. Follow-ups went out through October 9, 2025; after September 8 the circuit's only response was a form acknowledgment. No explanation of the gap has issued through August 20, 2026. Forty-four days later, the mandamus was filed (N-058). [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
When a custodian certifies in writing that records exist and takes the copying fee, the requester gets those records, or a written statement of what was withheld and why. The state constitution puts that burden on the custodian, including the judicial branch, and the circuit's own letter concedes the framework applies. The requests asked for electronic records. What came back was a mailed letter, a prepaid paper box, and no electronic files even after the unreadable pages were reported.
Receipt
  • Exhibit 006 pp. 13-15 (8/21/25 letter: both certifications, 226-page count, both fee figures, cc line).
  • 006 pp. 4, 6 (electronic-format request: "Please provide the records in electronic format if available.").
  • 006 p. 23 (8/31/25 omissions email, native e-filed text layer).
  • 006 p. 20 (9/15/25 acknowledgment: "responses to your requests will be made in a reasonable manner").
  • Doc 012 paras. 17-21, 23, 26 (text layer); exhibit 010, the scanned 377-page production, interior not read.
  • Fee arithmetic recomputes from 226 pages at the stated per-page rate. Interval 8/31/25 to 10/14/25 is 44 days.
  • Exact paper-pickup date is not yet confirmed.
  • Follow-ups: 8/26, 8/31, 9/9, 9/12, 9/24, 10/9/25.
  • Scope note: production did include some December 2024 scheduling traffic among judicial assistants and counsel, so the claim is the narrower one: nothing showed the judge's own involvement, the after-hours decisions, or the non-attendance exchange.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P1

N-0532025-08-21Court administration withheld the April 4, 2025 hearing video as security footage without ever stating a fact that makes it one.DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Court administration confirmed the April 4, 2025 hearing video exists and withheld it as security footage without ever stating a fact that makes it one, stated in writing that scheduling records "do exist," and never answered Husband's written notice that records were missing.

E
Expected output

A custodian invoking a security-system exemption for a recording of a court hearing states the fact that puts it inside: what system made it. A custodian that certifies "Records do exist," takes the fee, and is told in writing that records are missing says what was produced and what was held back. Its own letters cite Rule 2.420.

V
Verified facts and law
  • July 24 to 25, 2025: every request: "Please provide the records in electronic format if available." The answer: a check first, then paper by pickup or $44.85 shipping. No PDF ever came. The readable pages hold no record of how the court handled Davis's notice that he would skip the Jan. 9, 2025 hearing; asked whether Davis was "ever excused by the Court," the judicial assistant replied: "This email shall be used for scheduling purposes only." NEW-P1
  • Aug. 21, 2025: "A video record does exist" for the April 4, 2025 hearing, withheld as "surveillance video footage from security cameras." Asked in writing three times whether there are "separate recording systems for hearings versus security," the office's one answer, Sept. 8: "the court's position to your follow-up request has not changed." May 15, 2026 admissions: "No analysis was needed." Sept. 2, 2026, its counsel called it "the April 4, 2025 hearing-room video recording." N-053, N-157
    Three written asks, zero answers: which system recorded the April 4, 2025 hearing?
  • Aug. 22, 2025: four pages of "correspondence between Judge DePaul and our Assistant General Counsel regarding an Order of Recusal" withheld under Rule 2.420(c)(1). Sept. 10, 2026, counsel: "confidential under judicial immunity." Sept. 17, 2026: 2.420(c)(1) again. N-053
  • Aug. 31, 2025: Husband: "It's concerning that these documents were not produced in the initial response." The office answered only about the video: "the court will not ignore or intentionally violate the applicable rule of court or statute." Counsel, May 26 and Sept. 10, 2026: "the only portion of Plaintiff's request that was withheld was the security video"; "All other documents were provided." Sept. 28, 2026, 393 days on: Judge Sherwood Coleman ordered a sworn certification of whether those records exist and "the reason they were withheld." NEW-P1, N-053
I
Independent encounter

Gina Justice, Court Administrator (2025 letters). Mike Moore, Public Information Officer (acknowledgments). Jessica Schwieterman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, counsel for the Circuit (admissions, filings, hearing). Judge Sherwood Coleman, from outside the circuit (Sept. 28, 2026 orders). Four requests, one office, one file. Every duty here arises from Rule 2.420 and the office's own letters on this file alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of every exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(2): "If the request is denied, the custodian must state in writing the basis for the denial." Section 119.071(3)(a), through Rule 2.420(c)(8), is a security-system exemption; whether this recording belongs to such a system is the custodian's fact to state and prove.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-08-21
Actor
Gina Justice / Mike Moore
Institution
13th Cir. AOC
Mechanism
the court confirmed the hearing video exists, then withheld it on an exemption whose factual basis it has never stated, through ten months of litigation
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) gives every person the right to inspect judicial-branch records, and the custodian carries the burden of justifying any withholding (Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988); Woolling v. Lamar, 764 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)). Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state the basis for a denial in writing. The exemption the custodian invoked, section 119.071(3)(a), rests on a factual predicate: that the recording is a security-system record.
What happened
On August 21, 2025 the 13th Circuit's administrative office confirmed in writing that "a video record does exist" for the April 4, 2025 hearing, and withheld it as confidential surveillance video without ever stating that the recording is a security-system record, the fact its own exemption requires. The same letter said no records existed for the seven other hearings requested that year. A September 8, 2025 letter restated the exemption in verbatim-identical words while ignoring the questions built to test it. The same defendants later admitted in discovery that no court order determines the video confidential (RFA responses, 5/15/26). The video has never been released. The same records category drew a different ground the next year: for a later set of seven hearing dates the office said the footage had already been overwritten under a 30-day retention schedule (N-057). [DENIED: access refused on an exemption whose factual basis was never given]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24 presumes the record open and puts the burden on the office that withholds it, which must state a written basis. The exemption invoked, section 119.071(3)(a), reaches security-system records, but the office has never stated that this recording is one, a predicate that takes one sworn sentence. In ten months of litigation, no affidavit from court administration or its defense counsel makes that showing. The recording is the one Judge Ayers herself invoked and then declined to pursue (N-042).
Receipt
  • Justice letter 8/21/25 (10255 Doc 6 p.14; Doc 083 Exs. D and E).
  • Letter 9/8/25 (Doc 6 p.44; exemption paragraph verbatim identical to 8/21/25).
  • RFA No. 4 admission that no court order determines confidentiality (5/15/26 RFA responses).
  • 2026 overwriting ground and retention schedule at N-057 (schedule text p. 255 of 258).
  • Defense filings swept for the affidavit negative: Doc 013, Doc 038, Doc 040, Doc 053, Doc 054, Doc 055, Doc 056, Doc 063, Doc 065, Doc 070, Doc 072, Doc 075, Doc 077, Doc 083, and the Responses to Request for Admissions served 5/15/26 (101 pages across the set).
  • Sweep documented in the 8/20/26 verification memo on the 10255 defense filings; the negative reaches that set and no further.
  • Seven other hearings that year drew a "no records" response in the same letter.

Read the source document: 10255 Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions (5/15/2026), No. 4 at p. 2 (no court order determines the video confidential)

Spawned by: N-042, N-098

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-053

FNEW-A22025-09-08the security exemption was re-asserted by letter over a recording that no sworn statement in the record, as swept, identifies as security-camera footage, while the four questions built to test that sat eight days old and unansweredIGNORED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Asked three times what recorded the April 4, 2025 hearing video, Court Administrator Gina Justice answered once, by repeating her security-camera exemption word for word. The Circuit's own counsel later called it "the April 4, 2025 hearing-room video recording," and the Circuit has never supported the exemption with a single fact.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires it to decide whether the record is exempt and state the basis in writing. The exemption invoked, s. 119.071(3)(a) through Rule 2.420(c)(8), covers security-system records, so the basis is a fact: which system made this recording. Ms. Justice had to name that system.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Aug. 21, 2025: "A video record does exist" for the April 4, 2025 hearing, withheld as "surveillance video footage from security cameras." For the seven other hearings requested, the same letter said there were no records. N-053, FNEW-A2
  • Aug. 31 to Sept. 12, 2025: Husband asked: "Are there separate recording systems - for hearings vs. for security?" The Sept. 8 letter repeated the Aug. 21 exemption paragraph word for word, answered nothing he asked, and closed: "the court's position to your follow-up request has not changed." He asked again on Sept. 9 and Sept. 12. FNEW-A2
    Asked three times in writing: which system recorded the April 4, 2025 hearing, and why does it hold video of only one of the eight hearings requested?
    Read them: Justice letter, Sept. 8, 2025 (records case Doc 6, p. 44) (link pending redacted copy)
  • May 15 to Sept. 28, 2026: asked whether anyone weighed the public interest or tried redaction, the Circuit's counsel answered "Admit. No analysis was needed," because the video is confidential. Aug. 17: "We didn't need to attach an affidavit, because the documents Mr. Hanson produced proved our point." Sept. 28, Judge Coleman found good cause and ordered the defendants to "invoice and arrange with Plaintiff the exchange" of the video. N-053, NEW-P11, N-157
I
Independent encounter

Gina Justice, Court Administrator (the Aug. 21 and Sept. 8, 2025 letters). Jessica Schwieterman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, counsel for the Circuit (admissions, hearing, Sept. 2 filing). One recording, one exemption, one set of written questions. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and Rule 2.420 on this request alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. opens judicial-branch records to every person, and "The governmental agency claiming the benefit of an exemption bears the burden of proving its entitlement to the exemption" (Barfield v. Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cnty., 135 So. 3d 560, 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)). Rule 2.420(m)(2): "If the request is denied, the custodian must state in writing the basis for the denial." Whether this recording came from a security system is the custodian's fact to state and prove.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-09-08
Actor
Gina Justice, Court Administrator, 13th Judicial Circuit, Administrative Office of the Courts (signer confirmed by eye 8/20, GATE_FNEW-A2 ledger)
Institution
13th Cir. Administrative Office of the Courts
Mechanism
the security exemption was re-asserted by letter over a recording that no sworn statement in the record, as swept, identifies as security-camera footage, while the four questions built to test that sat eight days old and unanswered
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution opens judicial-branch records to every person, and the custodian asserting an exemption carries the burden of showing it applies (Woolling v. Lamar, 764 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)). Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for a denial. The exemption the Circuit invoked, s. 119.071(3)(a), reaches only records that actually are security-system information: a factual predicate that can be tested.
What happened
On August 31, 2025 Husband asked in writing which camera system captured the April 4, 2025 hearing, whether the courtroom microphones connect to it, what the video captures, and why routine surveillance video exists for exactly one hearing of the eight requested. A letter dated September 8, 2025, received by mail, re-asserted the security exemption in the same words as the office's August 21, 2025 response, citing the judicial-branch rule, the security-system statute, and a 2015 attorney general opinion. It engaged none of the four questions, and it stated: "the court's position to your follow-up request has not changed." The August 21 letter had opened: "Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, does not apply to records of the judicial branch of government." Months later, in court discovery, the same defendants admitted in writing that no court order determines the video confidential (N-053), and their one-word denial that nobody had viewed the footage before this denial named no viewer, no date, and no authority (N-103). At the August 17, 2026 hearing their counsel said: "We didn't need to attach an affidavit" (NEW-P11). No affidavit or other sworn statement appears in any defense filing in this case as swept through September 17, 2026. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
The exemption invoked here reaches only records that actually are security-system information. That is a factual predicate, and it can be tested. Article I, section 24(a) presumes the record open and puts the burden of proving the predicate on the custodian asserting it. Each of the four questions on file had a short answer if the predicate is true. Stating that answer was the office's burden, and the letter left it unstated.
Receipt
The September 8 letter: 10255 exhibit DIN 6 p. 44 (170 pages). Husband's September 12 reply attaching it: DIN 6 pp. 21-22. The August 21, 2025 letter, pp. 1-2, in the matter's correspondence file; the September 8 letter repeats its exemption paragraph word for word, although it dates its antecedent to "August 26, 2025." The May 15, 2026 responses to requests for admission, Nos. 2, 4 and 6. The August 17, 2026 certified transcript, 16:4-7. Affidavit sweep, September 26, 2026: eighteen defense documents, 117 pages (Docs 013, 038, 040, 053, 054, 055, 056, 063, 065, 070, 072, 075, 077, 083, 094, 098, the September 17, 2026 First Amended Response, Filing 257283141, and the May 15, 2026 responses). Zero affidavits, declarations under penalty, sworn statements, notarizations, jurats or custodian certifications. Every "affidavit" hit sits inside the reproduced Radford block quote or a summary-judgment rule recital.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-A2

N-0682025-11-24the circuit put a price on the records while the lawsuit over those same records was pending, and the records stayed behind the priceONLY-FOR-A-PRICE
Date
2025-11-24
Actor
Richard T. Melendi, signer, with K. Angela Smith, Interim Court Administrator, cc'd on all three letters
Institution
13th Cir. AOC
Mechanism
the circuit put a price on the records while the lawsuit over those same records was pending, and the records stayed behind the price
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy judicial-branch records, and the custodian carries the burden of justifying any barrier to access. Rule 2.420(l) makes mandamus the remedy for a denial of access. The Circuit's own fee letters placed these requests under Rule 2.420 and Article I, section 24, stating that Chapter 119 does not apply.
What happened
Husband sent three records requests on October 14, 2025, the day he filed the mandamus petition: communications involving Judge Felix, Judge Ayers's disqualification records, and the handling of his correspondence with Chief Judge Sabella's office. On November 13 his amended petition asked the court to order those records produced. Eleven days later the Circuit's chief deputy court administrator began answering with deposit demands, each letter copied to the interim court administrator: $348.14 for the Felix communications (768 emails; the deposit sentence reads $348.41) on November 24, and $7,746.15 for the Ayers records (20,192 emails) on November 25. After Husband narrowed the Ayers and Felix requests, letters dated December 17 asked $236.02 (432 emails) and $973.39 (2,154 emails), and a December 18 letter asked $512.20 for the Sabella request (1,122 emails; table total $512.19). Every letter required the deposit before any review began. As of September 26, 2026, no records answering the three requests appear in the records file. The defendants' September 17, 2026 filing in the mandamus states: "All other documents were provided." The two accounts are in dispute. [ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) opens judicial-branch records to every person and puts the burden of justifying any barrier on the custodian. By the time the Circuit priced these requests, they were already part of the pending mandamus: Husband's amended petition of November 13, 2025 asked the court to order production of the records responsive to them. A price set by the defendant, on records already in suit, decides whether those records reach the lawsuit. This belongs to a family visible across forums: the Bar's prepayment demand (N-082) and the Sixth Circuit's half-deposit-before-search condition.
Receipt
The five letters, each signed by Richard T. Melendi, Chief Deputy Court Administrator - Operations, with K. Angela Smith, Interim Court Administrator, copied: November 24, 2025, Felix communications (768 emails; table total $348.14, deposit sentence $348.41); November 25, 2025, Ayers disqualification records (20,192 emails; page 1 states $7,746.04, the table and the deposit $7,746.15); December 17, 2025, narrowed Ayers (432 emails, $236.02); December 17, 2025, narrowed Felix (page 1: "2,154 emails have been identified"; page 2 prices "2,164" emails at $973.39); December 18, 2025, Sabella correspondence (1,122 emails; table $512.19, deposit $512.20). Each letter states that Chapter 119 does not apply and treats the request under Rule 2.420 and Article I, section 24. Amended petition, Doc 012 p. 7, para. 24. First Amended Response, Filing 257283141, p. 4.

Spawned by: N-058, NEW-P1

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-068

Second District Court of Appeal11 nodes

Official public records: Second District Court of Appeal, official site

N-0542025-09-12the petition asking for the first written review of the orders that shut off the financial records was dismissed in three words, and the order that later denied every post-dismissal motion carries no judge's name at allDENIED
Date
2025-09-12
Actor
2D DCA panel (per curiam)
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-0681)
Mechanism
the petition asking for the first written review of the orders that shut off the financial records was dismissed in three words, and the order that later denied every post-dismissal motion carries no judge's name at all
What the law required
Article V, section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 9.030(b)(2)(A) give the Second District certiorari jurisdiction over a non-final order that departs from the essential requirements of law and causes material injury with no adequate remedy on appeal; Rule 9.100 supplies the procedure. Rule 9.330(a)(2)(D) lets a party ask for a written opinion, and the court's own Internal Operating Procedures, section 3.3, direct the clerk to identify on the face of every dispositive order the names of the participating judges.
What happened
On September 12, 2025 the Second District dismissed the certiorari petition per curiam, naming the panel: "NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur." Every post-dismissal motion was denied on February 2, 2026 by an order naming no one, reading in full: "Petitioner's motion for rehearing, clarification, oral arguments, en banc review, and/or written opinion is denied." A written opinion was asked for in terms and refused in terms, by an order that gives no reason and identifies no judge. The mandate issued February 19, 2026. The discovery freeze below was left undisturbed, and the orders that produced it remain unexamined. [DENIED: review refused without a written explanation.]
Baseline deviation
Certiorari would have been the first written look at the orders that cut off the financial records (N-018). The court dismissed in three words. The 2/2/26 order that later denied every post-dismissal motion names nobody, in a court whose own procedures direct the clerk to put the participating judges' names on every dispositive order. Asked in writing which judges decided, the court answered that no record shows who participated (N-114). This is the first of three unexplained appellate silences on this record (N-066, N-088).
Receipt
  • 9/12/25 dismissal, eDCA original, 2D2025-0681 docket 065: "PER CURIAM." / "Dismissed." Panel: "NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur." Lower tribunal: Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, Kelly A. Ayers, Judge. Footer: "Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication."
  • Also in 1150 record at Doc 248 p.2 (filed by Wife 10/14/25) and Doc 275.
  • 2/2/26 order, eDCA original, docket 066: "BY ORDER OF THE COURT:", denies "Petitioner's three motions for oral argument, all filed on November 4, 2025", and denies the notice of filing error/request to strike as moot; no judge named; certified by Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk. Also at 1150 Doc 263.
  • Mandate 2/19/26.
  • Orders that cut records off below: N-018, N-018. Three-doors pattern: N-066, N-088. Refusal to identify deciding judges: N-114.

Spawned by: N-018, N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-054

N-0662025-11-26the appellate court kept the courthouse video out of the record in orders that name no judge and give no reason, and when asked who decided, answered that no such record is filed anywhere a party can reachDENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Second District refused even an in camera look at the April 4, 2025 video Judge Ayers offered as proof of her own conduct, twice in one-sentence orders naming no judge, then withheld as "confidential and exempt" any record of which judges decided.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) presumes the Second District's own records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the court as custodian. Which judges ruled on a party's motion is a fact of the court's administration: under its own procedures "The clerk schedules and assigns cases." Asked who decided, the court names the judges, or identifies each record it withholds and states the specific basis, as Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Sept. 23, 2025: Husband moved to supplement the record with the video of the hearing where Judge Ayers said, "I will go get the camera footage and do it because I have not rolled my eyes at you," and with Judge DePaul's recusal document. In the alternative he asked the court to "conduct an in camera review of the evidence." N-042, N-066
    Read them: Motion to supplement, Sept. 23, 2025 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Nov. 26, 2025 to Jan. 27, 2026: "BY ORDER OF THE COURT: Appellant's 'Motion to Supplement the Record with Video of 4/4/25 Hearing and Recusal Documents' is denied." No judge is named; the only signature is the clerk's certification. Husband moved for rehearing and a "Formal Written Order." Denied in one sentence, again naming no judge. On April 6, 2026 the court refused the video a third time, nine days before affirming. N-066, N-087
    Read them: Order, Nov. 26, 2025 (link pending redacted copy) · Order, Jan. 27, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • May 14 to July 27, 2026: asked for the records identifying which judges issued these orders, Clerk Kuenzel answered for Chief Judge Lucas: those records "are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1) unless filed as a part of the court record. There are no documents filed as part of the court record that reflect which judges participated in those orders." N-114, N-066
    Which judges decided the November 26, 2025 and January 27, 2026 orders?
I
Independent encounter

The unnamed judges of the Second District (both orders). Clerk Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel (certified both orders; answered for Chief Judge Lucas). One motion, two orders, one records answer. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and the court's own procedures on this motion alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for each denial. The court's procedures place case assignment with the clerk.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-11-26
Actor
2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named)
Institution
2D2025-1936
Mechanism
the appellate court kept the courthouse video out of the record in orders that name no judge and give no reason, and when asked who decided, answered that no such record is filed anywhere a party can reach
What the law required
Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(f) provides for supplementing an appellate record that omits an item the trial court considered. Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of establishing an exemption on the custodian, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a written basis for any denial.
What happened
On November 26, 2025 the Second District denied the motion to supplement the record with the April 4, 2025 courthouse video, the video Judge Ayers herself invoked and then declined to pursue (N-042), and the recusal documents, naming no panel and giving no reasoning. Husband moved for rehearing of that order on December 1, 2025; the court denied rehearing on January 27, 2026, again naming no judge. Two more followed the same pattern, April 6 and May 12, 2026 (N-087, N-101). Asked in writing to identify who decided, the court refused: writing for Chief Judge Lucas on July 27, 2026, Clerk Kuenzel answered that no document reflects which judges participated, and any unfiled record is confidential under rule 2.420(c)(1). Chief Judge Lucas wrote the same on July 14, and Marshal Haynes again on August 4, 2026 (N-149); Clerk Kuenzel had denied the same category on June 3, 2026 (N-114). Four written refusals, and not one name on any of the orders. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 9.200(f) lets a party supplement an incomplete record. Two orders from the same court kept the courthouse video out, and a third denied rehearing; none names a panel and none gives a reason. Asked in writing which judges decided, the court refused four times. Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden of proving an exemption on the custodian, and a bare rule citation carries none of it.
Receipt
  • As pleaded at complaint para. 30E.
  • 11/26/25 order denying Appellant's "Motion to Supplement the Record with Video of 4/4/25 Hearing and Recusal Documents", filed 2D2025-1936 docket 041: issues "BY ORDER OF THE COURT", carries Kuenzel certification, names no judge.
  • 1/27/26 order denying "Motion for Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc, for Clarification, for Formal Written Order, and/or Certification" under Rules 9.330/9.331, filed 2D2025-1936 docket 042; no judge named.
  • Chief Judge Lucas's 7/14/26 letter and Marshal Haynes's 8/4/26 email.
  • Clerk Kuenzel's 6/3/26 email on file as native PDF; her 7/27/26 response held only as a mailbox text capture, no page image, quoted at N-114 on that basis.
  • Video's origin at N-042; withholding of it at N-053.
  • Related decision points: N-115.
  • Husband's December 1, 2025 motion for rehearing "of its November 26, 2025, order denying Appellant's 'Motion to Supplement the Record with Video of 4/4/25 Hearing and Recusal Documents'" (Filing 236689274), 2D2025-1936 docket 046.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-066

N-0782026-02-10Asked whether a judge he is suing may keep deciding his divorce, Husband got one sentence: the petition "is denied."DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Asked whether a judge Husband is suing may keep deciding Husband's divorce, a Second District panel that included Judge Andrea Teves Smith, whom the court has since disclosed is recused in another of Husband's appeals, denied the petition in one sentence seven days after filing, required no response, and said nothing about transferring venue.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 9 guarantees an impartial judge, and Rule 2.330(e)(2)(C) makes a judge's own interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding a ground for disqualification. Shown that the trial judge is a defendant in the petitioner's lawsuit, the Second District orders a response and rules on that ground, with reasons. It decides the request to transfer venue. A judge recused in one of the petitioner's related cases explains, when asked, why that ground did not reach the others, and the clerk answers when the recusal took effect.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Feb. 3, 2026: the petition asked for a writ "disqualifying Judge Matthew Felix and all judges of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit from presiding over Case No. 24-DR-001150 and directing a transfer of venue to a neutral circuit". N-078
    Read them: Petition, Feb. 3, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Feb. 10, 2026: seven days after filing: "Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied." Judges Villanti, Sleet and Smith concurred. No response was required; the order says nothing about venue or the circuit named as a respondent. N-078
    Read them: Order, Feb. 10, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • July 27 to Oct. 2, 2026: the clerk, for the Chief Judge: "Judge Andrea Teves Smith is recused in case no. 2D2025-0681." Judge Smith, the only Smith on the court's letterhead, sat on this panel and on the April 15, 2026 panel in 2D2025-1936. Asked whether any judge "is recused, or has been recused at any point" in those cases: "no judges are recused in these cases." The recusal date: "confidential and exempt." Oct. 2, 2026: under IOP section 1.7, Husband asked when the recusal took effect, its ground, and whether it was considered here. Unanswered as of Oct. 3, 2026. N-138, N-078
    When did Judge Smith's recusal in 2D2025-0681 take effect, on what ground, and was that ground considered before she sat on this panel?
    Read them: Husband's email to the clerk, Oct. 2, 2026 (link pending redacted copy) · Decision, 2D2025-1936, Apr. 15, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Judges Villanti, Sleet and Smith (the one-sentence denial). Clerk Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, answering for Chief Judge Lucas. One petition, one order, one seven-entry docket. Every duty here arises from the Second District's own prohibition jurisdiction over this petition alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const. and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an impartial tribunal: "[N]o man can be a judge in his own case" (In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). Art. V, s. 4(b)(3) gives the Second District jurisdiction in prohibition to enforce that guarantee. Court rules govern "practice and procedure" (Art. V, s. 2(a)); the federal guarantee binds "the Judges in every State" over any conflicting state rule (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Art. I, s. 24(a) presumes the court's own records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-02-10
Actor
2D DCA panel: Villanti, Sleet, Smith
Institution
2D DCA (2D2026-0279)
Mechanism
the petition asking whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may keep presiding over the related one was denied in a single sentence, seven days after filing and one day after the fee posted, with no response ever required from anyone
What the law required
Article V, section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 9.030(b)(3) give the Second District original jurisdiction in prohibition; Rule 9.100 supplies the procedure. Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an impartial tribunal, disqualification is constitutionally required where the probability of actual bias is too high to be tolerable (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.), and the federal Constitution binds "the Judges in every State" over any conflicting state rule (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Court rules govern "practice and procedure" (Art. V, s. 2(a), Fla. Const.).
What happened
On February 10, 2026 a panel of Villanti, Sleet, and Smith denied the prohibition petition seven days after it was filed, and one day after the fee posted. The order reads: "Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied." No opinion, no order to show cause, no response ever required. The petition had asked for a writ "disqualifying Judge Matthew Felix and all judges of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit from presiding over Case No. 24-DR-001150 and directing a transfer of venue to a neutral circuit pursuant to Fla. Stat. s. 47.122", and named the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit itself as a respondent. The order does not mention venue, transfer, section 47.122, or the circuit as an entity; its caption lists only the two spouses. Judge Felix remained presiding. The structural question this petition raised has now been put to three courts and answered by none (N-059). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Prohibition exists to stop a judge from presiding where disqualification is required, and the Constitution controls over any rule that would let him stay. The petition put a structural question to the court: may a judge who is a named defendant in Husband's pending suit keep deciding Husband's case. The one-sentence denial names its judges and answers nothing else. It required no response, and it is silent on the second thing the petition asked for, transfer of venue under section 47.122. Judge Felix kept presiding.
Receipt
  • Denial order 2/10/26, 2D2026-0279 docket 001, p.1, and copy at docket 008, Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel clerk certification, served on Hillsborough Clerk, Davis, Felix, Hanson.
  • Petition of 2/3/26, 2D2026-0279 docket 007, PDF pp. 4-5, 16, 26-27, verified: prayer at section III, para. 44 and WHEREFORE clause: "remanding with instructions to transfer venue to the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Pasco County, or another neutral venue".
  • 2D2026-0279 docket sheet, text layer, seven entries, no order-to-show-cause and no response entry.
  • Disqualification ruling this followed: N-069. Structural-conflict spine: N-059.

Read the source document: 2D2026-0279 Doc 1, Order denying the petition for writ of prohibition (Feb. 10, 2026), p. 1

Spawned by: N-069

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-078

N-0872026-04-06nine days before it affirmed, the court refused to add the video to the record and struck five filings in a one-page order naming no judge, while an order from the same court fifty-five days earlier named all three of its judges.DENIED
Date
2026-04-06
Actor
2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named)
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-1936)
Mechanism
nine days before it affirmed, the court refused to add the video to the record and struck five filings in a one-page order naming no judge, while an order from the same court fifty-five days earlier named all three of its judges.
What the law required
Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(f) provides for supplementing a record that omits an item the trial court considered. Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of establishing an exemption on the custodian.
What happened

On April 6, 2026 the Second District refused to supplement the record with the April 4, 2025 video and the recusal documents, and struck five filings in the same one-page order. The order names no judge. It issues only "BY ORDER OF THE COURT". The per curiam affirmance came nine days later, on a record that still did not contain the video (N-088).

Fifty-five days earlier the same court had denied the prohibition petition in an order that did name its judges: Villanti, Sleet, and Smith (N-078).

Four written refusals followed the question of who decided: by the Clerk on June 3 and again on July 27, 2026, by the Chief Judge on July 14, 2026, and by the Marshal on August 4, 2026, each resting on rule 2.420(c)(1). This is the middle order in the series opened at N-066 and continued at N-101. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Rule 9.200(f) permits supplementing an incomplete record. Same court, same year, two orders: the prohibition denial fifty-five days earlier carries three names; this one carries none. The unnamed order decided whether the central evidence would be in the record, nine days before the court affirmed on that record. Husband asked which judges decided; the court refused four times in writing. Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden of proving an exemption on the custodian.
Receipt
  • The 4/6/26 order, filed in 2D2025-1936 at docket 043, one page. It strikes five filings (Appendices 1 through 3 of 3/31 and the Notices of Filing of 4/1), treats the 4/3 "Updated Notice of Related Cases, Supplemental Motion to Supplement the Record, and Motion for Panel Review of 4-4-25 Video" as a motion to supplement and denies it, and names no judge.
  • The named comparator at Doc 270, the 2/10/26 prohibition denial (N-078), naming Villanti, Sleet, and Smith.
  • The four written refusals to identify the deciding judges: Clerk Kuenzel on 6/3/26 and again on 7/27/26 (N-114), Chief Judge Lucas on 7/14/26 (N-115), and Marshal Haynes on 8/4/26 (N-149).

Spawned by: N-042, N-049

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-087

N-0882026-04-15the appeal ended in three words, on the same record the court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video at the center of the caseDENIED
Date
2026-04-15
Actor
2D DCA panel
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-1936)
Mechanism
the appeal ended in three words, on the same record the court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video at the center of the case
What the law required
Article V, section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 9.130(a)(3) give the Second District jurisdiction to review the order denying transfer of venue. Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an impartial tribunal (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.), and findings are required before a section 47.122 transfer is granted (Fast v. Nelson). Rule 9.330(a)(2)(D) lets a party ask for a written opinion, and without one the Florida Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review a per curiam affirmance for conflict (Jenkins v. State).
What happened
On April 15, 2026 the Second District affirmed per curiam. The opinion reads "PER CURIAM. Affirmed." The panel line reads "KHOUZAM, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and SMITH, JJ., Concur." Oral argument had been held on April 7, 2026, eight days before the affirmance. The mandate issued June 2, 2026. One week earlier the same court had struck five filings and refused to put the April 4, 2025 video into that record (N-087), and five months before that it had refused the same thing without naming a panel or giving a reason (N-066). The rulings below stood, and no court has written an examination of them. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
The appeal asked whether a venue ruling made without findings could stand, and a January 2026 notice put the structural conflict before the court. A per curiam affirmance without opinion decides it without a word, and under Jenkins the Florida Supreme Court cannot review it for conflict, so the written opinion Husband then asked for was the last door. This one carries three judges' names. It affirmed on the record the same court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video (N-066, N-087, N-054).
Receipt
  • The 4/15/26 per curiam affirmance in 2D2025-1936, the eDCA original, filed at docket 045, two pages: the disposition and the panel line as quoted
  • The appeal taken "pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Matthew L. Felix, Acting Circuit Judge"
  • The copy at docket 036 is a KB-layer copy and is superseded by 045 for citation
  • Mandate at Doc 035
  • The refusals to supplement at N-087 and N-066; the first of the three unexplained dispositions at N-054
  • Clerk Kuenzel's letter of June 3, 2026: "The April 7, 2026, oral argument in case no. 2D2025-1936 was live-streamed on the Court's YouTube channel."

Spawned by: N-049

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-088

N-1012026-05-12Husband asked the court in writing to state its reasoning; the order refusing that request states no reasoning and names no judge, and it is the fifth of its kindDENIED
Date
2026-05-12
Actor
2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named; clerk certification only)
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-1936)
Mechanism
Husband asked the court in writing to state its reasoning; the order refusing that request states no reasoning and names no judge, and it is the fifth of its kind
What the law required
Rules 9.330 and 9.331 let a party ask for rehearing, rehearing en banc, clarification, certification, and a written opinion (Rule 9.330(a)(2)(D)); a per curiam affirmance without opinion is beyond the Florida Supreme Court's conflict jurisdiction (Jenkins v. State), so the written opinion is the last route to further review.
What happened
On May 12, 2026 the Second District denied, in one order, Husband's motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, written opinion, clarification, and certification. That motion listed among its grounds "that supplementation of the record below, and in this Court, was denied". The order issues "BY ORDER OF THE COURT". It names no judge and no panel. The only name on it is the clerk's certification that it is a true copy. The four orders before it are the November 26, 2025 and January 27, 2026 orders (N-066), the February 2, 2026 denial at Doc 263, and the April 6, 2026 order (N-087). The rulings below stood without any written examination, and no judge is identified as having made that choice. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Husband asked in writing for the court's reasoning and for the written opinion that would open the door to Florida Supreme Court review. The order answers in one sentence, states no reason, and identifies no judge. It is the fifth anonymous order in this series; the same court named its judges three months earlier (N-078). Asked which judges decided, the court refused (N-066, N-114).
Receipt
  • Doc 301 in the 1150 docket, one page, dated May 12, 2026, 2D2025-1936, L.T. 24-DR-001150, signed by Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk, electronically filed 05/12/2026 10:35:30 AM
  • The named comparator at Doc 270
  • The earlier anonymous orders at N-066, Doc 263, and N-087
  • The refusals to identify the panel at N-066 and N-114
  • Husband's April 21, 2026 motion (Filing 246531481), 2D2025-1936 docket 047, ground (6).

Spawned by: N-088

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-101

N-1142026-06-03the court withheld its own machinery, case assignment, scheduling, the case-management system, and phone logs, behind an exemption that protects deliberation, and the category asking which judges decided the unnamed orders drew the same boilerplate as the restDENIED
Date
2026-06-03
Actor
Clerk Mary Beth Kuenzel
Institution
2D DCA
Mechanism
the court withheld its own machinery, case assignment, scheduling, the case-management system, and phone logs, behind an exemption that protects deliberation, and the category asking which judges decided the unnamed orders drew the same boilerplate as the rest
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of establishing an exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(b)(3) makes the chief judge the custodian of a court's administrative records, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to determine, record by record, whether a requested record is exempt and to state in writing the basis for any denial. Subdivision (c)(1) reaches material prepared as part of deciding cases; case assignment, scheduling, and phone logs are administrative machinery.
What happened

On June 3, 2026 the Second District's clerk, Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, denied nearly all of a nine-category administrative-records request. Every administrative category drew the identical line: non-court-file records "are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1)." The administrative records have still not been produced.

Asked specifically who decided, she answered in writing on July 27, 2026, for Chief Judge Lucas, again citing rule 2.420(c)(1) for anything not filed in the court record: "There are no documents filed as part of the court record that reflect which judges participated in those orders."

Read precisely, that is not a statement that no such records exist. It is a statement that none is in the court record, and anything outside it is withheld as exempt. The effect is that the orders deciding these appeals name no judge, and the court's own record contains nothing that would (N-066, N-087, N-101). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Rule 2.420(c)(1) protects a court's deliberation, not its machinery. Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a written basis for denial. Identical boilerplate across nine categories identifies no record and gives no basis specific to any, so nothing can be tested. Assignment records are how a reader learns which judges issued an order that names none (N-087, N-101). The order in case 0279 does name its judges (N-078).
Receipt
  • Clerk Kuenzel's 6/3/26 email from 2dcaclerk@flcourts.org, Wednesday, June 3, 2026 at 2:53 PM EDT, her substantive response to the Rule 2.420 request, on file as a native PDF export
  • On the judge-identification category it states: "There are no other documents filed as a part of the court record that are responsive to this request, and any records not filed as a part of the court record are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1)."
  • The 6/3 email states on its face that it responds to a request of May 18, 2026
  • Full 7/27/26 answer: "You have asked for any 'records that reflect which judges participated in those orders' prior to or following the disposition in each case, but these records are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1) unless filed as a part of the court record. There are no documents filed as part of the court record that reflect which judges participated in those orders." This is a complete mailbox text capture whose operative sentence also appears at p. 5 of the 7/30/26 email to the Second District clerk; the native message itself is not held
  • Intake note, recorded as the clerk's stated reason and not as a departure: the clerk's office declined to open the 5/14/26 request because it arrived as an attachment, stating verbatim "we do not generally open attachments from unknown senders", which cost five days at the front of the request and supports a Question Protocol ask for the written policy

Spawned by: N-087

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-114

N-1152026-06-04the chief judge answered forty days after the request reached him and six days after the follow-up, produced a record for free, then placed every other record behind one rule citation naming no document, and the supplement he promised has not issuedPARTIAL
Date
2026-06-04
Actor
Chief Judge Matt Lucas
Institution
2D DCA
Mechanism
the chief judge answered forty days after the request reached him and six days after the follow-up, produced a record for free, then placed every other record behind one rule citation naming no document, and the supplement he promised has not issued
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect and copy judicial-branch records; access is the presumption, and the burden of establishing an exemption rests on the custodian, a judge included. Rule 2.420(b)(3) makes the chief judge the custodian of the court's administrative records, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires him to determine whether each requested record is exempt and to state in writing the basis for any denial. A categorical assertion over a whole class, identifying nothing withheld, leaves nothing a requester or a reviewing court under Rule 2.420(l)(1) can test, and so carries none of the custodian's burden.
What happened

On June 4, 2026 Husband's narrowed records request was redirected to Chief Judge Lucas as custodian. A follow-up went by email July 8. Lucas responded by signed letter dated July 14, forty days after the routing and six days after the follow-up. He named the governing law correctly, citing the Constitution before the rule, and produced the Court's Internal Operating Procedures at no charge.

Everything else he placed behind one sentence: "Other than the case records provided previously by Clerk Kuenzel, any other records that may exist relating to this request are confidential and exempt pursuant to Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420(c)(1)." No record was identified and no index accompanied the claim.

On the two remaining categories he found nothing responsive and said a report was coming: "We expect a report this week; when it is received, I will update this response." No update issued. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) presumes judicial-branch records open, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for any denial. He answered within six days of the follow-up, cited the constitution first, and produced a record at no charge. Withholding an entire class under one rule citation, naming no document, still leaves nothing to test. And he wrote that he would update his response when a report arrived. He did not.
Receipt
  • Chief Judge Lucas's signed letter response, dated July 14, 2026, pp. 1-2, wet signature over "Matthew C. Lucas", "Encl."
  • Record produced: Second District's Internal Operating Procedures, effective 12/1/2025, 22 pages, produced 7/14/26.
  • Cover email 7/14/26 8:53 AM EDT from 2dcaAdministrative: "Please see the attached response from Chief Judge Lucas."
  • Follow-up and pre-suit notice sent 7/8/26 2:14 PM, demand paragraph setting 7/14 and closing paragraph setting 7/15; the 7/6/26 files are drafts, not send copies.
  • Kuenzel's 6/4/26 8:04 AM EDT routing confirmation: "Your request will be forwarded to the Chief Judge of the Second District Court of Appeal, Chief Judge Matt Lucas."
  • Letter states it "responds to yours of June 4, 2026, and July 8, 2026."
  • Full chronology and search scope for every negative held in the 2D DCA records-front status memo of 8/16/26.
  • Elapsed as of 8/16/26: 73 days since the 6/4 routing, 94 days since the original 5/14/26 request, 32 days of Rule 2.420(l)(1) ripeness attaching 7/15/26.
  • Letter dated Tuesday 7/14/26; the week he named ended Sunday 7/19/26. 28 days ran from that date to 8/16/26, 33 days from the letter itself.
  • Kuenzel answered on his behalf 7/27 and Marshal Haynes answered 8/4 (N-138, N-149); neither purports to be the promised update.
  • Which of the two answers (categorical exemption vs. no-records-identified) governs which category is unresolved; ambiguity raised in writing 7/20 and again 7/30, unresolved.
  • Search scope for the negative: 60-day Gmail sweep across the court's domains, both 2D DCA records folders, the four 2D DCA matter folders, and the downloads folder, as of 8/16/26; Husband's Yahoo address was not searched.
  • RE line on the letter mistypes the first case number as "2D20225-1936" and reads "Office of State Courts Administrator" without "the".
  • Two limits: the current text of Rule 2.420(m)(2) is held here only as Husband's own verbatim quotation in the 7/30/26 letter; and which court reviews a DCA chief judge's denial is answered here as (l)(1) rather than circuit-court mandamus under (l)(2).

Spawned by: N-114

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-115

N-1372026-07-25the certiorari challenge to the guardian ad litem order is pending, and the Second District has ordered a responsePENDING
Date
2026-07-25
Actor
2D DCA
Institution
2D2026-1955 (L.T. 24-DR-001150)
Mechanism
the certiorari challenge to the guardian ad litem order is pending, and the Second District has ordered a response
What the law required
Rule 9.100 provides certiorari review of the guardian ad litem order (Doc 337).
What happened
On July 25, 2026 Husband filed a certiorari petition challenging the June 25, 2026 guardian ad litem order, 38 pages with a 429-page appendix, asking the court to "quash the June 25, 2026 order". The Second District docketed it July 27 as 2D2026-1955. A first fee submission was rejected for a case-number error; the resubmission, $311.85, was confirmed docketed the next morning, though its status still read "Processing" at that capture, so nothing here says the payment settled. On August 3, 2026 the Second District ordered a response within thirty days, ordered a reply thirty days after that, and imposed on both parties a duty to keep the court apprised of hearings affecting the proceeding. The order under challenge is being reviewed while the trial court's retainer terms run (N-134, N-135). [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Rule 9.100 provides certiorari review of the guardian ad litem order. No determination has issued. The court's earlier dispositions in this lane (N-054, N-078, N-087, N-088) are noted for context. What the record shows at this step is a schedule: a response ordered, a reply ordered, a respondent named, and a duty on both sides to keep the court advised.
Receipt
  • Filing #253269488 (the petition as filed). The relief quoted at para. 44, PDF p. 18, and again in the conclusion at para. 93, PDF p. 37; the string "Doc 351" appears nowhere in the 38 pages, and the 7/23/26 appointment order is mentioned once, descriptively, at para. 46, PDF p. 19.
  • Filing #253628363 (the rejected fee submission), clerk's stated reason: "Case Number Cannot Be Determined or Case Number Not for This Court", with a refund auto-generated; whether the refund posted is unknown.
  • Filing #253668293 (the accepted $311.85 fee, Order #19922246, memo line "Statutory Convenience Fee: $11.85 / Total Paid: $311.85"), with the 7/31/26 8:24 AM clerk processing confirmation, native PDF p.1.
  • The 8/3/26 order was entered as DIN 363.
  • As-filed word count 7,932 per the compliance certificate, PDF p. 38. Appendix tab 35 is the same facially incomplete Doc 351 artifact.
  • Three limits: the rejection notice is held without a page image; the portal returned "No Matching Entries" for the certificate of service, and service went by a separate 10:08 AM email; the para. 92 "For 800 days" figure is not recomputed here.
  • The 7/30 fee record still displayed "NEW CASE."

Spawned by: N-134, N-125

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-137

N-1382026-07-27asked under the court's own procedures whether any judge is recused in four named cases, the court disclosed one recusal in one case and gave no date it took effect; asked a second time, it said no judge is now recused in the other cases, left unanswered whether one had been, and said any record of the date is exemptPARTIAL
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Second District disclosed that Judge Andrea Teves Smith "is recused in case no. 2D2025-0681," though she sat on panels deciding two of Husband's other cases. Asked whether any judge "has been recused at any point" in those two, it answered "no judges are recused" and withheld the date hers took effect.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) presumes the court's records open and puts the burden on the custodian. Section 1.7 of the court's own procedures says "Parties may inquire of the clerk to determine whether any judge is recused in their case," and a judge who finds a conflict notifies the clerk, "who will designate a substitute judge." Asked about four matters, the clerk answers for each, says whether any judge has been recused at any point, and gives the date the disclosed recusal took effect. A recusal the clerk records is administration, not deliberation.

V
Verified facts and law
  • July 20 to 27, 2026: invoking section 1.7, Husband asked about four matters. Clerk Kuenzel, "On behalf of Chief Judge Lucas": "You have asked whether any judge is recused in your cases. Judge Andrea Teves Smith is recused in case no. 2D2025-0681." That is the whole recusal answer: no date, nothing on the other cases. N-138
  • Feb. 10 and Apr. 15, 2026: Judge Smith, the only Smith on the court's letterhead, sat on both panels: "VILLANTI, SLEET, and SMITH, JJ., Concur." (prohibition, 2D2026-0279) and "KHOUZAM, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and SMITH, JJ., Concur." (2D2025-1936). N-078, N-138
    Read them: Order, Feb. 10, 2026 (link pending redacted copy) · Decision, Apr. 15, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Aug. 20 to Oct. 3, 2026: asked whether any judge "is recused, or has been recused at any point": "no judges are recused in these cases." On the date and her participation: "Any responsive records are confidential and exempt pursuant to rule 2.420(c)(1)." Oct. 2: under section 1.7, Husband asked when the recusal took effect, its ground, and whether it was considered in the other two cases. Unanswered as of Oct. 3, 2026. N-138, N-078
    Has any judge been recused at any point in 2D2025-1936 or 2D2026-0279, and on what date did Judge Smith's recusal in 2D2025-0681 take effect?
    Read them: Husband's email to the clerk, Oct. 2, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Clerk Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, writing for Chief Judge Lucas (both answers). One inquiry under the court's own procedure, one disclosed recusal, one withheld date. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and section 1.7 of the court's procedures on this inquiry alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the written basis for each denial. Art. I, s. 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an impartial tribunal, and the date a recusal took effect is how a party tests that guarantee.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-07-27
Actor
Mary Beth Kuenzel, Clerk, Florida Second District Court of Appeal, writing "On behalf of Chief Judge Lucas"
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-0681, 2D2025-1936, 2D2026-0279)
Mechanism
asked under the court's own procedures whether any judge is recused in four named cases, the court disclosed one recusal in one case and gave no date it took effect; asked a second time, it said no judge is now recused in the other cases, left unanswered whether one had been, and said any record of the date is exempt
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution makes judicial-branch records open and access the presumption; the custodian carries the burden of justifying anything withheld. The Court's own Internal Operating Procedures section 1.7 provides that a party may ask the clerk whether any judge is recused in the party's case, which supplies both the mechanism and the expectation that an inquiry naming four cases is answered as to four cases. Canon 3E of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct governs disqualification. The lawful path in one sentence: answer the inquiry as to each case named in it, and state the effective date of any recusal disclosed.
What happened
On July 20, 2026 Husband asked the Second District's clerk, under the court's own Internal Operating Procedures, whether any judge is recused in his cases, naming four matters. On July 27, 2026 Clerk Kuenzel answered, "On behalf of Chief Judge Lucas": "You have asked whether any judge is recused in your cases. Judge Andrea Teves Smith is recused in case no. 2D2025-0681." That is the whole answer. No effective date. No statement whether that judge participated in anything in that case before the recusal took effect. Nothing at all about 2D2025-1936 or 2D2026-0279. On July 30 Husband asked for the date the recusal took effect, whether the judge participated in any order before it, and whether any judge is or has been recused in 2D2025-1936, 2D2026-0279 or 2D2026-1955. On August 20, 2026 the Clerk answered the question about the other cases in the present tense only, 'no judges are recused in these cases,' leaving 'or has been recused at any point' unanswered, and answered the date and participation questions with an exemption: 'Any responsive records are confidential and exempt pursuant to rule 2.420(c)(1).' The Court's own letterhead on the July 14, 2026 letter lists exactly one judge named Smith, ANDREA TEVES SMITH, and N-078 records the February 10, 2026 prohibition denial in 2D2026-0279 as issued by a panel of Villanti, Sleet, and Smith. If that is the same judge, then a judge recused in one of this requester's cases sat on the panel that denied prohibition in another. The date that would test it is the date the Court now withholds as exempt. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of justifying any withholding on the custodian. The Court's own Internal Operating Procedures, section 1.7, invite exactly this question: a party may ask the clerk whether any judge is recused in the party's case. A judge who is disqualified in a case steps aside from it,. The lawful path was one sentence long: answer as to each case the inquiry named, and state the effective date of any recusal disclosed.
Receipt
The clerk's 7/27/26 email, read from the native Gmail message (id 19fa51c4eab02f25, 3:45 PM ET) on 9/26/2026 and matching both tree captures verbatim. The clerk's 8/20/26 reply (Gmail id 1a01fbd3a01d2ddd, filed under Public_Records\by_agency\2D-DCA) answering the 7/30/26 follow-up. The judge roster naming ANDREA TEVES SMITH appears on the page image of the 7/14/26 Lucas letterhead, p. 1. The N-078 panel composition is confirmed on the face of the order, checked against the page image from the rendered page on 9/26/2026: Husband supplied the 2/10/26 prohibition-denial order in 2D2026-0279 on 8/20/26 and it was filed at that case's docket 008, and it names the panel, "VILLANTI, SLEET, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.", over the certification of Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk. The four-case inquiry of 7/20/26 under IOP section 1.7. The same 7/27/26 email is the response quoted at N-114 and N-066. Question Protocol, asked 7/30/26 and answered 8/20/26 (date: exempt under 2.420(c)(1); other cases: no judge recused): the effective date of the 2D2025-0681 recusal, her participation before it, and recusals in the two related cases. A date and a yes or no closes the question. A refusal, after the Court volunteered the fact of one recusal, marks the recusal record itself as withheld. An answer that no record of the effective date exists establishes that the Court does not document when its judges step aside.

Spawned by: N-114, N-078

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-138

N-1492026-08-04"Upon receipt of payment, I will proceed with the review": $313 before the court would look for Husband's records.PARTIAL
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Second District's marshal declared "Any records of" two whole request categories confidential and exempt without identifying a single record, put the name-search review behind $313 paid in advance, and then named the exemption she expects before reading anything.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) and Rule 2.420(m)(2) require the marshal to find the records, decide each one, and state in writing the basis for each denial. The marshal's own email describes that method: review each message and "determine whether the message is confidential and exempt." Any charge is reasonable and tied to the cost actually incurred, and the exemption is decided after the review, not announced before it.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Aug. 4, 2026: Answering Husband's July 20 request, Marshal Haynes gave two categories a blanket exemption, with no record identified. Under the same numbered category she attached two records, one a Teams message reading, in full, "Pro Se, Christopher Hanson has arrived". For the name search: "The charge for this time is $313.00. Upon receipt of payment, I will proceed with the review of these e-mail messages and attachments." N-149
    Read them: Marshal Haynes email, Aug. 4, 2026 (redacted) (link pending redacted copy)
  • Aug. 20, 2026: "There are no responsive phone logs." She estimated at least four hours of review "Based on the volume of potentially responsive account records identified in the first query." N-149
  • Sept. 29, 2026: "No waiver is authorized." "No document or record identifies how many potentially responsive records the first query identified." "Upon payment, I will ask them to update the first query." And: "I expect that any record withheld will be a confidential and exempt record under Rule 2440(c)(1). I will state the basis in writing when I have reviewed the records." N-149
    Asked on Aug. 18 and Sept. 25, 2026: does the Second District hold any record in the two categories it declared exempt, and under which subdivision is each one withheld?
    Read them: Marshal Haynes email, Sept. 29, 2026, with the Aug. 20 email below it (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Marshal Jacinda (Jo) Haynes, custodian of the Second District's administrative records (every answer and the $313 charge). One request, one custodian, one email thread. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and Rule 2.420 on this request alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. gives every person the right to inspect or copy public records, presumes them open, and places the burden of establishing an exemption on the entity asserting one. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to determine whether each requested record is exempt and to state in writing the basis for any denial. Rule 2.420(m)(3) sets fees at the amounts section 119.07 provides, which limits any special charge to a reasonable one based on the cost actually incurred.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-08-04
Actor
Marshal Jacinda (Jo) Haynes
Institution
2D DCA
Mechanism
the appellate court's custodian asserted a blanket exemption over records "referencing me by name," attached two records of exactly that description in the same email, and put everything else behind $313 in advance
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy public records and places the burden of establishing an exemption on the entity asserting one; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to determine whether each requested record is exempt and to state in writing the basis for any denial. Internal Operating Procedures section 4.1(K) assigns the marshal the duty of responding to administrative-records requests. Inspection is a constitutional right, and Rule 2.420(m)(3) sets copy fees at the amounts section 119.07 provides, which limits any special charge to a reasonable one based on the cost actually incurred.
What happened
On August 4, 2026 the Second District's marshal answered a request pending since July 20. Two categories drew a blanket exemption as confidential and exempt. Four lines later the same email reads: "Or records 'referencing me by name.' I have attached two administrative records referencing you by name." One attachment is a Teams message reading, in full, "Pro Se, Christopher Hanson has arrived". On August 4 the telephone-records category drew only that the logs contain phone numbers and voicemails would be reviewed as part of the same process, with no existence statement and no denial; on August 20 the marshal answered it: "There are no responsive phone logs." Everything further was priced at $313.00, payable before any review would proceed. No privilege log, no list of what is withheld, and no description of the search have ever issued. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24 presumes records open and puts the burden of proving an exemption on the withholder; an unstated basis is an unmet burden, and a price is not a basis. A categorical exemption's test is whether it is applied categorically. Here the same officer, over the same category, on the same day, asserted the exemption and then attached two records of that description four lines later. Everything else was priced at $313, payable before any review would begin, for records nobody had yet said exist.
Receipt
  • The marshal's 8/4/26 email with both attachments, produced by the court itself.
  • The 7/20/26 request and 7/21/26 acknowledgment in the quoted chain of the same PDF.
  • On the telephone-records category, the same email neither produced a record, nor stated one exists, nor cited an exemption. Her 8/20/26 2:40 PM email answered the category: "There are no responsive phone logs." (quoted chain in the marshal's 9/29/26 email PDF, p. 3).
  • Full quote: "Telephone records (call detail logs) contain phone numbers. Voicemails will be reviewed as part of the email process above."
  • Full quote: "The charge for this time is $313.00. Upon receipt of payment, I will proceed with the review of these e-mail messages and attachments."
  • The unattributed supplement denials at N-066 (denied without panel name or reason).
  • Cross-links N-115 (the request chain) and N-138 (the IOP provision).

Spawned by: N-115

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-149

Judge Coleman13 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Sixth Judicial Circuit

N-0582025-10-14the court rule requires expedited review when judicial-branch administrative records are withheld; this case waited 91 days for its first substantive look and, 345 days after filing (as of September 24, 2026), has had no final hearingIGNORED
Date
2025-10-14
Actor
13th Cir. respondents; assigned judges Wolfe (Div. B), then Frayman (FSC Assignment Order 2026-40), then Coleman (FSC Assignment Order 2026-63)
Institution
25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the court rule requires expedited review when judicial-branch administrative records are withheld; this case waited 91 days for its first substantive look and, 345 days after filing (as of September 24, 2026), has had no final hearing
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) grants the right of access to judicial-branch records and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(l) requires that review of a denial of access to judicial-branch administrative records be expedited, through an action for mandamus; Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995), routes judicial-branch records through the rule rather than chapter 119.
What happened
The petition was filed October 14, 2025 and amended November 13, 2025. The first assigned judge's opening act was a next-day order transferring the case for lack of jurisdiction, vacated one day later as "entered in error." No judicial act appears for the next 48 days. The petition's first substantive review came 91 days after filing, from a specially assigned outside judge. Hearings or arguments were held January 13, February 6, March 11, April 13, July 24 and August 17, 2026. No final hearing has been held as of September 24, 2026. The court's rulings on the peremptory writ are separate decision points (N-086, N-089). [IGNORED: the expedited review has reached no final hearing.]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) grants the right of access to judicial-branch records and puts the burden of any exemption on the state actor asserting it. Rule 2.420(l) requires "[e]xpedited review" of a denial, through an action for mandamus. This case exists because a recording and administrative records were withheld on an exemption whose factual basis was never stated (N-053). A final hearing would put the withholding, and the reason for it, on a court record. None has been held.
Receipt
  • Docs 003 and 012 (filing and amendment); Docs 005 and 008 (transfer order and its next-day vacatur).
  • Doc 016 (first order of specially assigned judge, 12/3/25).
  • Doc 040 p.1 stamp (first defense response, 1/8/26, at exactly 20 days from claimed 12/19/25 service; Clerk's counsel gives 12/23/25, discrepancy preserved at Doc 54 para. 2).
  • Day counts: 10/16 to 12/3 is 48; 10/14/25 to 1/13/26 is 91.
  • The same day the petition was filed, three further records requests went out; the answer, 64 days later, was a set of fee letters.
  • Amended petition re-grounds the case on the state constitution's records right and judicial-branch rule first, statute as an argued extension.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-058

N-0752026-02-09the vacate-and-restart route, the case that justified it, and the argument that Husband had invited it all came from the bench, while the defendants' own lawyer told the court there was no case law giving that guidanceDENIED
Date
2026-02-09
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned per FSC Order 2026-63), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the vacate-and-restart route, the case that justified it, and the argument that Husband had invited it all came from the bench, while the defendants' own lawyer told the court there was no case law giving that guidance
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d) requires the alternative writ on a facially sufficient complaint, and once it issues “the burden is on the respondent to come forth with facts upon which it refused to perform its legal duty” (Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), quoting Smith v. State, 696 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). Courts “rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020). A court that vacates a finding no party challenged decides an issue no party presented.
What happened
By order signed February 9 and filed February 17, 2026, the successor judge denied the neutral-judge request as moot, vacated the alternative writ pending his own review, and denied the family-case transfer for lack of authority. At the hearing, the court built the vacate-and-restart route itself, before any defense lawyer addressed writ procedure: "If I vacate Judge Frayman's order. then don't I move back to a point in time where this court needs to conduct its responsibilities under the rules of making its own determination about whether or not there's a prima facie case?. So don't I just end up all the way back at the status quo ante of January 12th." No defendant had raised that authority or the invited-error point that followed. Husband offered the narrower path, "You can vacate the order in parts," but the court vacated everything, restarting the response clock again (NEW-P3). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A court rules on what the parties argue. When the winning theory, its controlling authority, and its rebuttal all originate with the judge, no party has been heard on any of them. Husband's own motion asked the court to vacate the carve-out and keep the finding in his favor; the court vacated the whole writ, and the order's footnote acknowledges the delay objection. The same judge signed his own alternative writ the next day, finding a prima facie entitlement on the same petition (N-080).
Receipt
  • Doc 061 (signed 2/9/26, filed 2/17/26); Doc 61 p. 3 n.3 (delay footnote, comparing only against partial vacatur); date confirmed against Doc 64 p. 1 recital.
  • Doc 66 (2/6/26 transcript, 79 pp., read in full): 31:16-33:1, 33:2-9, 35:14-25, 45:9-11, 48:15-17, 51:11-23, 68:6-9, 69:6-7, 70:5-21, 72:12-73:9.
  • Court's own authority cite: "I would cite you to some other authorities. Ake vs. Moore seems to anticipate that The Court is supposed to engage in the prima facie review."
  • AAG's answer: "I don't think there is specific case law that gives that kind of guidance."
  • Invited-error exchange: "Well, you moved for his disqualification, didn't you, Mr. Hanson?" and "Oh, so you want to keep what you liked, but if he disagreed with you, you want The Court to disregard it?"
  • Vacatur order signed 2/9/26; successor's own alternative writ signed 2/10/26; both entered 2/17/26.

Spawned by: N-070

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-075

N-0802026-02-17the day after vacating his predecessor's writ, the second outside judge looked at the same petition and again found Husband entitled on its face, set a date to produce the records or show cause, and nothing was produced and nothing was enforcedWON-THEN-NULLIFIED
Date
2026-02-17
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the day after vacating his predecessor's writ, the second outside judge looked at the same petition and again found Husband entitled on its face, set a date to produce the records or show cause, and nothing was produced and nothing was enforced
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d) requires the alternative writ and a return date on a facially sufficient mandamus complaint, and once the writ issues “the burden is on the respondent to come forth with facts upon which it refused to perform its legal duty.” Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), quoting Smith v. State, 696 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
What happened
Signed February 10, 2026, the day after the order vacating his predecessor's writ, and entered February 17, 2026 alongside it, the successor's own alternative writ found that the complaint "alleges a prima facie entitlement to some or all of the relief requested," and ordered production or a showing of cause by March 4, 2026. No merits ruling and no peremptory writ has followed it. Pressed directly at the July 24, 2026 hearing to enter the writ or state what remained in dispute, the court entered nothing and named no disputed issue (N-136). The motion to enforce this writ and its predecessor has sat unruled since April 2026 (N-089). [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
When a mandamus complaint is facially sufficient, the court issues an alternative writ and sets a return date: produce the records, or come to court and say why not; from then on the respondent carries the burden of coming forward with facts. The judge ruled for Husband here. Two outside judges have each found a prima facie case for him, the second the day after vacating the first judge's writ (N-075), and in both instances enforcement stopped there. That is evidence about what happens after a finding, not an accusation against him.
Receipt
  • Doc 062, quote at p. 1; p. 2 para. 3 (March 4, 2026 return date) and para. 4 (e-filing deemed sufficient service); signed "this 10th day of February 2026."

Spawned by: N-075

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-080

NEW-P32026-03-04one amended petition drew four responsive filings; each extra chance for the answering defendants came from a court act rather than any motion they filed, and the first response, the only one compelled by service, raised none of the exemption grounds the video dispute now runs onIGNORED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Rule 2.420(l) requires that review of a court records denial be "expedited." With the Circuit defendants' response already on file, the court gave them twenty more days, and Judge Frayman said: "I'll take full responsibility for the delay." When Husband moved to vacate the parts of that writ that dismissed his claims, the court vacated all of it and set a new return date thirty days after their second response. Their last response came 71 to 75 days after service.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian, and Rule 2.420(l) makes review "expedited." On that docket each discretionary choice favors speed: the response already filed moves the case forward, and a defect is cut out rather than the whole writ.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Jan. 8 to 13, 2026: the Circuit defendants filed their first response 20 days after Dec. 19, 2025, the service date they state. At the Jan. 13 conference Judge Frayman said, "even though they did file a response in opposition, technically I can't consider that," and "I got to give them the twenty days." Husband: "they've had a lot more than twenty days since they've been formally served." The court: "I'll take full responsibility for the delay." NEW-P3
    Read them: Transcript, Jan. 13, 2026 (Doc 51), pp. 14-15 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Feb. 2 to 17, 2026: the second response came exactly 20 days after the Jan. 13 writ. At the Feb. 6 hearing on his Jan. 27 motion, Husband told Judge Coleman, "You can vacate the order in parts." The court vacated the Jan. 13 writ in full and reissued it with a March 4 return date, 30 days after that second response. An unopposed extension sought by the Clerk, a separate defendant, ran to the same date. NEW-P3, N-075
    Read them: Transcript, Feb. 6, 2026 (Doc 66), p. 33 (link pending redacted copy) · Order, Doc 61, pp. 2-3 (link pending redacted copy)
  • March 4 to 23, 2026: the third response arrived on the deadline day. Husband moved to strike the second as untimely; the court denied it because the third "supersedes the February 2, 2026 'Response in Opposition.'" The first response never cited the security-system statute invoked in August 2025; that ground first appeared in the second. NEW-P3
    Read them: Order, March 23, 2026 (Doc 73), p. 2 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Judge Evan G. Frayman, specially assigned (the Jan. 13 reset). Judge Sherwood Coleman (the vacatur, the reissued writ, the supersession ruling). Jessica Schwieterman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for the Circuit defendants (all three responses). One amended petition, three responses from the same defendants, 75 days. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and Rule 2.420(l) on this docket alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. opens judicial-branch records and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(l): "Expedited review of denials of access to administrative records of the judicial branch must be provided through an action for mandamus or other appropriate relief." The defendants themselves litigate under chapter 119, and s. 119.11(1) says the court "shall set an immediate hearing, giving the case priority over other pending cases."

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-03-04
Actor
Judges Frayman and Coleman (windows); AG defendants (filings)
Institution
25-CA-010255
Mechanism
one amended petition drew four responsive filings; each extra chance for the answering defendants came from a court act rather than any motion they filed, and the first response, the only one compelled by service, raised none of the exemption grounds the video dispute now runs on
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(l) requires that expedited review of a denial of access to judicial-branch administrative records “must be provided through an action for mandamus or other appropriate relief”; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d) and (e) govern the writ and the return, which is due within the Rule 1.140 window. A defense left out of the first responsive pleading is waived, and a custodian must state any exemption with particularity (Woolling v. Lamar, 764 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)).
What happened

Four filings met one amended petition. Only the first was compelled by service; each later window was opened by a court act.

At the January 13 conference the court reset the clock although a response was already on file: "even though they did file a response in opposition, technically I can't consider that," it said. Husband objected that he had already had far more than twenty days since service. The court took responsibility for the delay and reset the clock anyway.

The successor judge then vacated that writ and reissued it with a March 4 return date. The third response arrived on the deadline day; when Husband moved to strike the second as untimely, the ruling was that the third "supersedes the February 2, 2026 Response in Opposition."

The first response, the only one compelled by service, raised none of the exemption grounds the video dispute now turns on. Husband's alternative, to vacate in part, was declined. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution grants the right of access to records and puts the burden of any exemption on the state actor asserting it, and the judicial-branch rule makes review of a denial expedited. A defense left out of the first response is waived. The first response, the only one compelled by service, raised none of the exemption grounds the video dispute now runs on; those grounds arrived in windows opened by court acts, and the last permitted response came seventy-one to seventy-five days after service.
Receipt
  • Doc 40 p. 1 stamp (first response, 1/8/26, at 20 days from claimed 12/19/25 service; the Clerk's counsel gives 12/23/25, discrepancy preserved)
  • Doc 51 Tr. 14:4-7, 14:18-15:6, 15:7-12 (the "I got to give them the twenty days" continuation, and Husband's on-record objection, "they've had a lot more than twenty days since they've been formally served")
  • Doc 55 p. 1 stamp and title (2/2/26, again at 20 days)
  • Doc 61 p. 3 n.3 (the court's own delay footnote; compares the reset only against a partial vacatur and does not address enforcement of a writ already answered)
  • Doc 62 p. 2 para. 3 (the 3/4/26 return)
  • Doc 65 p. 1 stamp and title (3/4/26, deadline day)
  • Doc 73 p. 2 (the supersession ruling)
  • Doc 66 Tr. 31:16-33:1, 33:2-9, 45:9-11, 70:5-18 (the vacate-and-restart origin and Husband's on-record alternative, "You can vacate the order in parts," declined; N-075)
  • Doc 40 read in full, all ten pages, for the grounds negative
  • Doc 054, the Clerk's unopposed motion for extension of time (e-filed 1/30/26 11:28 AM), and Doc 059, the order extending "Defendants" to March 4, 2026, "noting Plaintiffs consent"; the AG-represented answering defendants filed no extension motion
  • Total responses by all defendants: four, including the Clerk's
  • Arithmetic, both service dates: from 12/19/25, 12 + 31 + 28 + 4 = 75; from 12/23/25, 8 + 31 + 28 + 4 = 71; 26 + 4 = 30
  • Service-date conflict inside the defense's own papers: Doc 040 para. 3 states "On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff served," and Doc 054 para. 2 states that "Plaintiff appears to have effected service of process for several other defendants in this case on December 23, 2025."

Spawned by: N-070, N-075, N-080

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P3

N-0862026-03-23the order denying the writ certifies that the court "has adhered to the procedural requirements," makes no finding about the records themselves, sets no next step and no deadline, and explains that fees are premature because no final judgment has been enteredDENIED
Date
2026-03-23
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the order denying the writ certifies that the court "has adhered to the procedural requirements," makes no finding about the records themselves, sets no next step and no deadline, and explains that fees are premature because no final judgment has been entered
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder. Once the alternative writ issues, “the burden is on the respondent to come forth with facts upon which it refused to perform its legal duty” (Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), quoting Smith v. State, 696 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)), and under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(e) and 1.140(d) the legal sufficiency of the return is heard and determined before trial on a party's application. The ruling on the peremptory writ and on the fee claim follows from that record.
What happened

By order signed March 23, 2026, all three rulings rest on procedure. The motion to strike was denied for lack of any cited legal basis, and because a later filing had superseded the one being struck.

The peremptory writ was denied because "Plaintiff has not demonstrated a legal basis for the Court to deviate from the requirements established under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.630". That writ would have enforced the alternative writ the same judge had issued five weeks earlier (N-080); it has not issued.

Fees were held premature because "The Court has not yet entered a final judgment determining whether any party is entitled to relief on the merits." Four months later the same judge announced summary judgment as the exclusive path forward, a second controlling procedure pointing away from the same pending motion (N-089, N-136). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution grants the right of access and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder; once the writ issued, the respondents carried the burden of coming forward with facts, and the sufficiency of what they filed was to be decided before any trial. This order resolves three requests on procedural grounds: no disputed fact, no merits finding, no next step, no deadline, no hearing. The court that has not entered the final judgment the fee ruling waits on is the court.
Receipt
  • Doc 073, 3 pages, read in full: title p. 1
  • Strike ruling p. 2 para. 1, including "cite[s] no legal basis upon which the Court could appropriately grant the requested relief"
  • Peremptory ruling and the Rule 1.630 sentence p. 2 para. 2, including "The Court has adhered to the procedural requirements for extraordinary remedies by issuing an alternative writ of mandamus and ordering a response"
  • Fee ruling p. 3 para. 3
  • Signature block p. 3 (signed in Chambers in Clearwater, Pinellas County, 23rd day of March 2026)
  • Filed stamp p. 1, April 2, 2026, 11:11 AM
  • The no-findings negative is scoped to this three-page document and is not a docket-wide claim

Spawned by: N-080

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-086

N-0982026-05-05the order signed May 5, 2026 recites and commands compliance with "an order dated April 18, 2026," an order that appears nowhere in the docket or the case file, and the court confirmed the error 114 days later, on August 27, 2026DENIED
Date
2026-05-05
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the order signed May 5, 2026 recites and commands compliance with "an order dated April 18, 2026," an order that appears nowhere in the docket or the case file, and the court confirmed the error 114 days later, on August 27, 2026
What the law required
Mandamus actions “are governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure” (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(a)), so a mandamus plaintiff keeps the discovery those rules give every civil litigant, and Rule 2.420(l) makes review of a records denial expedited. An order must recite accurate predicates; a party can only obey an order that exists.
What happened

The order signed May 5, 2026 recites at its first paragraph "an order dated April 18, 2026" and commands compliance with it. April 18, 2026 was a Saturday, and the docket runs from an April 14 entry to this order with nothing between. Husband raised it in two filings and asked for formal confirmation of a scrivener's error. The confirmation came 114 days after the order: the order signed August 27, 2026 states that the Court "CONFIRMS that the reference to an order 'dated April 18, 2026' is a scrivener's error and is corrected to refer to the Order entered on April 28, 2026 (Doc 80)."

The same order restricted chambers email: "substantive arguments concerning the merits of the case, disagreement with rulings, or requests for court action are not to be communicated via email," it states. It says nothing about the motion for entry of the peremptory writ, then three weeks old and still pending (N-089). The court ruled on that motion August 27, 2026, denying the peremptory writ.

A week earlier, the order signed April 28, 2026 stayed all of Husband's discovery except requests for admission. The same April 18 recital also appears on the arc card at N-024, counted once across the two. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
An order must recite accurate predicates, because a party can only obey what exists. Husband's own filings call the recital a probable typing error for the order signed April 28. The order recited a dated order not in the file or docket, commanding compliance anyway; the point was raised twice in writing and was corrected 114 days later, on August 27, 2026. A discovery stay that closes every channel but one also leaves a one-way record.
Receipt
  • Docs 080 and 081; the April 18 recital at Doc 81 para. 1
  • the email restriction at Doc 81 para. 3, including "Email communications must be limited to scheduling matters only."
  • Certified 4/13/26 transcript, Tr. 30 (Lexitas 446278): "At past times, you have not been correct on the law," with no instance identified when pressed
  • Husband's Docs 085 and 086 for the confirmation request
  • the April 28, 2026 stay (Doc 080) arrived after a deadline that passed while the defendants' stay motion was pending (N-081); the one channel it left open later produced the defendants' written admission that no court order determines the video confidential (N-053)
  • The correction: the order signed August 27, 2026 (Doc 95, entered September 2, 2026), para. III(e)

Spawned by: N-089

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-098

N-1172026-06-05a court set a hearing in a records case the statute puts first in line and never said what the hearing was about, before it or after; six weeks later the same court held that facts were disputed and declined to name one.IGNORED
Date
2026-06-05
Actor
Chambers of Judge Sherwood Coleman, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Section 6, over the signature block of Nichelle Ramsay, Judicial Assistant
Institution
25-CA-010255 (13th Cir. mandamus, Sixth Circuit judge assigned)
Mechanism
a court set a hearing in a records case the statute puts first in line and never said what the hearing was about, before it or after; six weeks later the same court held that facts were disputed and declined to name one.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution guarantees due process, and notice of a hearing that does not identify what will be heard is not notice a party can prepare against; the burden of giving that notice sits with the court when the court sets the hearing on its own initiative rather than on a party's notice of hearing. Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives the right of access, and Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(l) requires that expedited review of a denial of access to judicial-branch administrative records “must be provided through an action for mandamus or other appropriate relief”, which is what makes an unexplained setting and unsetting consequential rather than merely untidy. The lawful path in one sentence: state what would be heard on June 15.
What happened

On June 5, 2026 the court wrote: "The Court has decided to set hearing on 6/15th at 10AM in Courtroom A on 49th street in Clearwater." No motion or matter was identified.

On June 11 Husband asked the court to "let me know either the subject for the 6-15 hearing or confirm that the Court is cancelling the hearing given the incoming motion to disqualify." The next morning the answer came that the hearing "regarding Mr. Hanson's most recent motion has been cancelled as requested." The subject was never stated, before or after.

Six weeks later the same court held at a case management conference that issues of material fact remained in the case and declined to name one (N-136). The pattern is the same actor's own: twice asked what is at issue, twice not saying.

The narrow fact that survives every fair reading is this one. A court set a hearing in a records-priority case and never said what it was for. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
Due process guarantees notice, and notice of a hearing that does not say what will be heard is not notice a party can prepare against. When a court sets a hearing on its own initiative rather than on a party's notice, the burden of giving that notice sits with the court. Article I, section 24(a) and the judicial-branch records rule also put records cases on an expedited footing, which makes an unexplained setting and unsetting consequential. The lawful path was one sentence long: state what would be heard on June 15.
Receipt
  • All four chambers and party emails from the 6/5 to 6/12/26 exchange, in the 10255 correspondence folder. The chambers emails issue over the signature block of Nichelle Ramsay, Judicial Assistant.
  • The subject of the June 15 setting has never been identified as of 8/17/26.
  • This chambers answers scheduling email promptly and civilly throughout. Recorded here.
  • Question Protocol: identify the motion or matter that was to be heard on June 15, 2026. An identification answers it. A statement that no subject had been assigned establishes that the setting was made before the court determined what it would hear. A refusal preserves the question as outstanding and dated.

Spawned by: N-136, N-098

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-117

N-1272026-07-01the motion was denied on the successive-motion track, counting a different judge's disqualification as the first motion, and that track is the one that let the order find that the undersigned judge "has been fair and impartial in this case"DENIED
Date
2026-07-01
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the motion was denied on the successive-motion track, counting a different judge's disqualification as the first motion, and that track is the one that let the order find that the undersigned judge "has been fair and impartial in this case"
What the law required
Due process guarantees an impartial tribunal (Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)). An initial motion directed to a judge is judged on legal sufficiency alone, with the facts alleged taken as true (Rule 2.330(h)), and the test “focuses on those matters from which a litigant may reasonably question a judge's impartiality rather than the judge's perception of his ability to act fairly and impartially” (Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983)). A judge does not certify his own impartiality.
What happened
On July 1, 2026 the judge denied the motion to disqualify himself. The order treats the motion as successive, which permits review of the truth of its allegations. It holds the motion untimely under the twenty-day rule. It holds that adverse rulings and a "preconceived opinion" are insufficient. And it states: "the record demonstrates that the undersigned judge has been fair and impartial in this case." The order is hand-dated July 1, 2026. It was emailed that day and is not docketed. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A motion to disqualify a judge is judged on whether a reasonable litigant could question his impartiality, with the facts alleged taken as true; the test excludes the judge's own view of his fairness. This was the first motion directed to this judge, and it rested on his own signed orders and transcript. The order took a different track: it counted a different judge's disqualification as the first motion, and on that track found the undersigned judge's own conduct fair and impartial. This judge has also ruled for Husband (N-080).
Receipt
  • Order, rendered pages; Doc 88 (filed 6/15/26).
  • Authorities cited in the order: Kokal and Cano; full citation, court, and year for each are not yet confirmed.
  • Rule 2.330 subdivision lettering: (h) Determination, Initial Motion; (i) Determination, Successive Motions.
  • The order is hand-dated, "1st day of July 2026."
  • The order identifies no specific factual allegation as false.

Spawned by: N-098

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-127

N-1362026-07-24Asked to name one disputed fact, the judge answered: "So, don't ask me to explain those matters to you."IGNORED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Judge Coleman told Husband that facts were in dispute in his records case. Asked which, he answered that they were "contained and delineated within their response," then: "So, don't ask me to explain those matters to you." His written order then denied the peremptory writ because "there are factual disputes" and named none.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian, and once the alternative writ issues the respondents must come forward with facts. A court that denies the writ because facts are disputed names those facts, so the requester can meet them. The custodian identifies every record it withholds, and the basis for each, in writing, at its first denial, here August 21, 2025, whatever the label: exempt, confidential, not a public record, or judicial immunity.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Aug. 21, 2025 to Feb. 2, 2026: the circuit withheld the courthouse video in writing, under a security-camera exemption it has never supported with a single fact. Its counsel later wrote that "Judicial immunity would apply to many of the requested records," which are "not available for release based on judicial immunity, if such records exist." N-053, NEW-AG1
  • July 24, 2026, day 100 of the April 15 motion for the writ: the court said facts were in dispute. Husband asked which. The court: "Those issues are contained and delineated within their response." Then: "So, don't ask me to explain those matters to you." Neither pending motion was ruled on. N-136, N-089
    Read them: Certified transcript, July 24, 2026, p. 25 (public copy) (link pending redacted copy)
  • Aug. 27, 2026: the written order denied the peremptory writ because "there are factual disputes" and named none. Asked for findings identifying the disputed facts, it ordered instead that "Defendants who claim that any responsive record other than the Video is exempt or confidential must file a written statement that, as to each such record: (1) identifies the record by date, author, recipient(s), and general subject matter". Those words reach only records claimed exempt or confidential. A record the defendants call no public record at all falls outside them. On Sept. 10 the defendants listed five emails, each "confidential under judicial immunity." N-089, NEW-AG1
    Which facts are in dispute, and where is the list of every record the defendants withhold, including each one they say is no public record at all?
    Read them: Order, Doc 095, pp. 3-4 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Judge Sherwood Coleman, the Sixth Circuit judge assigned to 25-CA-010255 (held facts disputed; named none). Jessica L. Schwieterman, Office of the Attorney General, counsel for the Thirteenth Circuit (signed the immunity filings; named no disputed fact). One petition, one writ, one set of withheld records. Every duty here arises from the court's own alternative writ and the records rules on this case alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. makes access to public records a constitutional right and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for any denial, record by record. Once the alternative writ issues, "the burden is on the respondent to come forth with facts upon which it refused to perform its legal duty" (Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), quoting Smith v. State, 696 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). The sufficiency of the return is decided before trial (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(e), 1.140(d)).

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-07-24
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
25-CA-010255 (13th Cir. Civil Div.; Sixth Circuit judge assigned)
Mechanism
the court held that facts were still in dispute and, asked three lines later to name one, pointed to a document instead: "Those issues are contained and delineated within their response," and then "don't ask me to explain those matters to you"
What the law required
Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. makes access to public records a constitutional right and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian; Rule 2.420(l) requires that expedited review of a judicial-branch records denial “must be provided,” and Rule 2.420(e) places on the party asserting confidentiality the burden to move for it. Once the alternative writ issues, “the burden is on the respondent to come forth with facts upon which it refused to perform its legal duty” (Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), quoting Smith v. State, 696 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)), and the legal sufficiency of the return is heard and determined before trial on a party's application (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(e), 1.140(d)). A court that holds that issues of material fact remain identifies them, so the party can meet them.
What happened

At a 37-minute Zoom conference on July 24, 2026, the motion for entry of the peremptory writ and a motion for rehearing on the discovery stay were both pending. Husband asked for entry or a statement of what remained in dispute. Counsel for the circuit asked for a final hearing; she was not asked to identify an issue of fact.

The court stated it had found issues of fact requiring a final hearing. Husband asked directly what those issues were. The court answered: "Those issues are contained and delineated within their response. If you can't comprehend it or you don't agree with it, then the rule regarding summary judgment is the procedural vehicle available to you." It routed Husband to summary judgment and closed with no ruling on either pending motion. The writ-entry motion had been filed 100 days earlier and remained unruled after the hearing. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
A court that holds issues of material fact remain identifies them, because the party has to be able to meet them. Access to public records is a right under Article I, section 24(a), the judicial-branch rule makes review expedited, and the burden of establishing confidentiality sits with the party asserting it, who after the writ must come forward with facts. The sufficiency of the return is decided before any trial; Husband had withdrawn his summary-judgment motion to stand on the motion for the writ.
Receipt
  • Certified 7/24/26 transcript, Guldin RPR, certified 8/1/26, signed electronic transcript.
  • Cites: 4:17-20, 8:5-8, 9:4-21, 9:22-10:3, 10:11-16, 12:15-24, 13:3-5, 15:25-16:9, 20:25-21:12, 23:8-16, 24:13-25:16, 25:19-22, 26:15-21, 27:8-18, 28:17-22, 32:11-14, 33:10-21, 34:8-9.
  • Reporter anomaly at 9:7; that clause is not quoted here.
  • Husband: "I think that the law is clear that it's time to enter the writ or at least provide some clarification on what the Court sees as a genuine issue of material fact." (9:22-10:3.)
  • Husband directly: "What are the issues of material fact based upon any of defendant's responses?" The court's fuller answer included, "So, don't ask me to explain those matters to you."
  • Counsel for the circuit, asked whether she meant a final hearing or summary judgment hearing, answered "No, your Honor, a hearing as in a final hearing." She then said "Thank you, your Honor": the whole of the respondents' participation.
  • The confidentiality-burden rule Husband raised drew one remark, "And (e)(1) is a matter for the Appellate Court jurisdiction; right?", and was not returned to.
  • The court also stated: "You have not had to wait for hearings. You have not had to wait for responses. You have not had to wait for orders." That is testable against the docket, where the writ-entry motion had sat unruled 100 days.
  • Docket numbers are as spoken on the record and are not independently confirmed.
  • A public redacted version of the transcript is on file. The court agreed to have its assistant coordinate hearing time on the two pending motions and stated Husband could propound discovery with objections ruled on as brought.
  • Related decision points: N-080.

Spawned by: N-089, N-098, N-127

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-136

NEW-P112026-08-17at the hearing on his motion to enter the writ, counsel for the custodian told the court no affidavit was needed and that the video would be released once the requester proved good cause; ten days later the order treated the requester's argument as that good-cause motionPENDING
Date
2026-08-17
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman; Senior AAG Jessica Schwieterman for the served respondents
Institution
13th Judicial Circuit (conflict judge, 6th Circuit)
Mechanism
at the hearing on his motion to enter the writ, counsel for the custodian told the court no affidavit was needed and that the video would be released once the requester proved good cause; ten days later the order treated the requester's argument as that good-cause motion
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian asserting it. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state the basis for a denial in writing, and Rule 2.420(l) makes mandamus the remedy. The noticed subjects were entry of the peremptory writ (Doc 078) and rehearing on the discovery stay (Doc 086).
What happened
The hearing went forward on August 17, 2026 by Zoom on Husband's motion for the peremptory writ and sanctions (Doc 078) and his motion for reconsideration of the discovery stay (Doc 086). Counsel for the judicial defendants maintained, "pursuant to Florida Statute 119," that the video is confidential as surveillance or security footage and that "there are specific things that Mr. Hanson has to follow in order to have that released." On the missing affidavit she said: "We didn't need to attach an affidavit, because the documents Mr. Hanson produced proved our point." She agreed the video exists and can be obtained, named the step as a motion showing good cause, told the court it would not need to view the video to decide good cause, and said no other exemption would be asserted. Husband argued that the proper framework is Rule 2.420, not chapter 119, and that no affidavit or evidence supports the exemption. The August 27 order denied the writ, treated Husband's assertion as an ore tenus motion to find good cause, gave the defendants seven days to respond on the video, and required a record-by-record statement for everything else (N-089). On September 2 the defendants wrote that Husband "has failed to plead any form of good cause" and that they "will tender the video to the Court immediately upon such an order." As of September 24, 2026, the docket showed no order after August 27. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
The custodian that asserts an exemption carries the burden of proving the record falls within it, and a sworn statement is how a custodian proves what a recording is. The requester's right comes from the Constitution itself. Measured against that allocation, the question at this hearing was where the next step would fall.
Receipt
Certified transcript of the August 17, 2026 hearing (Lucente L26-133, reporter Lorial L. Milazzo, RPR, certified 8/19/26), filed with the Notice of Filing at Doc 096: 15:8-17, 16:4-7, 24:3-25:4, 26:2-9, 34:7-9, 34:20-35:3. Doc 095 (8/27/26, entered 9/2/26) pp. 1-5. Doc 094 (Filing 256242348, e-filed 9/2/26) pp. 2-3. Docket status: the 10255 README audit of 9/23/26 and the 9/24/26 email thread with Judge Coleman's chambers.

Spawned by: N-136, N-089

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P11

N-0892026-08-27two judges each found the case sufficient on its face; the motion to enforce those findings waited 134 days, and when it was decided on August 27, 2026, the peremptory writ and sanctions were denied and the defendants received new deadlines to justify the withholdingDENIED
Date
2026-08-27
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
two judges each found the case sufficient on its face; the motion to enforce those findings waited 134 days, and when it was decided on August 27, 2026, the peremptory writ and sanctions were denied and the defendants received new deadlines to justify the withholding
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder. Once the alternative writ issues, “the burden is on the respondent to come forth with facts upon which it refused to perform its legal duty” (Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), quoting Smith v. State, 696 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)); the sufficiency of the return is decided before trial on a party's application (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(e), 1.140(d)), and a court that finds facts disputed names them and sets them for hearing. Sanctions were sought in the alternative under Rule 2.420(i), Rule 1.380 and section 57.105, and the movant carries that burden.
What happened

Husband moved on April 15, 2026 for sanctions and for entry of the peremptory writ on five grounds. The motion was heard August 17 and decided August 27, 2026, 134 days after filing. The order denied the peremptory writ because "there are factual disputes," without naming one; denied sanctions without prejudice; and gave the defendants seven days on the video and fourteen days to justify every other withheld record.

Before that ruling, the court named two different controlling procedures, each pointing away from deciding this motion: in March, the writ was denied for lack of a Rule 1.630 basis (N-086); in July, the court called summary judgment "the exclusive remedy for you to move forward."

At that same July hearing the court also said: "You have not had to wait for hearings. You have not had to wait for responses. You have not had to wait for orders." That claim is checkable: when the court said it, the April 15 motion had been pending 100 days without a hearing or a ruling.

At the July hearing the court entered nothing and named no disputed issue. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution grants the right of access to records and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder; after the writ, the respondent carries the burden of coming forward with facts. A court that has already found a complaint facially sufficient rules on the motion to enforce it, and if it finds facts disputed it names them. This same judge has ruled for Husband before (N-080).
Receipt
  • Doc 078 (4/15/26, sanctions and peremptory writ on five grounds, safe-harbor letter served the same day, running about 5/6)
  • Docs 085 and 086 (5/28)
  • Doc 095 (8/27/26 order, entered 9/2/26), pp. 2-5
  • the 5/16/26 motion for clarification
  • Certified 7/24/26 transcript for the July quotations (N-136 ledger)
  • Day counts run from 4/15/26: to 7/24/26 is 100; to the 8/17/26 hearing is 124; to the 8/27/26 order is 134

Spawned by: N-080, N-086

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-089

N-1552026-08-27the court treated Husband's argument as an oral motion for a good-cause finding under the statute; the transcript shows him asking for the peremptory writ, saying the law does not require that motion, and telling the court that Rule 2.420, not Chapter 119, governsDENIED
Date
2026-08-27
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman (Sixth Circuit, sitting by assignment)
Institution
25-CA-010255, 13th Cir. (assigned 6th Cir. judge)
Mechanism
the court treated Husband's argument as an oral motion for a good-cause finding under the statute; the transcript shows him asking for the peremptory writ, saying the law does not require that motion, and telling the court that Rule 2.420, not Chapter 119, governs
What the law required
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution guarantees due process, and an adversarial court decides the case the parties bring: courts "rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present" (United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020) (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008))). Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden of establishing any exemption on the custodian, and the requester carries none. A good-cause motion under section 119.071(3)(a)3.d. presupposes an exemption that was never established.
What happened
On August 17, 2026 Husband asked the court to "immediately enter the peremptory writ on the video and then all of the documentation" (Tr. 32:12-14). Asked whether Chapter 119 applies, he answered that it "can be informative" but "does not apply" and that the governing provision is Rule 2.420 (Tr. 29:8-16; 34:7-9). Asked why he would not file a motion to determine good cause, he answered: "I know that the law doesn't require it" (Tr. 38:8-10). The August 27 order recorded that "Plaintiff emphatically asserted he has shown good cause" and stated: "This Court accepts Plaintiff's assertion as an ore tenus motion for the Court to find good cause for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit to disclose the Video to Plaintiff under section 119.071(3)(a)3.d., Florida Statutes." It then gave the defendants seven days to state a position on good cause. Husband moved on September 8, 2026 to vacate that characterization (Doc 97, prayer (b); Doc 100, prayer (c)). As of September 26, 2026 no ruling on either motion appears on the docket. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A court decides the request the party makes. Husband asked for the peremptory writ on the video because no exemption had been proven. The order recorded a different request in his name: a motion for a good-cause finding, which starts from the premise that the exemption applies. The same order denied the writ he asked for (N-089). When the order issued, the deviation was complete.
Receipt
  • Doc 095 p. 2 (order, signed 8/27/26, docketed 9/2/26): the "emphatically asserted" and "accepts Plaintiff's assertion as an ore tenus motion" sentences; fn. 1 (pp. 1-2) assumes Chapter 119 "for purposes of this analysis only."
  • Doc 096 (certified 8/17/26 transcript, Lucente L26-133): Tr. 28:4-13 (no evidence the video falls under the exemption); Tr. 29:3-19 (Chapter 119 "does not apply"; Rule 2.420); Tr. 32:12-14 (ask: enter the peremptory writ on the video); Tr. 34:7-9 ("the proper cite. would be found in 2.420 and not Chapter 119"); Tr. 38:2-11 (court's question; "the law doesn't require it"); Tr. 39:17-22 ("Are you saying that pleading a fact is sufficient?").
  • Doc 097 p. 5 para. 8-9 and p. 13 prayer (b); Doc 100 p. 2 para. 2 and p. 14 prayer (c): vacatur asked.
  • Clerk docket screenshot 9/23/26 (DIN 94-102): no order after DIN 95; Gmail e-service sweep through 9/26/26: none.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-155

N-1562026-08-27 -> 2026-09-26the court promised to decide the video question "expeditiously" on the papers; the papers were complete on September 8, 2026, the custodian had already said it would hand over the video on a good-cause finding, and as of September 26 no ruling has issuedPENDING
Date
2026-08-27 -> 2026-09-26
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman (Sixth Circuit, sitting by assignment)
Institution
25-CA-010255, 13th Cir. (assigned 6th Cir. judge)
Mechanism
the court promised to decide the video question "expeditiously" on the papers; the papers were complete on September 8, 2026, the custodian had already said it would hand over the video on a good-cause finding, and as of September 26 no ruling has issued
What the law required
Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). Rule 2.420(l) requires expedited review of a denial of access to judicial-branch records. The order added its own standard: the court "will resolve the good-cause question expeditiously based upon the parties' submissions."
What happened
The August 27, 2026 order recorded the Thirteenth Circuit's representation that, on a good-cause finding, "it would not interpose another exemption or objection and would provide Plaintiff the Video," and stated that if the defendants contested good cause "the Court will resolve the good-cause question expeditiously based upon the parties' submissions." The defendants filed their statement on September 2 (Doc 94), offering to "tender the video to the Court immediately upon such an order." Husband filed his submission on September 8 (Docs 97 and 100; Doc 101 is the same video motion resubmitted with exhibits on September 11). He asked chambers for hearing time on September 14 and again on September 24; the judicial assistant replied that day that the office was "working on freeing up time on the calendar for you if they cannot be decided on written submissions." As of September 26, 2026, the clerk's docket (pulled September 23, DIN 94 through 102) shows no order after the August 27 order, and no order has been served by e-mail through September 26. Elapsed: 18 days since Husband's submission, 24 since the defendants', 30 since the order, 40 since the hearing. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
A judge rules within a reasonable time on every matter submitted, and a records case gets expedited review. This order set a narrower standard for itself: once both sides filed, the good-cause question would be resolved expeditiously on those filings. The defendants had told the court that a good-cause finding would end the dispute, with no further exemption or objection. One ruling stands between Husband and the video.
Receipt
  • Doc 095 p. 2, sec. I paras. 1 and 3 (representation recorded; "expeditiously" sentence).
  • Doc 094 p. 1 stamp (e-filed 9/2/26 11:15:50 AM) and p. 3 (tender sentence).
  • Doc 097 p. 13 stamp (e-filed 9/8/26 11:43 AM); Doc 100 (Filing 256559091, e-filed 9/8/26 12:09 PM; clerk clock-in 9/8, entered 9/14); DIN 101 (clock-in 9/11, entered 9/14).
  • The 9-14-26 and 9-24-26 emails to Section 6 with the 9/24/26 1:21 PM JA Ramsay reply (Gmail capture).
  • _DATA\DOCKET_SCREENSHOT_clerk_2026-09-23 (DIN 94-102, no order after 95); Gmail sweep 9/21 to 9/26/26 for court, clerk and AG senders: no 10255 order served.
  • Day counts from 9/8, 9/2, 8/27 and 8/17 to 9/26/26: 18, 24, 30, 40.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-156

JQC2 nodes

Official public records: Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, official site

N-0622025-10-28a complaint about a concealed courthouse video was closed in a one-page letter that never mentions the video and identifies not one thing the Commission didDENIED
Date
2025-10-28
Actor
Blan L. Teagle, Executive Director
Institution
Judicial Qualifications Commission (Docket 25-762)
Mechanism
a complaint about a concealed courthouse video was closed in a one-page letter that never mentions the video and identifies not one thing the Commission did
What the law required
Article V, section 12 of the Florida Constitution creates the Judicial Qualifications Commission and vests it with jurisdiction to investigate judicial conduct and recommend discipline to the Supreme Court. The complaint charged violations of Canons 1, 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and identified the April 4, 2025 courthouse video, offered by the judge on the record, as the evidence. Because Commission inquiries are confidential under Art. V, s. 12(a)(4) and Rule 2.420, the closing letter is the only account of what the Commission did.
What happened
On October 28, 2025 the Judicial Qualifications Commission closed Docket 25-762. Executive Director Blan L. Teagle wrote that "The Investigative Panel of the Commission has completed its review of your complaint in the above matter and has determined, that the concerns you have expressed are not allegations involving a breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct warranting further action by the Commission but may be matters for review through the normal court process," and that "The Commission has found no basis for further action on your complaint that therefore has been dismissed." The judge had already deferred the same conduct to the Bar (N-045), closed in six days (N-031). A reconsideration and records request later drew no response, 268 days as of August 16, 2026 (N-063). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Article V, section 12 gives the Judicial Qualifications Commission jurisdiction to investigate judicial conduct. The complaint charged Canons 1, 2 and 3 and pointed to a courthouse video the judge had offered on the record. Confidentiality under section 12(a)(4) leaves the closing letter as the sole account of what the Commission did: one page, recording no interview, no record obtained, no finding on any allegation, and no mention of the video.
Receipt
  • JQC closing letter, October 28, 2025, "Docket No. 25-762; Ayers", one page, signed "Blan L. Teagle, J.D. / Executive Director", initials BLT/mc.
  • Letter's footer states confidentiality basis: "Inquiries by the Commission are confidential pursuant to Art. V, Sec 12(a)(4) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 2.420, Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration."
  • Referral-circle receipts held separately: N-031 (Huston 2/24/25 closure) and N-045 (4/22/25 Tr. 36).
  • 11/21/25 reconsideration and records request held at N-063.
  • Letter addressed to Husband at his home address; the address is redacted here.

Spawned by: N-042, N-045

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-062

N-0632025-11-21the follow-up asked one plain question, whether the Commission had ever tried to get the video, and it drew no answer of any kind, not a denial, not an exemption, nothing reviewable, for about eight months as of August 16, 2026IGNORED
Date
2025-11-21
Actor
JQC
Institution
Judicial Qualifications Commission
Mechanism
the follow-up asked one plain question, whether the Commission had ever tried to get the video, and it drew no answer of any kind, not a denial, not an exemption, nothing reviewable, for about eight months as of August 16, 2026
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution reaches every state commission and puts the burden of stating an exemption on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2), the rule the Commission's own letter footer invokes, requires the basis for a denial in writing. A confidentiality claim under Art. V, s. 12(a)(4) is a written answer. A request for reconsideration, records and preservation that draws no writing leaves no exemption stated and nothing a requester or a court can review.
What happened
On November 21, 2025 Husband asked the Commission to reconsider. He asked the direct question: "did the JQC make any effort to obtain video of the 4-4-25 hearing that Judge Ayers offered on the record?. If the JQC did not obtain that, why not?". He also raised a conflict naming the firm: "attorney Schifino is at the same law firm as Alicia Gangi". And he served public records request #10 for records and preservation. The Commission has answered none of it. About eight months later there is no response, no denial, and no claimed exemption. The question of whether anyone ever tried to obtain the video is exactly where the closing letter left it. [IGNORED: no response of any kind was given.]
Baseline deviation
The 11/21/25 email asked one plain question, whether the Commission ever tried to obtain the video, and served a records and preservation request. A Commission file sits outside the ordinary access presumption by constitutional provision (N-062), so the expected answer was a written statement of the exemption, which would also have recorded whether the video was ever sought. The Commission wrote nothing back, so there is nothing a requester or a court can review. The dismissal at N-062 at least exists on paper.
Receipt
  • 11/21/25 email and attachments, six pages (sent 11/21/25 09:19 AM EST to contact@floridajqc.com).
  • Husband also asked: "I can't tell if that's acknowledging that there are violations just not ones that warrant JQC actions or if you've concluded there is no violation of the code".
  • Silence from the Commission since 11/21/25, across a case-wide scan as of 8/18/26; responds to the dismissal at N-062.
  • GAP, material: the PRR #10 and "schifino correspondence" attachments exist only as filenames and sizes on p.6, not otherwise in the record.

Spawned by: N-062

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-063

Judge Frayman2 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Sixth Judicial Circuit

N-0702026-01-13the outside judge who first read the petition found a case for Husband and, in the same order, removed the administrative-records claims against the three judges on a rule no defendant had cited and no defendant had arguedWON-THEN-NULLIFIED
Date
2026-01-13
Actor
Judge Evan Frayman
Institution
6th Cir. (specially assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the outside judge who first read the petition found a case for Husband and, in the same order, removed the administrative-records claims against the three judges on a rule no defendant had cited and no defendant had argued
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian; Rule 2.420 implements that right for the judicial branch (Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995)), and Rule 2.420(l) requires that expedited review of a denial of access to judicial-branch administrative records “must be provided through an action for mandamus or other appropriate relief”. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d) requires the court, on a prima facie showing, to issue the alternative writ. A court decides the issues the parties present; it may not dismiss claims on a defense no defendant raised. Jones v. Sayer, 313 So. 3d 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020).
What happened
On January 13, 2026 an outside judge, specially assigned, found "an, albeit inartful, prima facie case" and issued the alternative writ. The same order struck the administrative-records claims against the chief judge and two trial judges, and dismissed the declaratory count. Both rulings were announced from the bench before any defense lawyer had addressed writ procedure. When the court asked defense counsel to confirm she would not need to respond to what it had just exempted, the answer was "That's correct." The carve-out then traveled into the writ itself and the next two defense responses as the operative limit on the case. At the case management conference the same day, the court muted Husband. No peremptory writ has ever followed. This is the control group: an outside judge on first look found a prima facie case for Husband, and the finding moved nothing. [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
A court decides what the parties put before it, and the custodian, not the requester, carries the burden of justifying any withholding. When a limit on a case enters from the bench rather than a filing, nobody has been heard on it, and the limit still binds. The defense had filed one ten-page document that nowhere cites the rule the carve-out rests on, and the assistant attorney general's speaking record that day contains no legal argument. The court also volunteered discovery guidance to Husband on the record.
Receipt
  • Doc 047 (writ; quoted finding at p. 3; carve-out at n.1).
  • Doc 051 Tr. 8:15-25 and 9:1-6 (carve-out announced sua sponte); 14:18-15:6, 17:22-23, 20:11, 20:21-24 (the muting); 21:4-8 (counsel's confirmation, "would not need to respond"); 26:19-23 (discovery guidance volunteered); 27:8-13 (court disclaims having considered the defense response); 27:14-17.
  • Doc 040, all ten pages read, does not cite the rule.
  • Carve-out carried forward at Doc 55 para. 4 and Doc 65 para. 4.
  • The later vacatur was relief Husband's own 1/16 combined motion invited (N-075, NEW-P13).

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-070

NEW-P132026-01-21the motion asked the judge to explain rulings he had made on his own initiative, and to step aside only if the explanation failed; five days later he stepped aside, addressed his order "solely to the alternative relief", and never explained the rulingsPARTIAL
Date
2026-01-21
Actor
Judge Evan Frayman
Institution
6th Cir. (specially assigned, Assignment Order 2026-40), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the motion asked the judge to explain rulings he had made on his own initiative, and to step aside only if the explanation failed; five days later he stepped aside, addressed his order "solely to the alternative relief", and never explained the rulings
What the law required
A judge rules on every motion properly before him; disqualification does not extinguish the requests pending when it is granted, and the successor inherits them. Rule 2.545(a) makes the judge “accountable and responsible for the fair and timely management of all assigned cases,” and Rule 2.420(l) makes review of a records denial expedited. Rule 2.330(h) confines the disqualification ruling to legal sufficiency.
What happened
Husband's verified motion of January 16, 2026 asked first that the court vacate parts of the writ dismissing his administrative-records and declaratory claims without notice or a hearing, and provide clarification for the court's sua sponte actions. Disqualification was the fourth request, conditional: grant it only if he remained unsatisfied after clarification and rehearing. Five days later the court granted the consequence without the condition. Its order states: "This Order is addressed solely to the alternative relief requested in the Motion, namely the request to disqualify the undersigned," and "the Motion is GRANTED, as legally sufficient." The order says nothing about reassignment, the vacatur, or the rehearing requests, or the alternative writ then on day 8 of its 20-day window. Husband called the order incomplete. A successor was assigned January 29 and on February 9 vacated the entire writ, including the finding in Husband's favor (N-075). [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
A judge rules on the motions before him, and disqualification does not erase the ones pending when it is granted. This motion asked first that the court vacate the rulings it had made on its own initiative and explain them, and for disqualification only if that failed. Disqualification passed the first three requests to the successor. What the sequence left behind: rulings that entered from the bench, never explained by their maker, that his successor then vacated wholesale, including the one finding that had gone Husband's way.
Receipt
  • Doc 049 pp. 1, 9, 10; Doc 050 pp. 1-2, full document; Doc 052 p. 1.
  • Doc 061 p. 2 para. 7 (successor assignment, 1/29/26); Doc 055 p. 1 (defense response at 20 days, 2/2/26); Doc 047 p. 3 n.3 (special designation).
  • Rule 2.330.
  • Doc 049 pp. 2-6 are not otherwise cited; no quotation here is drawn from the motion's body.

Spawned by: N-070

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P13

Office of the Attorney General7 nodes

Official public records: Florida Office of the Attorney General, official site

NEW-AG12026-01-08 -> ongoingFive emails withheld as "confidential under judicial immunity" in a records lawsuit that seeks no damages.PENDING
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Attorney General's office told the court in May 2026 that "the only portion of Plaintiff's request that was withheld was the security video," nine months after the custodian had withheld five emails on Judge DePaul's recusal. Ordered to list them, it called them "confidential under judicial immunity," then relabeled all five under Rule 2.420(c)(1) a week later.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian: it identifies every record it withholds and the specific rule that exempts it, the first time, and what its counsel tells the court about withheld records is complete and true. The office wrote that duty itself in each of its first three responses: the custodian must "provide the grounds for the exemption and include the statutory cite for the exemption."

V
Verified facts and law
  • Aug. 22, 2025 to May 26, 2026: Court Administrator Gina Justice withheld four pages: "The records identified as confidential are correspondence between Judge DePaul and our Assistant General Counsel regarding an Order of Recusal in case #24-DR-001150" (Doc 98, Ex. A). Nine months later the office told the court: "the only portion of Plaintiff's request that was withheld was the security video" (Doc 83, p. 7). NEW-AG1
    Read them: Doc 83, Defendants' Response, May 26, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Aug. 27 to Sept. 10, 2026: ordered to state the "specific constitutional, statutory, or rule-based basis" for each withheld record, the office listed "four (4) pages withheld": five emails dated April 28, 2025, subject "judicial recusal," each marked "This document is confidential under judicial immunity." NEW-AG1, N-048
    Read them: Doc 98, Response to Confidentiality, Sept. 10, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Sept. 17 to 28, 2026: an amended response marked the same five "confidential under Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420(c)(1)," a rule the office called "very closely related to judicial immunity." Judge Coleman then ordered a certification "sworn under penalty of perjury" stating whether the list of withheld records "is complete as to every record responsive to Plaintiff's requests." NEW-AG1
    Read them: First Amended Response, Sept. 17, 2026 (link pending redacted copy) · Order on Notice of Noncompliance, Sept. 28, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Jessica Schwieterman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, under Attorney General James Uthmeier (every filing, as counsel for the Thirteenth Circuit and its judges). Judge Sherwood Coleman (the August 27 and September 28 orders). One records lawsuit, one list of withheld records. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and Rule 2.420 on this lawsuit alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes judicial-branch records open, and the custodian asserting an exemption carries the burden of showing it applies. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the basis for any denial in writing, and Rule 2.420(l) makes mandamus the remedy. The office's own April 1, 2026 motion says judicial immunity "protects judges from liability for damages for acts performed in the course of their judicial capacities." This suit seeks records.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-01-08 -> ongoing
Actor
Office of the Attorney General, as counsel for the 13th Circuit defendants in 25-CA-010255
Institution
Office of the Attorney General / 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the lawsuit asks for records, not damages; the Attorney General's office answered with judicial immunity, a doctrine its own filing describes as protection "from liability for damages"; applied to records, the argument makes judges immune from their constitutional duty to open them. The office carried it from its first response to a September 10, 2026 filing that labeled five withheld records "confidential under judicial immunity"; a week later it relabeled the same five under Rule 2.420(c)(1), a rule it called "very closely related to judicial immunity"
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy judicial-branch records; the presumption is openness, and the custodian asserting an exemption carries the burden of showing it applies. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state the basis for a denial in writing, and Rule 2.420(l) makes mandamus the remedy.
What happened
The Office of the Attorney General appeared for the judicial defendants in the records mandamus (N-071) and asserted judicial immunity as a ground for withholding judicial records. It first appears in Doc 040, filed January 8, 2026: "With respect to the Court's mental impressions which may, or may not have been expressed in the records, they are protected by judicial immunity, their personal impressions are protected and not subject to disclosure." It broadens on February 2 in Doc 055: "For the records to which the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit is the custodian of records, Judicial immunity would apply to many of the requested records," and, on page 6, "those are not available for release based on judicial immunity, if such records exist." Doc 065 repeats both on March 4. On April 1 the motion to stay all of Husband's discovery carried it into discovery: "With respect to the Court's mental impressions involved in this litigation, they are protected by judicial immunity and not subject to discovery." That motion produced the stay (FNEW-A4, N-081). Counsel argued it aloud on April 13. It is absent from the May 15 admissions and from Doc 083 of May 26. The August 27 order then required a record-by-record statement of the "specific constitutional, statutory, or rule-based basis" for each withheld record. On September 10 the office listed five withheld emails and wrote beside each: "This document is confidential under judicial immunity." On September 17 an amended response replaced each of those five labels with Rule 2.420(c)(1), which it called "very closely related to judicial immunity," and kept the immunity memorandum. As of September 26, 2026, no order rules on the position. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
The office's own April 1, 2026 motion describes judicial immunity as a doctrine that "protects judges from liability for damages for acts performed in the course of their judicial capacities." This petition seeks records, not damages. In each of its first three responses, the office wrote the custodian's duty to "provide the grounds for the exemption and include the statutory cite for the exemption" in the paragraph just before the immunity assertion, and supported the assertion with case law alone. As of September 26, 2026, no order rules on the position.
Receipt
Doc 040 pp. 4, 6 (e-filed 1/8/26 4:40 PM); Doc 055 pp. 4, 6 (Filing # 240817260, e-filed 2/2/26 5:17 PM); Doc 065 pp. 5, 7 (e-filed 3/4/26 5:46 PM); Doc 072 pp. 4-5 (Filing # 245071283, e-filed 4/1/26 12:33 PM), including the Limehouse "liability for damages" sentence; 4/13/26 certified transcript (Lexitas 446278) 21:19-22; Doc 095 (8/27/26) p. 4, para. II(d); Doc 098 (Filing 256803151, e-filed 9/10/26 3:52 PM) p. 4; First Amended Response (Filing 257283141, e-filed 9/17/26) pp. 2-4 and footnote 1 ("Amended to include previously omitted paragraph and corrected authority and case law"). Absence: the 5/15/26 admissions, 4 pages, read in full; Doc 083, 26 pages, keyword scan. The immunity paragraphs cite Parrotino, Johnson v. Harris, Forrester v. White, Kalmanson, Mireles, Berry, Fong, Richman, Limehouse, State v. Lewis and DHSMV v. Marks. Signer on every filing: Jessica Schwieterman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, under Attorney General James Uthmeier.

Read the source document: 10255 Doc 40, Defendants' Response in Opposition to Amended Petition (e-filed 1/8/26), judicial immunity at pp. 4 and 6 | 10255 Doc 65, Defendants' Response per 2-17-26 Alternative Writ (e-filed 3/4/26), judicial immunity at pp. 5 and 7 | 10255 Doc 72, Motion for Protective Order (e-filed 4/1/26), the Limehouse "liability for damages" sentence at p. 4

Spawned by: N-058, N-071

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-AG1

FNEW-A32026-03-10in a lawsuit about withheld records, the defendants' entire document disclosure was the records production the plaintiff himself had already filed with the court 146 days earlierPARTIAL
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Circuit's defendants, who carry the burden of justifying every record they withhold, served initial disclosures listing one document: Husband's own court filing. They named three judges as their witnesses, then 22 days later moved to stop all discovery, arguing that a judge's testimony may be compelled only when "absolutely necessary."

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian: the Circuit proves each exemption with evidence it brings forward. A custodian that chooses to disclose lists its proof: the exemption decision, the search, the recording, the records withheld.

V
Verified facts and law
  • March 10, 2026: the disclosures, made "pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280," name four witnesses: Chief Judge Sabella, Judge Ayers, Judge Felix, and "RICK MELINDI." One document: "Public Records that were previously provided to Plaintiff and filed in this case on October 15, 2025, located on the docket as DIN 6." That is Husband's own exhibit filing, made 146 days earlier. FNEW-A3
    Read them: Initial disclosures (Doc 70), p. 2 (link pending redacted copy)
  • April 1, 2026: the same office moved to stay all discovery: "A party may not depose or otherwise compel the testimony of a judge unless '. . . the testimony is absolutely necessary to establish factual circumstances not in the record . . .'" The motion also invoked judicial immunity for "the Court's mental impressions involved in this litigation." FNEW-A4
  • March 18 to April 28, 2026: Husband's interrogatories and document requests on the withheld video drew no answer by the April 17 deadline. On April 28 the court stayed all discovery except requests for admission. The one channel left open produced "Admit. No analysis was needed." N-081, N-053
    Served March 18, 2026 and never answered: who decided to withhold the April 4, 2025 video, and on what evidence?
I
Independent encounter

Jessica Schwieterman, Senior Assistant Attorney General under Attorney General James Uthmeier, signed the disclosures and the stay motion as counsel for the Thirteenth Circuit, Court Administrator Gina Justice, Chief Judge Sabella, Judge Ayers and Judge Felix. One lawsuit, one disclosure, one document. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 on this lawsuit alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. opens judicial-branch records to every person, and "The governmental agency claiming the benefit of an exemption bears the burden of proving its entitlement to the exemption" (Barfield v. Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cnty., 135 So. 3d 560, 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)). Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for any denial. A burden of proof is met with evidence; letters asserting the exemption, filed by the requester, restate it without proving it.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-03-10
Actor
SAAG Jessica Schwieterman (Fla. Bar #116460), for the judicial defendants (13th Judicial Circuit Court, TCA Gina Justice, Chief Judge Sabella, Judges Ayers and Felix)
Institution
Office of the Attorney General, as counsel for the 13th Circuit defendants
Mechanism
in a lawsuit about withheld records, the defendants' entire document disclosure was the records production the plaintiff himself had already filed with the court 146 days earlier
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution puts the burden of justifying any withholding of judicial-branch records on the custodian. The defendants served these initial disclosures under Rule 1.280 (Doc 070 p. 1).
What happened
On March 10, 2026 the judicial defendants served their initial disclosures in the records mandamus, e-filed the next day. The complete contents: four witnesses, Chief Judge Sabella, Judge Ayers, Judge Felix, and a fourth named "RICK MELINDI" as spelled in this filing; one document, listed as "Public Records that were previously provided to Plaintiff and filed in this case on October 15, 2025, located on the docket as DIN 6"; no anticipated damages; no insurance. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
Initial disclosures exist so each side learns, without having to ask, what the other intends to rely on. In a case about withheld records, the custodian carries the burden of justifying the withholding. The single document these disclosures list is the plaintiff's own court filing. The contested video, the exemption decision, the searches and the missing logs appear nowhere in it. The same weeks show the same pattern: served discovery on those subjects drew no answers by its deadline (N-081), and three weeks after naming its witnesses the office moved to stay all discovery (FNEW-A4).
Receipt
Doc 070, Notice of Serving Initial Disclosures, 25-CA-010255, Filing #243572846, certificate of service March 10, 2026, e-filed March 11, 2026 2:26 PM, served under Rule 1.280. The name as filed is "RICK MELINDI"; the companion fee letters are signed Richard T. Melendi, Chief Deputy Court Administrator (N-068). The disclosed document is Husband's own DIN 6 filing of 10/15/25, filed 146 days before the 3/10/26 service date of these disclosures (10/15/25 to 3/10/26).

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-A3

FNEW-A42026-04-01in a records case the defendants themselves litigate under chapter 119, whose section 119.11(1) requires the court to "set an immediate hearing, giving the case priority over other pending cases," the office moved to stop all discovery into who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it, and the court stopped all of it except requests for admissionDENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Fourteen days after Husband served discovery on the withheld video, the Attorney General's office moved to stay all of it, telling the court the documents were filed "or are confidential and have not been provided." The stay issued; the interrogatories and document requests stand unanswered.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian, so in a records case the custodian brings its proof forward, and a protective order needs good cause shown by the party asking for it. The office's own motion described documents that "are confidential and have not been provided." The expected output was to list each one with its basis and let discovery test the video exemption.

V
Verified facts and law
  • March 18 to April 17, 2026: Husband served seven requests for admission, six interrogatories, and five document requests, all aimed at the withholding of the April 4, 2025 video. On April 1 the office moved to stay all discovery. The April 17 deadline passed with nothing answered. N-081
  • April 1, 2026: the motion: discovery is improper "as the documents subject to the litigation have been filed with the Court as part of the initial filing or are confidential and have not been provided in accordance with the Florida Statutes." FNEW-A4
    Read them: Motion for Protective Order (Doc 72), pp. 4-5 (link pending redacted copy)
  • April 28 to Sept. 10, 2026: Judge Coleman stayed "all discovery, except for Plaintiff's Request for Admission," and directed that a final evidentiary hearing be set; as of Oct. 4, 2026, none has been held. Fifty-five days after the motion, the office told the court "the only portion of Plaintiff's request that was withheld was the security video." On Sept. 10 it listed four pages withheld since Aug. 22, 2025: five emails on Judge DePaul's recusal. N-081, NEW-AG1, N-058
    Which documents "are confidential and have not been provided," and when was each first identified to Husband?
    Read them: Stay order, April 28, 2026 (Doc 80), p. 2 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Jessica Schwieterman, Senior Assistant Attorney General under Attorney General James Uthmeier, signed the motion as counsel for the Thirteenth Circuit, Court Administrator Gina Justice, Chief Judge Sabella, Judge Ayers and Judge Felix. Judge Sherwood Coleman (the April 28 stay, kept Aug. 27, 2026). One motion, one stay, one set of unanswered discovery. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and the good-cause rule on this motion alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes judicial-branch records open, and the custodian claiming an exemption "bears the burden of proving its entitlement" to it (Barfield, 135 So. 3d at 562). Under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280, which the motion invoked, "The burden of showing good cause is on the party seeking the protective order," and Florida courts "have disapproved ... orders providing for lengthy postponements of discovery" (Bush v. Schiavo, 866 So. 2d 136, 138 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)).

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-04-01
Actor
Office of the Attorney General, for the judicial defendants
Institution
Office of the Attorney General, as counsel for the 13th Circuit defendants
Mechanism
in a records case the defendants themselves litigate under chapter 119, whose section 119.11(1) requires the court to "set an immediate hearing, giving the case priority over other pending cases," the office moved to stop all discovery into who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it, and the court stopped all of it except requests for admission
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution opens judicial-branch records and puts the burden of any withholding on the custodian. Section 119.11(1), which the defendants invoke, requires the court to "set an immediate hearing, giving the case priority over other pending cases." A protective order requires good cause (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c), as the defendants quoted it at Doc 072 p. 2).
What happened
On April 1, 2026 the Office of the Attorney General, defending the Thirteenth Circuit and its judges in the records mandamus, filed a Motion for Protective Order to Stay Discovery. On the discovery question the motion says: "discovery is improper for a mandamus proceeding as the documents subject to the litigation have been filed with the Court as part of the initial filing or are confidential and have not been provided in accordance with the Florida Statutes." The sentence gives the litigation's documents two possible states, filed with the court, or confidential and not provided in accordance with the Florida Statutes. On judicial records it says: "With respect to the Court's mental impressions involved in this litigation, they are protected by judicial immunity and not subject to discovery." The motion was the noticed matter at the April 13, 2026 hearing. On April 28, 2026 Judge Coleman stayed all of Husband's discovery except requests for admission, depositions included (N-081). The August 27, 2026 order kept the stay in place. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden of justifying a withholding on the custodian, and section 119.11(1), which the defendants invoke, gives a records case priority. A protective order requires good cause. The motion was filed while the defendants' own thirty-day discovery deadline was running, and that deadline expired with nothing answered and nothing objected to (N-081). The same motion carried the judicial-immunity position from disclosure into discovery (NEW-AG1). The one channel the stay left open, requests for admission, later produced the written admission that no court order makes the video confidential (N-053).
Receipt
Doc 072, Motion for Protective Order to Stay Discovery, 25-CA-010255, "Filing # 245071283, e-filed 04/01/2026 12:33:22 PM," six pages; the quoted "or" clause at p. 5 and the immunity sentence at p. 4. Signed "/s/ Jessica Schwieterman," Senior Assistant Attorney General, Florida Bar No. 116460, under "JAMES UTHMEIER, ATTORNEY GENERAL," certificate of service April 1, 2026. The stay order is Doc 080, signed 4/28/26 (N-081); Doc 095 p. 5, para. III(a), keeps it. The served discovery and its expired deadline are at N-081 (Filing #244103616). The defendants' own invocation of chapter 119: Doc 094 p. 1 and Doc 098 p. 1. Section 119.11(1) is quoted from the 2026 Florida Statutes.

Spawned by: N-081

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-A4

N-0812026-04-28Discovery into who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it has been stayed since April 28, 2026, pending a final hearing that has never been set. On August 27 the court kept the stay and denied the writ because "there are factual disputes"; asked for a written order identifying them, it named none.DENIED
Date
2026-04-28
Actor
10255 defendants and Senior Assistant Attorney General Schwieterman (OAG)
Institution
25-CA-010255
Mechanism
Discovery into who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it has been stayed since April 28, 2026, pending a final hearing that has never been set. On August 27 the court kept the stay and denied the writ because "there are factual disputes"; asked for a written order identifying them, it named none.
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Mandamus actions “are governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure” (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(a)); Rules 1.340, 1.350 and 1.370 require a response within 30 days, and a protective order issues only on good cause shown, a burden the party seeking it carries (Rule 1.280).
What happened
On March 18, 2026 Husband served one combined set, seven requests for admission, six interrogatories, and five requests for production, all directed at the withholding of the April 4, 2025 video. On April 1 the office moved for a protective order staying all discovery. On April 17 the deadline to respond passed while the stay motion was pending. On April 28 the court signed the stay, leaving only the requests for admission open. Those admissions were answered on May 15 (N-053, N-103). The interrogatories and the requests for production have never been answered; the August 27, 2026 order left the stay in place while requiring the defendants to justify each withheld record first. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A party served with discovery has thirty days to answer, object, or seek protection, and the party seeking protection carries the burden of showing good cause. The office took the third route on April 1 and let the deadline pass while its motion was pending; the court granted the stay on April 28 and kept it on August 27. The instruments asked who viewed the video, who decided to withhold it, and the basis for the exemption. The office's bare denial says someone viewed it and does not say who (N-103). The custodian's subpoena was quashed and no deposition was taken (N-109).
Receipt
  • Filing #244103616 (the 3/18/26 combined discovery set)
  • Doc 072 (Motion for Protective Order to Stay Discovery, "Filing # 245071283, e-filed 04/01/2026 12:33:22 PM,")
  • Doc 080, signed 4/28/26 (N-098); stay kept, Doc 095 p. 5 III(a)
  • Doc 095 pp. 3-4: II(a) "there are factual disputes"; II(d) answers Doc 078 prayer (d), the request for a written order identifying the disputed facts, with an exemption statement "other than the Video" and names no disputed fact
  • the 5/15/26 responses (N-053, N-103)
  • the quashed custodian subpoena at N-109 (Tr. 101-157)

Read the source document: 10255 Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions (5/15/2026, AAG Schwieterman; incl. 'No analysis was needed', Nos. 6-7)

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-081

N-1032026-05-15asked to admit that nobody had watched the video before it was withheld, the office answered in one word, "Denied," disputing that nobody watched it, and the record still does not say whoPENDING
Date
2026-05-15
Actor
Same Defendants, by Senior Assistant Attorney General Jessica Schwieterman
Institution
Office of the Attorney General, Tampa / 13th Cir. - 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
asked to admit that nobody had watched the video before it was withheld, the office answered in one word, "Denied," disputing that nobody watched it, and the record still does not say who
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(a) requires that a denial “shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission,” and matters admitted are conclusively established (Rule 1.370(b)). A custodian withholding a judicial-branch record must state the basis for the denial in writing (Rule 2.420(m)(2)) and move in writing, with a signed good-faith certification, to have the record determined confidential (Rule 2.420(e)(1)).
What happened
Request No. 2 asked the defendants to admit that before the September 8, 2025 denial, no employee, agent, or representative of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit actually viewed the requested video footage. On May 15, 2026 the entire response was: "RESPONSE: Denied." Every other response in the four-page filing carries a stated basis or a volunteered explanatory sentence. No. 2 is the only one-word answer in the document, and the only response asserting a fact about the defendants' own internal handling of the record. Who watched it, when, in what capacity, and under what authority stays open. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
A denial in discovery must meet the substance of what was asked; this one puts the defendants on record disputing that nobody viewed the recording before the September 8, 2025 refusal. It names no viewer, no date, no capacity, no authority. The interrogatories asking this were never answered (N-081), and the custodian's subpoena was quashed (N-109).
Receipt
  • RFA Responses 5/15/26 p.2; the companion admissions are at Nos. 6 and 7 (N-053)
  • all four pages read in full; signed "/s/ Jessica Schwieterman," Senior Assistant Attorney General, under "JAMES UTHMEIER, ATTORNEY GENERAL"
  • The unanswered interrogatories that asked the same question are Filing #244103616 (N-081)
  • the stay is Doc 080, signed 4/28/26 (N-098)
  • the quashed custodian subpoena is at N-109

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-103

N-1222026-06-17the Attorney General's office called its production complete while answering one of eight categories; the two categories about its own authority remain wholly unansweredDENIED
Date
2026-06-17
Actor
Darya Massoudi
Institution
Office of the Attorney General
Mechanism
the Attorney General's office called its production complete while answering one of eight categories; the two categories about its own authority remain wholly unanswered
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution opens every record of the executive branch and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Section 119.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes: “Every person who has custody of a public record shall permit the record to be inspected and copied by any person desiring to do so”; a custodian who withholds must state the basis in writing and, on request, “with particularity” (s. 119.07(1)(e)-(f)). Every category of a request gets one of three dispositions: the record, a statement that none exists, or a cited exemption.
What happened
The Attorney General's office answered one of the eight categories in Husband's request, under a cover letter stating that its 37-page May 8, 2026 production "will serve to complete" the request. A June 17 production cured one more category and partly answered two others. The two categories asking for the office's own memos on its sections 16.01 and 16.015 authority are still wholly unanswered, and the office has never stated that no such records exist. One further category it declined as too vague. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
The Constitution opens the office's records and puts the burden of any exemption on the office. The records law then requires an itemized disposition of every category: produce the record, state that none exists, or cite an exemption. On the two categories asking for the office's own memos about its authority to act, the office has done none of the three, and it is the office that co-publishes the state's Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual. The core is the silence on the authority memos.
Receipt
  • 5/8/26 cover letter.
  • Preserved production package (SHA-256 manifest; Phase B verification completed 7/6/26).

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-122

N-1572026-09-02 -> 2026-09-17given seven days to agree to good cause or explain why the video should not be provided, the defendants filed three statements in September 2026 and none of them states a fact showing the recording is security-camera footage, the ground on which it was withheld more than a year earlierPARTIAL
Date
2026-09-02 -> 2026-09-17
Actor
Senior AAG Jessica Schwieterman, Office of the Attorney General, for the Thirteenth Circuit defendants
Institution
Office of the Attorney General (counsel for 13th Cir. defendants), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
given seven days to agree to good cause or explain why the video should not be provided, the defendants filed three statements in September 2026 and none of them states a fact showing the recording is security-camera footage, the ground on which it was withheld more than a year earlier
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution puts the burden of establishing an exemption on the custodian, and exemptions are construed narrowly (Woolling v. Lamar, 764 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)). Rule 2.420 requires a written basis for withholding stated with particularity. The ground the custodian invoked, section 119.071(3)(a), reaches security-system records; a statement relying on it states the fact that this recording is one.
What happened
Ordered on August 27, 2026 to state within seven days why there was not good cause for Husband to receive the Video, the defendants filed on September 2 (Doc 94). That filing argues that Husband "has failed to plead any form of good cause" and closes: "Defendants agree that this ultimately a decision for the Court to make as the case law is clear that it is an exercise of discretion and will tender the video to the Court immediately upon such an order." It describes the record as "the April 4, 2025 hearing-room video recording." The words surveillance and camera do not appear in it; the word security appears once, inside its paraphrase of the statute. It attaches no affidavit or exhibit. The September 10 statement (Doc 98) and the September 17 amended statement (DIN 102) address records "other than the Video" and say nothing further about it. Across all three filings, no fact is stated showing that the April 4, 2025 recording is "surveillance video footage from security cameras," the ground on which the custodian withheld it on August 21, 2025. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
The custodian carries the burden of proving an exemption, and the burden is met with facts, not labels. The exemption invoked covers security-system records. A statement that this recording is one takes a single sworn sentence naming the system that made it. The court's order invited exactly that statement. Three filings later, the sentence has not been written.
Receipt
  • Doc 095 p. 2 (the seven-day directive: "a statement explaining why there is not good cause and therefore the Video should not be provided to Plaintiff").
  • Doc 094 pp. 1-4 (Filing 256242348, e-filed 9/2/26): "has failed to plead any form of good cause" (p. 2); tender sentence (p. 3); "hearing-room video recording" (p. 1); word sweep: surveillance 0, camera 0, security 1 (p. 2, statute paraphrase), affidavit 0, exhibit 0.
  • Doc 098 p. 1 and DIN 102 pp. 1-2 (Filings 256803151 and 257283141): scope "(other than the Video)"; word sweep of DIN 102: surveillance 0, camera 0, security 0.
  • Doc 006 p. 14 (Justice letter 8/21/25): "surveillance video footage from security cameras located on and within courthouse facilities in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit is confidential and exempt."
  • RFA responses served 5/15/26, Nos. 6 and 7 ("No analysis was needed"), carried at N-053.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-157

Leon (Judge Dempsey)1 node

Official public records: Official judicial page, Second Judicial Circuit, Leon County

N-0792026-02-13The judge's office asked the Bar's lawyer for the dismissal order the day before Husband's opposition was filed.DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Eight days after the Bar moved to dismiss, before Husband had filed his opposition, Judge Dempsey's assistant asked the Bar's lawyer: "Please provide an order in word granting the Motion to Dismiss." The final judgment, built on that draft, followed with no hearing, on three grounds his filings had already answered.

E
Expected output

On a motion to dismiss a verified records petition, the court takes the petition's facts as true and reads the opposition before it decides. Whether records "do not exist" is settled on evidence at a hearing.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Jan. 27 to Feb. 5, 2026: the Bar moved to dismiss; the docket holds no order setting a response date. At 11:27 AM on Feb. 4, Judge Dempsey's judicial assistant wrote the Bar's counsel: "Please provide an order in word granting the Motion to Dismiss." At 12:19 PM Husband asked for "just 14, or even 10 days" and "a hearing and an opportunity for argument before the Court on the dismissal issue," the second of five written requests. The Bar's draft arrived at 5:27 PM; his opposition, Feb. 5. No hearing was ever set. N-079
    Read them: Chambers email, Feb. 4, 2026 (link pending redacted copy) · The Bar's draft order (link pending redacted copy)
  • Feb. 13, 2026: final judgment, built on the Bar's draft down to its caption typo ("IN AND FOR OR LEON COUNTY"). Ground 1, no jurisdiction "to review the Bar's decision to dismiss Plaintiff's grievance": the Bar's own motion says its records "are governed by" Rule 2.420, and the response said "discipline is no part of the relief requested." Ground 2, "immune from suit": the response said, "Plaintiff Hanson is not suing for tort damages. He is petitioning for Mandamus." Ground 3, "all the reasons articulated in the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss," including "Such records were not provided because they do not exist": the motion's own exhibit is three Bar letters, each copied to Davis, and the response called existence "a disputed question of fact." N-077, N-079
    Read them: Motion to dismiss and exhibit, record on appeal pp. 625-643 (link pending redacted copy) · Response, record on appeal pp. 644-658 (link pending redacted copy) · Final judgment, record on appeal pp. 769-770 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Feb. 19 to 24, 2026: rehearing said it again: "This is a Petition for Writ of Mandamus seeking specific performance and public records." Denied five days later, "no legal or factual basis," file closed. N-079
    Read them: Rehearing motion and denial, record on appeal pp. 771-775 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Judge Angela C. Dempsey (judgment; rehearing denial). Kerri L. Owens, her judicial assistant (the Feb. 4 request). John Londot, Greenberg Traurig, for the Bar (the motion; the draft order). One petition, one motion, one response, one judgment, all on this court's docket; no other card is needed.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes the record open; the custodian carries the burden. Rule 2.420(l)(2) sends enforcement against a non-judge custodian to the circuit court. Rule 1.630(d)(2): on a prima facie showing the court "must issue" an alternative writ. On a motion to dismiss the petition's facts are taken as true; whether a record exists is decided after a hearing (Consumer Rights, LLC v. Bradford County, 153 So. 3d 394, 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)).

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-02-13
Actor
Judge Dempsey
Institution
2d Cir. Leon Co. (2025-CA-002469)
Mechanism
the court solicited the dismissal order from the Bar's counsel the day before Husband's opposition was even filed, granted the dismissal without ever holding a hearing, and denied rehearing with the file ordered closed
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution secures the access right, and Rule 2.420(l)(2) places its enforcement against a non-judge custodian in the circuit court. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d)(2): if the petition shows a prima facie case the court 'must issue' an alternative writ. On a motion to dismiss the verified petition's allegations are taken as true, and a disputed allegation that a record exists is decided after a hearing, not on the papers. Consumer Rights, LLC v. Bradford County, 153 So. 3d 394, 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
What happened
On February 4, 2026 the judicial assistant to Judge Dempsey emailed the Bar's counsel: "Please provide an order in word granting the Motion to Dismiss." Counsel returned a draft the same day. Husband filed his opposition the next day and asked for a hearing. On February 13 the court entered final judgment for the Bar, adopting the Bar's own grounds, whose operative assertion, that the records "were not provided because they do not exist," is not sworn. Husband moved for rehearing on February 19; on February 24 it was denied for lack of any legal or factual basis, with no further motions allowed and the file ordered closed. The certified docket's hearing table is empty; no hearing was ever held. The court added the grounds itself; the Bar's draft had granted the motion in one line. The signed order recites having considered a response that did not exist when the order granting the motion was solicited. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 1.630(d)(2) told the court what a petition showing a prima facie case gets: an alternative writ and a return. A motion is decided after the response is in, and a court that asks the winning side to draft the order does so after deciding. Here the sequence ran backward: order requested from the Bar's counsel first, opposition filed second, final judgment for the Bar signed third, reciting a response that did not exist when the order was requested. Husband asked for a hearing four times in writing; none was set.
Receipt
  • Chambers email chain of 2/4, 2/5, and 2/19/26.
  • Both orders and the certified Leon progress docket (First DCA record pp. 4-5, 769-770, 775).
  • The Bar's motion (pp. 625-638): "for all the reasons articulated in the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,".
  • Husband's response (pp. 644-713).
  • Draft-vs-signed comparison by exact text extraction, not OCR.
  • Rehearing denial: "no legal or factual basis,".

Spawned by: N-055

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-079

Sixth Circuit administration0 nodes

Official public records: Sixth Judicial Circuit, court administration

University of Florida18 nodes

Official public records: University of Florida, official site | Brechner Center for the Advancement of the First Amendment, UF College of Journalism and Communications

FNEW-U12026-03-30before UF's search ever ran, its records office told the IT staff that the requester had not asked for attachments, and scoped the search to two mailboxes and to email alone; the request had asked for written communicationsPARTIAL
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Asked for "all written communications" of College of Journalism employees, text and Signal/WhatsApp messages included, UF's records custodian had IT search the email of two people, attachments out: "The person did not ask for attachments."

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) and s. 119.07(1)(a) required UF to search the scope Husband wrote: every channel he listed, and the records of all employees within the UF College of Journalism and Communications, the group his request named. UF's own brief names the duty: "making reasonable efforts to determine from other officers or employees within the agency whether such a record exists." A custodian that narrows the search to two mailboxes tells the requester which ones, in writing, before the search runs.

V
Verified facts and law
  • March 26, 2026: the request covered "employees within the UF College of Journalism and Communications, specifically including but not limited to" the Brechner project, Cuillier and Bambauer, and asked for "all written communications, including but not limited to emails, text messages, Signal/WhatsApp messages, internal memoranda, notes," personal devices included. UF's acknowledgment noted: "Email searches will not include attachments unless specifically requested." FNEW-U1
  • March 30, 2026, 11:29 AM to 12:48 PM: the custodian asked IT to "handle the email search for this request," named two mailboxes, David Cuillier and Jane Bambauer, and added: "The person did not ask for attachments." IT's return: "This search concluded with 103 message(s), which resulted in 330 page(s). No attachments were included." FNEW-U1
    Read them: The custodian's instruction and IT's return (production pp. 2, 23) (link pending redacted copy)
  • May 8 to July 7, 2026: Husband asked for a certification "identifying the custodians and locations searched, including personal devices and private email accounts used for University business." UF's answer, after he sued: "Nowhere does Chapter 119 require that a state agency certify to a requestor that it has made a diligent search for records." The custodian swore he also sent the terms to the two professors, who "sent me records that consisted of email correspondence with Petitioner." FNEW-U1, N-120
    Which College mailboxes, phones and message accounts did UF search beyond two people's email, and where are the attachments to the 103 messages it pulled?
I
Independent encounter

John Hines, Director of Public Records and records custodian (wrote the instruction; swore to the search). Daniel Quiros, UF Information Technology (ran the two-mailbox search). One request, one instruction, one search. Every duty here arises from UF's own March 30, 2026 search design on this request alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. makes access to public records a constitutional right, presumes records open, and puts the burden of justifying any withholding on the custodian. Section 119.011(12), Fla. Stat., reaches official-business records in any physical form or means of transmission, texts and attachments included, and s. 119.07(1)(a) requires the custodian to permit inspection of every non-exempt public record the request describes.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-03-30
Actor
John Hines, Director of Public Records (custodian), and UF Information Technology
Institution
University of Florida
Mechanism
before UF's search ever ran, its records office told the IT staff that the requester had not asked for attachments, and scoped the search to two mailboxes and to email alone; the request had asked for written communications
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the records open and puts the burden of any narrowing on the custodian. Section 119.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat., obliges the custodian to permit inspection of the records the request describes, and the request asked for 'all written communications, including but not limited to emails, text messages, Signal/WhatsApp messages, internal memoranda, notes, and draft research or survey data' (App. 8).
What happened
UF's processing file, produced later under a second records request, shows how the search for Husband's first request was built. On March 30, 2026 at 11:29 AM the records custodian wrote to UF Information Technology: 'Can you please handle the email search for this request? The person did not ask for attachments.' The search covered two mailboxes only, Cuillier and Bambauer, and email only: no text messages, no chat, no other written channel. The time frame was set at December 1, 2024 to March 26, 2026, the request date, while the request ran to 'the date this request is fulfilled.' The IT return came back the same afternoon: 'This search concluded with 103 message(s), which resulted in 330 page(s). No attachments were included.' The request itself, quoted in the custodian's own instruction, had asked for all written communications, including emails, text messages, Signal/WhatsApp messages, memoranda and notes, on personal devices too. UF's position is on the face of its own acknowledgment, which carried a standing note: 'Email searches will not include attachments unless specifically requested.' Whether that request 'specifically requested' attachments is the point the note and the instruction decided against the requester without saying so. A hit-distribution chart in the same file shows that 98.26% of the messages the whole 21-term search returned contained the bare word 'Hanson'; the other twenty terms added almost nothing. That is the 103-message universe every later UF card inherits: the stalled search and the closure at 53 pages (N-096, N-097), the surname withholding (N-100), and the extraction built out of the same set three days after completeness was declared (N-099). [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
The Constitution presumes the records open and puts the burden of justifying any narrowing on the agency. The scope of a search is set by the request's terms. The narrowing here happened in writing, inside UF's own processing file, before the search ran: attachments out, every channel but email out, two mailboxes in, and a date window closing on the request date. What the excluded scope held was never searched, so nobody can say what it contained. UF's later completeness statements (N-096, N-120) describe what this scope returned, not what existed.
Receipt
UF's W018964 production, produced July 17, 2026, emails_1.pdf: pp. 2 and 38 (custodian instruction, 3/30/2026 11:29:17 AM, with the request language quoted beneath it), pp. 23-24 and 36-37 (UFIT return, 3/30/2026 12:48:13 PM), p. 222 (hit distribution). Petition appendix App. 8 (UF's 3/26/2026 acknowledgment, carrying the request text and the note 'Email searches will not include attachments unless specifically requested'), Filing 250752293, PDF p. 9. UF response numbers digest, 7/31/26. Checked against the page image 9/26/2026: emails_1 pp. 2, 23 and 38, App. 8; earlier 8/19/2026 ledger for the remaining pages.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to FNEW-U1

N-0932026-04-23the University of Florida held a records request twenty-eight days and gave no reason of any kind; it answered only after Husband followed up, and then, the next day, in a single sentence saying the request was under legal review, a line its own lawyer wrote for the custodian that same dayIGNORED
Date
2026-04-23
Actor
John Hines, Director of Public Records; Amy B. Quillen, Associate Counsel, Office of the General Counsel
Institution
University of Florida
Mechanism
the University of Florida held a records request twenty-eight days and gave no reason of any kind; it answered only after Husband followed up, and then, the next day, in a single sentence saying the request was under legal review, a line its own lawyer wrote for the custodian that same day
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes every state record open and puts the burden of justifying any withholding on the agency. Chapter 119 permits delay only for the limited reasonable time the custodian needs to retrieve the record and delete the portions it asserts are exempt (Tribune Co. v. Cannella), and section 119.07(1)(c) requires a prompt, good-faith acknowledgment and response. Section 119.07(1)(e) and (f) require any withholding to be stated with its statutory basis, in writing and with particularity on request.
What happened
Husband's request went to UF on March 26, 2026. Twenty-eight days passed with no reason of any kind before he followed up. UF's entire reply was one sentence, written inside its Office of the General Counsel minutes earlier when Associate Counsel Amy Quillen instructed the records custodian: "You can let him know that his request is undergoing the legal review." Three weeks earlier the same lawyer had written internally, "I think very little of this may be responsive, so no invoice for now." Production followed thirty-nine days after the request: fifty-three pages, entirely correspondence between Husband and UF representatives (N-096). No reason has ever been given for the twenty-eight days. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
The burden of justifying any withholding is UF's. The only delay the records law allows is the limited time it takes to retrieve records and remove exempt portions, and UF's own file shows 340 pages in hand within four days. UF had two honest answers available in April: say it was still searching, or name an exemption. It gave neither for four weeks, then one sentence its lawyer wrote for the custodian. A legal review is a label, and a label gives a requester nothing to test.
Receipt
  • Request 3/26/26 (petition App. 8)
  • Husband's 4/22 9:52 AM follow-up
  • UF's 4/23 12:39:01 PM reply (petition App. 11, petition para. 16), whose page image has not been checked
  • Quillen to Hines, 4/23 12:25:18 PM, emails_1 p. 68, the top-level original
  • Quillen 4/3 9:15:05 AM, emails_1 p. 60
  • Day counts machine-computed at build: 3/26 to 4/23 is 28 days; 3/26 to 5/4 is 39
  • The 7/30/26 public filing of the withheld set is at N-144
  • The 5/4 production and its contents are at N-096

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-093

NEW-0913-U132026-04-23a records request was told it was undergoing legal review for weeks, the University's records custodian later testified under oath that the review creates no record and that attorneys, not he, handle it, and when its product finally reached the public docket months later it left unredacted personal information of third partiesIGNORED
Date
2026-04-23
Actor
UF Office of the General Counsel (Quillen); the records portal; the records custodian (Hines)
Institution
UF
Mechanism
a records request was told it was undergoing legal review for weeks, the University's records custodian later testified under oath that the review creates no record and that attorneys, not he, handle it, and when its product finally reached the public docket months later it left unredacted personal information of third parties
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution makes the records open and puts the exemption burden on the custodian. Section 119.07(1)(c) requires a good-faith, prompt response, and sections 119.07(1)(e)-(f) require a stated exemption basis with citation for anything withheld or redacted. A review invoked to justify delay or withholding should be describable by the agency that invokes it.
What happened
Four weeks after the request, with the pages already gathered, the University's portal told the petitioner his request was 'undergoing the legal review.' No one has ever defined what that review is. Under oath at the September 2 hearing, the University's own records custodian testified that 'The attorneys handle the legal review of public records request, I'm not an attorney,' that it creates no record ('Records are not created'), and, asked why, 'It's the law, a record is not to be created.' He does not perform the searches, does not watch them, and does not decide what is produced ('Not me'). Sorting the records the University ultimately produced into what belongs to the petitioner and what belongs to unrelated people sharing his last name does not take weeks by any account given under oath. When that sorted set finally reached the public docket in July, after months of the review it invoked in April, it still carried unredacted personal information of third parties, though footnote 4 of that filing said the category (2) records 'have been redacted' under three statutes. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A review invoked to justify delay should be describable by the agency that invokes it, and it should protect the private information it claims to have screened. Neither held here: no witness could describe what the review does or point to a record it left behind, and the filing the review is said to have cleared still exposed third parties' personal information to the public.
Receipt
  • The April 23, 2026 portal message and the University's internal instruction to the custodian the same day.
  • The custodian's September 2, 2026 sworn testimony that the review creates no record and that he does not perform, watch, or decide it.
  • The University's July 30, 2026 filing, its footnote claiming redaction under three statutes, and the unredacted personal information described in the disqualification motion.

Spawned by: N-096, N-144

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0913-U13

N-0942026-04-24 -> 2026-07-30UF's own file counted the pages it found, batch by batch, and in the same messages asked whether to prepare an invoice; the requester was told the request was complete at fifty-three pages and was given no count of what had been located until 103 days later, after he suedPARTIAL
Date
2026-04-24 -> 2026-07-30
Actor
University of Florida: the records custodian, the Office of the General Counsel, and UF Information Technology
Institution
University of Florida (W018463-032626; 8th Cir. 01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
UF's own file counted the pages it found, batch by batch, and in the same messages asked whether to prepare an invoice; the requester was told the request was complete at fifty-three pages and was given no count of what had been located until 103 days later, after he sued
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the records open and puts the burden of justifying any withholding on the agency. Section 119.07(1)(c) requires a good-faith response, and section 119.07(1)(e) and (f) require a custodian who withholds a located record to identify the basis, in writing and with particularity on request. A custodian whose own file counts the pages it located can state that count to the requester.
What happened

UF's May 4 production was fifty-three pages, and UF told Husband: "This completes the public records request" (N-096). It gave no count of anything it had located, then or in the two months that followed.

Its own processing file had been counting all along: 621 pages logged on April 24, 109 rerun pages plus seventeen recovered messages on May 4 (N-097), and 88 extraction pages on May 7 (N-099).

A larger figure reached Husband only after he sued. On July 7, 2026, 103 days after the request, UF's court response put the number at over 470 pages gathered. On July 30 UF filed papers stating 479 gathered and 426 withheld, with the withheld set attached as a public exhibit (N-144). UF has identified no individual record as withheld and has produced no privilege log. The 621-page batch appears in no production, affidavit, motion, exhibit, or in camera submission UF has made in this case; the 109 rerun pages and the 88-page extraction went to the judge on September 2, 2026, described by counsel in his own inventory, and not to the requester.

Baseline deviation
The Florida Constitution presumes the records open and puts the burden of justifying a withholding on the agency. A custodian whose file carries a page count can tell the requester what it counted. UF stated counts internally in the same weeks it stated none outward, and told the requester the request was complete. Every figure UF has since stated came after suit, and none has been reconciled to the batches its own file logged.
Receipt
  • emails_1.pdf p. 119 (Wood 5/4 11:11 AM, 109 rerun pages plus 17 messages) and pp. 267-268 (the 621-page 4/24 batch and the 88-page 5/7 extraction)
  • Production email 5/4 3:22 PM (petition App. 13-15)
  • UF Response, Filing 251907242, p. 3 and the custodian's affidavit para. 6 (over 470)
  • Doc 006 para. 24 and Exhibit D; Combined Response, Filing 253756192 (479/53/426, per the 8/8 correction recorded on N-144)
  • Day counts computed from UF's own dates: 3/26 to 7/7 is 103 days; 5/4 to 7/7 is 64 days

Spawned by: N-093, N-096

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-094

N-0962026-05-04UF's own IT office wrote at 10:40 that morning that the search had stalled and that seventeen messages should have been included; four and a half hours later the records office marked the request complete and wrote, "This completes the public records request"DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Four and a half hours after its IT office wrote that the search "stalled before completing the search of Professor Bambauer's mailbox," UF closed Husband's request at fifty-three pages holding not one internal UF email, and the next day called it a "good faith search."

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) and s. 119.07(1)(a) required UF to produce every non-exempt record Husband's request described. A custodian told at 10:40 AM that its search stalled finishes the search, produces what it finds, and only then writes "complete." UF's legal office had 109 rerun pages in hand by 11:11 AM. Anything kept back gets its statute in writing under s. 119.07(1)(e).

V
Verified facts and law
  • May 4, 2026, 10:40 AM: UF's IT office: the search tool "stalled before completing the search of Professor Bambauer's mailbox. After March 9th, 2026, no further emails were identified in her mailbox." Seventeen other messages "should have been included previously." N-096, N-097
  • May 4, 2026, 3:11 PM to 3:22 PM: the custodian marked the request Completed/Closed, and UF wrote Husband: "This completes the public records request." It produced fifty-three pages, all correspondence between Husband and UF: not one internal UF email. N-096
    Read them: UF's own emails, May 4, 2026 (production p. 119) (link pending redacted copy) · UF's request log, Completed/Closed at 3:11:24 PM (p. 6) (link pending redacted copy)
  • May 5, 2026, 4:18 PM: UF's records center: "The university conducted a good faith search for any public records responsive to your request, including reaching out to the employees you identified and to UF IT to conduct email searches." NEW-0826-3, NEW-0906-U6
  • July 7, 2026: after Husband sued, the custodian's affidavit gave May 4 one sentence: "On May 4, 2026, I delivered the responsive public records to Petitioner." It says nothing of the stall, the seventeen messages, or the 109 rerun pages. Husband raised the stall and the seventeen messages with UF's counsel on Sept. 3, 2026; the reply that afternoon addressed neither. N-096, N-097
    What search had UF finished when it wrote "This completes the public records request," and where does its sworn account of May 4 report the stall?
I
Independent encounter

Daniel Quiros, UF Information Technology (reported the stall). John Hines, Director of Public Records and records custodian (closed the request; signed the affidavit). James W. Kirkconnell, UF counsel (filed the affidavit; sent the Sept. 3 reply). One request, one closure, one sworn account. Every duty here arises from UF's own May 4, 2026 search on this request alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. makes access to public records a constitutional right, presumes records open, and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Section 119.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat., requires the custodian to permit inspection of the non-exempt records its search located; s. 119.07(1)(c) requires a good-faith response; s. 119.07(1)(e) requires the statutory basis for anything withheld.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-05-04
Actor
UF's records custodian (UF Information Technology / Office of the General Counsel)
Institution
University of Florida (W018463-032626)
Mechanism
UF's own IT office wrote at 10:40 that morning that the search had stalled and that seventeen messages should have been included; four and a half hours later the records office marked the request complete and wrote, "This completes the public records request"
What the law required
Chapter 119 requires good-faith production. A custodian may not declare a request complete over same-day written notice that the search failed.
What happened

Husband asked UF for records referencing his case numbers, the judges in those cases, and surveillance video. On May 4, 2026, UF Information Technology wrote to the records custodian that the search "stalled before completing the search of Professor Bambauer's mailbox" and that seventeen messages should have been included previously.

Four and a half hours later the records custodian marked the request complete, and within minutes UF wrote to Husband: "This completes the public records request." What was produced was fifty-three pages, entirely correspondence between Husband and UF representatives, containing no UF-internal email and no record authored by Bambauer.

The custodian's July 7 affidavit presents May 4 as a clean completion. It says nothing about the stalled search, the seventeen missed messages, the 621-page April 24 batch (N-094), or the 88-page extraction built three days later (N-099). The whole sequence surfaced only because Husband filed a second records request. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
The Florida Constitution presumes the records open and puts the burden on the agency to justify what it holds back. When a custodian is told its search failed, good faith leaves two doors open: finish the search and respond, or produce what exists and identify the gap. The record shows a third door. At four weeks, the only explanation UF had was the one its lawyer wrote for the custodian that day: the request was "undergoing the legal review" (N-093). At five and a half weeks, its own IT office reported the search had stalled. Four and a half hours after that notice, the request was closed.
Receipt
  • emails_1.pdf pp. 93, 119, 199 (the 10:40 AM UFIT stall notice at p. 119; a 7:40 AM rendering of the same message also exists, both reported)
  • W018964_Granicus.pdf pp. 6-7 (status Completed/Closed 5/4 3:11:24 PM)
  • Production email 5/4 3:22 PM (App. 13-15)
  • Custodian's affidavit para. 8, sworn to the best of his knowledge and unnotarized; both copies on file are the same two-page, eight-paragraph document (Response Ex. A, PDF pp. 16-17; Doc 006 Ex. C, PDF pp. 30-31)
  • Intervals: 10:40 AM to 3:11:24 PM is 4h31m; 3:11:24 PM to 3:22 PM is 10 minutes 36 seconds, which is why the prose says "within minutes" and never "eleven minutes after"; 3/9/26 precedes the 3/26/26 request by 17 days

Spawned by: N-100

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-096

N-0972026-05-04UF closed the request at 53 pages the same afternoon its lawyers logged 109 more pages "for review and release approval".IGNORED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

UF closed Husband's records request at fifty-three pages the same afternoon its own legal office logged 109 more pages of "potentially responsive records" for release approval, and has never given those pages to him.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) and s. 119.07(1)(a) require UF to produce the records its own search located. Marking the request closed ends nothing. Every record withheld gets its statutory exemption in writing under s. 119.07(1)(e). UF counted the pages and asked, "SHALL I PREPARE AN INVOICE?" The next step was the invoice and the 109 pages, delivered to Husband.

V
Verified facts and law
  • May 4, 2026, 10:40 AM: UF's IT office wrote that its search tool "stalled before completing the search of Professor Bambauer's mailbox" and that 17 other messages "should have been included previously." N-096, N-097
  • May 4, 2026, 11:11 AM to 3:22 PM: legal assistant Barbara L. Wood: "I am in receipt of potentially responsive records (109 rerun PAGES; EXCLUDING Attachments)," copied "to be reviewed by the General Counsel and for approval to be released." That afternoon the request was marked Completed/Closed, and UF told Husband: "This completes the public records request." It produced fifty-three pages, all correspondence between Husband and UF: not one internal UF email. N-097, N-096
    Read them: UF's own emails, May 4, 2026 (production p. 119) (link pending redacted copy)
  • Sept. 2 to Sept. 29, 2026: UF's counsel sent the May 4 pages to the judge, "intended for an in camera review only," without copying Husband. The order denying the petition found everything public was produced "prior to the filing of this action." No production to Husband has carried the 109 pages. N-097, NEW-0906-U5, N-094
    Which production delivered the 109 pages to Husband, and what statutory exemption does UF claim for any page it kept?
I
Independent encounter

Daniel Quiros, UF Information Technology (reported the stall and the missed messages). Barbara L. Wood, Office of the General Counsel (logged the 109 pages for release approval). John Hines, records custodian (received both emails; marked the request complete that afternoon). One request, one day's emails, one set of pages. Every duty here arises from UF's own May 4, 2026 search on this request alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. makes access to public records a constitutional right, presumes records open, and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Section 119.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat., requires the custodian to permit inspection of the non-exempt records its search located, and s. 119.07(1)(e) requires the statutory basis for anything withheld. A located record stays responsive after the request is marked closed.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-05-04
Actor
UF Information Technology; Barbara L. Wood, Office of the General Counsel; the records custodian
Institution
University of Florida (W018463-032626)
Mechanism
the rerun that finished after the stalled search returned 109 pages and 17 recovered messages that same morning; UF's lawyers put them in a folder for review and release approval and asked about an invoice, and that afternoon UF closed the request at 53 pages
What the law required
Section 119.07(1)(a) requires a custodian to permit inspection of non-exempt public records located for a request, and section 119.07(1)(e) requires a stated statutory basis for anything withheld. Records located by the request's own search do not stop being responsive because the request is marked closed.
What happened

On May 4, 2026, UF's IT office reported that the first search had stalled and that a rerun had run to completion. Minutes later the General Counsel's office confirmed receipt of 109 rerun pages, plus seventeen messages that should have been included previously, copied them to a drive folder for review and release approval, and asked whether to prepare an invoice.

That afternoon the request was marked Completed/Closed, and UF produced fifty-three pages and called the request complete (N-096). The 109 pages and the seventeen messages appeared in no production, affidavit, or motion until September 2, 2026, when UF's counsel delivered them to the judge for in camera review, described in his own inventory, and not to the requester. Three days later a second file was built and routed the same way, to a drive folder for release approval, and it too was never released (N-099). [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
The Constitution presumes the records open and puts the burden of justifying a withholding on the agency. A custodian must let the requester inspect non-exempt records located, and state a basis for anything held back. A located record stays responsive after the request is closed. UF's office asked how many pages, for an invoice; the answer went to a review-and-release folder, and closure followed that afternoon at fifty-three pages. UF has never disclosed that the 109 pages exist.
Receipt
  • emails_1.pdf p. 119: Wood to Hines and Quillen, 5/4/26 11:11:08 AM, 109 rerun pages excluding attachments, copied to the PRR drive at W018463-032626\Fr UFIT 05-04-26, with the invoice question; the same page carries the UFIT 10:40 AM stall-and-rerun notice and the seventeen-messages line
  • W018964_Granicus.pdf p. 6: status Completed/Closed 5/4 3:11:24 PM
  • Production email 5/4 3:22 PM (petition App. 13-15)

Spawned by: N-096

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-097

NEW-0826-32026-05-05 -> 2026-07-30the University told the requester in writing that nothing was withheld or redacted from the records responsive to his request, then told the court that 426 of the 479 gathered pages were not produced and that 249 of them were redacted under three exemption authorities; the word carrying the difference is 'responsive,' a call made in a review the custodian swore creates no recordPARTIAL
Date
2026-05-05 -> 2026-07-30
Actor
UF records office (5/5/26 portal closure message) and UF counsel (7/30/26 Doc 006 fn. 4)
Institution
UF
Mechanism
the University told the requester in writing that nothing was withheld or redacted from the records responsive to his request, then told the court that 426 of the 479 gathered pages were not produced and that 249 of them were redacted under three exemption authorities; the word carrying the difference is 'responsive,' a call made in a review the custodian swore creates no record
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution puts the exemption burden on the custodian. Sections 119.07(1)(e)-(f): a custodian who redacts or withholds states the exemption claimed, with citation, to the requester, and on request the reasons in writing with particularity.
What happened
On May 5, 2026 the University's portal wrote to the requester: 'No exempt information was withheld or redacted from the records responsive to your request, and consequently, no statutory exemptions were cited in UF's response.' Three days later it wrote that it 'did locate public records that contain the search term "Hanson," which relate to individuals who are not you.' On July 30, 2026 the University filed the 479 pages it had gathered as Exhibit D to its protective-order motion, in three categories: (1) pages 1-53, the pages produced; (2) pages 54-302; and (3) pages 303-479. Footnote 4 states that the category (2) records 'have been redacted pursuant to' FERPA, section 1006.52, and section 119.071(5)(b). Footnote 5 dates the requester's 'first request' for categories (2) and (3) to July 13, 2026. So the University's position is that the May 5 sentence was true of the 53 pages it called responsive, and that the 426 pages it gathered and kept, 249 of them later redacted were not responsive. The determination that made them not responsive was the 'legal review' the custodian testified creates no record (NEW-0913-U13). Under oath on September 2 the custodian answered 'No' to whether the University asserted any exemptions; the next afternoon its counsel wrote that the in camera records 'contain some exempt information.' As of September 26, 2026 no exemption statement with a citation has been sent to the requester, and the University's two written replies to the August 26 letter answered none of its questions (NEW-0826-5). [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
The University's May 5 statement is the baseline: 'No exempt information was withheld or redacted from the records responsive to your request, and consequently, no statutory exemptions were cited.' The deviation is the July 30 filing: 479 pages gathered, 53 produced, categories (2) and (3) held back, and category (2) 'redacted pursuant to' FERPA, section 1006.52, and section 119.071(5)(b). The University's reconciliation is the word 'responsive.' The statute's exemption statement runs to the requester, and none has been sent.
Receipt
  • The 5/5/2026 4:18 PM portal message (Respondents' exhibit composite, Filing 256089009, p. 123; also quoted at App. 76).
  • The 5/8/2026 1:07 PM portal message quoted at App. 74 ('relate to individuals who are not you').
  • Doc 006 (Filing 253616687) p. 7: paragraph 24 (categories and page ranges), footnote 4 (category (2) redactions), footnote 5 (July 13 'first request').
  • Certified 9/2/2026 transcript, Tr. 121:17-19 ('assert any exemptions? A No.') and Tr. 109:12 ('Records are not created.').
  • Counsel's 9/3/2026 4:32 PM email and its 9/2 transmittal: 'These records contain some exempt information.'
  • The 8/26/2026 letter and the University's 8/26 and 8/28 replies (NEW-0826-5).

Spawned by: N-096, N-120, N-144

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0826-3

N-0992026-05-07three days after declaring the records request complete, UF's own lawyer asked for the disputed records "as a separate pdf"; UF's staff routed the 88-page file "for approval to be released"; it was never released or logged, and no UF filing mentioned it until UF's August 31, 2026 exhibit list included the emails that name itIGNORED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Three days after "This completes the public records request," UF's associate counsel had IT pull every result for two of Husband's case numbers, both judges and "surveillance video" into a separate 88-page file, routed "for approval to be released." As of Sept. 29, 2026, UF has never released it to him or said which of its pages it produced on May 4.

E
Expected output

Section 119.07(1)(a) required UF to give Husband the file its own lawyer built from his request, or to name in writing, under s. 119.07(1)(e), the statute for any page it keeps. UF's counsel listed the file among "the files forwarded to the public records office as part of fulfilling this request." The next step was delivery to Husband.

V
Verified facts and law
  • May 7, 2026, 9:16 AM to 10:28 AM: Associate Counsel Amy B. Quillen to IT: "can you pull out the results with the search terms 13th Circuit, 2025-CA-002469, 25-CA-10255, Judge Kelly Ayers, Judge Matthew Felix, and surveillance video? If yes, please provide those results as a separate pdf." Legal assistant Barbara L. Wood logged "additional potentially responsive records (88 PAGES)," copied "to be reviewed by the General Counsel and for approval to be released." N-099
    Read them: UF's own emails, May 7, 2026 (production pp. 267-268) (link pending redacted copy)
  • May 8, 2026: UF wrote that it "did locate public records that contain the search term 'Hanson,' which relate to individuals who are not you," and asked whether he sought them. Husband answered that day: no, and demanded "Internal University communications ... referencing the case numbers, individuals, or keywords I identified" with a privilege log. UF's message never mentioned the day-old file. N-100, NEW-0826-3, N-099
  • Sept. 2 to Sept. 29, 2026: 118 days after the file was built, Judge Keim ordered every record UF located delivered for in camera review. UF's counsel sent the file to the judge, "intended for an in camera review only," without copying Husband. On Sept. 3 he answered Husband's request for those materials: "I will have that request processed through the portal and provided to you once any exempt or confidential information is redacted." No production to Husband has carried the file, and no exemption statement with a citation has reached him. NEW-0906-U5, NEW-0906-U6, N-099, NEW-0826-3
    Which production delivered the 88-page file to Husband, and what statutory exemption does UF claim for any page it kept?
    Read them: UF counsel's emails, Sept. 2 to 3, 2026 (pp. 1, 5-8) (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Amy B. Quillen, Associate Counsel (ordered the separate pdf). Barbara L. Wood, legal assistant (routed it for release approval). James W. Kirkconnell, Assistant Counsel (sent it to the judge; promised it through the portal). One request, one file, one demand. Every duty here arises from UF's own May 7, 2026 extraction on this request alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes public records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Section 119.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat., requires the custodian to permit inspection of the non-exempt records its search located, and s. 119.07(1)(e) requires the statutory basis for any exemption claimed.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-05-07
Actor
Amy B. Quillen, Associate Counsel (Office of the General Counsel), with UF Information Technology and Hines
Institution
University of Florida
Mechanism
three days after declaring the records request complete, UF's own lawyer asked for the disputed records "as a separate pdf"; UF's staff routed the 88-page file "for approval to be released"; it was never released or logged, and no UF filing mentioned it until UF's August 31, 2026 exhibit list included the emails that name it
What the law required
Chapter 119 requires a located responsive record to be produced, or withheld under a cited exemption with the statement required by sec.119.07(1)(e)-(f).
What happened

On May 7, 2026, three days after UF declared Husband's request complete, Associate Counsel Amy Quillen asked UF Information Technology to pull results for the case numbers, the judges' names, and surveillance video, and to "provide those results as a separate pdf." IT delivered the same morning: sixteen messages, eighty-eight pages. Within the hour, UF's legal assistant recorded in writing: "I have copied the records to Amy Q's PRR U: Drive to be reviewed by the General Counsel and for approval to be released." The release never happened.

The next day Husband demanded those records and a privilege log. UF produced neither, and no UF filing through its August 10, 2026 case management statement mentions the file; UF's August 31, 2026 hearing exhibit list includes the two May 7 emails from its legal assistant that name it (Exhibits Z and EE). UF produced the correspondence that created, named, transmitted, and filed the extraction, but not the extraction. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
The records law gives a custodian two lawful moves with a located record: produce it, or withhold it under a stated exemption with the required written statement. UF's counsel created a file of exactly the disputed material and made neither move. The next day UF told Husband that what it had not produced was records of other people named Hanson (N-100). One sentence saying where the 88 pages went would settle it. It has never been written.
Receipt
  • UF email production emails_1.pdf pp. 267-268: the Quillen 9:16 AM request (p.268), the Quiros 10:11 AM delivery, and the Wood 10:28 AM routing email (p.267), naming the file ISS-444193-W018463-032626-16-88-opt-SpecificKeywords.pdf and flagging a possible invoice "based on the number of pages"
  • Full Quillen request: "can you pull out the results with the search terms 13th Circuit, 2025-CA-002469, 25-CA-10255, Judge Kelly Ayers, Judge Matthew Felix, and surveillance video? If yes, please provide those results as a separate pdf."
  • keyword chart same page (Hanson 113 messages, 98.26%)
  • p. 190; Exhibit D to Doc 006 searched in full (479 pages, text layer plus eye for the 27 pages without one)
  • the never-released scope statement checked against UF's four filings, each read in full: not the protective-order motion, not its exhibits, not the response to the order to show cause, not the 8/10/26 case management statement
  • UF's 8/31/26 Exhibit List (Filing 256089009) lists the 5/7 Wood emails that name the file as Exhibits Z and EE (PDF pp. 2, 156-158, 181-182)

Spawned by: N-096

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-099

N-1002026-05-08UF said it had found records and was keeping them because they concerned other people named Hanson, a ground that exists nowhere in the records law; its file shows hits on both case numbers, judges' names, and surveillance video, none of which is a surnameDENIED
Date
2026-05-08
Actor
UF records office
Institution
University of Florida (W018463-032626)
Mechanism
UF said it had found records and was keeping them because they concerned other people named Hanson, a ground that exists nowhere in the records law; its file shows hits on both case numbers, judges' names, and surveillance video, none of which is a surname
What the law required
Chapter 119 requires an agency to produce the record or cite a statutory exemption. No exemption exists for a shared surname.
What happened

On May 4, 2026 UF declared the request complete after producing fifty-three pages, entirely correspondence between Husband and UF representatives (N-096). On May 8, UF said it had located records responsive to the Hanson search and was withholding them as records of other Hansons.

UF's processing file, produced July 17, 2026, shows a three-category parse, a 177-page bucket never mentioned, and keyword hits on 13th Circuit, both judges' names, both case numbers, and surveillance video, none of which is a surname.

UF has since made the position explicit: no exemption was needed because "Petitioner did not ask for them and said he did not want them." That has to meet UF's own keyword chart, which records hits on terms Husband did ask for. A second set of 426 pages drew the position that "No exemptions apply to such materials, because public records exemptions only apply to public records." [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Exemptions in Florida are created by law, not by a case team. The Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of proving an exemption on the agency. Article I, section 24(a) and (c). An agency has two lawful moves with a located record: produce it, or name the statute that lets it keep it, in writing. A shared surname is not a statute. UF's contemporaneous file, produced later, contradicts the ground UF gave.
Receipt
  • Petition Exs. D-G (the petition text layer is ciphered; visual reads required)
  • W018964 production, emails_1 pp. 190, 268 (keyword chart and the Cuillier 5/6 email placing "a few dozen" non-Hanson surveillance-video emails in his own mailbox); both pages held from the production text layer, page images not separately checked
  • Doc 006 paras. 12-15, fn. 5 (p. 7), Ex. B App. 74-76
  • Response from UF (Filing 251907242, 7/7/26, Kirkconnell), p. 6 and p. 7: "The University did not cite an exemption for these records, because no exemption is necessary for records that are not responsive to a request."; the "Petitioner did not ask for them" sentence sits on the same p. 6; the italic emphasis inside UF's statutory quotation on p. 7 is UF's own
  • A footnote to UF's July 30, 2026 motion dates the first request for those two categories to July 13, 2026; UF's own Exhibit B to that motion contains the May 8, 2026 demand
  • The 479 / 53 / 426 figures are N-144's
  • Related decision points: N-120.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-100

N-1462026-07-13 -> 2026-09-11the one demand that costs UF nothing to answer, written confirmation it is preserving the search outputs and logs, was put to UF in writing on July 13, 15, 16, and 18 and again on August 26, 27, and September 11; UF's counsel answered the August 26 letter the same afternoon without mentioning it, and no answer to it has been foundIGNORED
Date
2026-07-13 -> 2026-09-11
Actor
Kirkconnell and UF OGC on the demand fork. UF Board of Trustees on the sec.57.105 fork
Institution
8th Cir. 01-2026-CA-001794 (Judge Keim)
Mechanism
the one demand that costs UF nothing to answer, written confirmation it is preserving the search outputs and logs, was put to UF in writing on July 13, 15, 16, and 18 and again on August 26, 27, and September 11; UF's counsel answered the August 26 letter the same afternoon without mentioning it, and no answer to it has been found
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the records open and puts the burden of justifying any withholding on the custodian. Section 119.07(1)(h) bars disposing of a requested record for thirty days after the request even where the custodian asserts it is not a public record, and section 119.11(4) carries that preservation duty through a pending enforcement action regardless of any claimed exemption or non-record assertion.
What happened
Husband asked UF's counsel in writing on July 13, 15, 16, and 18, 2026 to confirm that UF was preserving the search outputs, hit lists and logs for his request, and specific batches (N-094, N-097, N-099). The demand was renewed on August 26 with an itemized schedule. UF's counsel replied that afternoon on scheduling and the records portal and did not mention preservation. The demand was renewed again on August 27 and September 11. On September 18, 2026 the court granted UF's protective-order motion and denied the petition; neither order addresses preservation. No written preservation confirmation has been found. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Confirming that records still exist costs an agency nothing, so a refusal to confirm cannot be explained by burden. The Constitution puts that burden on UF, so a free question is one its position must survive.
Receipt
  • Husband's written demands of July 13, 15, 16, and 18, 2026 (as sent).
  • The August 26, 2026 letter, preservation schedule (as sent), and Mr. Kirkconnell's same-day 2:26 PM reply.
  • The August 27 and September 11, 2026 renewals (as sent).
  • The September 18, 2026 orders granting the protective order and denying the petition.
  • The transmittal of the seventeen recovered messages (N-097); the extraction placed for approval to be released (N-099); the April 24 batch (N-094); the mailboxes and devices searched.

Spawned by: N-145

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-146

NEW-0826-42026-07-13 -> ongoinga second records request, asking how the first one was searched, drew a same-day acknowledgment, then a message 23 days later that pointed back to an earlier production and asked a clarifying question, and, 75 days on, none of the search records it asked forIGNORED
Date
2026-07-13 -> ongoing
Actor
Hines (custodian; request forwarded to him 7/14) with counsel Kirkconnell as the transmission channel
Institution
UF
Mechanism
a second records request, asking how the first one was searched, drew a same-day acknowledgment, then a message 23 days later that pointed back to an earlier production and asked a clarifying question, and, 75 days on, none of the search records it asked for
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution puts the burden on the custodian. Section 119.07(1)(c) requires a prompt, good-faith response, including reasonable efforts to determine whether a record exists and where it can be accessed. No exemption has been asserted and no log produced; the duty in play is the response duty.
What happened
On July 13, 2026 a second records request went to the University: six items about how the first request was searched and processed. The portal acknowledged it at 2:36 PM the same day, tracking number W019186-071326. The next day the University's counsel wrote that it was 'forwarded to Mr. Hines and will be processed in due course.' The University's own request log, produced September 21, shows what happened next: automated reminders to the custodian on July 16, 20 and 22; then, on August 5, a status change to 'Requested Clarification' and a staff message logged as sent to the requester's address, blind-copied to two University lawyers, a legal assistant, and the custodian. That message refers parts 1 to 3 to the July 17 production made under a different request number, asks what 'delivery package' means in part 4, and answers part 5 with 'the University does not have public records responsive.' The requester reports never receiving it; the log records a send, not a delivery. He answered the clarification through the portal on September 4. On September 10 the custodian set the request back to 'Forwarded Request for Processing.' As of September 26, 2026, 75 days after the request, no search output, hit list, export, run date, or index has been produced. The first request produced a lawsuit about what a diligent search requires; the second asks for the records of that search. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
The University's own baseline is its handling of the first request: same-day acknowledgment, internal batch counts, dated productions. The second request asked for the search outputs, the per-term run data, and any index of the gathered pages. The University's system logged three automated reminders to its custodian before the first staff action, a clarification request on part 4 and a referral to an earlier production for parts 1 to 3. A prompt-response statute has no carve-out for requests about the agency's own process.
Receipt
  • The 7/13/26 portal acknowledgment (W019186-071326, 2:36 PM).
  • Counsel's 7/14/26 'processed in due course' email.
  • The University's own Granicus request log for W019186-071326, produced 9/21/2026 (rows 7/13 through 9/10, including the 8/5/2026 8:16:01 AM staff message and its BCC list).
  • The 8/5/2026 portal message headed Requested Clarification, as printed from the portal 9/4/2026.
  • The requester's 9/4/2026 portal reply.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0826-4

N-1442026-07-30UF put all 479 gathered pages onto the public docket unsealed, including pages it had refused the requester since May; for 98 pages the same filing takes both positions at once, records it need not produce and records it need not logPENDING
Date
2026-07-30
Actor
UF Board of Trustees, by counsel Kirkconnell
Institution
8th Cir. 01-2026-CA-001794 (Judge Keim)
Mechanism
UF put all 479 gathered pages onto the public docket unsealed, including pages it had refused the requester since May; for 98 pages the same filing takes both positions at once, records it need not produce and records it need not log
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution puts the burden of justifying any withholding on the agency, and section 119.07(1)(e) and (f) require the exemption for each record to be identified and, on request, stated in writing with particularity. Section 119.11(1) gives a records action priority and an immediate hearing. Rule 1.280(d) puts the burden of showing good cause for a protective order on the movant, item by item (Deltona Corp. v. Bailey), and an unsworn claim of burden carries none of it (Topp Telecom, Inc. v. Atkins).
What happened

On July 30, 2026, four days before the noticed depositions, UF filed two motions. Doc 006 sought a protective order over all discovery pending a threshold compliance ruling, stating Husband "has not, and cannot, offer any evidence," without mentioning the processing file UF had produced thirteen days earlier. Doc 005 demanded an immediate evidentiary hearing while asking that both motions be heard at the August 24 conference.

The same filing placed all 479 gathered pages on the public docket, unsealed, including 177 pages UF maintains are not public records. For 98 pages UF holds both positions in the same filing on the same day. Exhibit D is not the whole of what UF located: an internal 621-page batch and an 88-page extraction targeting "surveillance video" appear in neither the exhibit nor either motion (N-099). UF has identified no individual record as withheld and has produced no privilege log. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
A document a university can file on a public docket is one it could always have handed the requester. Article I, section 24(a) presumes records open and puts the burden of justifying withholding on the agency; UF's stated ground for four months was that the pages were not public records at all. Then UF published them. Separately, UF demanded an immediate hearing under the records-priority statute while asking, the same day, that both motions be heard three weeks later.
Receipt
  • UF Motion for Protective Order, Doc 006 (Filing 253616687), paras. 5, 9, 11, 18, 21, 24, fn. 4, fn. 5, and Exhibit D; Motion to Dispense, Doc 005 (same filing envelope), paras. 3 and 9.
  • Petitioners' Combined Response, Filing 253756192, paras. 28, 30-32, and 38-39.
  • Deposition notices at Doc 006 Ex. A.
  • Doc 005 para. 9 demands an "immediate evidentiary hearing"; para. 3 asks that both motions be heard at the August 24 conference.
  • The 621-page batch and 88-page extraction targeted the case numbers, both judges, and "surveillance video". Husband's Combined Response states in terms that UF took both positions on the same 98 pages.
  • Exhibit D category stamps counted across all 479 pages, boundary pages re-checked: Category 1 = 53, Category 2 = 346 stamped plus 1 unstamped, Category 3 = 79, total 479, confirming the 98-page double label.
  • The 621-page and 88-page batches at emails_1 pp. 267-268; the 621-page reference is not pinned to a page. The 88-page extraction was built May 7, three days after UF declared the request complete.
  • A footnote to Doc 006 dates the first request for those categories to July 13, 2026, which its own Exhibit B contradicts.
  • Docketing-lag advisory, from the 8/11/26 message.
  • UF's counsel made scheduling commitments on July 14 and 15 and did not perform them; UF's filed position is that no exemption log is owed at all (N-120).
  • Related decision points: N-094.

Spawned by: N-096, N-099, N-100, N-120

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-144

N-1452026-08-03the only person who swore to UF's account, its own records custodian, was noticed for deposition with ten days' notice; on the day, no witness and no lawyer for UF appeared at either setting, and no order had ever excused attendanceIGNORED
Date
2026-08-03
Actor
UF Board of Trustees, by counsel Kirkconnell. Witnesses John Hines (Director of Public Records, records custodian, sole affiant to UF's response to the order to show cause) and Prof. Jane Bambauer
Institution
8th Cir. 01-2026-CA-001794 (Judge Keim)
Mechanism
the only person who swore to UF's account, its own records custodian, was noticed for deposition with ten days' notice; on the day, no witness and no lawyer for UF appeared at either setting, and no order had ever excused attendance
What the law required
A party or witness noticed for deposition under Rule 1.310 must appear unless the court enters a protective order; the filing of a motion for protective order, without an order, does not stay a noticed deposition (Stables v. Rivers). Rule 1.380(e)(2) (former Rule 1.380(d)) directs the court to require the party that failed to appear to pay the reasonable expenses caused by the failure, absent substantial justification.
What happened
Both settings convened on August 3, 2026 with stenographic and audiovisual coverage arranged: Bambauer at 1:00 p.m. Eastern, Hines at 3:00 p.m. Eastern, by Zoom. No witness appeared at either setting. No counsel for UF appeared at either setting. No order excused attendance, and none has been entered since. UF had conferred by telephone on July 24 on precisely this relief, and its July 30 motion names both depositions expressly, so this is not a case of silence: UF said it wanted the depositions stopped, but never said it would simply not appear if no ruling came. On August 21, 2026 the court reporter confirmed in writing: "I was the court reporter on August 3, 2026 for the depositions that were to be held. The CNAs have been completed." No testimony was taken at either setting, and the non-appearance has drawn no consequence. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A pending motion is an ask, and only an order excuses attendance. UF conferred by telephone on July 24, moved on July 30, and never obtained the order, against a written invitation to bring any such motion promptly so the court could rule before August 3. On the day, UF's sole affiant and records custodian, the one witness who had sworn to UF's account, did not appear, and neither did UF's counsel. The rules put the expense of that choice on the party that made it.
Receipt
  • 7/24/26 deposition notices, served on counsel (Doc 006 Ex. A; service email plus the 7/27 chambers reply, held off docket).
  • Doc 006 para. 4 (the burden sentence) and the Chandler line in UF's Response, both born-digital text layer.
  • Court reporter Valerie Gunning, Vincent M. Lucente & Associates, email of 8/7/26 1:01 PM EDT.
  • Ten days' notice recomputed 7/24 to 8/3.
  • The 8/3 demand letter is N-146.
  • Bambauer's service was never confirmed (the July 24 question about accepting service for her went unanswered), so her absence has an innocent explanation Hines does not share; only Hines, UF's sole affiant and records custodian, carries the compulsion argument (N-096, N-099).

Spawned by: N-144, N-096, N-099, N-100

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-145

NEW-0826-52026-08-26 -> 2026-08-28 (window); response state as of 2026-09-13five demands and thirteen one-sentence questions went to the University with an answer date; two replies came back, and neither addressed any demand or questionIGNORED
Date
2026-08-26 -> 2026-08-28 (window); response state as of 2026-09-13
Actor
Addressees: Quillen, Kirkconnell, Cuillier, Bambauer; cc LoGiurato, pr-request, three strategic-communications addresses, UF Compliance
Institution
UF
Mechanism
five demands and thirteen one-sentence questions went to the University with an answer date; two replies came back, and neither addressed any demand or question
What the law required
The duties probed are the section 119.07(1) response duties, preservation, and the exemption-statement duty.
What happened
On August 26, 2026 the petitioner sent the University's counsel, its records office, and the two Brechner project principals a letter with five demands and thirteen questions, each answerable in a sentence, with an answer date of August 28 and a stated rule that an unanswered question is the University's answer. Three hours and forty-nine minutes later the University's counsel replied in four sentences: use the portal, no continuance, the custodian will testify, and no service accepted for any other witness. On the answer date he replied again, declining rehearing, declining any effort to remove the judge, and declining further conversation. Neither reply addresses any demand or any question, including the fifth written request that the University confirm it is preserving its search records. Two automatic out-of-office replies came back within minutes of sending. No other addressee has replied, through September 26, 2026. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
The same office answered every scheduling item in the petitioner's next email sentence by sentence. It answered none of the questions about what it found, what it withheld, and why. A preservation confirmation costs a custodian nothing, and this was the fifth time it was asked. The letter copied the University's media office, and the two professors it was addressed to owed the petitioner no answer at all.
Receipt
  • The University's 8/26/2026 2:26 PM and 8/28/2026 3:12 PM replies (Gmail PDF exports, both in the matter's correspondence record).
  • The 8/26/2026 letter as sent, with Attachment A (the preservation schedule) and Attachment B (the batch table).
  • The two automatic replies of 8/26/2026 10:40 AM (records office, medical leave; media office, out until 8/31).
  • The absence, through September 26, 2026, of any reply from the records office, the two professors, or the copied offices (Gmail sweep 9/26/2026).

Spawned by: NEW-0826-3, N-094, N-099, N-144

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0826-5

NEW-0906-U22026-08-31the University's own hearing exhibits cover March 30 in five emails and May 7 in six, and skip entirely April 24, the day its own file logs its largest delivery, though the University's own Exhibit Z quotes that delivery by page countPARTIAL
Date
2026-08-31
Actor
UF Board of Trustees, by counsel Kirkconnell; the sole listed witness is John Hines, Director of Public Records and records custodian
Institution
UF
Mechanism
the University's own hearing exhibits cover March 30 in five emails and May 7 in six, and skip entirely April 24, the day its own file logs its largest delivery, though the University's own Exhibit Z quotes that delivery by page count
What the law required
The 8/25 order required exhibits pre-marked and served through the e-portal, a paper copy received by the court, and a list of all parties and witnesses expected to participate, all by Monday, August 31, 2026. The duty that runs to the underlying request is in section 119.07(1)(c): a good faith response includes reasonable efforts to determine whether a record exists and where it can be accessed. This entry measures the University’s exhibit selection only against the University’s own other accounts.
What happened
On August 31, 2026, the deadline the court set, the University filed a list of thirty-two exhibits and a witness list naming one person, its records custodian, "c/o James W. Kirkconnell, Esq." The exhibits are dated March 26, March 30, April 23, and May 4 through May 11. None is dated between April 24 and May 3. The University's own processing file records 621 pages "received from UFIT on 04/24/26," and that sentence appears in the University's exhibit set, quoted beneath a later email the University chose as Exhibit Z. Under oath on September 2 the custodian said 'the 621 pages resulted from an IT search conducted for a different request, W018643'; the Exhibit Z email itself, written by the legal assistant who logged the 621, says she 'accidently put them in W018643,' a folder path, and moves only the 88-page file. Both statements stay on this card. The person the University's file identifies as having run the searches is not on its list, was later served with a hearing subpoena, and did not appear. The University twice declined to accept service for any witness but the custodian. The petitioner had told the University in conferral that he had no objection to its witness. His objection was to the witnesses it would not produce, and his own list named seven. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
The comparison here is the University against itself: five exhibits for March 30, six for May 7, none for April 24, the day the University's own file logs 621 pages received, on a list that quotes the 621 pages anyway. It is another of the University's accounts of what it gathered, and another that leaves that day out. The right of access is in Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution, and chapter 119 puts the burden of justifying nondisclosure on the custodian. The University filed this list under an order to show cause why a writ should not issue.
Receipt
  • Respondents' Exhibit List and Witness List, Filing 256089009, e-filed 8/31/2026 4:08:02 PM, pp. 1-2 of each.
  • The 621-page sentence at p. 157 of the University's exhibit composite (its Exhibit Z), and at p. 273 of the University's processing file as filed (Filing 255904665).
  • The Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing (Filing 255637757) p. 2, setting the 8/31 deadlines.
  • Petitioner's Witness List, Filing 256048920, naming seven witnesses, including the engineer later served and not appearing.
  • The University's 8/26 and 8/28 emails declining service for any witness but the custodian.

Spawned by: NEW-0826-2, N-144, N-094, N-145

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0906-U2

NEW-0906-U52026-09-02the University's counsel transmitted ten files to chambers the same afternoon he was ordered to, six of them described by counsel as the request files, with page counts he listed himself; the one batch the University's own file logs as its largest delivery, 621 pages received April 24, does not appear in counsel's inventory and is not mentioned in itPARTIAL
Date
2026-09-02
Actor
James W. Kirkconnell, Assistant Counsel, UF Office of the General Counsel
Institution
UF
Mechanism
the University's counsel transmitted ten files to chambers the same afternoon he was ordered to, six of them described by counsel as the request files, with page counts he listed himself; the one batch the University's own file logs as its largest delivery, 621 pages received April 24, does not appear in counsel's inventory and is not mentioned in it
What the law required
The oral order as UF's own assistant described it: all documents located, including non-responsive records, within five days. Sections 119.07(1)(d) through (f): redact and produce the remainder; state the basis of any exemption with citation to the requester; on request, in writing with particularity. Section 119.11(4): the custodian of records in suit shall not transfer, alter, destroy, or dispose of them until the court directs otherwise; delivery to the court under its order is a directed transfer, and the native forms remain subject to the duty.
What happened
On the afternoon of September 2, 2026 the University's counsel emailed the judge ten files, describing six of them as the files forwarded to the public records office for the request, with a page count each and his own 'Total 538.' The counts and descriptions are counsel's own; no custodian has certified that these are the complete universe of records located. The petitioner was not copied; counsel wrote that the records "contain some exempt information and are intended for an in camera review only." He learned of it from opposing counsel the next afternoon. The University's own file separately records "the 621 pages received from UFIT on 04/24/26," a batch that is not among the counts counsel listed. The sentence appears in the University's processing file and again in its hearing exhibits. The custodian's explanation under oath is that 'the 621 pages resulted from an IT search conducted for a different request, W018643'; the May 7 email of the legal assistant who logged them says she 'accidently put them in W018643,' a folder, and corrects only the 88-page file's location. No filing, affidavit, exhibit, or submission has accounted for the 621 pages themselves, and only the University can say whether they overlap the batches counsel listed. No certification, index, or chain of custody accompanied the delivery. The oral order, as chambers relayed it, required none of the three, and counsel did ask chambers to copy the petitioner on the confirmation of receipt, which chambers did on September 4. The September 18 order denying the petition recites '538 pages,' counsel's total, and does not mention the 621. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
In one afternoon the University's counsel produced the batch-by-batch description the requester had asked for since July: a page count and a file name for each item. The right of access is in Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution, and chapter 119 puts the burden of justifying nondisclosure on the custodian, not on the person who asked. The University made this delivery under an order to show cause why a writ should not issue. Its own file also logs 621 pages received April 24, which do not appear in counsel's description at all.
Receipt
  • The University's 9/2/2026 transmittal to chambers with counsel's own file-by-file table, reproduced in the University's own 9/3/2026 email. Counsel listed the page counts himself: 10 and 330 from March 30, 106 and 3 from May 4, 88 from May 7, and one screenshot. Those are counsel's figures for what counsel says he sent.
  • The same email's statement that the records "contain some exempt information" and that the petitioner "has not been included on this correspondence."
  • The 621-page sentence at p. 273 of the University's processing file as filed (Filing 255904665) and at p. 157 of the University's own exhibit composite (Filing 256089009).
  • The judicial assistant's 9/4/2026 11:54 AM confirmation of receipt.
  • Petitioner's Notice of Objection (9/4/2026), paragraphs 3 and 5.

Spawned by: NEW-0906-U4, N-094, N-097, N-099, N-144

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0906-U5

NEW-0906-U62026-09-03the day after delivering an in camera submission to the judge without copying the requester, the University's counsel wrote that the requester was not entitled to view the unredacted documents, declined the proposed protocol, a supplemental petition, any reconvening, and any further phone conferral, and said the records contained exempt information, four months after writing that none had been withheld or redacted from the records responsive to the requestREFUSED
Date
2026-09-03
Actor
James W. Kirkconnell, Assistant Counsel, UF Office of the General Counsel
Institution
UF
Mechanism
the day after delivering an in camera submission to the judge without copying the requester, the University's counsel wrote that the requester was not entitled to view the unredacted documents, declined the proposed protocol, a supplemental petition, any reconvening, and any further phone conferral, and said the records contained exempt information, four months after writing that none had been withheld or redacted from the records responsive to the request
What the law required
Good-faith conferral before motions. Sections 119.07(1)(d) through (f): a custodian asserting an exemption redacts and produces the remainder, states the basis with statutory citation to the requester, and on request states the reasons in writing with particularity. UF's own 5/5/2026 statement is the actor's baseline: 'No exempt information was withheld or redacted from the records responsive to your request, and consequently, no statutory exemptions were cited in UF's response.'
What happened
In May 2026 the University told the petitioner in writing: “No exempt information was withheld or redacted from the records responsive to your request, and consequently, no statutory exemptions were cited in UF’s response.” On September 3, 2026 its counsel wrote: "You were not copied on this correspondence because you are not entitled to view the unredacted documents." He declined the proposed in camera order and the protocol motion, declined a supplemental petition, declined any reconvening, said reconsideration was unlikely to be agreed, said he would no longer confer by telephone, and said a separate request was answered August 5. The portal record for that request shows a message posted that day headed Requested Clarification, not a production: it points back to a July 17 production made under a different request number, declines one item, answers no records to another, and is silent on a sixth. The same email says the petitioner "insulted the witnesses, me, and the Court." He committed to process that request through the portal once exempt or confidential information is redacted. Nearly four months after writing that no exempt information was withheld or redacted from the responsive records, the University put in writing that it is holding and redacting material. The May statement was scoped to the records responsive to the request. The September delivery included non-responsive records. The University's position is that the May statement covered only records it deemed responsive; that position is disputed (NEW-0826-3). What the University has not done, either way, is send the petitioner an exemption statement with a citation. [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
One week earlier the same office conferred by phone and answered each scheduling question in a sentence. The right of access is in Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution. Chapter 119 lets a custodian withhold exempt material, but it puts the burden on the custodian and not on the requester: the custodian must state the basis to the requester, with the statute cited, and on request in writing with particularity. Since the May 5 statement that nothing was exempt, no exemption statement has been sent to the petitioner at all; the exemption claims have gone to the court, to a footnote, and to counsel's email.
Receipt
  • The University's 9/3/2026 4:32 PM email (Exhibit D to the disqualification motion's Notice of Filing).
  • The University's May 5, 2026 portal statement (Respondents' exhibit composite, Filing 256089009, p. 123).
  • The University's 8/28/2026 email recording the telephone conferral.
  • The petitioner's 9/2/2026 1:34 PM and 9/3/2026 2:21 PM emails that the 9/3 reply answers only in part: the served engineer's non-appearance, the 621 pages, and the certification question are not addressed.

Spawned by: NEW-0906-U5, NEW-0826-3, NEW-0826-4, NEW-0826-5, N-145

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0906-U6

NEW-0913-U112026-09-14a chronology of the University's own evolving statements about what it located and withheld, drawn from its own written and sworn record, was filed as an exhibit to the closing briefPENDING
Date
2026-09-14
Actor
Christopher A. Hanson, Petitioner (filer); UF Board of Trustees and its custodian and counsel (subjects of the chronology)
Institution
UF
Mechanism
a chronology of the University's own evolving statements about what it located and withheld, drawn from its own written and sworn record, was filed as an exhibit to the closing brief
What the law required
Sections 119.07(1)(e) and (f) require a custodian who withholds to state the exemption and its statutory citation to the person who asked, and on request to state the reasons in writing and with particularity. The question this chronology puts is which of the University’s five accounts is the one the custodian stands behind.
What happened
On September 14, 2026 the petitioner filed a sixteen-row chronology of the University's own statements about the records it located: a portal message with no count, an internal routing email carrying a count that was not sent to the requester at the time, a sworn affidavit with an approximate figure, a court exhibit with an exact figure and named exemptions, and this exchange under oath at the hearing: "Q Did the University of Florida assert any exemptions? A No" (Tr. 121:17-19). Each statement is the University's own, in its own words, to a different audience. Asserting an exemption to a requester under section 119.07(1)(e) and redacting exempt material from records going to a judge are not the same act, and that difference may reconcile some of these. No one at the University has said which reconciliation is the right one, in writing, to the person who asked. Four days later the successor judge denied the petition on 'the materials generated by the search terms,' naming no count, no exemption, and no record (Filing 257408968). As of September 26, 2026 no exemption statement with a citation has reached the requester. (Filing 257004764, Exhibit A.) [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
The right of access is in Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution, and chapter 119 puts the burden on the custodian and not on the requester: a custodian who withholds or redacts must state the exemption and its citation to the person who asked. The University's account of one production has never held still long enough to test against that duty. What it told the portal, what it told its own lawyers, what it swore in an affidavit, what it filed as a court exhibit, and what it said under oath are five different statements, and none has been reconciled with the others in writing to the person who asked.
Receipt
  • The disqualification motion's chronology at P6(a)-(j), with its own citations to the University's portal message, internal emails, sworn affidavit, motion exhibit, and hearing transcript.
  • The sworn exchange at Tr. 121:17-19 of the September 2, 2026 certified transcript.
  • Exhibit A (Chronology), pages 17 to 19 of Petitioner's Closing Argument and Legal Brief, filed September 14, 2026 (Filing 257004764).

Spawned by: NEW-0826-3

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0913-U11

Florida Supreme Court1 node

Official public records: Florida Supreme Court, official site

N-1112026-06-01the Florida Supreme Court's records office answered seven of ten categories with a single rule citation that identifies no record, and three categories it never answered at allDENIED
Date
2026-06-01
Actor
Paul Flemming, PIO
Institution
Florida Supreme Court
Mechanism
the Florida Supreme Court's records office answered seven of ten categories with a single rule citation that identifies no record, and three categories it never answered at all
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect judicial-branch records; access is the presumption and the custodian carries the burden of establishing an exemption. Rule 2.420 implements that right for the judicial branch, and subdivision (m)(2) requires the basis for a denial in writing. Rule 2.420(c) is a list of discrete exemptions, each with its own elements, so a written basis identifies the subdivision and the record withheld.
What happened

On June 1, 2026 the Florida Supreme Court's public information officer, Paul Flemming, asserted blanket confidentiality under Rule 2.420(c) over seven of the ten categories in a May 30 request about SB 1652 and the Vexatious Litigant Workgroup. He identified no record and cited no sub-provision. Categories 1, 5, and 9 he did not address at all. The file carries a promise: "A response to your request will be given in a reasonable amount of time."

A follow-up and pre-suit letter went by email on July 8, 2026, setting a deadline of "no later than Tuesday, July 15, 2026". That deadline passed with no response in the channels searched, and the request is still open. The June 1 response arrived at the Yahoo address, which has not been swept, so nothing here claims nothing was sent, only that nothing was found where the search ran. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect court records. Access is the presumption, and the burden of proving an exemption sits on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for denial. A basis that identifies nothing tells no one what is withheld, so one rule citation across seven categories leaves nothing to test; three of the ten categories drew no answer, not even a refusal.
Receipt
  • Flemming's response of 6/1/26, held as a native PDF; the 6/1/26 text is carried verbatim
  • The original request of 5/30/26 as sent and the 6/2/26 reply as sent
  • The as-sent follow-up of 7/8/26, an archive built from the Gmail copy, message id 19f41c10b40d43cf; sent 8:42 AM ET as a reply on the existing thread; it is a verbatim text archive rather than an image of the send
  • The 7/6/26 files are drafts, not send copies, and a 7/14/26 version was drafted and exported but never sent
  • Search scope for the silence: the Florida Supreme Court public-records matter file, which holds no inbound after the 6/1/26 response, and the Gmail account, checked 7/14/26
  • The Yahoo mailbox has not been swept, and there is no exported page image of the 7/8 send

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-111

Eighth Circuit (Judge Keim)7 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Eighth Judicial Circuit | Eighth Judicial Circuit of Florida, official site

N-1202026-06-12a judge outside the case read the petition and ordered UF to show cause; UF answered by denying that either duty exists, under a heading of its own writing: "Florida Law Does Not Require Certification of Diligent Search or a Privilege Log"DENIED
Date
2026-06-12
Actor
Judge Donna M. Keim
Institution
8th Cir. Alachua Co. (01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
a judge outside the case read the petition and ordered UF to show cause; UF answered by denying that either duty exists, under a heading of its own writing: "Florida Law Does Not Require Certification of Diligent Search or a Privilege Log"
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) and (c) of the Florida Constitution make the right of access self-executing and put the burden of justifying nondisclosure on the custodian (Weeks v. Golden). Once the court finds a petition facially sufficient and orders the agency to show cause, the burden is on the respondent to come forth with the facts on which it refused to perform its duty (Chandler v. City of Greenacres), and section 119.07(1)(e) and (f) require record-by-record identification of anything withheld, in writing and with particularity on request (Jones v. Miami Herald Media Co.).
What happened

On June 12, 2026, Judge Donna M. Keim, a third judge outside the family case, found Husband's petition facially sufficient and ordered UF to show cause within twenty days. UF answered on time, standing on having already produced everything, under a heading declaring neither is required: "Nowhere does Chapter 119 require that a state agency certify to a requestor that it has made a diligent search for records, nor is there any requirement that a state agency produce a privilege log."

UF carried the position into its later protective-order motion, describing a privilege log and sworn certifications as things Husband has no right to. It claimed no exemption for anything it declined to produce, while asserting FERPA and section 119.071(5)(b) redactions, and asked for denial without a hearing. This is the third outside-judge facial-sufficiency finding; the first two produced writs never enforced (N-070, N-080).

On September 16, 2026, Judge Keim granted Husband's motion to disqualify. On September 18, 2026, the reassigned judge, David P. Kreider, denied the petition. After an in camera review of the 538 pages UF submitted, the order found that "all materials requested by Petitioner that meet the definition of a public record were produced to Petitioner prior to the filing of this action." It does not address whether UF owed a certification of its search or a log of what it withheld, and it does not mention the 621 pages logged in the request's own file. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
The Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of justifying withholding on UF; an order to show cause moves that burden onto the record, where UF must come forth with facts. Two ordinary instruments carry it: a sworn account of the search, and a record-by-record statement of what is withheld and why. The September 18 denial rests on production before suit and does not reach whether UF owed either instrument, or the 621 pages its own file logged.
Receipt
  • Order to show cause, Filing #250268011, plus the 6/17 verified return; the case number and OSC stamp are on the face of the filing.
  • UF Response, Filing #251907242, e-filed 7/7/26 12:32:51 PM, signed /s/ James W. Kirkconnell: p. 8, Section IV heading and second paragraph; the same position restated at pp. 2, 9, 10, and 14.
  • Attribution pin: the paragraph-21 sentence is from the protective-order motion, Doc 006 (Filing 253616687) p. 6, attorney argument, not from the custodian's affidavit, which is two pages, eight numbered paragraphs, and has no paragraph 21.
  • Doc 006 paras. 17 and 19 at pp. 5-6, stating "the burden shifts back to the Petitioner" and "Petitioner's inference is not enough." The motion asks for denial without a hearing.
  • FERPA and section 119.071(5)(b) redaction assertions are Doc 006 fn. 4, p. 7; that footnote also cites section 1006.52.
  • UF's Response was read in full.
  • First two facial-sufficiency findings and their unenforced writs: N-070 (Doc 047, alternative writ, 1/13/26, Judge Frayman found "an, albeit inartful, prima facie case") and N-080 (Doc 062, alternative writ signed 2/10/26 by Judge Coleman, return date 3/4/26). Unruled motion to enforce both is N-089.
  • The 7/30 motions are N-144; the 8/3 non-appearance is N-145.
  • Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Filing 257408968, e-filed September 18, 2026 (Judge Kreider); order granting disqualification, Filing 257189440 (September 16, 2026)

Spawned by: N-100

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-120

NEW-0826-12026-08-24the University's own notice set three motions for one half hour; the court granted the University's two and never reached the petitioner's, then granted a protective order over all discovery while stating on the record that he was entitled to an immediate hearingDENIED
Date
2026-08-24
Actor
Judge Donna M. Keim, Circuit Civil Division W
Institution
8th Cir. Alachua Co. (01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
the University's own notice set three motions for one half hour; the court granted the University's two and never reached the petitioner's, then granted a protective order over all discovery while stating on the record that he was entitled to an immediate hearing
What the law required
Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution secures the right of access, and section 119.11(1) entitles a records enforcement action to an immediate hearing with priority over other pending cases. A motion noticed for hearing is before the court; UF's own 8/14/2026 Notice of Hearing (Filing 254902680) and the petitioner's (Filing 255482392) each set three motions, including 'Petitioner's Cross-Motion to Set an Expedited Evidentiary Schedule.' A protective order requires good cause (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c)).
What happened
On August 24, 2026 the court heard three motions the University had noticed for a thirty-minute conference. It announced the University's motion to dispense was "well taken" and granted it. It granted the University's motion for protective order over all discovery: "I do believe it's outside the scope." It did not name the petitioner's cross-motion, which the University's own notice had set. The words "cross" and "cross-motion" do not appear anywhere in the certified transcript's thirty-nine pages. The cross-motion asked for an expedited evidentiary schedule, and the next day the court set an evidentiary hearing eight days out. Nothing on the record rules on it, defers it, or names it. The court said the petitioner was entitled to an immediate hearing and said its assistant would reach out about scheduling one. The order setting the hearing issued the next afternoon. No outreach from chambers reached the petitioner before it. The petitioner made an oral motion to disqualify the judge in words the transcript records and this map does not soften; it was denied at once. The protective-order ruling was reduced to writing on September 18, 2026, by the successor judge assigned after the first judge's recusal (Filing 257389224); that order recites the August 24 hearing, grants the motion, and says nothing of the cross-motion. As of September 26, 2026 no written order exists on the motion to dispense or on the cross-motion. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A motion set for hearing is before the court, and this court counted three. The University's two were decided; the petitioner's was never named. The University was under an order to show cause why a writ should not issue, so the burden was its own. A protective order needs good cause; the court stated a ground for barring discovery going forward and none for the written discovery already served or the depositions already missed. Thirty minutes were reserved. The evidentiary hearing was set the next day.
Receipt
  • The University's Notice of Hearing, Filing 254902680 (8/14/2026), and the petitioner's Notice of Hearing, Filing 255482392 (8/24/2026), both listing all three motions.
  • Certified transcript of 8/24/2026 (reporter Mary Ann Browne, certified 8/28/2026): rulings at Tr. 3:8-12, 3:24-25, 4:15-20, and 36:9-11; the disqualification denial at Tr. 36:18-19; the court's count at Tr. 11:9-10; the entitlement exchange at Tr. 29:24-30:11 and 36:22-25; the closing exchange at Tr. 37:12-24.
  • The oral disqualification motion, in the petitioner's own words: "I think that you're corrupt and you're dishonest and you are trying to protect insiders" (Tr. 36:13-16).
  • The absence of any ruling, deferral, or mention of the cross-motion, across all 39 pages.
  • The Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing (Filing 255637757), entered the next day.
  • The Order Granting Motion for Protective Order, signed 9/18/2026 by Judge Kreider (Filing 257389224): the only written order on any 8/24 ruling as of 9/26/2026.

Spawned by: N-144, N-120, N-145

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0826-1

NEW-0826-22026-08-25an immediate-hearing statute case sat unset for 81 days, then was set for a 90-minute evidentiary hearing on eight days' notice, the day after the petitioner's oral motion to disqualify was denied on the recordPARTIAL
Date
2026-08-25
Actor
Judge Donna M. Keim, order issued on the court's own review ('THIS ACTION came before the Court for review'), e-signed 8/25/2026 1:29:45 PM.
Institution
8th Cir. Alachua Co. (01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
an immediate-hearing statute case sat unset for 81 days, then was set for a 90-minute evidentiary hearing on eight days' notice, the day after the petitioner's oral motion to disqualify was denied on the record
What the law required
Section 119.11(1), Florida Statutes: 'Whenever an action is filed to enforce the provisions of this chapter, the court shall set an immediate hearing, giving the case priority over other pending cases.' Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution secures the right the statute enforces. Scheduling is neutral administration: the timing of a setting follows the statute and the docket, not the litigant's announced motions.
What happened
The petition invoked Florida's immediate-hearing statute for records cases on June 4. Through August 24, no evidentiary hearing was set. On August 25, one day after the petitioner's oral motion to disqualify was denied on the record, the court set the full evidentiary hearing for September 2 at 9:00 AM by Zoom, with '1 1/2 hours reserved'. The same order requires, six days out: all exhibits pre-marked and e-served, a paper copy of everything physically received by the court, and witness lists with driver's license copies. The setting is also the first hearing the statute has produced in this case. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
The records statute commands an immediate hearing with priority over other pending cases. Eighty-one days without a setting, then eight days' notice for the merits with a six-day exhibit deadline, is the deviation.
Receipt
  • The 8/25/26 Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing (Filing 255637757), filed in the docket folder, hash-matched to the portal download.
  • Its own terms: September 2 hearing, 90 minutes reserved, exhibits, witness lists, and paper copies all due August 31.
  • The 6/4/26 petition invoking section 119.11(1) priority (N-120).
  • The 8/24/26 conference transcript, the oral disqualification ruling.

Spawned by: N-120, NEW-0826-1

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0826-2

NEW-0906-U12026-08-25 -> 2026-09-13the University was invited to write the court's order the day after the conference and sent one whose filename denies a motion the certified transcript shows the court never reached; the protective order was finally signed twenty-five days later by a different judge, and the cross-motion still has no rulingIGNORED
Date
2026-08-25 -> 2026-09-13
Actor
Two lanes on one card: UF Office of the General Counsel (Kirkconnell; LoGiurato transmitting) for the draft; Division W chambers (Judge Keim; JA Theresa Hall) for entry
Institution
8th Cir. Alachua Co. (01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
the University was invited to write the court's order the day after the conference and sent one whose filename denies a motion the certified transcript shows the court never reached; the protective order was finally signed twenty-five days later by a different judge, and the cross-motion still has no ruling
What the law required
A proposed order tendered by a party is that party's representation to the court of what the court ruled; An order is rendered when a signed written order is filed (Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)), and review clocks run from rendition, not from an oral announcement. The certified 8/24/2026 transcript records rulings on two motions and none on the third.
What happened
On August 24, 2026 the court granted both of the University's motions from the bench and did not reach the petitioner's cross-motion, which the University's own notice had set for the same half hour. That afternoon the University's legal assistant asked chambers whether the judge would like the University to prepare the orders; the next morning the judicial assistant answered, 'Yes, please prepare the orders from yesterday's hearings and send them to me in word format for review.' The University sent a draft at 12:35 PM whose filename reads "20260825 - Proposed Order Granting Motion to Dispense, Granting MPO & Denying Cross-Motion." The petitioner objected in writing on August 27 that the cross-motion "was not separately ruled upon, and it remains pending." On September 3 the University's counsel wrote that it was 'very unlikely' the University would agree to reconsideration, 'though the University cannot be certain until the written order is entered.' On September 18, 2026, twenty-five days after the conference, the protective-order motion got its written order: signed at 10:19 AM by Judge Kreider, assigned the day before, and e-filed at 1:34 PM (Filing 257389224). It recites the August 24 hearing and the transcript the petitioner filed on September 14, grants the motion, and does not mention the cross-motion or the motion to dispense. As of September 26 neither of those has a written order; the petitioner's September 25 motion states that the cross-motion 'has never been ruled on.' [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A proposed order is the winning party's account of what the judge said, and the judge decides whether to sign it. The same chambers produced a hearing order in one day. The University's draft would have decided a third motion the transcript shows was never reached. The protective order was signed on September 18 by the successor judge after the first judge's recusal; it grants that motion and names no other. The motion to dispense and the cross-motion have no written order. The petitioner was invited to send a competing draft and did not.
Receipt
  • The University's 8/24/2026 2:40 PM request to prepare the orders and the judicial assistant's 8/25/2026 11:42 AM reply, both reproduced in the University's own 9/3/2026 email (p. 7 of the 10-page PDF).
  • The attachment list on that 9/3/2026 email (p. 10), naming "20260825 - Proposed Order Granting Motion to Dispense, Granting MPO & Denying Cross-Motion."
  • The certified transcript of 8/24/2026: rulings at Tr. 3, Tr. 36; no ruling on the cross-motion anywhere in 39 pages.
  • The University's 8/14/2026 Notice of Hearing (Filing 254902680) listing all three motions.
  • The Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing (Filing 255637757), signed 8/25/2026, one day after the conference.
  • The petitioner's 8/27/2026 objection to the proposed order (Exhibit K to the DQ motion's Notice of Filing).
  • The Order Granting Motion for Protective Order, Filing 257389224, signed 9/18/2026 10:19:49 AM by Judge Kreider, e-filed 1:34:50 PM.
  • Petitioner's Verified Successive Motion to Disqualify Successor Judge, Filing 257927929 (9/25/2026), paragraphs 12 and 26.

Spawned by: NEW-0826-1, N-144

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0906-U1

NEW-0906-U42026-09-02at the merits hearing, 160 days after the request, the court ordered everything the University located sent to the judge within five days, by oral order, with no index, no certification, and nothing to the requester; no written order has been enteredPARTIAL
Date
2026-09-02
Actor
Judge Donna M. Keim, Circuit Civil Division W
Institution
8th Cir. Alachua Co. (01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
at the merits hearing, 160 days after the request, the court ordered everything the University located sent to the judge within five days, by oral order, with no index, no certification, and nothing to the requester; no written order has been entered
What the law required
Section 119.11(1): an immediate hearing with priority. The order to show cause put the burden on the University to show why a peremptory writ should not issue (N-120). Sections 119.07(1)(e) and (f): a custodian withholding as exempt states the basis with citation, and on request in writing with particularity, to the requester. The requester's 8/31 motion asked, in the alternative, for identification and in camera inspection, and that the court direct delivery of the withheld materials for in camera inspection at or before the hearing (Filing 256010098).
What happened
At the merits hearing on September 2, 2026 the court ordered everything the University had located sent to the judge. By the University's own account that afternoon, the judge ordered its counsel to give her every document the University located, including non-responsive records, for in camera review. The certified transcript records the court's own words: "All redundancy, every page accounted for to the Court for an in-camera inspection within five days of today." In camera delivery of the withheld material was the alternative relief the petitioner's own August 31 motion had asked for. The order gave the petitioner nothing: no index, no certification, no copy. His written request that the delivery be tied to the batches in the University's own file drew a reply about delivery mode and nothing about the batches. The court closed the hearing while he was speaking: "I've made my ruling. I've entered my order. I've given you an hour more than you had. We're out of time." On September 18, 2026 the successor judge, assigned the day before, denied the petition (Filing 257408968). His order recites the oral ruling as an order to produce 'any documents that had been withheld' and records that 'Respondents produced 538 pages to the Court via email,' the University's own count; the transcript's 'every page accounted for' and the University's same-day description, all documents located 'including all non-responsive records,' appear nowhere in it. The in camera ruling itself has no written order as of September 26. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
When this court wanted a usable hearing record, its August 25 order required pre-marked exhibits, a paper set received by a date, witness lists, and identification. The in camera order, as the court's own assistant described it, required a deadline and a delivery mode. The right of access is in Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution, and section 119.11(1) entitles this case to an immediate hearing. The court's own order to show cause put the burden on the University to show why a writ should not issue, and it has stayed there.
Receipt
  • The certified transcript of September 2, 2026 (reporter Diane B. Guldin, certified 9/8/2026), a hearing set for ninety minutes, extended, by Zoom: Tr. 134-136 (the in camera order and its aftermath), Tr. 87-88 (the extension and the petitioner's request to testify).
  • The University's 9/2/2026 12:35 PM email describing the oral order, and the judicial assistant's 9/2/2026 2:03 PM email stating the five-day term.
  • The petitioner's 9/2/2026 1:34 PM email asking that the delivery be tied to the batches, and the return of service showing the University's engineer was served and did not appear.
  • The Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing (Filing 255637757), the court's own requirements for the hearing record.
  • The Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Filing 257408968 (9/18/2026), pp. 1-2: the recital of the oral order and of '538 pages.'

Spawned by: NEW-0826-2, N-120, N-144, NEW-0826-1

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0906-U4

NEW-0913-U82026-09-02 -> 2026-09-14a videographer arranged for a public hearing was not admitted, and the written requests asking the court who controlled that admission were answered with one redacted log, four answers of “We have no records responsive to your request”, and a bill to be paid before the rest would be searched forPARTIAL
Date
2026-09-02 -> 2026-09-14
Actor
8th Cir. Alachua Co. Court Reporting Department (George C. Stengel, DCR); 8th Cir. Court Administration (Christy Cain, Communications Coordinator); Division W chambers (judicial assistant Theresa Hall)
Institution
8th Cir. Alachua Co., Court Reporting Department and Court Administration (01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
a videographer arranged for a public hearing was not admitted, and the written requests asking the court who controlled that admission were answered with one redacted log, four answers of “We have no records responsive to your request”, and a bill to be paid before the rest would be searched for
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution reaches judicial-branch records, and Rule 2.420 of the Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration governs access to them; the custodian carries the burden of any exemption, must determine whether a requested record exists and is exempt, and if it denies must state the basis in writing (Rule 2.420(m)(2)). The duty at issue is the records duty: who controlled admission, and preservation while the request is pending.
What happened
A videographer arranged for the September 2, 2026 hearing logged on and was not admitted. The petitioner asked the court in writing who controlled admission. The Court Reporting Department answered within hours on the recording and said nothing about the logs. Six days and two follow-ups later, Court Administration answered four items "We have no records responsive to your request," and as to the communications, wrote: "We will charge a $50 per-hour fee to retrieve the requested emails and messages," with $25 demanded in advance and a second payment to follow. The same office had sent a near-verbatim version of that paragraph, same one-hour estimate, same $25, on September 2, on an unrelated request. The preservation requests of September 8 and 11 were acknowledged in writing on September 16. The redacted Zoom log the office produced, re-exported on September 16 so the times print, has sixteen rows for eight named participants. The videographer's only row reads: entered the waiting room at 9:04:02 a.m., left at 9:05:36 a.m., reason 'Removed by host,' never admitted. The host field names the judge; the alternative-host and co-host fields are empty. The log records the event and the account, not the hand on the account: who operated the host account, or on what instruction, is not in it. On September 16 the office wrote that it has 'no records responsive' on that question and will run a custom query once search terms and a payment are supplied. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
The duty at issue is narrow: telling a party who controlled admission when he asks in writing, preserving the records while the request is pending, and determining whether a record exists whether or not a charge is paid. Article I, section 24(a) reaches judicial-branch records and puts the exemption burden on the custodian; Rule 2.420 governs access. The court's own log now answers part of the question: the videographer's only row ends 'Removed by host.' Who operated the host account is the part the office says it will search only after payment.
Receipt
  • Petitioner's 9/8/2026 written request under Rule 2.420(m)(1), and the Court Reporting Department's reply the same morning: "there is no recording on the requested date in this case."
  • Petitioner's renewed requests of 9/8/2026 9:58 p.m. and 9/11/2026 4:49 p.m., the second asking who served as Zoom host, who controlled admission and removal, and that the records be preserved.
  • Court Administration's reply of 9/14/2026 10:35 a.m.: a redacted Zoom log produced, four items answered "We have no records responsive to your request," and a $25 advance payment demanded before the communications search would run.
  • Court Administration's earlier reply of 9/2/2026 4:45 p.m. on the August 28 request, carrying the same one-hour estimate and the same $25 half-up-front demand.
  • Court Administration's reply of 9/16/2026 10:48 a.m.: the log re-exported with the time column expanded, the 9/8 and 9/11 preservation requests acknowledged, and "no records responsive" on the host-control question pending search terms and payment.
  • The Zoom log as re-exported 9/16/2026: sixteen rows, host Judge Donna M. Keim, the videographer's row 9:04:02 to 9:05:36 a.m., "Removed by host," "In Waiting Room: Yes"; duration 2:35:53 ending 11:35:02 a.m.; Recording FALSE.

Spawned by: NEW-0826-5, NEW-0826-2

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0913-U8

NEW-0913-U102026-09-13a verified motion to disqualify the trial judge was granted three days after filing; the successor judge decided every pending matter within a day of assignment, with no hearing before himPARTIAL
Date
2026-09-13
Actor
Christopher A. Hanson, Petitioner, self-represented (movant); Judge Donna M. Keim (legal-sufficiency ruling owed under Rule 2.330(h))
Institution
8th Cir. Alachua Co. (01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
a verified motion to disqualify the trial judge was granted three days after filing; the successor judge decided every pending matter within a day of assignment, with no hearing before him
What the law required
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a fair tribunal. A motion to disqualify is legally sufficient where the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial (MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1335 (Fla. 1990)). Disqualification exists to secure that fair hearing, and Rule 2.330(j) lets the successor judge reconsider prior rulings on motion.
What happened
On September 13, 2026 the petitioner filed a verified motion to disqualify the trial judge, timely under Rule 2.330(g) as to both the August 24 and September 2 grounds. The motion rests on three things: a noticed motion that was never reached while the opposing party's two were granted; an in camera process described in writing only by the opposing party, on terms that do not track the hearing transcript; and the cumulative pattern across both hearings. It expressly disclaims any reliance on adverse rulings. The motion also carries the petitioner's own words to the court in full: "I think that you're corrupt and you're dishonest and you are trying to protect insiders and I think you should be off of my case" (Tr. 36:13-17), spoken as an oral motion to disqualify and denied on the record one line later. He states plainly that he does not retreat from them. (Filing 256936128.) On September 16, 2026 the court granted the motion, recused, and referred the case to the Chief Judge for reassignment (Filing 257189440). The one-page order states no finding and says nothing about the words quoted in the motion. The case was reassigned on September 17 to Judge David P. Kreider (Filing 257349132), who by 3:47 PM the next day had signed three orders, each for the University, with no hearing before him. The disqualification was granted; the fresh hearing it was meant to secure did not follow. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
Disqualification is the remedy for a reasonable fear of an unfair proceeding. Its value lies in what follows: a judge who takes up the record fresh and hears the parties. Here the recusal came three days after filing. Within a day of assignment the successor ruled on the petition, a contested protective order and a contempt motion, with no hearing before him.
Receipt
  • Verified Motion to Disqualify, Filing 256936128, with the Notice of Filing of Exhibits A through K.
  • Rule 2.330(g) timeliness computation on the record of the motion itself.
  • Order Granting Motion to Disqualify, Filing 257189440, signed 9/16/2026 12:25 PM, e-filed 12:36 PM: motion 'GRANTED,' judge recuses, case referred to the Chief Judge.
  • Order of Reassignment, Filing 257349132, signed 9/17/2026 3:03 PM, e-filed 9/18/2026 8:37 AM.

Spawned by: NEW-0826-1, NEW-0906-U1, NEW-0906-U4, NEW-0906-U5, NEW-0906-U6, NEW-0913-U8

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0913-U10

First District Court of Appeal1 node

Official public records: First District Court of Appeal, official site

N-1262026-06-30the appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decisionPENDING
Date
2026-06-30
Actor
The Florida Bar, appellees in 1D2026-0728, by Keating and Londot, Greenberg Traurig
Institution
1D2026-0728
Mechanism
the appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decision
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 2.420(l)(2) place enforcement of the access right against a non-judge custodian in the circuit court. The First District reviews a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo, taking the verified petition's allegations as true; Rule 1.630(d)(2) requires an alternative writ on a prima facie showing, and a disputed allegation that a record exists is decided after a hearing (Consumer Rights, LLC v. Bradford County, 153 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)).
What happened

On 6/30/26 the Bar appellees filed their Answer Brief in 1D2026-0728. It states that "Mr. Hanson's grievance file against Mr. Davis was closed without further investigation," and that because review was limited to submissions and court records, the file held no communications with Davis. In a footnote it concedes the condition on which its production duty binds: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it."

The brief also restates settled law that a person has neither the right to compel discipline nor standing to appeal a non-discipline decision, and describes the 2/24/25 closure as a no-jurisdiction finding, wording absent from the letter. The appeal record carries the Bar's own letters, including a 9/24/25 letter describing a Senior Staff Attorney investigation and two further reviews of the same file the brief says was closed without further investigation (N-055). [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
An appeal reviews whether a case was rightly ended. This one asks whether a verified records petition could be dismissed with prejudice on an unsworn assertion that the records do not exist, before the opposition was filed and without a hearing (N-079). No decision has issued. What the appellate papers supply is the regulator's positions in writing and unhedged, and two concede more than any letter did: the file 'was closed without further investigation,' and the Bar 'would be obligated to provide' Davis communications if the file held any.
Receipt
  • Answer Brief of Appellees, 1D2026-0728, filed 6/30/26, Filing 251514921, 34 PDF pages and 28 numbered, signed M. Hope Keating and John K. Londot, held in the appeal's brief file.
  • Quotes at PDF pp. 8 (brief p. 2, the "no jurisdiction" characterization), 18 (brief p. 12, the standing sentence), 30 (brief p. 24, both admissions), and 31 (brief p. 25 fn. 3, the conditional concession).
  • Precision note, load-bearing: "no jurisdiction" is the BRIEF's phrase, anchored to Standing Board Policy 15.75(d)(1), and does NOT appear in the Huston letter; attribute the phrase to the brief and the deferral language to the letter.
  • Composite Exhibit A to the 1/27/26 motion to dismiss with the judicial-notice request at Leon ROA p. 626; the letters at ROA pp. 640-643.
  • Underlying letters quoted by the brief at ROA pp. 44 and 103.

Spawned by: N-079

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-126

Bar and 13th Circuit custodians (preservation demand)1 node

Official public records: The Florida Bar, official about page | Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, contact and public information

N-1312026-07-11one complaint drew three different written statements from the Bar: that it investigated, that it did not act, and that it disposed of the file; this letter set them side by side and put the good-faith-basis question to sixteen Bar officers, board members, and counselPENDING
Date
2026-07-11
Actor
Bar leadership; 13th Cir. custodians Gina Justice and Mike Moore (video records request)
Institution
The Florida Bar / 13th Cir. AOC
Mechanism
one complaint drew three different written statements from the Bar: that it investigated, that it did not act, and that it disposed of the file; this letter set them side by side and put the good-faith-basis question to sixteen Bar officers, board members, and counsel
What the law required
Rule 3-7.3(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: bar counsel must investigate the allegations in any written complaint signed under oath, and Rule 3-7.3(a) governs closure at intake. The letter is built on the Question Protocol so that any answer is evidence: they produce, they state a particularized basis, or silence ratifies.
What happened
On 7/11/26 Husband sent a letter to nineteen addressees, sixteen of them Bar officers, board members, or Bar counsel. It put a good-faith-basis question to each by name, made demands under the Bar's discipline rule 3-7.3(a) and (b), and set out the Bar's three conflicting written statements about the same complaint. It raised the 7/7/26 quash of the four Bar officials' subpoenas (N-130) and a dues objection with an accounting demand on the Bar's outside-counsel engagement. It invoked review under the Bar's own policy SBP 15.75 with a no-waiver clause and set a July 17, 2026 deadline. A companion public-records request for the hearing video completed its full review pipeline on 7/13/26, addressed to the new Court Administrator, Rob Snyder. A separate nine-point objection of 7/4/26 drew a written answer on 7/24/26 that granted an ACAP review of the closure and addressed none of the other eight points (N-124). [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
This is Husband's own letter, and it measures no institution against a duty. It is on the map because of how the instrument is built: three branches and no innocent one. They produce, they state a particularized basis, or their silence answers. It can be built that way because the underlying inconsistency is the Bar's own writing rather than a characterization of it.
Receipt
  • The preserved.eml file and its text extraction, filed as sent 7/11/26 8:35 PM.
  • Addressees on the To line: Orr, Greenlee, Baker-Barnes, Doyle, Wackes, ACAP, four 13th Circuit Board of Governors members, two 6th Circuit Board of Governors members, Chilson; on Cc: Kelley, Courtemanche, Bailey, Londot, Davis, and self.
  • Of the nineteen addressees, three are not Bar officers, board members, or counsel: the Bar's intake program, opposing counsel, and Husband himself.
  • The companion video-records request final version expands to all proceedings since 4/22/25.
  • Both drafts carry verified receipt maps.
  • The three-statements stack and the closure answer are receipted at N-124; the quash at N-130.

Spawned by: N-057, N-124

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-131

Judge Ayers to Judge Felix (handoff)2 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Judge Kelly A. Ayers, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit | Official judicial page, Judge Matthew L. Felix, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

N-0042024-05-22 -> ongoingon the one issue this case turns on, from May 2024 through February 2025, the only sanction Wife's late disclosure drew was a fee entitlement that was never set.EXCUSED
Date
2024-05-22 -> ongoing
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers, then Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
on the one issue this case turns on, from May 2024 through February 2025, the only sanction Wife's late disclosure drew was a fee entitlement that was never set.
What the law required
Rule 12.285 makes financial disclosure mandatory for both parties on fixed periods, and Rule 12.285(j) requires the producing party to certify under oath, in her own certificate, that the disclosure is “complete, accurate, and in compliance with this rule,” stating any exception “with specificity.” Section 92.525, Florida Statutes, puts that oath under penalties of perjury, so the certificate reaches exactly as far as its own words. Rule 12.380 supplies the consequence when a documented violation is put before the court.
What happened

On May 22, 2024 Wife stated in writing that she would supplement and amend her financial disclosures. The lawyers then stipulated a June 28, 2024 production date. Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that date. Wife's disclosures ran about four months past it, and the compel order that followed was granted with a fee finding and never enforced (N-009).

Three compliance certificates followed, and the sworn words moved each time. The first, filed six days before the October 28, 2024 hearing, swears only that a list of documents is accurate to the best of the signer's knowledge. It never swears that the rule was complied with. The second, filed three days after that hearing, is verified the same way. Husband's December 2024 motion named the limit: the certificates "made no attempt to comply with the requirements in Rule FFLRP 12.285(j)"; they "only certify that Wife held no interest in any relevant accounts or assets in 'the last 12 months'"; "Wife is only swearing that she had no interest in relevant accounts from October of 2023 forward."

The third was filed twice, eleven minutes apart near midnight, about eleven hours after that motion was denied (N-029), under the court's direction that day to audit and amend and Wife's counsel's stipulation to use the rule's oath. It swears the disclosure is "complete, accurate, and in compliance with Fla. R. Fam. L. P. 12.285 unless otherwise specifically stated herein." What the document specifically states is a twelve-month window. The qualifier returns to the certificate whatever the certificate itself limits. Wife signed under penalties of perjury. The open question is how far the signature reaches, and a window fixed at "the last 12 months" moves forward with every month of delay. [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation
Rule 12.285 binds both sides the same way, and the sworn certificate is the producing party's own accounting: it reaches only the periods and the items it names. When one party documents that the other missed the rule and puts that before the court, the rule supplies a consequence. This chain is one issue, one beneficiary, and nine months, all inside Judge Ayers's tenure, and the only consequence it drew was a fee entitlement that was never set.
Receipt
  • Doc 156, the 5/22/24 supplement statement.
  • Doc 155 Tr. 21:8-11 (transcript of the October 28, 2024 hearing), Samarkos, the June 28 date as "an agreement between Counsel"; Tr. 13:20-14:12 for Husband's answers on that date.
  • Docs 044 p. 9 and 046 p. 9, the certificates of October 22 and October 31, 2024, each signed by Wife under section 92.525, Florida Statutes, "under penalties of perjury," e-signed 13:57 EDT and 09:30 EDT.
  • Doc 054, the compel order, e-filed 11/20/24.
  • Doc 084 paras. 15-17, 19, and 21, the quoted language-gap passages; para. 19, "six months late from the stipulated due date."
  • Docs 124 and 125 p. 10, the two identical amended certificates of 2/12/25, Filing #216669496 at 11:15:25 PM and Filing #216669860 at 11:26:49 PM, same DocuSign envelope 0518E64D-6C12-4C6B-BDFC-A83E1B488B9A, each carrying the qualified oath quoted above.
  • Doc 130, the written denial, 2/14/25.
  • Doc 142, Husband's on-deadline certificate, 2/26/25.
  • Doc 203 para. 5, the postmarital agreement signed 10/8/23 without financial disclosures. The record's own name for that instrument is the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23; "postmarital" and "post-marital" are aliases,.
  • The nine-month span runs from the first enumerated event (5/22/24) to the last (2/26/25).
  • Deliberately not counted in this chain: the post-disqualification conduct (N-047), the undecided prescribed motion (N-019, N-033), and the never-ruled objection to the second subpoena set (N-034).
  • Related decision points: N-003, N-007, N-040.

Read the source document: Doc 155, Transcript of 10-28-24 hearing

Spawned by: N-006, N-007, N-009, N-016, N-029

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-004

N-0342025-03-02Wife objected to the second set of bank subpoenas and told the court a fifteen-minute hearing would resolve it; as of September 23, 2026 the objection had gone 570 days without a ruling, blocking the records that whole time.IGNORED
Date
2025-03-02
Actor
Judge Ayers then Judge Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Wife objected to the second set of bank subpoenas and told the court a fifteen-minute hearing would resolve it; as of September 23, 2026 the objection had gone 570 days without a ruling, blocking the records that whole time.
What the law required
Rule 12.351 governs production from non-parties: a party's timely objection under subdivision (b) stops the subpoena until the court rules on it under subdivision (d), so an objection never ruled on operates as a quash no judge signed. Rule 2.215(g)(1): “Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge,” with monthly reports to the chief judge of every matter held under advisement more than 60 days. The objection is Wife's instrument, and she asked for the expedited hearing herself.
What happened
Husband refiled the Chase subpoenas February 28, 2025, the day he filed the motion that was the route to that discovery (N-033). Wife objected two days later, asked in the same paper that Husband be sanctioned and that she be awarded fees, and sought an expedited hearing, writing that "the undersigned attorney believes that this issue can be resolved by the Court at the conclusion of a 15-minute hearing." No order has ever ruled on that objection. Husband moved for an immediate ruling June 28, 2025; the court's entire answer was a form order checking one box: "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." At the June 3, 2025 venue hearing Husband asked the successor judge to order the pending subpoena; Wife's counsel objected that the request was outside the noticed motion, and no ruling was made. More than a year later, Wife's own notice sets Husband's June 2025 motion among ten matters for October 9, 2026. [IGNORED: an untested objection has functioned as a quash no judge ever signed]
Baseline deviation
An objection to a non-party subpoena stops it until the court rules; until then the records stay blocked and no judge passes on whether the objection was any good. Wife's objection is her own instrument; she asked for the expedited hearing herself, and years of non-ruling have given her its benefit without ever carrying it. The first set of subpoenas at least drew an order (N-018). This set has drawn nothing, over records both sides call the financial center.
Receipt
  • DIN 147 (JPMorgan Chase, Filing 217820385, 2/28/25 1:49 PM) and DIN 148 (Chase Bank, Filing 217820597, 1:51 PM), each with the Exhibit A scope quoted above.
  • DIN 149 (Filing 217872880, 3/2/25), the objection, paras. 17-18, including her own para. 17 calling these Husband's "latest" notices.
  • DIN 209 (6/28/25) para. 32. DIN 210 (6/30/25), the checked-box form order.
  • Doc 212, transcript of the June 3, 2025 hearing, Tr. 16:19-17:3.
  • DIN 361, Wife's 7/30/26 notice for the 10/9/26 setting, still listing DIN 209.
  • Doc 93's decretal para. 2 names DIN 28 and 29 only, and Set 2 was filed sixty days after it was signed.
  • Day counts in the card: 535 days from 2/28/25 and 533 days from 3/2/25, both to 8/17/26, per ledger sec. 3e; recompute at use.

Spawned by: N-018, N-033

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-034

Systemic (cross-institution)5 nodes

Official public records: Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, About the Court | The Florida Bar, official about page | Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, official site

N-0242025-01-21 -> ongoinga court order barred both parents from writing anything critical about the guardian ad litem or her private law firm, recited that they had waived the right to, and no party had asked for any of itDENIED
Date
2025-01-21 -> ongoing
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix; Judge Sherwood Coleman; Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
24-DR-001150 (13th Cir. Fam. Div. A); 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
a court order barred both parents from writing anything critical about the guardian ad litem or her private law firm, recited that they had waived the right to, and no party had asked for any of it
What the law required
A parent's liberty interest in his children and his freedom of speech are protected by Article I, sections 9 and 4 of the Florida Constitution and by the First and Fourteenth Amendments; a limitation on protected speech is presumptively invalid and the state carries the burden of justifying it (Romero v. Erik G. Abrahamson, P.A., 113 So. 3d 870, 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)). In the adversarial system the parties frame the issues and the court rules on what they present; a court may not grant relief no party requested or decide on grounds no party raised. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020). Notice and an opportunity to be heard attach before an obligation is imposed.
What happened
Wife's motion for a guardian ad litem asked for three things: appoint a guardian, make Husband pay subject to reallocation, and any other relief appropriate. The order granting it, signed June 25, 2026, carried terms in no motion by any party. Paragraph 19 states: "The parents acknowledge that they are prohibited from posting any online reviews concerning the Guardian ad Litem and [the firm named in the appointment order]. Any postings to social media about the case shall be immediately removed and the parents authorize, Google, Avvo, Facebook, etc. to immediately remove the posts based upon this specific waiver." No such acknowledgment or waiver appears in the record. The order also has each parent waive future claims against the guardian, requires prepaying the guardian's counsel, and imposes mandatory paid OurFamilyWizard (N-134), none requested. A parallel pattern recurred in the mandamus case, receipted below. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A court rules on what somebody asked for, and a restriction on a parent's speech is presumptively invalid until the state justifies it. Terms binding two parents appear in no party's papers, no one was heard on them, and the order recites agreements no party made. An order in the records case commanded compliance with a dated order that appears nowhere, uncorrected after two motions asked about it.
Receipt
  • Wife's Motion for Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, 12/13/2024, prayer at p. 3.
  • Doc 337 (order granting, signed 6/25/2026, 2 pp.). Appointment-order terms quoted from the amended order, DIN 365, p. 8; its 7/23/26 predecessor was served as a five-page odd-pages-only artifact and the page restoration is documented at N-134, where the Guardian's 8/3/26 request that "a complete copy of the Order be entered into the electronic court file so that I can fully carry out the duties the Court has entrusted to me" also sits.
  • Mandamus-case scrivener pattern: Doc 81 para. 1 (5/5/2026) for the April 18 recital of a non-existent order (confirmed a scrivener's error for the April 28 order by the order signed August 27, 2026, para. III(e)); Doc 80 para. (e), signed 4/28/26, carries the actual dates directive; Husband's Docs 85 and 86 para. 30.
  • Negative search scope, stated because it bounds the claim: filename patterns and full-text scan across the entire 10255 matter tree, plus the ACIS docket sheet read end to end (DIN 79 clocked in 4/14, DIN 80 on 5/5, nothing between). Email was not searched.
  • Party-presentation authority: Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020).
  • Related decision points: N-023.

Spawned by: N-023, N-098, N-134

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-024

N-0592025-10-14 -> ongoingone structural question was put to three courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related oneIGNORED
Date
2025-10-14 -> ongoing
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix; the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; a 2D DCA panel (Villanti, Sleet, Smith); The Florida Bar
Institution
25-CA-010255 (13th Cir.); 24-DR-001150 (13th Cir.); 2D2026-0279; 2025-CA-2469 (Leon)
Mechanism
one structural question was put to three courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related one
What the law required
Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest: In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (disqualification required where the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable); Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016) (the error is structural). Court rules govern "practice and procedure" (Art. V, s. 2(a), Fla. Const.); the impartial tribunal is a constitutional guarantee, and the federal Constitution binds "the Judges in every State," any state rule to the contrary notwithstanding (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Under Rule 2.330(h) the facts alleged are taken as true and the motion is judged on legal sufficiency alone. In a records mandamus the respondent's role is to answer the writ (Radford v. Brock, 914 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 674 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)), so the named judges are either nominal custodians with no stake, in which case no merits advocacy for them is proper, or parties with a stake, in which case Murchison and Williams apply; no court in this record has answered either way.
What happened
The conflict takes three forms across related cases: Judge Felix, a named defendant in the records mandamus, kept presiding over the family case; the mandamus was filed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, with the Attorney General appearing for the judicial defendants; and The Florida Bar is itself a party in two of the forums. Three courts were asked whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one, and each disposed of the request without reaching that question. Judge Felix denied the disqualification motions on the successive-motion rule, the second time 9 hours and 27 minutes after it was filed, ruling it legally insufficient and stating that he can be fair and impartial (N-069, N-118). The Second District denied the prohibition petition in one sentence, seven days after filing, with no response required (N-078). The Sixth Circuit judge assigned to the records case ruled that he had no power to transfer the family case (N-075). No court has said why a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Due process forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest, and a procedural rule cannot override that guarantee. A judge named as a defendant in the records case kept presiding over the related family case. The question was put to three courts; each disposed of it without reaching the merits, and no court has said why a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one.
Receipt
  • Amended mandamus petition caption (e-filed 11/13/25, 25-CA-10255).
  • Disqualification order rested on the successive-motion rule (Rule 2.330(i)).
  • 2D DCA denial: prohibition petition filed 2/3/26 and denied 2/10/26, seven days later, one day after fee paid, no opinion, no response required (N-078).
  • 1150 Doc 258 (1/8/26) and Doc 331 (6/10/26, e-signed 9:27:13 AM; the motion, Doc 329, e-filed 12:00:02 AM).
  • 10255 Doc 61 paras. 9 and 11 (family-case transfer denied for lack of authority).
  • Two of the judges in this chain have ruled for Husband.
  • Defendants have a nominal-party answer available; naming a court and its judges in a mandamus about the court's own records is how such petitions are normally styled.

Spawned by: N-058, N-069, N-078, N-091

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-059

N-0652025-11-24every institution named in the article was invited in writing to point out anything false in it, with an offer to amend; in the nearly nine months from November 24, 2025 through August 20, 2026, not one has named a single sentenceIGNORED
Date
2025-11-24
Actor
Judge Ayers and Judge Felix (Div. A and D chambers); Chief Judge Sabella, the 13th Circuit General Counsel, and the trial court administrator; the Florida Bar ACAP and the Judicial Qualifications Commission; Scott Davis
Institution
13th Judicial Circuit / The Florida Bar / JQC
Mechanism
every institution named in the article was invited in writing to point out anything false in it, with an offer to amend; in the nearly nine months from November 24, 2025 through August 20, 2026, not one has named a single sentence
What the law required
Rule 3-7.3(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: bar counsel “must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath.” Canon 3D(2) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct: a judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has violated the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar “shall take appropriate action.” Both duties are written in mandatory terms. An official who has a correction available has the means to make it, so a documented failure to identify any false statement is evidence of what the record contains.
What happened
On November 24, 2025, within sixteen minutes, Husband sent three emails under one subject line, each linking a published article and naming specific officials, to the judicial divisions and Wife's counsel, to circuit administration, and to the Bar and JQC. Each carried the same offer: "If you believe that anything stated in the article is untrue, please let me know so I can consider amending the article if appropriate," with a request for comment. No deadline was set. No reply from the Bar, the JQC, or the 13th Circuit appears in the records swept. Wife's counsel answered the same day with a cease-and-desist letter that denied the article wholesale and identified no specific sentence as false. Its one concession: "certain discovery was withheld or delayed pursuant to a valid court order and consistent with the prenuptial and postnuptial agreements." Asked the next day which order he meant, he wrote: "I'll see you in court." Six hours twenty-two minutes after the third email, Judge Ayers filed a Bar complaint against Husband, kept open since without the Bar naming a false statement (N-064). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A regulator that receives a specific, documented allegation of misconduct processes it, and an official who can correct a false statement has the means to. Correcting this cost nothing: the sender offered in writing to amend the article. The silence is evidence that nobody positioned to correct it has tried.
Receipt
  • Three sends of 11/24/25 at 10:18, 10:27 and 10:34 AM; the 4:40 PM cease-and-desist; the 11/25/25 reply chain.
  • Wife's counsel's reply to which order he meant: "I'll see you in court."
  • The article, 16 pages, published on X on or about November 21, 2025, filed at Doc 267 pp. 14-56.
  • Scope of no-reply finding: rests on the 7/13/26 Gmail sweep; these three sends originated from a Yahoo account, so a Yahoo-side reply cannot be excluded.

Spawned by: N-064

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-065

N-0712026-01-15the executive branch was asked to investigate the Thirteenth Circuit, and instead entered an appearance as that circuit's defense counsel; the written demand asking it to explain the conflict has never been answeredIGNORED
Date
2026-01-15
Actor
AG Uthmeier / OAG (Sr. AAG Schwieterman appearing)
Institution
Office of the Attorney General
Mechanism
the executive branch was asked to investigate the Thirteenth Circuit, and instead entered an appearance as that circuit's defense counsel; the written demand asking it to explain the conflict has never been answered
What the law required
The Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution guarantee an impartial tribunal, and no one may judge a cause in which he has an interest (In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016)). An office that appears as counsel for that judge does so only after a conflict analysis, and a written demand to withdraw, disclose the conflict, preserve records and produce witnesses calls for an answer.
What happened
In or about January 2026 the Office of the Attorney General appeared as counsel for the judicial defendants in the records mandamus, case 25-CA-010255. Every AG filing since is signed by Jessica Schwieterman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, under the block "JAMES UTHMEIER, ATTORNEY GENERAL," over the designation "Counsel for Defendants 13th Judicial Circuit, Trial Court Administrator Gina Justice, Chief Judge Sabella, Judge Ayers, and Judge Felix." As pleaded, Husband and a State Representative had already asked the executive to investigate that circuit. Husband then demanded in writing that the Attorney General withdraw, issue a corrective disclosure, honor a litigation hold, and produce named deponents. The office did not withdraw, did not cure, and did not answer. The demand stands unanswered. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
An impartial tribunal is a constitutional guarantee, and a conflict analysis comes before a representation. As pleaded, Husband and a Florida State Representative asked the executive to investigate the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; the office then appeared for that circuit's judges, one of whom still presides over Husband's family case, and has defended them since (N-058, NEW-AG1). Husband's written demand asked the office to withdraw, issue a corrective disclosure, honor a litigation hold, and produce named deponents. The office has since been asked twice to state its authority; both asks sit unanswered (N-122).
Receipt
  • Requests to investigate pleaded at complaint paras. 80-81, carried as pleaded, not independently verified.
  • Appearance: Doc 038 in 25-CA-010255, "Filing # 238833280 E-Filed 01/06/2026 08:54:23 AM" (native e-filed text layer).
  • Signature block identical on Docs 055, 065, 072, 083 and the 5/15/26 responses, each signed "/s/ Jessica Schwieterman," Senior Assistant Attorney General.
  • Unanswered authority-memo categories: N-122's receipt (5/8/26 cover letter and preserved AGSFT package).

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-071

N-0852026-03-20 -> ongoingthe regulator announced it would put Husband under oath, he agreed the same week without conditions, waived confidentiality, and invited the public; he renewed his availability repeatedly in writing, and as of August 20, 2026, 153 days later, no subpoena and no dates have issuedIGNORED
Date
2026-03-20 -> ongoing
Actor
Bar Counsel Jason Kelley (Florida Bar)
Institution
Florida Bar
Mechanism
the regulator announced it would put Husband under oath, he agreed the same week without conditions, waived confidentiality, and invited the public; he renewed his availability repeatedly in writing, and as of August 20, 2026, 153 days later, no subpoena and no dates have issued
What the law required
The First Amendment and Article I, section 4 of the Florida Constitution protect a citizen's truthful reporting on the courts and the Bar. Rule 3-7.3(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar requires bar counsel to investigate a sworn complaint; a regulator that announces it will take the respondent's sworn statement either takes it or withdraws the demand, and tells the respondent which statement it claims is false. A subpoena to a non-party witness is quashed on stated grounds and, where the rule requires them, on findings; a proceeding that decides facts has to let someone test them.
What happened

On March 20, 2026, Bar counsel told Husband the regulator would put him under oath: "I am going to send you a subpoena to appear in person for a sworn statement." Husband accepted three days later, without condition, waived confidentiality, and asked that the proceeding be public.

He renewed his availability in writing five times over the following months. On July 10 he wrote: "I agreed at once and without condition. More than 110 days have passed; no subpoena and no dates have issued. I renew my unconditional availability."

No subpoena and no dates have issued, 153 days as of August 20, 2026. In the same period every other witness Husband subpoenaed in this proceeding was released, quashed, or did not appear, with no protective order obtained for those who did not appear. [IGNORED: the announced statement was never taken, and the request for dates stands unanswered.]

Baseline deviation
Truthful reporting on the courts is protected speech. A regulator that announces it will take a respondent's sworn statement either takes it or withdraws the demand, and names the statement it claims is false. A witness who agrees without condition and renews his availability in writing cannot be the reason the statement never happened. A regulator may decide it does not need the statement after all. The record shows neither answer: it did not take the testimony, did not identify a false statement, and did not close the file.
Receipt
  • The 3/20/26 email and Husband's 3/30, 4/27, 5/13 and 7/10/26 follow-ups are carried verbatim in one document, the 7/10/26 as-sent letter (Gmail id 19f4d070ee6ec12a, sent 2026-07-10T17:15:34Z)
  • Full 3/20/26 announcement, 16-page chain PDF, Bar correspondence folder, p. 3: "It appears you have a lot to say, and I am going to give you the opportunity to make it all part of the record. I am going to send you a subpoena to appear in person for a sworn statement. I will send you some dates and give you your choice. I am expecting 3-4 hours."
  • Counsel's 3/19/26 message at p. 4; Husband's 3/19/26 12:10 PM reply at p. 3, "Can you tell me one statement that I've made that is false?"; Husband's 3/23/26 unconditional acceptance and his request that the proceeding be public, "I request that they be public and I would even invite the public to attend the deposition if that is an option," at p. 2
  • Renewals, enumerated: five, on 3/30, 4/17, 4/27, 5/13 and 7/10/26; the 4/17/26 1:05 AM email states the interval on its own face
  • Intervals machine-computed: 3/20/26 to 8/20/26 is 153 days; 3/20/26 to the 7/10/26 letter is 112 days
  • Negative, with scope: no subpoena, no dates, and no identification of any allegedly false statement appears in any document across the three swept Bar roots through 8/6/26, and no reply from that counsel after 3/20/26 appears there either
  • Other witnesses in the same period, each counted once at its own row and not recounted here: three quashed from the bench 5/29 (N-109), former counsel released with no findings (N-112), the circuit's records custodian released with no findings (N-113), a protective order signed about four hours after the proposed order reached chambers (N-123), four Bar officials quashed 7/7 with no written order in the following thirty-one days (N-130), two university witnesses who did not appear (N-145)
  • No fact originates here; every element is receipted on an underlying row

Spawned by: N-109, N-064

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-085

Eighth Circuit administration1 node

Official public records: Official site, Eighth Judicial Circuit of Florida

NEW-0826-62026-03-10the circuit's administrative-reassignment order was rewritten to drop both of its own prior limitations; neither version provides notice to parties of a moved casePENDING
Date
2026-03-10
Actor
Eighth Judicial Circuit administration
Institution
8th Cir. Alachua Co. (01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
the circuit's administrative-reassignment order was rewritten to drop both of its own prior limitations; neither version provides notice to parties of a moved case
What the law required
Stated criteria govern administrative case reassignment. AO 9.16 (effective 6/4/2024) keyed reassignment to a trigger, 'Should the draw for the civil divisions become imbalanced,' and to 'the most recently filed cases with the least amount of judicial activity.' AO 9.17 (effective 3/10/2026) reads 'filed cases with the least amount of judicial activity,' with no trigger clause.
What happened
Effective March 10, 2026, the Eighth Circuit's administrative order on case reassignment, AO 9.17, replaced the 2024 order AO 9.16. The 2024 order carried two limits the circuit had set for itself: an imbalance trigger ('Should the draw for the civil divisions become imbalanced') and selection from 'the most recently filed cases with the least amount of judicial activity.' The 2026 order drops the trigger and the most-recently-filed limit and keeps 'filed cases with the least amount of judicial activity,' assigned at random by the Office of the Court Administrator. Its recital states the reason: 'the balance in the case draw percentages must be maintained with the creation of Circuit Civil Division CA4.' Neither order provides for notice to the parties of a moved case. This is a structural observation about the mechanism now in force. No claim is made that any case was moved under it. The August 27, 2026 records request to Court Administration drew a September 2 answer: the order set produced, one item referred to the Clerk of Court, two items answered 'We have no records responsive to your request,' and a $25 prepayment demanded before any email search. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
The baseline is the circuit's own 2024 order. The imbalance trigger and the most-recently-filed limit are both gone from the 2026 order; the least-judicial-activity criterion stays. Neither order provides for notice to the parties of a moved case.
Receipt
  • AO 9.16 v1 (effective 6/4/2024, signed Mark W. Moseley, Chief Judge), retrieved 8/25/2026; section 1 quoted.
  • AO 9.17 v1 (effective 3/10/2026, signed William E. Davis, Chief Judge), retrieved 8/25/2026; recital and section 1 quoted.
  • Court Administration's 9/2/2026 4:45 PM reply to the 8/27/2026 request (items 4 and 6: no records; item 3: Clerk of Court; items 5 and 8: $25 prepayment).

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0826-6

Press and access organizations2 nodes
NEW-FAF12026-07-08 -> ongoingFlorida's open-government watchdog was asked four yes-or-no questions about a courtroom video a judge offered on the record and that has never been produced, and about state records the Bar says were "disposed of" while a lawsuit over them was pending; it was told in writing that a statement of "no position" would be understood "as just that"; as of 9/26/26, 80 days after the letter, it has sent nothing on that thread at allIGNORED
Date
2026-07-08 -> ongoing
Actor
First Amendment Foundation (Bobby Block, Executive Director; through counsel James Lake, Thomas & LoCicero)
Institution
First Amendment Foundation
Mechanism
Florida's open-government watchdog was asked four yes-or-no questions about a courtroom video a judge offered on the record and that has never been produced, and about state records the Bar says were "disposed of" while a lawsuit over them was pending; it was told in writing that a statement of "no position" would be understood "as just that"; as of 9/26/26, 80 days after the letter, it has sent nothing on that thread at all
What the law required
No statute obligates a private foundation to comment. The measuring baseline is the Foundation's own stated mission and public role: Florida's open-government watchdog and co-publisher of the Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual with the Attorney General's office. The request was engineered so that 'no position' was itself a complete, costless answer: 'as to any the Foundation chooses not to answer, I ask it to say so expressly, and I will understand a statement of no position as just that.'
What happened
On 7/8/26 at 9:14 AM Husband emailed the Foundation's executive director and its counsel four questions, each expressly answerable yes, no, or no position: whether any good-faith position holds that Florida judges are immune from the constitutional duty of public access to judicial records; whether the Attorney General's office taking that formal position concerns the Foundation, given that the two organizations co-publish the Sunshine Manual; whether courthouse-camera video that a judge offered on the record to show her own conduct is a public record absent evidence it is security footage; and whether any good-faith position permits a state agency to destroy records a citizen is actively suing to obtain. Each question tracks a live filing: the immunity defense at NEW-AG1, the withheld video at N-053, and the Bar's report that the records were "disposed of" while the appeal was pending at N-116. He wrote that it was his one request and that he would not follow up beyond the letter, then sent a single follow-up on 7/9/26 at 12:06 PM: "Please let me know before 5 today if you plan to respond with any statement or I'll just assume that you are refusing to comment." No response of any kind appears on that thread as of September 26, 2026, 80 days later. Kept distinct: on August 31 the Foundation's counsel answered a separate request to testify at a hearing (NEW-0906-U3); that reply does not mention the four questions. Recorded as context and kept distinct: on 5/22/26 the Foundation's counsel gave a written checkbox certification that the Foundation had no third-party communications about Husband or his litigation between 1/1/25 and 5/17/26, given to resolve a hearing subpoena. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
No rule obliges anyone to answer this letter. The First Amendment Foundation is a private organization, it owes Husband nothing, and that is stated here on the face of the record. The only baseline is the one the Foundation states for itself: Florida's open-government watchdog, and co-publisher of the Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual with the Attorney General's office. The letter was built so that the cheapest possible response was still a complete one: "as to any the Foundation chooses not to answer, I ask it to say so expressly, and I will understand a statement of no position as just that." A complete answer cost two words. What the record shows since July 8 is zero words: no yes, no no, no "no position," no acknowledgment, nothing.
Receipt
Verbatim Gmail archives, filed in the consolidated public-records file under the First Amendment Foundation: the request for comment of 7/8/26 as sent, with the follow-up of 7/9/26 (message id 19f41de0d08bd911), and the full-thread PDF beside it; the certification of 5/22/26 in the same archive. The 7/8/26 letter, its four questions, the 'no position' sentence and the 5/22/26 certification checked against the page image against the rendered full-thread PDF (pp. 1-3) on 9/26/26; the 7/9/26 follow-up and its quoted sentence read from the native Gmail message (id 19f47a12e2b7b3c6, 12:06 PM ET). The underlying threads reference the children by age only, and it stays that way.

Spawned by: NEW-AG1, N-116

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-FAF1

NEW-0906-U32026-08-31two days before the hearing, the requester asked two of the bodies the University's own records center had named in its March referral to describe, without taking sides, what they see in Florida records compliance; the Foundation's counsel answered within five hours that nobody was available and questioned the relevance, and the Clinic has not answeredPENDING
Date
2026-08-31
Actor
First Amendment Foundation; First Amendment Clinic, Florida State University College of Law
Institution
First Amendment Foundation; First Amendment Clinic, Florida State University College of Law
Mechanism
two days before the hearing, the requester asked two of the bodies the University's own records center had named in its March referral to describe, without taking sides, what they see in Florida records compliance; the Foundation's counsel answered within five hours that nobody was available and questioned the relevance, and the Clinic has not answered
What the law required
Neither institution owed the requester any legal duty to appear, to write, or to answer. The requests say so in terms: 'I understand the Foundation owes me nothing'; 'I understand the Clinic owes me nothing.'
What happened
On the morning of August 31, 2026 the petitioner wrote to the First Amendment Foundation and to the First Amendment Clinic at Florida State's law school, two of the bodies the director of the University's records project had named in his March referral. Each request asked for one of three things: appear and describe what the institution sees in records compliance, send a short written statement, or say in writing that it takes no position. Each said the institution owed him nothing, and that a statement of no position would be treated as a complete answer. The Foundation director's auto-reply said he was away until the morning of the hearing. At 2:44 PM the same day the Foundation's counsel wrote that the director was unavailable for the hearing, could not provide a written statement, and is the Foundation's only full-time employee, 'so no one from the Foundation is available to participate in this hearing,' adding: 'I don't see how the state of the public records law generally is relevant to a particular public records request. But in any event, no one from the Foundation is available to assist you.' The Clinic has not answered in any form as of September 26, twenty-six days later. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Each request said the institution owed the petitioner nothing, and the notice was two days. The shape of the loop is this: a university center whose published description offers referrals to other experts and legal resources referred a requester elsewhere; of two places it named, one answered that nobody was available and doubted the relevance, and the other has not answered a request that asked it only to describe what it sees.
Receipt
  • The two requests as sent, filed as Petitioner's Exhibit T (Filing 256050100, pp. 23-33).
  • The March 19, 2026 referral, quoted in Petitioner's Hearing Memorandum (Filing 256049173) p. 4.
  • Petitioner's Witness List (Filing 256048920), paragraphs 1.f and 1.g.
  • The Foundation counsel's reply of 8/31/26 at 2:44 PM ET, as received (filed under the First Amendment Foundation in the consolidated public-records file).
  • The absence of any reply from the Clinic through September 26.

Spawned by: NEW-0826-2

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0906-U3

Florida Legislature1 node

Official public records: Official site, The Florida Senate

NEW-0826-72026-06-15 -> ongoingnine categories about a bill that was filed, published, and heard drew a written answer that the Senate has no responsive records; a preservation demand and seven search-record questions drew a short reply that answers parts of three and confirms nothing about preservationPENDING
Date
2026-06-15 -> ongoing
Actor
Senate Office of Public Records (6/24 response given for 'the Senate'); Perez addressee on the 8/24 questions
Institution
Florida Legislature
Mechanism
nine categories about a bill that was filed, published, and heard drew a written answer that the Senate has no responsive records; a preservation demand and seven search-record questions drew a short reply that answers parts of three and confirms nothing about preservation
What the law required
Article I, section 24(c): each house adopts its own records rules; the Senate answered under section 11.0431 and Senate Rule 1.48. The 8/24 letter expressly does not dispute that framework; it asks how the rule was applied. The 8/24 letter made five preservation demands and asked seven questions, each answerable in one written sentence.
What happened
On June 15, 2026 a records request went to the Florida Senate: nine categories about Senate Bill 1652 (2025), directed to the office of its prime sponsor. Drafts of the bill. Communications with the Florida Supreme Court and the 2024 Workgroup on Vexatious Litigants. Calendar entries for meetings about it. On June 24 the Senate answered in writing: 'the Senate has found no responsive records.' The bill was filed, published, and heard. On August 24 a five-part preservation demand and seven written questions went back: who searched, what systems, whether the sponsor's own office and accounts were included, what terms were used, and whether anything was excluded or deleted. On September 3 the Senate's General Counsel replied briefly: the Office of the Senate General Counsel handles every request, including one sent to a Senator, and 'Per the search terms in your original request, including a search of all personal devices and accounts, no responsive records were found. This search included the Senator's records.' That reply names the office, points back to the original request for its terms, and says personal devices, accounts and the Senator's records were searched. The name of the person who searched, the repositories, the actual terms, the dates, whether anything was excluded, and whether anything was deleted remain unanswered, and the preservation demand is unconfirmed, as of September 26. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
A bill that was filed, published, and heard normally leaves records in the chamber that produced it: drafts, communications, calendars. An answer of no responsive records across all nine categories is the fact to be explained. The questions now pending are built so that any answer explains it: a narrower search than the request, an exclusion on stated grounds, or a written confirmation that nothing exists.
Receipt
  • The Senate's 6/24/26 answer as received (Public Records Request #252, Michelle Perez, Public Records Manager, Office of the Senate General Counsel), captured in the records tree.
  • The 8/24/26 letter as sent (in the records tree), quoting that answer verbatim.
  • The Senate General Counsel's 9/3/26 reply, as received.
  • The June 15 request's nine categories, reproduced in the Senate's own response.
  • The pending answer window on seven search-record questions and the preservation confirmation, each answerable in one written sentence.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-0826-7