The Node Ledger: a public decision record

Interpretable Justice

Leveraging AI to find the truth and restore accountability in our institutions

The whole record as one picture: the graph (SVG), the same graph as an image (PNG).

The same record, split by institution, in one fixed frame: the norm the facts required, the decision made, and the distance between the two. All institutions side by side, or one at a time: Judge Ayers (26), Judge Felix (45), Court Oversight (22), Florida Bar (20), Appellate (13), Public Records Litigation (11), UF/Brechner Freedom of Information Project (10).

Why this is called interpretable

Read the method

Modern AI systems are studied by a field called interpretability. It exists because of one problem: you cannot learn how a system works by asking it. A model can give a reason for what it did that is fluent, plausible, and not the actual cause. So researchers stopped taking the explanation at face value. They trace the computation instead. Which internal features activate, in what order, and what changes when one of them does not fire.

This ledger applies that method to institutions. Courts, bars, and records custodians state reasons, or state none. Those statements are evidence of what was said. They are not evidence of what happened. So this record does not argue about anyone’s motive. It locates each point where an actor had to choose between what a rule required and something else, records what the rule required, records what was done, and attaches the receipt.

Five things carry over directly.

  1. The unit is the decision point, not the outcome. Interpretability does not grade answers. It opens the process. Every row here is a moment of choice, not a verdict about a result.
  2. Stated reason and actual mechanism are recorded separately. A model’s account of its own reasoning can be unfaithful to its own computation. An order’s recital can be unsupported by its own record. Both get checked against the trace.
  3. Decision points compose. Features combine into circuits. Here each entry records what it was spawned by, so a chain runs from one decision to the next one it made possible. The picture above draws those links.
  4. The comparison is counterfactual. Interpretability learns what a component does by removing it and watching what changes. Each row here asks what ordinary practice would have produced at that point, and records the deviation from it.
  5. Every claim carries what it rests on. No finding here rests on characterization. Each carries a document, a docket number, or a page and line, so anyone can rerun it and disagree with something specific.

The method needs no one’s state of mind, and this ledger asserts none. That restraint is the point. A pattern that has to be explained by intent can be argued away. A pattern visible in the record itself cannot.

The same ledger, organized three ways. Every card carries its receipt. This is an incomplete record of 154 decision points so far, and it continues to grow.

A note on the density: the drawing is complicated because the record is. Taken one filing at a time, each of these events was easy to overlook, and that is exactly how a pattern stays out of view; holding the whole record in one frame is the point. Card ids beginning with NEW- are intake labels from the newest additions to the record, kept unchanged so existing citations keep resolving. Those cards carry the same audit status as the numbered ones.

Divergent results from Florida’s Judicial System

The law has authority and precedent that control results. All judges are bound to follow the law and precedent established before the litigation over which they preside. When the facts are straightforward and undisputed, litigants and their attorneys understand what result to expect. When a Court’s decisions diverge from the lawful result on the facts before it, there are motions for rehearing, appeals, and oversight authorities, each also bound by authority and precedent. They exist to correct errors and misconduct in the court system.

The appellate courts and judicial and attorney oversight are all part of the same self-contained judicial system. The Florida Bar has well over 100,000 members, although it is controlled by far fewer: the 7 Supreme Court justices and the 52-member Board of Governors. Those small groups almost fully control how the system evaluates itself. That, combined with the control over discipline and licensing of Florida attorneys, gives them enormous power.

Unfortunately, the self-regulating nature of the judicial system and the concentration of immense power at the top create an environment that’s especially resistant to exposing internal corruption and misconduct. Power that is never confronted by a united public is rarely confronted at all. And power without confrontation can become unrestrained and absolute.

The law and professional rules still act as grounds for challenging a system’s credibility and, closely related to that, accountability for system insiders. Every ruling and determination can be measured against what the law actually required. Where the departures repeat, the question stops being whether any single ruling was wrong, which is often debatable, and becomes whether any good faith explanation can account for the departures. More importantly, the public can ask the question that the insider-regulated system will never ask: whether the system is serving the insiders instead of the public.

The whole record, drawn

Every decision point in the ledger, and every recorded link between them, top to bottom in time order. An arrow means the later decision point exists in the record because of the earlier one. It says nothing about what anyone intended. The four focused chains above are cut from this picture.
N-002 · 2024-05-14 · IGNORED In one week Wife demanded his three years of financials and his mental-health providers, medications, and pharmacies. Across 52 Wife-side filings and 17 hearings, none shows her side using anything he produced, and her own papers state she "has not sought to take Husband's deposition."N-002N-003 · 2024-05-16 · IGNORED the first motion filed in the case waited 23 months for a hearing while the other side's later motions were heard and grantedN-003N-061 · 2025-10-17 · DENIED Husband tried to ask opposing counsel why he filed for primary custody 26 days before the discovery hearing; the court shut the question off, and declined to set the guardian ad litem motion, later run to an order, while his older discovery motion stayed behind.N-061N-125 · 2026-06-25 · DENIED the order appointing a guardian ad litem over Husband's children makes no finding that either parent is unfit, cites no statute and no rule, names no guardian, and recites a hearing on a date when no session took placeN-125N-039 · 2025-04-01 -> 2026-08-12 · IGNORED Husband's written objection to the cost and risk of a guardian ad litem sat on the docket 450 days before the order granting one and 478 days before the order pricing it at $6,000; neither order mentions cost, risk, or ability to pay.N-039N-119 · 2026-06-10 · EXCUSED twelve days after his own question drew a sworn denial, counsel argued the denied premise to the court as established fact, supplied the inference himself, and named no concern about either child; the objection to it was never ruled onN-119N-134 · 2026-07-23 · DENIED a party's email asking for the order was followed by a signed order in about 25 hours; the order bills Husband $3,000 within three days, imposes a paid communication service no motion asked, and was entered while his briefed challenge to the appointment sat unruledN-134N-024 · 2025-01-21 -> ongoing · DENIED a court order barred both parents from writing anything critical about the guardian ad litem or her private law firm, recited that they had waived the right to, and no party had asked for any of itN-024N-135 · 2026-07-23 · IGNORED the three-day clock to pay a guardian ad litem $3,000 ran out before the guardian had ever contacted Husband, and the motion he filed that same morning to stay or extend it drew no ruling of any kind before the deadline passedN-135N-137 · 2026-07-25 · PENDING the certiorari challenge to the guardian ad litem order is pending, the Second District has ordered a response, and nothing here is charged against anyoneN-137N-073 · 2026-02-03 · DENIED asked to set an earlier hearing on a 20-month-old motion to compel, the court put the question to opposing counsel three times, was told "No, sir, I do not," and said "But I want his consent"; a court needs no permission to hear a motion.N-073N-090 · 2026-04-17 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED after 23 months the motion was finally heard and granted from the bench, and the grant moved nothing: the objections that block production were expressly preserved, production was not compelled, and no written order was ever entered.N-090N-001 · 2023-10 -> 2024-12-13 · DENIED A three-page motion asking the court to appoint a guardian alleges no incident, no date, no observation, and no witness. Every allegation about Husband is quoted from his own earlier filing. The movant had signed the October 2023 postmarital agreement giving 50/50 fourteen months earlier.N-001N-016 · 2024-12-13 -> 2026-06-25 · IGNORED Husband offered to sign the medical releases and to take the evaluations with no court order needed, Wife's counsel declined on the record, and the motions asking for those very things have gone twenty months without a ruling, as of August 20, 2026.N-016N-004 · 2024-05-22 -> ongoing · EXCUSED on the one issue this case turns on, from May 2024 through February 2025, the excusals ran one way.N-004N-026 · 2025-01-31 · REFUSED A signed letter threatening suit claims discovery was withheld pursuant to a valid court order and the marital agreements; asked the next day to name that order, none was named, and the order Husband actually obtained on 10/28/24 ran the other way.N-026N-036 · 2025-03-24 · DENIED the children's school named three routes, one needing no court process; Husband proposed that one in writing on March 18, no answer is located, and six days later counsel refused to agree to the subpoena, leaving only the route carrying the statutory contempt languageN-036N-041 · 2025-04-04 · DENIED the court gave the day to the motion questioning Husband as a parent and pushed the discovery two months out, and in four years the only documented concern about either child was that each had once seemed tired.N-041N-038 · 2025-04-01 · IGNORED the court asked Wife's lawyer in writing to summarize her testimony, he promised it the same day and never sent it, and the court told its own assistant not to remind him.N-038N-044 · 2025-04-07 · IGNORED the judge asked opposing counsel to summarize Wife's testimony and he agreed in writing; no summary came, and the court withdrew its own request in a signed order and did the work itself, so what her testimony consisted of was never fixed on paperN-044N-056 · 2025-10-03 · IGNORED an 82-page motion asking for findings on opposing counsel's conduct and for misconduct referrals has stood more than ten months with no order in either direction, as of August 20, 2026.N-056N-060 · 2025-10-17 · IGNORED the court set three of Husband's own filings for the 10/17/25 hearing and reached none of them, and the one thing it did grant that day, lifting the stay, was never put in an order, so for six months nobody could say what was stayed.N-060N-092 · 2026-04-17 · DENIED an eight-hour trial day on Wife's motion, held while the case was stayed; Husband's noticed motions had waited nine months for any hearing at allN-092N-043 · 2025-04-04 · IGNORED the cooperative route to what the children's school knew was refused in writing, so the school was subpoenaed under a contempt warning, and the compelled witness said nothing had been documented about either child in four years beyond one instance of seeming tired.N-043N-046 · 2025-04-22 · EXCUSED asked in court twice and under oath once to name one thing Husband had filed or done that was inappropriate, no motion, paragraph, or sentence has been identified; the only conduct ever named was an email exchange about baseball equipment, charged to both sides.N-046N-128 · 2026-07-03 · PENDING opposing counsel's own exit order, sent direct to chambers, was signed in 19 hours and 54 minutes; the entered order gave him more than the stipulation asked, releasing him "forever relieved of the responsibility's attendant thereto" [sic]N-128N-133 · 2026-07-22 · IGNORED Husband asked the court to put its own Doc 22 ruling in writing; the answer was "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email" and seven August slots that all lapsed; the same court signed Wife's emailed order in 25 hours and set her an eight-hour hearing one day after she asked.N-133N-139 · 2026-07-28 · DENIED Husband sought a hearing by filed motion, by proposed order, and by an email accepting the court's own offered dates, and got no hearing, no order and no reply; Wife asked by email and had an eight-hour day set the next day, by the same court that six days earlier had written "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email."N-139N-143 · 2026-07-30 · PENDING the court closed itself as a correspondence channel and routed both parties to a case manager, the morning after Husband escalated to the chief judge's office.N-143N-140 · 2026-07-29 · PENDING the rule requires a judge to report to the chief judge every month on any matter he has held more than 60 days; on 7/29/26 Husband filed six formal notices in one morning for six matters standing at 290 to 804 daysN-140N-141 · 2026-07-29 · PENDING the chief judge, a named defendant in the records lawsuit, now holds written notice that matters in his circuit had been pending 290 to 804 days as of the July 29, 2026 notice, and the rule governing him requires examining dockets and requiring reportsN-141N-142 · 2026-07-29 · PENDING on the same afternoon the same chambers set Wife's 8-hour hearing by email in 2 hours 7 minutes, Husband asked for the August dates the court had already offered and that any refusal be put in writing; no response to either appears in the recordN-142N-005 · 2024-05-30 -> 2024-08-14 · REFUSED across eleven weeks the client supplied his own firm with the objective, the instrument, and the urgency, in writing, and asked again when nothing went out; the draft arrived the day of his second follow-up, after the first went unanswered.N-005N-006 · 2024-06-28 · IGNORED she produced nothing by the deadline her own counsel stipulated, and nothing for months after it, while Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day; she had promised in writing, twice, that she would complyN-006N-007 · 2024-10-28 · EXCUSED Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.N-007N-018 · 2024-12-19 · DENIED the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.N-018N-019 · 2024-12-19 · IGNORED the judge told Husband exactly which motion to file to get the financial records, he filed it in exactly that form, she confirmed on the record that it had worked, and as of August 2026, seventeen months on, no judge has ruled on it.N-019N-040 · 2025-04-04 · IGNORED thirty-five days after Husband filed the motion the court itself had told him to file, the judge said on the record that he had "now opened a door to entitle yourself to more evidence"; twenty-four days after that she recused, without ruling on it.N-040N-147 · 2026-08-04 · PENDING four pages of obligations Husband had never been served, among them a ban on posting about his own case, first reached him on August 4, 2026, entered on a non-party's letter with no motion, no notice, and no hearingN-147N-148 · 2026-08-04 · PENDING over roughly $3,260, the motion asks the court to cut a father's time with his minor children to alternate weekends as "an appropriate sanction," in a case where no order anywhere on this docket has found one problem with Husband's parentingN-148N-151 · 2026-08-07 · PENDING no order to show cause was ever issued; the unsworn contempt motion itself was set for hearing three days after it was filed, with one hour reserved for three motions, one of which asks the court to cut Husband's time with the children to alternate weekends as a sanction.N-151N-028 · 2025-02-10 · DENIED Husband's challenge to the order that killed the bank subpoenas was set for an evidentiary hearing; two days before it, the court denied the parent motion on paper, then denied the hearing motion as moot, and the hearing never happened.N-028N-031 · 2025-02-24 · DENIED the regulator closed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without ever asking him to answer it, and told the complaining lawyer to come back once a court made the finding that court has since refused to makeN-031N-032 · 2025-02-24 -> ongoing · DENIED one family-law docket, two opposite answers from the same regulator: the reason it would not examine the opposing lawyer, and the source of the material it examined when the complaining lawyer was the one accusedN-032NEW-P4 · 2026-06-10 · REFUSED asked twice, on two hearing days, whether he had any emails with The Florida Bar about the complaint against him, counsel denied the existence of "secret emails," a phrase the question never used, and the question as asked has never been answeredNEW-P4NEW-P9 · 2026-05-22 -> ongoing · PENDING the Bar's own letter sent this complaint to its Tampa office for additional investigation; seventy-five days later the office running that investigation had not answered its own complainant's two requests to know whether anything was happeningNEW-P9N-045 · 2025-04-22 · EXCUSED twenty-five pages of unrefuted evidence about opposing counsel's conduct produced no inquiry, no finding, and no conduct identified, in any forum; the court pointed to the Bar, the Bar had already closed the file and pointed back to the court, and the judicial commission later pointed back to the courts as well.N-045N-062 · 2025-10-28 · DENIED a complaint about a concealed courthouse video was closed in a one-page letter that never mentions the video and identifies not one thing the Commission didN-062N-063 · 2025-11-21 · IGNORED the follow-up asked one plain question, whether the Commission had ever tried to get the video, and it drew no answer of any kind, not a denial, not an exemption, nothing reviewable, for about eight months as of August 16, 2026N-063N-064 · 2025-11-24 · PENDING the complaint against Husband says he said something untrue in public; he has asked in writing, again and again, which statement, and the Bar has never named one, while the file stays open and the Bar's own rules keep an open file confidentialN-064N-065 · 2025-11-24 · IGNORED every institution named in the article was invited in writing to point out anything false in it, with an offer to amend; in the nearly nine months from November 24, 2025 through August 20, 2026, not one has named a single sentenceN-065NEW-P7 · 2025-11-24 · IGNORED invited in writing to name one false statement in the article about her, she filed a Bar complaint the same afternoon; through July 23, 2026, across sixteen written demands, nobody has named one.NEW-P7N-085 · 2026-03-20 -> ongoing · IGNORED the regulator announced it would put Husband under oath, he agreed the same week without conditions, waived confidentiality, and invited the public; he renewed his availability repeatedly in writing, and as of August 20, 2026, 153 days later, no subpoena and no dates have issuedN-085N-055 · 2025-09-24 · DENIED the Bar described three internal reviews of the closure but produced no record of what any of them did, and told the complainant that anything further he wrote would go in the file without responseN-055N-077 · 2026-02-09 · PARTIAL asked whether communications with Wife's lawyer ever existed, the Bar's counsel answered, three minutes later, that none were withheld from production; his own filed paper thirteen days earlier had said flatly that they do not existN-077N-079 · 2026-02-13 · DENIED the court solicited the dismissal order from the Bar's counsel the day before Husband's opposition was even filed, granted the dismissal without ever holding a hearing, and denied rehearing with the file ordered closedN-079N-082 · 2026-03-09 · DENIED the records showing what the Bar spent on the law firm defending it against its own member were priced and made payable in advance, with the letter noting on its face that Florida law provides no waiver for indigency or public interestN-082N-129 · 2026-07-04 -> ongoing · PARTIAL a dues-paying member asked who funds the outside firm his own Bar retained against him, four times between July 4 and July 11, two fifty-six minutes apart the same evening; the Bar priced the question at $101.09 and has never answered itN-129NEW-P5 · 2026-07-07 · IGNORED the Bar's lawyer won the ruling, accepted the court's assignment to write the order, and six weeks later the ruling still did not exist as an order, so the party that lost it has nothing to appealNEW-P5NEW-P10 · 2026-07-07 · IGNORED the Bar's lawyer told a judge he had a "spidey-sense" about the other side's mental health, said he is not a doctor, and advised the self-represented father to spend better time with his children; the objection was immediate and drew no answer, correction, or withdrawalNEW-P10N-116 · 2026-06-05 · DENIED the Bar reported the file destroyed while the appeal about that very file was pending, and named no disposal date, no schedule provision and no one who authorized itN-116N-124 · 2026-06-19 · PARTIAL the routine request got the routine answer in twenty days; the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and the request for executive-committee review drew nothing in writing from anyoneN-124N-131 · 2026-07-11 · PENDING one complaint drew three different written statements from the Bar: that it investigated, that it did not act, and that it disposed of the file; this letter set them side by side and put the good-faith-basis question to sixteen Bar officers, board members, and counselN-131N-126 · 2026-06-30 · PENDING the appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decisionN-126N-105 · 2026-05-22 · PENDING the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copiedN-105N-130 · 2026-07-07 · DENIED Bar counsel argued three rule grounds by name, the court found none of them, and the four Bar officials' subpoenas were quashed with two of the four sitting in the roomN-130N-107 · 2026-05-28 · IGNORED a motion asking the court to hear the discovery first and the guardian ad litem second went unruled, and four weeks later the guardian ad litem was appointed with the sequencing question still open.N-107N-110 · 2026-05-30 · DENIED the same chambers gave the guardian ad litem hearing a date twelve days out; for the 30-minute hearing Husband needed first, the 5/27/26 offer was 63 days out, and it was heard on 7/7, twelve days after the guardian ad litem had already been granted.N-110N-121 · 2026-06-16 · DENIED the second complaint arrived with a written conflicts notice on its face, and closed in 23 days without a word about the conflicts, from an institution that was at that moment an active defendant in the complainant's pending lawsuit against itN-121NEW-P6 · 2025-02-24 -> 2025-10-10 · IGNORED seventeen emails in this chain, six replies out, three emailed status formulas and three mailed letters, and not one of his questions answered; when he asked in writing whether there was a rule against speaking with him, no one repliedNEW-P6N-033 · 2025-02-28 · IGNORED the court told Husband exactly what to file if he wanted discovery, he filed it in exactly that form, and as of 8/17/26, 535 days later, no judge has ruled on it; the gate the court built has never opened.N-033N-034 · 2025-03-02 · IGNORED Wife objected to the second set of bank subpoenas and told the court a fifteen-minute hearing would resolve it; as of August 17, 2026 the objection had gone more than five hundred days without a ruling, blocking the records that whole time.N-034N-042 · 2025-04-04 · DENIED the judge offered the courthouse camera footage as proof about her own conduct, and when Husband asked her to go get it she refused twice and ended the hearing, and it has never been produced.N-042N-047 · 2025-04-28 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED the one time the disqualification rule was applied as written, Husband won and the judge left the case; not one of the things he had been asking that court to decide moved.N-047N-048 · 2025-04-28 · DENIED the judge who inherited the case signed an order of recusal the same day, stating no reason, and that order was left out of the circuit's records production and refused entry into the appellate recordN-048N-049 · 2025-06-24 · DENIED the venue motion was denied from the bench with no findings, the winning side was told to write the order, and fees were reserved for "both parties" when only one side had ever asked for them.N-049N-087 · 2026-04-06 · DENIED one week before it affirmed, the court refused to add the video to the record and struck five filings in a one-page order naming no judge, while an order from the same court fifty-five days earlier named all three of its judges.N-087N-114 · 2026-06-03 · DENIED the court withheld its own machinery, case assignment, scheduling, the case-management system, and phone logs, behind an exemption that protects deliberation, and the category asking which judges decided the unnamed orders drew the same boilerplate as the restN-114N-115 · 2026-06-04 · PARTIAL the chief judge answered forty days after the request reached him and six days after the follow-up, produced a record for free, then placed every other record behind one rule citation naming no document, and the supplement he promised has not issuedN-115N-149 · 2026-08-04 · PARTIAL the appellate court's custodian asserted a blanket exemption over records "referencing me by name," attached two records of exactly that description in the same email, and put everything else behind $313 in advanceN-149N-088 · 2026-04-15 · DENIED the appeal ended in three words, on the same record the court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video at the center of the caseN-088N-101 · 2026-05-12 · DENIED Husband asked the court in writing to state its reasoning; the order refusing that request states no reasoning and names no judge, and it is the fifth of its kindN-101N-053 · 2025-08-21 · DENIED the court confirmed the hearing video exists, then withheld it on an exemption whose factual basis it has never stated, through ten months of litigationN-053N-058 · 2025-10-14 · IGNORED the statute says a public-records case gets an immediate hearing ahead of everything else; this one waited 91 days for its first substantive look and, as of August 20, 2026, ten months after filing, has had no final hearing and no writ enteredN-058N-059 · 2025-10-14 -> ongoing · IGNORED one structural question was put to four courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related oneN-059N-069 · 2026-01-08 · DENIED the ground raised was that a judge named as a defendant in a pending case was presiding over the related one; the order answered with a procedural bar, contained no analysis of that question, and the follow-on denial cited no authority at all.N-069N-078 · 2026-02-10 · DENIED the petition asking whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may keep presiding over the related one was denied in a single sentence, seven days after filing and one day after the fee posted, with no response ever required from anyoneN-078N-091 · 2026-04-17 · DENIED asked six times to make findings of fact, the court answered: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so."N-091N-095 · 2026-05-01 · IGNORED Husband asked the court to write down its own factual findings; the entire answer was a checked box reading "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course," and the findings are still unwritten.N-095N-108 · 2026-05-29 · DENIED asked whether he knew he was a defendant in a pending case against the circuit, the judge answered "I may be"; asked whether he would ever find any facts about Husband's constitutional rights, and after reframing the question himself, he answered "Maybe."N-108N-109 · 2026-05-29 · DENIED all three of Husband's witnesses were excused from the bench in one hearing, and the motion excusing the court's own records custodian was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends this judge in the records case.N-109N-112 · 2026-06-02 · DENIED the witness who holds Husband's own former firm's record of the 2024 discovery refusals was "fully released" by an order that states no findings and no legal basis anywhere on its face.N-112N-113 · 2026-06-03 · DENIED the order releasing the court's own records custodian states no findings and no legal basis, and it was entered twice: Doc 327 is a byte-identical duplicate of Doc 326.N-113N-118 · 2026-06-10 · DENIED the motion pled a status ground the rule treats separately, that the judge was himself a named defendant in a pending case; the order denying it 9 hours and 27 minutes after filing called the motion "legally insufficient" and never mentions that groundN-118N-070 · 2026-01-13 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED the outside judge who first read the petition found a case for Husband and, in the same order, removed the administrative-records claims against the three judges on a rule no defendant had cited and no defendant had arguedN-070N-072 · 2026-01-21 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED the one disqualification motion in this case that a judge had no discretion to refuse was granted, and the case's direction did not changeN-072NEW-P13 · 2026-01-21 · PARTIAL the motion asked the judge to explain rulings he had made on his own initiative, and to step aside only if the explanation failed; five days later he stepped aside, addressed his order "solely to the alternative relief", and never explained the rulingsNEW-P13N-075 · 2026-02-09 · DENIED the vacate-and-restart route, the case that justified it, and the argument that Husband had invited it all came from the bench, while the defendants' own lawyer told the court there was no case law giving that guidanceN-075N-080 · 2026-02-17 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED the day after vacating his predecessor's writ, the second outside judge looked at the same petition and again found Husband entitled on its face, set a date to produce the records or show cause, and nothing was produced and nothing was enforcedN-080N-086 · 2026-03-23 · DENIED the order denying the writ certifies that the court "has adhered to the procedural requirements," makes no finding about the records themselves, sets no next step and no deadline, and explains that fees are premature because no final judgment has been enteredN-086N-089 · 2026-04-15 · IGNORED two judges each found the case sufficient on its face, and the motion to enforce those findings has sat unruled since April 15, 2026, 127 days as of August 20, 2026, while the court announced two different controlling rules, each pointing away from itN-089N-098 · 2026-05-05 · DENIED the order signed May 5, 2026 recites and commands compliance with "an order dated April 18, 2026," an order that appears nowhere in the docket or the case file, and two motions asking the court to confirm the error have gone unansweredN-098N-102 · 2026-05-15 · PARTIAL asked to admit that nobody weighed the public interest and nobody considered redaction before the video was refused outright, the office admitted both, giving the same reason twice: "No analysis was needed as the video is confidential"N-102N-103 · 2026-05-15 · PENDING asked to admit that nobody had watched the video before it was withheld, the office answered in one word, "Denied," disputing that nobody watched it, and the record still does not say whoN-103N-117 · 2026-06-05 · IGNORED a court set a hearing in a records case the statute puts first in line and never said what the hearing was about, before it or after; six weeks later the same court held that facts were disputed and declined to name one.N-117N-127 · 2026-07-01 · DENIED the motion was denied on the successive-motion track, counting a different judge's disqualification as the first motion, and that track is the one that let the order find that the undersigned judge "has been fair and impartial in this case"N-127N-136 · 2026-07-24 · IGNORED the court held that facts were still in dispute and, asked three lines later to name one, pointed to a document instead: "Those issues are contained and delineated within their response," and then "don't ask me to explain those matters to you"N-136NEW-P3 · 2026-03-04 · IGNORED one amended petition drew four responsive filings, every extra chance came from the court and not from any motion the defendants filed, and the exemption grounds the case now runs on first appeared inside the second court-created windowNEW-P3N-071 · 2026-01-15 · IGNORED the executive branch was asked to investigate the Thirteenth Circuit, and instead entered an appearance as that circuit's defense counsel; the written demand asking it to explain the conflict has never been answeredN-071N-076 · 2026-02-09 · IGNORED two writs, an appellate motion, and four trial-court motions have asked a court to watch the 4/4/25 courthouse video; asked on 4/17/26 whether he had reviewed it, Judge Felix answered "I have not."N-076N-081 · 2026-02-17 · IGNORED the deadline to answer seven admissions, six interrogatories, and five document requests came and went with nothing answered and nothing objected to; those requests asked who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it, and most have never been answeredN-081N-104 · 2026-05-18 · IGNORED asked to take judicial notice of the case in which he is himself a named defendant, the judge sustained the other side's relevance objection from the bench, stated no ground of his own, and entered no written order.N-104NEW-P2 · 2025-10-14 · PARTIAL the three requests that asked how the chief judge's office handles complaints, what one judge communicated about eight emergency filings, and another judge's disqualification history drew one forwarding sentence and, through the pleaded window, nothing elseNEW-P2N-066 · 2025-11-26 · DENIED the appellate court kept the courthouse video out of the record in orders that name no judge and give no reason, and when asked who decided, answered that no such record is filed anywhere a party can reachN-066NEW-P1 · 2025-08-21 · PARTIAL the circuit certified twice in writing that the records existed, counted them, took the copying fee, and handed over a paper box that did not contain the judge-level communications the certification covered. The August 31, 2025 request for an explanation was unanswered a year later.NEW-P1N-057 · 2025-10-12 · IGNORED the request that hearings be recorded was never decided, and while it waited the recordings that did exist were erased on a 30-day schedule; seven hearing dates now have no video at all.N-057N-050 · 2025-06-28 · IGNORED Husband asked for an immediate ruling on discovery objections that had waited four to thirteen months; the answer was a form saying it was not an emergency and belonged in the normal course. That normal course has still not come, more than 13 months later.N-050N-054 · 2025-09-12 · DENIED the petition asking for the first written review of the orders that shut off the financial records was dismissed in three words, and the order that later denied every post-dismissal motion carries no judge's name at allN-054N-008 · 2024-11-08 · IGNORED counsel dated the delinquency at many months with zero documents received, called what had arrived partial, and in the same email handed the matter on. Nobody pressed it afterward.N-008N-009 · 2024-11-20 (heard 10-28) · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.N-009N-011 · 2024-12-05 · IGNORED the sanctions statute gives 21 days to fix the problem and walk away; eight days into that window the answer was four motions filed that morning, and as of August 21, 2026, 624 days later, no hearing on the notice has ever been heldN-011N-013 · 2024-12-13 · IGNORED four motions against Husband in one day, two of them quoting his own sentence about withholding a payment and stopping at "out of anger and frustration," before the words that say he did it to get the bank statementsN-013NEW-P8 · 2024-11-25 -> 2025-01-31 · REFUSED a motion about children implies a concern about children; asked in writing, more than once, to name it so he could address it, the father was told no explanation was owed unless a court ordered oneNEW-P8N-022 · 2025-01-09 · EXCUSED the court answered a showing about opposing counsel's specific conduct with its own general impression of the lawyer, and the conduct in the case pending before her went unexamined.N-022N-027 · 2025-02-05 · DENIED the first motion asking Judge Ayers to step aside was denied as legally insufficient with no reason given; twelve weeks later the same species of motion was granted with its ground stated on its face, and the denial has still never been explained.N-027N-030 · 2025-02-18 · EXCUSED an order to show cause backed by an arrest warning issued against both parties without naming a single email, date, sender, or count, and a hearing on it had already been noticed before the order existed.N-030N-029 · 2025-02-12 · DENIED the motion challenged the certificate of compliance under one subdivision of the disclosure rule; the order denied it for failing to identify a document under a different subdivision, and the same order recorded Wife's agreement to file a corrected certificate.N-029N-035 · 2025-03-04 · DENIED in the same fortnight, Wife's motion to compel was granted in part with a deadline attached, and Husband's motion attacking the orders that left him with no disclosure came back to him as his own paper with the word DENIED stamped on it.N-035N-037 · 2025-04-01 · IGNORED the request for Davis's own billing, payment, and source-of-funds records has gone 546 days as of August 21, 2026 with no response, no objection, and no rulingN-037N-010 · 2024-11-22 · REFUSED seventy-two hours after sending a positive case update, Husband's own lawyer threatened to withdraw; she then moved her exit hearing up twenty-four days on one day's notice, and he met the four motions filed against him self-represented.N-010N-014 · 2024-12-13 · DENIED a withdrawal motion that had been set thirty-four days out was heard twenty-four days early, on one day's notice, with no emergency asserted and no basis for the acceleration stated; the client had objected in writing twice before it began, and it ended his representation.N-014N-015 · 2024-12-13 · DENIED the rule puts the burden on the lawyer who wants to leave; the court demanded instead that the client produce a legal basis for keeping his own lawyer, kept the lawyer's stated reason free of any question, and made no findings when he asked for them.N-015N-023 · 2025-01-21 · EXCUSED Husband had waived his own privilege three separate ways; the court still closed off any inquiry into the call that ended his representation, by invoking a privilege belonging to the other side that the other side had never claimed.N-023N-083 · 2026-03-11 · PENDING she told The Florida Bar that her withdrawal was a "direct result" of a November 25 email; the response does not mention that she had already threatened to withdraw three days earlier, and the exhibit she attached herself is what shows itN-083N-021 · 2025-01-09 · DENIED Husband won his rehearing on paper, and by the day it was heard he had already lost his lawyer, answered the petition alone, and been served with a motion to default him.N-021NEW-A121 · 2025-01-21 · EXCUSED with the accused lawyer present in the room and the legal question put squarely twice, inquiry into his alleged misconduct was again refused on a privilege ground that does not exist.NEW-A121N-025 · 2025-01-22 · IGNORED told three times in writing that its own circuit had a problem, the chief judge's office answered that it has no investigative powers and pointed Husband back to the judge he was complaining aboutN-025N-051 · 2025-06-28 · EXCUSED a filed record of dated interference with the children's time drew one checkbox and no finding on any item, and more than a year later no judge has made a finding on any of it.N-051N-052 · 2025-08-01 · DENIED two orders in three minutes fifty-one seconds, neither with a hearing and neither with reasons, froze the whole discovery queue while the parts of Husband's own motion that would have moved discovery forward went unruled.N-052N-074 · 2026-02-03 · IGNORED the stay that froze discovery for six months was imposed in writing in under four minutes and was never lifted by any order at all; Husband asked in writing which order lifted it, and the question has never been answered.N-074N-093 · 2026-04-23 · IGNORED the University of Florida held a records request twenty-eight days and gave no reason of any kind; it answered only after Husband followed up, and then, the next day, in a single sentence saying the request was under legal review, a line its own lawyer wrote for the custodian that same dayN-093N-094 · 2026-04-24 -> 2026-07-30 · PARTIAL UF's own file counted the pages it found, batch by batch, and in the same messages asked whether to prepare an invoice; the requester was told the request was complete at fifty-three pages and was given no count of what had been located until 103 days later, after he suedN-094N-100 · 2026-05-08 · DENIED UF said it had found records and was keeping them because they concerned other people named Hanson, a ground that exists nowhere in the records law; its file shows hits on both case numbers, judges' names, and surveillance video, none of which is a surnameN-100N-096 · 2026-05-04 · DENIED UF's own IT office wrote at 10:40 that morning that the search had stalled and that seventeen messages should have been included; four and a half hours later the records office marked the request complete and wrote, "This completes the public records request"N-096N-097 · 2026-05-04 · IGNORED the rerun that finished after the stalled search returned 109 pages and 17 recovered messages that same morning; UF's lawyers put them in a folder for review and release approval and asked about an invoice, and that afternoon UF closed the request at 53 pagesN-097N-099 · 2026-05-07 · IGNORED three days after declaring the records request complete, UF's own lawyer asked for the disputed records "as a separate pdf"; UF's staff routed the 88-page file "for approval to be released"; it was never released, logged, or mentioned in any filingN-099N-144 · 2026-07-30 · PENDING UF put all 479 gathered pages onto the public docket unsealed, including pages it had refused the requester since May; for 98 pages the same filing takes both positions at once, records it need not produce and records it need not logN-144N-145 · 2026-08-03 · IGNORED the only person who swore to UF's account, its own records custodian, was noticed for deposition with ten days' notice; on the day, no witness and no lawyer for UF appeared at either setting, and no order had ever excused attendanceN-145N-146 · 2026-08-03 · PENDING the one demand that costs UF nothing to answer, written confirmation it is preserving the search outputs and logs, was put to UF on July 13, 15, 16, and 18, and again August 3; no answer has been found in any channel searchedN-146N-120 · 2026-06-12 · PENDING a judge outside the case read the petition and ordered UF to show cause; UF answered by denying that either duty exists, under a heading of its own writing: "Florida Law Does Not Require Certification of Diligent Search or a Privilege Log"N-120N-106 · 2026-05-27 · REFUSED the witness with the most direct knowledge of the 2024 representation was subpoenaed and litigated against testifying rather than testify; six days later an order declared her "fully released," and what she had written in 2024 about Husband as a father never reached the record.N-106N-111 · 2026-06-01 · DENIED the Florida Supreme Court's records office answered seven of ten categories with a single rule citation that identifies no record, and three categories it never answered at allN-111N-122 · 2026-06-17 · DENIED the Attorney General's office called its production complete while answering one of eight categories; the two categories about its own authority remain wholly unansweredN-122N-123 · 2026-06-17 · PENDING a non-party's lawyer submitted a proposed order at 9:42 AM and had it signed by 1:47 PM the same day, about 4 hours and 5 minutesN-123

154 decision points drawn. Select any box to open its card.

The Power Imbalance and AI as the Great Equalizer

The public is largely helpless to hold the courts accountable because each litigant mistreated by the system is alone against this powerful and insulated institution. It is hard to unite people behind a single litigant’s cause, especially if numerous layers of institutional oversight have reached the same result, irrespective of how dishonest and corrupt the result may be.

Despite dozens of attorneys, judges, and state officials that oppose me at every level for over 2 years, I know without any doubt that I will prevail for one simple reason: the truth. Pay attention to the reaction you just had. That is what you actually think of the judicial system. Keep that clear in your mind for a moment. It’s so frustrating that it’s the type of thought we barely notice. We’ve become so despondent we just accept it and want to forget we ever had the thought.

Every single person I’ve discussed this situation with, friends, family, fellow lawyers, doctors and others, all react the same way: "that’s just the way things are," or "you can’t fight city hall!" or "What makes you so special that you think you can actually fight any one of these powerful institutions, let alone all of them at once?"

That’s the cruelest part about the misconduct involved here. The people with the power to correct any of this are the same people a correction would expose, and nothing in the system compels them to answer. So they do not. They close the file, refer it to another office, or say nothing at all, and every forum points to another. That is not a theory about what anyone is thinking. It is what the record shows they did, every time, and it is why a pattern this obvious survives. Fortunately, I have the skills as an attorney to protect me and my family. I’ve made the truth salient and public all along. Power will not subvert the truth in these matters.

Thank God there are 2 people who are just as sure as I am that I’ll prevail: my 2 daughters. They don’t know what I’m fighting against, but even if they did, they’d remain completely free of doubt. Because they still understand the truth is real. And powerful. And AI just made it orders of magnitude more powerful even in the hands of a single Florida attorney.

154decision points
35months of record
9separate proceedings
21actors and institutions

Not one of them ended with the legally expected output enforced. Where the law requires an outcome, that outcome is the expected result from the decision-maker. Much of what the law commands leaves no discretion: a required finding is made or it is not, a deadline is met or it is not, a filed motion is ruled on or it is not. Every class in this ledger is computed from the rows. Across 35 months of record, the full legally expected output was never enforced, not once.

How to read that zero

Check it three ways

Every card in this ledger states the legally expected output: what, if anything, the facts before the decision-maker required. A card where that output issued and held shows alignment. A card where it did not shows a divergence. A pattern of divergences, running one way, is misalignment. Where the law required an outcome, a win here is not the long shot; it is the expected result. Of the 154 decision points recorded here, the number that ended with the legally expected output enforced is 0. That is a count, not an estimate.

Set aside the 20 that are still pending, and 134 have an outcome. 124 of those did not end in the expected output at all, 10 ended with part of it, and none ended with all of it, enforced.

Now take the most generous reading available. Count all 10 partial results as though the full expected output had issued, and count all 6 where the expected output issued on paper and was then nullified as though it had held. That is 16 of 154, or 10.4 percent of everything recorded, and 16 of 134, or 11.9 percent of what has an outcome. Not one of the 6 produced the relief it granted.

Many of these cards began as Husband's own motions, appeals, and records requests. Each of them asked for something the law already required: produce the record, make the required finding, apply the rule as written. Any institution could have ended the dispute at any card by doing that, and the card would record alignment. What the cards record is what happened instead. A single divergence can be error. Divergence sustained in one direction, across institutions whose duties include correcting one another, is not explained as error, and no single decision-maker explains it either. Documenting that is what this ledger is for.

If anything in this document is untrue, identify the statement and I will correct it.

That request stands to anyone reading this. The allegations collected here have been put in writing, more than once, to the institutions with authority to examine them, and no false statement has been identified in response. Every row below names the document, transcript page, or email that proves it, so a wrong row can be shown wrong from the same records.

How one decision produced the next

Close the diagrams

The ledger records which decision points exist because of earlier ones. Those relationships are drawn here for the first time. Every arrow is a record relationship, not a claim about anyone’s intent.

One bar complaint, five different accounts from the Bar on its handling

A sworn complaint was filed on February 18, 2025 and closed at intake six days later, before any response cycle began. What follows is the same institution describing what it did with that complaint, in the order it said it. In September 2025 it recited an investigation by a Senior Staff Attorney, review by the Intake Director, and review by the Chair of a grievance committee. In January 2026 its filed motion to dismiss said the records do not exist. Thirteen days later its counsel, who signed that motion, wrote that none had been withheld from public record production, which is a narrower statement than the one already filed. In May 2026 a filed paper said the Bar did not act on the complaint. Two weeks after that, in June 2026, it answered a request for the records of its own handling and review, a request that expressly excluded the closed investigative file, by saying those records had been disposed of under a records retention schedule. Those are five written positions about one complaint in ten months. An institution that did not act has no handling file to dispose of, and an institution that investigated did not do nothing. Husband has asked the Bar in writing, and in open court, to say which account is the accurate one. No answer identifying one has come back.
N-031 · 2025-02-24 · DENIED the regulator closed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without ever asking him to answer it, and told the complaining lawyer to come back once a court made the finding that court has since refused to makeN-03102/24/25the regulator closed a25-page written complaint…N-055 · 2025-09-24 · DENIED the Bar described three internal reviews of the closure but produced no record of what any of them did, and told the complainant that anything further he wrote would go in the file without responseN-05509/24/25the Bar described threeinternal reviews of the…N-077 · 2026-02-09 · PARTIAL asked whether communications with Wife's lawyer ever existed, the Bar's counsel answered, three minutes later, that none were withheld from production; his own filed paper thirteen days earlier had said flatly that they do not existN-07702/09/26asked whethercommunications with Wife'…N-105 · 2026-05-22 · PENDING the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copiedN-10505/22/26the Bar told a court it"did not act" on the…N-116 · 2026-06-05 · DENIED the Bar reported the file destroyed while the appeal about that very file was pending, and named no disposal date, no schedule provision and no one who authorized itN-11606/05/26the Bar reported the filedestroyed while the appea…N-124 · 2026-06-19 · PARTIAL the routine request got the routine answer in twenty days; the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and the request for executive-committee review drew nothing in writing from anyoneN-12406/19/26the routine request gotthe routine answer in…N-130 · 2026-07-07 · DENIED Bar counsel argued three rule grounds by name, the court found none of them, and the four Bar officials' subpoenas were quashed with two of the four sitting in the roomN-13007/07/26Bar counsel argued threerule grounds by name, the…N-131 · 2026-07-11 · PENDING one complaint drew three different written statements from the Bar: that it investigated, that it did not act, and that it disposed of the file; this letter set them side by side and put the good-faith-basis question to sixteen Bar officers, board members, and counselN-13107/11/26one complaint drew threedifferent written…

8 decision points drawn. Select any box to open its card.

From a financial-disclosure dispute to a guardian ad litem

Read downward. Each arrow means the later decision point exists in the record because of the earlier one. It says nothing about what anyone intended. The appointment sits at the bottom of a chain that begins in a financial-disclosure dispute.
N-125 · 2026-06-25 · DENIED the order appointing a guardian ad litem over Husband's children makes no finding that either parent is unfit, cites no statute and no rule, names no guardian, and recites a hearing on a date when no session took placeN-12506/25/26the order appointing aguardian ad litem over…N-018 · 2024-12-19 · DENIED the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.N-01812/19/24the court said it was notruling on the two marital…N-006 · 2024-06-28 · IGNORED she produced nothing by the deadline her own counsel stipulated, and nothing for months after it, while Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day; she had promised in writing, twice, that she would complyN-00606/28/24she produced nothing bythe deadline her own…N-007 · 2024-10-28 · EXCUSED Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.N-00710/28/24Wife's side was alreadylate enough that a fee…N-107 · 2026-05-28 · IGNORED a motion asking the court to hear the discovery first and the guardian ad litem second went unruled, and four weeks later the guardian ad litem was appointed with the sequencing question still open.N-10705/28/26a motion asking the courtto hear the discovery…N-011 · 2024-12-05 · IGNORED the sanctions statute gives 21 days to fix the problem and walk away; eight days into that window the answer was four motions filed that morning, and as of August 21, 2026, 624 days later, no hearing on the notice has ever been heldN-01112/05/24the sanctions statutegives 21 days to fix the…N-009 · 2024-11-20 (heard 10-28) · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.N-00911/20/24Husband won the ordercompelling Wife's…N-031 · 2025-02-24 · DENIED the regulator closed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without ever asking him to answer it, and told the complaining lawyer to come back once a court made the finding that court has since refused to makeN-03102/24/25the regulator closed a25-page written complaint…N-037 · 2025-04-01 · IGNORED the request for Davis's own billing, payment, and source-of-funds records has gone 546 days as of August 21, 2026 with no response, no objection, and no rulingN-03704/01/25the request for Davis'sown billing, payment, and…N-061 · 2025-10-17 · DENIED Husband tried to ask opposing counsel why he filed for primary custody 26 days before the discovery hearing; the court shut the question off, and declined to set the guardian ad litem motion, later run to an order, while his older discovery motion stayed behind.N-06110/17/25Husband tried to askopposing counsel why he…N-003 · 2024-05-16 · IGNORED the first motion filed in the case waited 23 months for a hearing while the other side's later motions were heard and grantedN-00305/16/24the first motion filed inthe case waited 23 months…N-060 · 2025-10-17 · IGNORED the court set three of Husband's own filings for the 10/17/25 hearing and reached none of them, and the one thing it did grant that day, lifting the stay, was never put in an order, so for six months nobody could say what was stayed.N-06010/17/25the court set three ofHusband's own filings for…N-056 · 2025-10-03 · IGNORED an 82-page motion asking for findings on opposing counsel's conduct and for misconduct referrals has stood more than ten months with no order in either direction, as of August 20, 2026.N-05610/03/25an 82-page motion askingfor findings on opposing…N-057 · 2025-10-12 · IGNORED the request that hearings be recorded was never decided, and while it waited the recordings that did exist were erased on a 30-day schedule; seven hearing dates now have no video at all.N-05710/12/25the request that hearingsbe recorded was never…

14 decision points drawn. Select any box to open its card.

One unheard statutory claim, and everything that followed it

N-046 spawned more decision points directly than any other entry: ten, and they run across seven different lanes. A single unheard statutory claim is what each of them follows from.
N-058 · 2025-10-14 · IGNORED the statute says a public-records case gets an immediate hearing ahead of everything else; this one waited 91 days for its first substantive look and, as of August 20, 2026, ten months after filing, has had no final hearing and no writ enteredN-05810/14/25the statute says apublic-records case gets…N-053 · 2025-08-21 · DENIED the court confirmed the hearing video exists, then withheld it on an exemption whose factual basis it has never stated, through ten months of litigationN-05308/21/25the court confirmed thehearing video exists, the…N-059 · 2025-10-14 -> ongoing · IGNORED one structural question was put to four courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related oneN-05910/14/25–ongoingone structural questionwas put to four courts an…N-069 · 2026-01-08 · DENIED the ground raised was that a judge named as a defendant in a pending case was presiding over the related one; the order answered with a procedural bar, contained no analysis of that question, and the follow-on denial cited no authority at all.N-06901/08/26the ground raised was thata judge named as a…N-070 · 2026-01-13 · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED the outside judge who first read the petition found a case for Husband and, in the same order, removed the administrative-records claims against the three judges on a rule no defendant had cited and no defendant had arguedN-07001/13/26the outside judge whofirst read the petition…N-071 · 2026-01-15 · IGNORED the executive branch was asked to investigate the Thirteenth Circuit, and instead entered an appearance as that circuit's defense counsel; the written demand asking it to explain the conflict has never been answeredN-07101/15/26the executive branch wasasked to investigate the…N-076 · 2026-02-09 · IGNORED two writs, an appellate motion, and four trial-court motions have asked a court to watch the 4/4/25 courthouse video; asked on 4/17/26 whether he had reviewed it, Judge Felix answered "I have not."N-07602/09/26two writs, an appellatemotion, and four…N-081 · 2026-02-17 · IGNORED the deadline to answer seven admissions, six interrogatories, and five document requests came and went with nothing answered and nothing objected to; those requests asked who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it, and most have never been answeredN-08102/17/26the deadline to answerseven admissions, six…N-104 · 2026-05-18 · IGNORED asked to take judicial notice of the case in which he is himself a named defendant, the judge sustained the other side's relevance objection from the bench, stated no ground of his own, and entered no written order.N-10405/18/26asked to take judicialnotice of the case in…N-105 · 2026-05-22 · PENDING the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copiedN-10505/22/26the Bar told a court it"did not act" on the…N-109 · 2026-05-29 · DENIED all three of Husband's witnesses were excused from the bench in one hearing, and the motion excusing the court's own records custodian was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends this judge in the records case.N-10905/29/26all three of Husband'switnesses were excused…NEW-P2 · 2025-10-14 · PARTIAL the three requests that asked how the chief judge's office handles complaints, what one judge communicated about eight emergency filings, and another judge's disqualification history drew one forwarding sentence and, through the pleaded window, nothing elseNEW-P210/14/25the three requests thatasked how the chief…

12 decision points drawn. Select any box to open its card.

Where it starts: one unenforced disclosure deadline

N-004 is a root. Nothing else in the ledger produced it, and six decision points follow from it directly. Following the chain the whole way down, 117 of the 154 entries in this ledger trace back to this single unenforced disclosure deadline. Roots are where the chain starts, not where blame is assigned.
N-006 · 2024-06-28 · IGNORED she produced nothing by the deadline her own counsel stipulated, and nothing for months after it, while Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day; she had promised in writing, twice, that she would complyN-00606/28/24she produced nothing bythe deadline her own…N-004 · 2024-05-22 -> ongoing · EXCUSED on the one issue this case turns on, from May 2024 through February 2025, the excusals ran one way.N-00405/22/24–ongoingon the one issue this caseturns on, from May 2024…N-007 · 2024-10-28 · EXCUSED Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.N-00710/28/24Wife's side was alreadylate enough that a fee…N-008 · 2024-11-08 · IGNORED counsel dated the delinquency at many months with zero documents received, called what had arrived partial, and in the same email handed the matter on. Nobody pressed it afterward.N-00811/08/24counsel dated thedelinquency at many month…N-009 · 2024-11-20 (heard 10-28) · WON-THEN-NULLIFIED Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.N-00911/20/24Husband won the ordercompelling Wife's…N-018 · 2024-12-19 · DENIED the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.N-01812/19/24the court said it was notruling on the two marital…N-037 · 2025-04-01 · IGNORED the request for Davis's own billing, payment, and source-of-funds records has gone 546 days as of August 21, 2026 with no response, no objection, and no rulingN-03704/01/25the request for Davis'sown billing, payment, and…

7 decision points drawn. Select any box to open its card.

Why this ledger exists

Read the full statement

My challenge to those accused of misconduct

This ledger and corresponding map are the checkable versions of these claims. The people and institutions this ledger accuses have been confronted with these allegations in writing, over and over. I’ll provide this to them as soon as it posts. I continue to ask one question: can any of you identify a single false statement? In November 2025 the article "Foxes Guarding the Courthouse" (https://tinyurl.com/hanson-foxes-article) went directly to the Bar, the JQC, and the Thirteenth Circuit. In June 2026 an open letter went to Sixth Circuit leadership and the Attorney General, and was filed on the docket (https://tinyurl.com/hanson-open-letter-6th-cir). In July 2026 a follow-up letter put the unanswered questions to the Bar again (https://tinyurl.com/hanson-bar-0723-followup). Not one person or institution has ever identified a false statement. What came back instead was silence, referrals to another office, and, six hours and twenty-two minutes after my third email sharing the article, a Bar complaint filed against me by Judge Ayers. And when the one discovery channel left open finally forced answers, the state admitted in writing that no confidentiality order exists and that "No analysis was needed" (https://tinyurl.com/hanson-10255-rfa-responses).

One more believer, of a newer kind

And one more believer, of a newer kind: the smartest neural network I know, which has discussed these facts with me at length. "Claude" never simply takes my word for anything. Claude attacked every claim the way a whole team of lawyers would and only included facts demonstrated in court documents and the written record. This is an incomplete list of the occasions on which the Florida judicial system has diverged from controlling authority. It is a work in progress, and it continues to grow as the record does.

So I ask all parents reading this: what type of a justice system do we want for our children? One that’s fair, or one where those in power get away with picking and choosing the winners and losers irrespective of the law and professional rules?

The method

This ledger is the method: every decision point recorded separately, measured against the rule that governed it, attached to a receipt anyone can pull, and carried across every institution that was asked to correct the last one. That turns an accusation into something checkable, and it is checkable by the same records the system keeps about itself.

The core divergence and efforts for a fair process and accountability

Open the case list
Hillsborough County Circuit Court, No. 24-DR-001150the dissolution case where the dispute began.
Second District Court of Appeal, No. 2D2025-0681petition for writ of certiorari.
Second District Court of Appeal, No. 2D2025-1936direct appeal.
Second District Court of Appeal, No. 2D2026-0279petition for writ of prohibition.
Second District Court of Appeal, No. 2D2026-1955certiorari petition on the guardian ad litem order.
Thirteenth Circuit, No. 25-CA-010255public-records mandamus against the court system itself, heard by judges specially assigned from the Sixth Circuit.
Leon County Circuit Court, No. 2469mandamus concerning Florida Bar records.
First District Court of Appeal, No. 1D2026-0728appeal from that mandamus.
Eighth Circuit, Alachua County, No. 01-2026-CA-001794public-records mandamus against the University of Florida.

Complaints were also filed with the Florida Bar and the Judicial Qualifications Commission, and public-records requests were made to the Office of the Attorney General, the Executive Office of the Governor, the Sixth Circuit, the Second District Court of Appeal, and the Florida Bar. Those are tracked here as well, offering examples of extreme divergence from authority whose consistent effect is to protect judicial insiders from accountability.

How to read the table.

Rows run in node-number order. The numbers were assigned chronologically as the ledger was built, by each card’s starting date, so the table reads straight through as a chronology; a card that covers a span of dates rather than a single one is numbered from where that span begins. A node number is the decision point’s permanent name. N-061 is N-061 in every version of this ledger, so a citation to a card stays good. Some rows are deliberately undramatic. They are the baseline: the pattern is measured against them. If you read only five cards: N-001, N-002, N-077, N-102, N-122. The ledger’s own prose calls the parties Husband and Wife. Quotes from the record keep their real names. Nothing here is asserted past its receipt. The Receipt column names the source, and a wrong row can be shown wrong from the same docket. That is the point. A companion verification record shows how each source was checked. An omissions log lists what was left out and why. Both are available on request. This table is current through Wednesday, August 26, 2026, and every day count is computed as of the date its own card states.

How to read the citations.

"Doc" and "DIN" both mean a numbered filing on the Clerk’s docket. "Tr." is a certified hearing transcript, cited by page and line. "PRR" is a public records request under Florida’s public records law. "GAL" is a guardian ad litem, a court appointee in custody matters.

Actor groups link to official public rosters (court directories and Florida Bar member records) so each decision-maker’s public role can be confirmed from the state’s own sources.

Other shorthand.

Open the glossary

The divorce case, No. 24-DR-001150, is called 1150 in short cites.

DCADistrict Court of Appeal.
OSCorder to show cause.
RFArequest for admissions.
JQCJudicial Qualifications Commission.
AOCAdministrative Office of the Courts.
OFWOurFamilyWizard, a paid co-parenting messaging service.
OGCoffice of general counsel.
FSCFlorida Supreme Court.
JAjudicial assistant.
TCAtrial court administrator.
AAGAssistant Attorney General.
HHDHarris, Hunt & Derr, a firm that once represented Husband.
GTGreenberg Traurig.
SBPthe Florida Bar Standing Board Policies.
JAWSthe circuit’s case-management system.
PIOpublic information officer.

Rule and statute numbers (12.285, 2.420, 57.105, 119.11) are the Florida rules and statutes governing disclosure, court records, sanctions, and public-records enforcement.

The classes of determinations

Every decision point carries one class. Each count is computed from the ledger. The definitions are the ledger’s own. No row in this ledger is scored WON.

  • DENIED55 relief refused.
  • IGNORED47 no ruling of any kind, often for years.
  • PENDING20 the fork is still open.
  • EXCUSED10 conduct by the side resisting disclosure was squarely before the court, and the court processed it without consequence. The conduct was not denied. It was absorbed.
  • PARTIAL10 the challenge produced an answer or a concession on paper while the records or relief themselves never arrived.
  • WON-THEN-NULLIFIED6 a win on paper never enforced; these rows still matter, because they show the pattern is not explained by weak positions.
  • REFUSED6 the actor retained by and owing duty to Husband refused to perform it.
  • WON0 the rule was applied as written, Husband prevailed, and the win was applied and enforced. As of this build, no row qualifies.

Classes are scored against the core objective of Husband’s requests for financial discovery: a DENIED row is relief sought toward that objective and refused, or obstruction of that pursuit granted by the Court.

154 decision points. Type to filter.

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By actor or institution

21 groups. Every decision point appears exactly once.

Select any row to open its full card, with the receipt and links to the same decision point in the other two views. The colored bar under each group name is that group’s outcomes in proportion, in the colors of the class legend above, so a group that runs mostly red or amber went mostly against Husband. Inside an open card, the Spawned by line names the earlier decision point this one grew out of, and it is a link: following it walks the chain backward toward the decision that produced this one.

Wife / Davis13 nodes

Official public records: Florida Bar member profile, Scott Paul Davis

N-0012023-10 -> 2024-12-13A three-page motion asking the court to appoint a guardian alleges no incident, no date, no observation, and no witness. Every allegation about Husband is quoted from his own earlier filing. The movant had signed the October 2023 postmarital agreement giving 50/50 fourteen months earlier.DENIED
Date
2023-10 -> 2024-12-13
Actor
Wife, with Scott Davis (Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.)
Institution
Petitioner/Wife, 13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
A three-page motion asking the court to appoint a guardian alleges no incident, no date, no observation, and no witness. Every allegation about Husband is quoted from his own earlier filing. The movant had signed the October 2023 postmarital agreement giving 50/50 fourteen months earlier.
What the law required
Section 61.401: a guardian ad litem appointment must rest on the child's best interest supported by a finding. A movant's own prior, contemporaneous endorsement of the challenged parenting arrangement is baseline evidence against a later best-interest claim built on the same-era facts.
What happened
Wife moved for a guardian ad litem on December 13, 2024. The three-page motion's only factual allegations about Husband are four quotations from his own May 2024 filing, signed by counsel with no verification. In closing argument her counsel fixed the crisis facts in 2023 and separately named the litigation as what triggered the December motions; he was not asked whether anything else did. At deposition Wife dated her concerns to November 2023 and produced no supporting document, recalling only a phone call and saying she did not know whether she had a text. The guardian ad litem was granted eighteen months later, June 25, 2026, with no unfitness finding. Every factual allegation about Husband in this motion was lifted from Doc 22, whose own pending motion went unheard for 23 months (N-003). In fairness, the quotations are accurate, and counsel argued the 2023 facts openly. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A guardian ad litem is appointed on the child's best interest; this motion says nothing about either child. In October 2023 Wife signed the postmarital agreement giving immediate 50/50 timesharing, with no expressed parenting concern despite Husband's health and marijuana use. Fourteen months later she sought a guardian on those same facts. Husband offered medical releases and evaluations with no compulsion; her counsel declined, stating they wanted the appointment instead (N-016). The June 2026 appointment carried no unfitness finding (N-125).
Receipt
  • Wife's Doc 69 (12/13/24) pp. 1-3, read in full and audited against Doc 22 paras. 21, 22 and 26.
  • June 10 Tr. 77:02-03, 77:14-21, 78:07-09, 79:08-22, 80:05-09, 113:09-15 (the 2023 endorsement with knowledge).
  • Tr. 104:07-10 and 104:11-17 (counsel's closing fixing the 2023 date and using it as the argued section 61.13 predicate); Tr. 92:3-12 (the litigation named as the December trigger).
  • Tr. 51:9-11 (the offers); Tr. 101:1-9 (the declination and its stated reason, carried at N-016); Tr. 80:12-18 (post-motion inquiry unanswered; that line has not been checked against a page image).
  • 5/29 Tr. 59:6-11 (the offer was attendance and releases, never funding).
  • Doc 203, her petition demanding 50/50, e-filed by Husband 6/19/25; its own filing stamp and date are and have not been reconciled with the 24-DR-001150 case number, so no characterization of what it pleads is carried above.
  • Doc 205 Tr. 122:12-25 (the no-document answer and the November 2023 date).
  • The appointment without an unfitness finding: N-125 (Doc 337, 6/25/26).
  • Motion-timing dataset on file (nine Wife-movant motions, one driven to a ruling).
  • Related decision points: N-013.

Read the source document: Doc 22, Response to Motion to Compel Payments and Motion to Compel Evidence of Marital Assets (filing record only, body withheld)

Spawned by: N-090, N-019

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-001

N-0022024-05-14In one week Wife demanded his three years of financials and his mental-health providers, medications, and pharmacies. Across 52 Wife-side filings and 17 hearings, none shows her side using anything he produced, and her own papers state she "has not sought to take Husband's deposition."IGNORED
Date
2024-05-14
Actor
Wife, self-filed as her own counsel (Fla. Bar 065956), on AssuranceAmerica insurance-employer letterhead, before Davis appeared; Davis's firm later adopted the set
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
In one week Wife demanded his three years of financials and his mental-health providers, medications, and pharmacies. Across 52 Wife-side filings and 17 hearings, none shows her side using anything he produced, and her own papers state she "has not sought to take Husband's deposition."
What the law required
Good-faith basis for discovery and motion practice. Discovery must be sought in good faith, not as burden and obstruction. Reciprocity in the exchange it opened.
What happened
On May 14, 2024 at 8:58 PM Wife, then acting as her own counsel, filed a motion to compel payments. Sixteen minutes later, at 9:14 PM, she filed a motion for court-monitored communications. At 7:30 AM the next morning she filed a notice of interrogatories, and she served a 16-page set that was never docketed. Husband's responsive motion, his own first-filed motion to compel her financial records, then sat 23 months (N-003). She answered nothing by the deadline she and his counsel had stipulated, while he answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day (N-006). What the court did with his motion is a separate question, recorded at N-003. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Discovery is served to be used, and disclosure runs both ways. Within a week Wife's interrogatories demanded his three-year financials and health records. She already held his account information; her own filings state she had "all account balances and passwords." What tests the demand is the yield: across 52 Wife-side filings and 17 hearings, none shows her side using anything Husband produced, and her own papers admit she never deposed him.
Receipt
  • Docs 015, 017, and 018 stamps and key pages (Doc 017 para. 7 for the "only by Order of the Court" pleading).
  • The served 16-page interrogatory set, held in the discovery materials for this matter and hash-matched to the pleadings-PDF copy, items 8 through 10 the health probe.
  • Doc 146 paras. 43, 57, 119 and Doc 269 para. 16 (her possession of balances, account information, and passwords).
  • Doc 177 para. 13, repeated at Docs 280/284 and 311/321 ("despite these alleged concerns, Wife has not sought to take Husband's deposition").
  • Doc 139 (notice), taken 4/2/25, transcript Doc 205, zero exhibits marked.
  • Doc 259 (118 pp.): her enforcement exhibits contain none of his produced discovery.
  • Ledgers V18 and V19, both 8/7/26.
  • Wife's Bar number 065956 appears on the self-filed set; this is the one place in this territory where the Bar number is carried, per F3 H73.
  • Sweep scope stated: 52 Wife-side filings and 17 hearings.
  • Related decision points: N-148.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-002

N-0062024-06-28she produced nothing by the deadline her own counsel stipulated, and nothing for months after it, while Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day; she had promised in writing, twice, that she would complyIGNORED
Date
2024-06-28
Actor
Wife, with Scott Davis
Institution
Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.
Mechanism
she produced nothing by the deadline her own counsel stipulated, and nothing for months after it, while Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that same day; she had promised in writing, twice, that she would comply
What the law required
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 requires automatic mandatory financial disclosure. The 6/28/2024 deadline was stipulated between counsel, not set by court order: Doc 155 Tr. 21:8-11, Samarkos: 'There wasn't a court order. It was just an agreement between Counsel that the discovery would be produced by June 28th for mandatory disclosure.' The rule duty is automatic either way.
What happened
Nothing was produced by the stipulated June 28, 2024 deadline, and nothing for months after. Husband answered Wife's three-year interrogatories that same day. On October 7, 2024 his counsel wrote to Wife's counsel: "After stipulating to producing the mandatory disclosure documents, you produced nothing and offered no explanation." The deadline was a counsel agreement rather than a court order: "There wasn't a court order. It was just an agreement between Counsel that the discovery would be produced by June 28th for mandatory disclosure." Her first production came days before the hearing on Husband's motion to compel; his Second Request to Produce demanding the metadata dating that availability drew no found response. The court granted Husband's motion to compel on October 28, 2024, order entered November 20, 2024, fee entitlement reaffirmed twice on February 12, 2025. The amount was never liquidated through July 2026, and compliance was never required. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Financial disclosure in a Florida divorce is automatic; here it was uncontested, as her counsel agreed to the date. In May 2024 Wife wrote "I have filed a financial disclosure but will be supplementing/amending it" and promised compliance with court-mandated disclosures. Her sworn petition admits the October 2023 postmarital agreement "did not include financial disclosures." She then retained counsel, and the disclosure did not come. No motive is asserted.
Receipt
  • Doc 155 Tr. 21:8-11 (Samarkos, the stipulation's origin, quoted above), Tr. 7:14-25 (a month of post-deadline silence), Tr. 13:20-14:12 (Husband's own 6/28/24 answers).
  • Doc 203 para. 5, sworn; second docket location at Doc 197 para. 32 p. 5, quoted in bold with the full petition attached.
  • Doc 156 p. 3 (her 5/22/24 email) and Doc 018 p. 20 (her 5/13/24 email, filed by her own side).
  • Doc 205 Tr. 53:22, 54:7-8, 54:22-23 (her definition problem on the record).
  • The 10/7/24 Samarkos-to-Davis letter on firm letterhead, quoted above at its first sentence only (F204; the letter's next clause is counsel's own characterization and is deliberately not carried).
  • The compel: granted 10/28/24, order entered 11/20/24 at Doc 054, fee entitlement reaffirmed twice 2/12/25, amount never liquidated through 7/2026, compliance never required (N-009; Doc 155 Tr. 18:19-25).
  • The Samarkos email of 11/8/24 (fact ledger). Certificate chronology: initial 10/22/24, amended 10/31/24, second amended 2/12/25.
  • Husband's 1/8/25 item F (captured chain) for the Ascensus detail. Second RTP, DIN 82, 12/17/24.
  • Related decision points: N-003.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-006

NEW-P82024-11-25 -> 2025-01-31a motion about children implies a concern about children; asked in writing, more than once, to name it so he could address it, the father was told no explanation was owed unless a court ordered oneREFUSED
Date
2024-11-25 -> 2025-01-31
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (correspondence)
Mechanism
a motion about children implies a concern about children; asked in writing, more than once, to name it so he could address it, the father was told no explanation was owed unless a court ordered one
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others) and 4-3.4 territory. What needs no rule citation: a lawyer who accuses in writing can specify in writing, and the record of asked-and-never-answered is scoreable as sequence without any rule at all.
What happened
On January 8, 2025 Husband sent a thirteen-item letter documenting the pattern, including: "Husband has asked Mr. Davis on multiple occasions about any concerns with the kids, and Wife has provided no answers." Fourteen minutes later, the reply answered the letter as a whole rather than the question about the children: "I do not owe you an explanation about anything unless I am ordered to do so. I am baffled as to why you think I owe you an explanation about any of your claims below. You can assume whatever you wish; however, that may ultimately be to your detriment." Two days later Husband asked directly whether counsel believed he had a duty of fairness and truthfulness; no answer appears in the captured chain. In fairness, Husband's own emails in this chain carry escalation language and abuse allegations. [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
Both things cannot be true of the same motion: that it was necessary for the children, and that what it was about could not be named to their father. Naming a concern costs nothing if one exists. The sequence is the whole of it: asked, and never answered. In fairness, counsel did answer substantively once, on January 31, 2025, denying any discovery-for-custody trade and describing guardian ad litem procedure; that answer stated no fact about the children.
Receipt
  • The 1/6/25 to 1/10/25 email chain, preserved in full in this matter's correspondence file, including the thirteen-item letter and the fourteen-minute reply (Gmail capture 8/17/26).
  • The reply's own words fix what it answered: "any of your claims below."
  • Three further receipted instances of the same shape: 11/25/24, 12/5/24, 12/17/24, all in the case tree.
  • Enumeration corrected per F3 H69: the 1/7/25 email is the primary quotation used in the prior draft and is never counted as a further instance, and the 1/31/25 email is the substantive answer carried in the baseline, so counting it as a refusal would count one date as both the refusal and the answer that makes the negative honest.
  • Husband's own 1/8/25 7:34 PM email in the same chain contains the escalation language named above.
  • Cross-lane echo at N-046: when the same specification request was put to the court, the only conduct ever named was the baseball-equipment exchange, charged to both sides.
  • Scope: the never-answered negative covers this correspondence and the three tree-receipted instances, never absolutely.

Spawned by: N-011, N-013, N-017

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P8

N-0112024-12-05the sanctions statute gives 21 days to fix the problem and walk away; eight days into that window the answer was four motions filed that morning, and as of August 21, 2026, 624 days later, no hearing on the notice has ever been heldIGNORED
Date
2024-12-05
Actor
Scott Davis
Institution
Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.
Mechanism
the sanctions statute gives 21 days to fix the problem and walk away; eight days into that window the answer was four motions filed that morning, and as of August 21, 2026, 624 days later, no hearing on the notice has ever been held
What the law required
F.S. 57.105(4) gives a 21-day safe harbor to withdraw or correct.
What happened
A section 57.105 Notice of Intent to Seek Sanctions issued on December 5, 2024 with itemized cure conditions and a 21-day safe harbor running to December 26. Nothing was corrected. Eight days into the window came the four motions of N-013. A second safe-harbor letter followed on May 9, 2025 with five itemized cure conditions; its window ran out on May 30, 2025, and the follow-on sanctions motion was not filed until October 3, 2025, 126 days later. That motion, Doc 239, ran 82 pages and has been unheard for 322 days as of August 21, 2026 (N-056). No hearing was ever held on the December 2024 notice itself: 624 days to August 21, 2026, and counting. The documented answer inside the second window, "Do what you need to do and file what you need to file. I will see you in court," appears at FNEW-W8. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Section 57.105(4) exists to give a party a way out. Serve the notice, and if the other side withdraws or corrects the identified position within 21 days, no sanctions motion follows. This one produced neither. What the window produced instead was escalation: the four motions of December 13, 2024, filed eight days in, are N-013. Then the notice itself has never been heard, and the 82-page sanctions motion that followed it has never been heard either.
Receipt
  • Doc 060 (the notice) and Doc 059 (cover).
  • F3 M36 correction: the ten-day figure belongs to the 10/28/24 compel order, not to this notice, and it is removed; December 13 is eight days into the 21-day window that ran to 12/26/24.
  • Safe-harbor arithmetic recomputed this session: 12/5/24 plus 21 days is 12/26/24; 5/9/25 plus 21 days is 5/30/25, confirmed; 5/30/25 to 10/3/25 is 126 days; 12/5/24 to 8/7/26 is 610 days; Doc 239 filed 10/3/25, unheard 308 days at 8/7/26.
  • The follow-on is not Doc 84, which rests on a 12/6 deficiency email and never cites the statute.
  • Ledger V6, 8/7/26. Day counts machine-recomputed; the dictated "seven, eight hundred" figure is corrected, because the 800-range figures belong to the N-003 and Doc 22 lineage.

Spawned by: N-009

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-011

N-0132024-12-13four motions against Husband in one day, two of them quoting his own sentence about withholding a payment and stopping at "out of anger and frustration," before the words that say he did it to get the bank statementsIGNORED
Date
2024-12-13
Actor
Scott Davis, with the Wife
Institution
Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.
Mechanism
four motions against Husband in one day, two of them quoting his own sentence about withholding a payment and stopping at "out of anger and frustration," before the words that say he did it to get the bank statements
What the law required
Section 57.105(4) safe harbor creates a correct-or-ratify fork, with the window open to 12/26. Motions require a good-faith basis. Confidential health disclosures are not to be weaponized.
What happened
On December 13, 2024, the day Husband's counsel exited on one-day notice over his objection (N-014), Davis filed four motions between 7:31 AM and 1:45 PM: a motion to compel, a judicial default, a guardian ad litem, and a psychological evaluation of Husband. The evaluation motion is unverified; its only allegation about Husband not drawn from his own earlier filing is that his conduct had "become increasingly unstable and erratic." Both child-related motions quote his sentence about withholding payment "certainly in part out of anger and frustration" and stop before the rest of that sentence, which explained he did it to get Wife to produce the bank statements. The default was abandoned within six weeks. The compel was granted in part. The guardian ad litem was granted eighteen months later with no unfitness finding. The psychological-evaluation motion has never been resolved. [IGNORED: evaluation prong never resolved]
Baseline deviation
A motion must have a good-faith basis when filed; what Wife's side did with its own motions is the measure. Husband offered signed medical releases and evaluation attendance, no compulsion needed; Davis declined on the record, stating they wanted a guardian ad litem instead (N-016). The appointment order that finally issued made no findings on Husband's fitness, ordered no evaluation, and stated no concern about the children. The other three motions: abandoned, granted in part, never resolved.
Receipt
  • Docs 067 (7:31 AM), 075 (8:32 AM, para. 7.b), 069 (11:12 AM, p.2 para. 6), 077 (1:45 PM, p.2 paras. 4-6, para. 10).
  • Doc 22 para. 26 (the truncated sentence).
  • Doc 118 Tr. 9:14-16.
  • Doc 138 (partial grant, 2/19/25); source audit on file.
  • Related decision points: N-044.

Spawned by: N-011

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-013

N-0262025-01-31A signed letter threatening suit claims discovery was withheld pursuant to a valid court order and the marital agreements; asked the next day to name that order, none was named, and the order Husband actually obtained on 10/28/24 ran the other way.REFUSED
Date
2025-01-31
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife, Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150
Mechanism
A signed letter threatening suit claims discovery was withheld pursuant to a valid court order and the marital agreements; asked the next day to name that order, none was named, and the order Husband actually obtained on 10/28/24 ran the other way.
What the law required
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution guarantees access to the courts, which discovery obstruction defeats in fact; the operative rules then supply the duties. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 makes mandatory disclosure automatic in a dissolution proceeding. It is not suspended by a private agreement and it does not wait on a ruling about that agreement's validity. Where a request goes beyond mandatory disclosure, Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.350(b) requires a written response or objection within 30 days, and the objecting party bears the burden of stating the grounds; an unserved objection is waived. Rule 4-3.4(d) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar provides that a lawyer must not, in pretrial procedure, fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request. The 10/28/2024 order in this case ran the other way, compelling disclosure within ten days (N-006, N-004). The lawful path in one sentence: comply with the outstanding order and Rule 12.285, or serve a timely written objection stating the grounds, rather than announce a doctrinal position by email and leave the request unanswered.
What happened
In January 2025 Wife's counsel wrote that documents beyond mandatory disclosure were not owed unless the agreements were set aside, and promised to produce any identified missing documents. In November 2025 his signed cease-and-desist letter stated that discovery "was withheld or delayed pursuant to a valid court order and consistent with the prenuptial and postnuptial agreements." Asked the next day to identify that order, none was identified in the exchange, and none has been identified since. The January promise went the same way: deficiencies were identified in writing repeatedly, and the third request to produce drew no response at all (N-037). In fairness, the same lawyer did cooperate on specific requests, including deposition scheduling. The record does not support saying he refused everything; it supports saying the order his letter relied on has never been named. [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
Financial disclosure in a Florida divorce is automatic; it is not suspended by a private agreement and does not wait on a ruling about that agreement's validity. An objecting party must serve a written objection within 30 days; an unserved objection is waived. Naming an order costs one sentence and makes the claim testable. No order compelling the withholding has been identified, and the order Husband obtained on 10/28/24 ran the other way: it compelled disclosure within ten days.
Receipt
  • The 1/31/2025 2:36:42 PM email at p. 3 of the preserved Davis correspondence exhibit, including the Smith-Fullerton citation offered "as a professional courtesy" and the same email's guardian ad litem passage.
  • The 11/24/2025 cease-and-desist letter at p. 1. The 11/25/2025 exchange, 12:03 PM question and 12:06 PM answer, preserved in two PDFs and held from the text layer only.
  • The compelling order: 10/28/2024, ten days to comply (N-009, N-006).
  • Cooperation instances: he identified the December 2024 court reporter by name and attached the reporter's email, offered to coordinate deposition dates in the same email that carries the school-subpoena refusal (N-036), and cleared a morning for a non-party deposition and agreed to three more hours of Wife's deposition without court involvement.
  • Question Protocol on file: identify the order by docket entry number and date and quote the language that authorized the withholding; and list every document produced after Husband identified it as missing, with both dates.

Spawned by: N-037, N-016, N-065

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-026

N-0362025-03-24the children's school named three routes, one needing no court process; Husband proposed that one in writing on March 18, no answer is located, and six days later counsel refused to agree to the subpoena, leaving only the route carrying the statutory contempt languageDENIED
Date
2025-03-24
Actor
Scott Davis, counsel for Wife
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
the children's school named three routes, one needing no court process; Husband proposed that one in writing on March 18, no answer is located, and six days later counsel refused to agree to the subpoena, leaving only the route carrying the statutory contempt language
What the law required
State the limit plainly. No rule compelled agreement. Opposing counsel was free to decline, and declining is not a violation of anything. This row is therefore scored on what the refusal produced, not on a breach. What is recorded instead is what Husband did before serving it: he asked for agreement first, and then for a joint request, so the school would not be compelled.
What happened
On March 6, 2025 the children's school stated in writing: "A court order, subpoena, or mutual agreement between parties would be required for any of our employees to participate." Three routes, one requiring no court process. On March 18, 2025 Husband proposed getting the information through a joint request; no answer to that proposal is located in the record as swept. Six days later he asked counsel to agree to a subpoena and waive the waiting period. The answer came that day: "I do not agree to the subpoenas and will object to same if a NPNP is filed." No reason was given, and none was required. What was refused was the subpoena, not the joint request, which simply drew nothing. The subpoena issued the same day, commanding the school to produce its most knowledgeable person, carrying the preprinted statutory contempt warning. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
No rule compelled agreement; declining is not a violation. The school named the route that would not drag it into court. Husband proposed it first, in writing. No answer is located in the record. Six days later he asked counsel to agree to the subpoena; counsel refused. What followed was a subpoena carrying statutory contempt language, to produce an answer taking one question: nothing was documented about either child in four years beyond one instance of seeming tired (N-043).
Receipt
  • Doc 166 pp. 3, 4, and 6 (the 3/18 and 3/24/2025 emails, including the 2:20:05 PM refusal).
  • Doc 165, the subpoena, DIN 165, dated 3/24/2025 and e-filed 3/25/2025, all three pages. The filing number is deliberately not printed: this instrument names the children's school, and the map withholds that name, so the citation is by DIN and date only (F3 C4).
  • The children's school's 3/6/2025 reply.
  • Tally guard: counted once; the same episode is carded at N-043 in the Ayers lane and is never counted as two.
  • One limit carried forward: no document has been found in which Wife or Davis objects to the wellness forms themselves, and Davis called that premise "blatantly and patently false" on 10/17/2025. What is recorded here is the refusal of the subpoena and the unanswered joint request, both of which are documents. Verified.
  • The subpoena's preprinted contempt language: it "may subject [the school] and/or the designated person to penalties under Florida law, including contempt of court proceedings."
  • Related decision points: N-119.

Spawned by: N-001

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-036

N-0372025-04-01the request for Davis's own billing, payment, and source-of-funds records has gone 546 days as of August 21, 2026 with no response, no objection, and no rulingIGNORED
Date
2025-04-01
Actor
Scott Davis (no response); court (no ruling)
Institution
Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A. / 13th Cir.
Mechanism
the request for Davis's own billing, payment, and source-of-funds records has gone 546 days as of August 21, 2026 with no response, no objection, and no ruling
What the law required
R. 12.350(b) requires a response or objection within 30 days.
What happened
The Third Request to Produce, number 140, demanded Davis billing, payment, and source of funds records. It was served February 21, 2025 and attached to Doc 163. No response was served, no objection was served, no court has ruled: 546 days of silence as of August 21, 2026. The deficiency was pressed three times by email, in April and May 2025. The demand is still outstanding per Doc 321, and the records have never been produced. A ruling sweep of every order-titled file after Doc 163, more than 35 of them, found none touching this request. In fairness, the notice defects opposing counsel identified in the same exchange are real, including a certificate for a deposition set on one day's notice, and Husband did not dispute them. Those defects explain an objection; they do not explain 546 days without one. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A request to produce calls for a response or a written objection stating grounds; neither came here. Total silence leaves no stated ground for anyone to test, and exposes the non-responding party to a motion to compel. The records sought sit alongside the financial disclosure that was never produced (N-006), part of the same core-records pursuit that two years of attempts never reached (N-003). A response, or an objection, would have documented what exists. Neither was served.
Receipt
  • Doc 321 pp. 3, 9. Service date receipted: served 2/21/25, attached as Exhibit A to Doc 163 (stamp).
  • Day count 532 as of 8/7/26, machine-recomputed.
  • Ruling sweep of 8/7/26: every order-titled file after Doc 163 checked (35+), none touching RTP #140; Doc 210's emergency finding had no substantive follow-through.
  • Deficiency emails 4/28, 5/2, and 5/9/2025.
  • Notice-defect detail: a certificate dated February 22, 2025 for an April 29, 2025 deposition and document requests served the afternoon before.
  • Rule-period citation (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350 / Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.350), not pulled.

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-037

N-0442025-04-07the judge asked opposing counsel to summarize Wife's testimony and he agreed in writing; no summary came, and the court withdrew its own request in a signed order and did the work itself, so what her testimony consisted of was never fixed on paperIGNORED
Date
2025-04-07
Actor
Scott Davis (non-performance); Judge Ayers (abandonment)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the judge asked opposing counsel to summarize Wife's testimony and he agreed in writing; no summary came, and the court withdrew its own request in a signed order and did the work itself, so what her testimony consisted of was never fixed on paper
What the law required
No rule compelled a summary, and the judge said so on the record ('It wasn't order', Tr. 51). The duty attaches to the acceptance, not the request: having committed in writing to the tribunal on 4/7/25 to provide the summary in 'a couple of days', counsel owed either performance or a withdrawal stated to the tribunal and to the copied opposing party. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.2 (expediting litigation). The court's own withdrawal of the request was lawful and is not the fork.
What happened
On April 7, 2025 the Division D chambers account emailed a request that Wife's counsel summarize her testimony. He answered the same day that he was happy to and would need a couple of days. No summary was produced. On April 16 the court's own order erased the ask: "No summaries have been provided to the Court. No summaries are being requested by the Court." At the April 22 hearing Judge Ayers reframed her own request as non-binding, declined to have her assistant remind him, and absorbed the work herself: "He didn't. So I'm doing it myself." The written summary that would have fixed on paper what Wife's testimony actually consisted of never existed. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
No rule compelled a summary, and the judge said so: "It wasn't order." Judge Ayers asked for the summary, counsel agreed in writing to provide it, no summary arrived, and the court withdrew its own request in a signed order and absorbed the work herself. The written summary that would have fixed on paper what Wife's testimony consisted of was never made.
Receipt
  • Doc 177 paras. 2-4 and p. 4 (both emails verbatim, including "happy to do that. I will need a couple of days").
  • Doc 173 p. 5 (the 4/7 9:58 AM chambers email as originally filed).
  • Doc 182 p. 1 (4/16/25).
  • Doc 192 Tr. 32:4, 32:21-33:9, 33:6-9, 51, 54:7-55:10, 56:1-25, 56:16-57:5; Davis sworn at Tr. 54:8, testimony at 54:15 ff.
  • Doc 180 para. 8 (4/21/25), first docketed capture of the position change.
  • Sender note: the 4/7 email is from famlawdivd@fljud13.org, displayed "Div D UFC Domestic Relations/Family," with no individual name on its face; the attribution rests on Doc 173 para. 1 and Judge Ayers's own "When I asked Dee Dee to ask him for a summary" (Tr. 33:6).
  • Related decision points: N-041.

Spawned by: N-018, N-040, N-041, N-045

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-044

NEW-P42026-06-10asked twice, on two hearing days, whether he had any emails with The Florida Bar about the complaint against him, counsel denied the existence of "secret emails," a phrase the question never used, and the question as asked has never been answeredREFUSED
Date
2026-06-10
Actor
Scott Davis (answers); Judge Felix (colloquy control)
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150
Mechanism
asked twice, on two hearing days, whether he had any emails with The Florida Bar about the complaint against him, counsel denied the existence of "secret emails," a phrase the question never used, and the question as asked has never been answered
What the law required
An attorney answering an accusation on the record can answer the question as asked. Candor to the tribunal is governed by R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3. The lawful path: answer 'any emails with the Florida Bar related to the complaint' yes or no, or decline to answer in terms.
What happened

On May 29, 2026 Husband asked whether counsel was hiding records about the Bar complaint. Counsel said "I'm not." The follow-up, whether there was any communication at all between him and the Bar, went unanswered because the court closed the colloquy.

On June 10 Husband asked again whether counsel had any emails with the Bar about the February 2025 complaint. Counsel answered: "The secret emails that he believes to exist that he's gone on and on about do not exist." He began to add that he had sent an email to the Bar, but the court cut him off as closing argument, and he dropped it. The question as asked, any emails, was never answered on either day. The documents behind the question were already the subject of a served request to produce, which Wife had personally signed an objection to as beyond the scope of the case. [REFUSED]

Baseline deviation
A lawyer answering an accusation on the record can answer yes, no, or state a refusal to answer. The question was "any emails." The answer denied "secret emails," a phrase Husband never used, and narrowing the question before answering leaves the original question standing. The court's interruption, not counsel, left his next sentence unfinished; what stands is the scoped denial and the unanswered question. The challenge is the same either way: produce the emails, or state that none exists.
Receipt
  • 6/10/26 Tr. 108:24-109:17 and 5/29/26 Tr. 245:14-24, both from the certified transcripts; the 6/10 closing speaker is mislabeled MS. HANSON at 108:2 after "Mr. Hanson, closing" at 108:1, so quote with [sic] or cite an adjacent line.
  • 5/29 Tr. 44:22-24 and 45:12-19 (the court declines to inquire of Davis), held from the transcript text layer only.
  • Negative with scope stated: a full text-layer sweep of the 427-page 4/17/26 transcript found 15 Bar references, every one spoken by Husband or the Court; Davis said nothing about Bar emails that day (the 8/17/26 Davis/Londot findings ledger, item 11).
  • The paper trail: request to produce served 3/16/26 (DIN 278, Requests 1 and 11); Wife's Notice of Appearance as co-counsel 4/16/26 (DIN 291); the objection she personally signed the same day (DIN 289); none of the three faces has been checked against a page image.
  • Rule 4-3.3 text ``, not confirmed in-tree.
  • On 6/10 counsel said, "Fair enough. I just thought because he believes that it exists, it's almost relevant to his mental health. But I understand. I'll stop talking." (Tr. 108:24-109:17.)
  • The court's cutoff: "Hold on, Mr. Davis. We're not responding. This is closing." (same cite.)

Spawned by: N-032

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P4

N-1192026-06-10twelve days after his own question drew a sworn denial, counsel argued the denied premise to the court as established fact, supplied the inference himself, and named no concern about either child; the objection to it was never ruled onEXCUSED
Date
2026-06-10
Actor
Scott Davis
Institution
Wife/Davis
Mechanism
twelve days after his own question drew a sworn denial, counsel argued the denied premise to the court as established fact, supplied the inference himself, and named no concern about either child; the objection to it was never ruled on
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(1): a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal. 4-3.4(e): a lawyer shall not in trial state a personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness or allude to any matter not supported by admissible evidence. A ruling on a timely objection is the mechanism by which either is enforced.
What happened

On May 29, 2026 Wife's counsel asked Husband whether he wanted anyone talking to his children. Husband answered under oath: "That's completely false. I tell all the teachers and helpers to ask them about everything and anything." He drew one line: he did not want a stranger connected to this litigation drawing the children's attention to it.

Twelve days later, in closing on June 10, the same counsel told the court the opposite as established: "He has time and time again shown that he does not want a third party to talk to the kids. Why? I respectfully suggest that should be concerning to the Court." He then supplied his own inference, that something damaging must be behind it. Husband objected. The court did not rule, and told counsel to proceed. No concern was ever named, then or since. [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation
This is one lawyer's examination against his own closing, twelve days apart, same case. A premise a witness denies under oath is not evidence of the premise, yet it was argued to the court regardless. Husband objected; the objection was never ruled on. The distinction Husband drew, between caregivers asking his children anything and a stranger drawing attention to the litigation, was already in the record. The refusal of a third-party route to that information is counsel's own writing (N-036).
Receipt
  • May 29, 2026 transcript, DIN 350, at 169:11-16, 169:25-170:7, 170:17-21, 200:11-16.
  • June 10, 2026 transcript, DIN 349, at 101:10-22, 101:23-102:3, 102:9, 102:12-22.
  • Closing argument runs 6/10 Tr. 89-107 (Davis), 108-116 (Husband), 116-117 (Davis rebuttal); the 5/29 transcript contains no closing argument.
  • Reporter defect: the 6/10 transcript prints "MS. HANSON" at 108:2, 110:3, 117:25 and probably 98:14 for lines that are plainly Husband's; quote the label as printed or cite an adjacent line.

Spawned by: N-125

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-119

N-1482026-08-04over roughly $3,260, the motion asks the court to cut a father's time with his minor children to alternate weekends as "an appropriate sanction," in a case where no order anywhere on this docket has found one problem with Husband's parentingPENDING
Date
2026-08-04
Actor
Wife (movant, self-represented since N-128). Decision pending before Judge Felix
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (Judge Felix)
Mechanism
over roughly $3,260, the motion asks the court to cut a father's time with his minor children to alternate weekends as "an appropriate sanction," in a case where no order anywhere on this docket has found one problem with Husband's parenting
What the law required
Civil contempt in a family case proceeds by an order to show cause stating the essential facts, service, an advisory of the right to counsel, a hearing, and proof of a prior order, ability to comply, and willful non-compliance. A coercive sanction for non-payment requires a finding of present ability to pay. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.615. Timesharing is determined by the children's best interests. It is not available as a sanction or as leverage for a financial obligation. Modification of timesharing requires a pleading and a substantial-change showing, not a paragraph inside a contempt motion.
What happened
On August 4, 2026, the same morning the amended guardian ad litem order was conformed (N-147), Wife filed a motion for contempt, to compel compliance, and for sanctions. It invokes two provisions of the July 23 order: the OurFamilyWizard paragraph and the $6,000 retainer paragraph. From those it pivots to ask the court to make Wife "primary custodian" and reduce Husband to alternate-weekend visitation, styled as "an appropriate sanction" lifted only on compliance. It supports the request with private health information about Husband, cited to an unidentified transcript, in an unsealed filing with no motion to seal. Her exhibit contains a July 29 email to the guardian, not copied to Husband, asking that his communications be counted against him. The court set the motion for hearing August 27, one hour reserved. No order to show cause has issued. Husband's response and motion to continue, filed August 15, remain undecided. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Contempt enforces an order; a child's time with a parent is decided on the child's best interest, not used as a lever for payment. This motion seeks to enforce the guardian ad litem appointment, granted with no finding of unfitness (N-147, N-016). The two provisions invoked are worth about $3,260 together, from a July 23 order facially incomplete as filed: text breaking mid-sentence, numbering running 16 to 20. This is Wife's request; the court has not ruled.
Receipt
  • The motion, DIN 364, e-filed 8/4/26 9:49:26 AM by Wife, self-represented; 3 pp. of motion plus certificate of service, Composite Exhibit A (text message), and Exhibit B (four-page email chain). Cited by DIN and date only, no filing number, by design (F3 C4).
  • All 9 pp. were read from the page images rather than the text layer.
  • The guardian ad litem appointment also carries no finding about either child and no evaluation ordered. The motion styles the request as "visitation only every other weekend" and alleges no substantial change in circumstances.
  • Her exhibit asks that "any of his communications are taxed against him" and offers the guardian "a summary."
  • A corrected order was conformed the same morning this motion was filed, so the compliance period ran under the broken version.
  • Hearing set by DIN 366, 8/7/26, e-served same day. The 10/9/26 setting, DIN 361, served 7/30, lists ten other matters and does not list this one.
  • Husband's filings: verified response (24 pp.) and motion to continue (17 pp.), both 8/15/26.
  • The incomplete July 23 order: Doc 351 as filed and served runs five pages, paragraph numbers 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 20, four of five page breaks mid-sentence; the corrected nine-page order was conformed 8/4/26 (DIN 365, event date 08/04/26).
  • Facial findings: the motion is unsworn (no oath, no verification, no affidavit, no section 92.525 declaration), and cites no rule, no statute, and no case.
  • Composite Exhibit A at p. 5 is cropped top and bottom, carries no date beyond "Wednesday 12:13 PM," identifies no phone, account, or participants, and mixes at least two threads on one page.
  • Prematurity: the order's three-day retainer term expired 7/28/26 under Rule 2.514(a)(2), so the motion is not premature as to that term; on the alternative ten-day-from-receipt term, the guardian's retainer request came 7/29/26 at 11:57 AM per Wife's own Exhibit B p. 7, making the deadline 8/8 or 8/10 rolled forward, so the 8/4 filing ran four to six days early.
  • Paragraph 7 defeats the $260 claim on the order's own face: each party maintains a subscription "at his or her own expense."
  • DIN 364 confirmed against the 8/15/26 docket snapshot covering DINs 347 to 366.
  • Related decision points: N-002, N-013.

Spawned by: N-147, N-019

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-148

Judge Ayers23 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

N-0072024-10-28Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.EXCUSED
Date
2024-10-28
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.
What the law required
A deadline the court sets binds both sides. A late submission over objection is either excluded or its acceptance is explained.
What happened

By October 2024 Wife's side had already been late enough on mandatory disclosure that the court granted a compel with a fee finding (N-009). At the October 28, 2024 hearing Judge Ayers took Wife's objections to the first set of Chase bank subpoenas under advisement and told both sides to submit the two agreements plus a short memorandum within ten days. The length of the deadline was Davis's own: the court said "whatever works with you," Davis said "Ten days is fine," and the court said "All right, 10 days."

Husband filed on day ten. Davis filed six days past the deadline, at 4:50 PM. Husband objected to the late memorandum, and then asked the court in writing to clarify "how the Court handled Mr. Davis's late filing." No ruling on that objection was ever entered. On December 13 the court's answer was: "this has already been argued. I have memorandums. I'm going to rule on the memorandums."

Documents were still being produced in increments while the compel order sat unenforced. The rules answer that pattern with escalating sanctions, up to striking the objections. That sanction was never applied, and no reason for it appears in the record as swept. The objections stood. The discovery did not come. The ruling that followed, announced by chambers email on December 16, made orally on December 19, and signed on December 30, did what the late memorandum asked (N-018). [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation
A deadline the court sets binds both sides. When a paper comes in late and the other side objects, a court either refuses the paper or explains why it is taking it anyway. Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.380 supplies the escalating remedies for discovery that does not come, and one of them is striking the objections that are holding it up. The remedy runs on the court's own record of what has already happened. Here a fee award for late disclosure was already on the books before this deadline was set, and the documents were still arriving in pieces.
Receipt
  • Doc 047, Husband's memorandum, e-filed 11/7/24, day ten.
  • Doc 053, Davis's memorandum, e-filed 11/13/2024 4:50:23 PM, Filing #210882545.
  • Doc 155, transcript of the October 28, 2024 hearing, Tr. 22:24-23:21 for the instruction and the deadline colloquy, including Tr. 23:6-7 and 23:18-21.
  • Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 16:1-3 for the quoted ruling statement and Tr. 13:25-14:14 for the timeliness passage.
  • Doc 098 relief para. F, the written clarification request. The earliest written flag is the 11/25 email filing at Doc 70, Filing #212769787, e-filed 12/12/2024 11:19:00 PM. Doc 091 Wherefore clause C repeats the request.
  • Doc 093, the written order.
  • Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.380 for the sanctions ladder and for striking objections as one of the available sanctions. `` pin the subdivision before the cite ships in a filing; the proposition ships publicly on Chris's authority per his 8/20 ruling on re-derivation.
  • The already-issued fee award and the four-months-late production are carded at N-009 and are referenced here rather than re-recited.
  • Fact ledger F266.
  • The reporter's garbled name "Soroka's" is preserved as printed; Merritt spells the same attorney "Samarkos."
  • Related decision points: N-006, N-013, N-014, N-018.

Read the source document: Doc 155, Transcript of 10-28-24 hearing

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-007

N-0092024-11-20 (heard 10-28)Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.WON-THEN-NULLIFIED
Date
2024-11-20 (heard 10-28)
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.
What the law required
Rules 12.380 and 12.285 govern enforcement. A fee entitlement must then be liquidated.
What happened
Judge Ayers granted the motion to compel and the fee entitlement at the October 2024 hearing, and reaffirmed the entitlement twice on February 12, 2025. The written order was e-filed on November 20, 2024. At the hearing the disclosures the order compelled already stood about four months past the June 28, 2024 production date the lawyers had stipulated. The only consequence imposed for that lateness was fees, and the fee amount was never set by any court through July 2026. Actual compliance with mandatory disclosure was never required, and Husband's position is that the noncompliance is continuing. Husband has not yet enforced the fee award in his favor because Wife has still not complied with basic mandatory disclosures. [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
An order compelling disclosure exists to put documents in someone's hands; winning one should change what a party actually has. Judge Ayers marked the fee award as unusual for her: "you both know I very rarely give out fees. but this one." She never required actual compliance with mandatory disclosure, and the fee was never liquidated, so the order produced nothing. This is the anchor row of the excusal chain at N-004.
Receipt
  • Doc 054 (the written order, e-filed 11/20/24).
  • Doc 155 Tr. 18:19-25 (the oral compel grant that became that order) and Tr. 18-22 (the fee colloquy, including the quoted sentence at 22:22-25).
  • Doc 152 Tr. 65:25 and 66:13-14 (the 2/12/25 reaffirmations).
  • Doc 93, pulled from the Clerk, recites the hearing date on its face.
  • Day and month spans are carded, not recomputed here.

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-009

N-0142024-12-13a withdrawal motion that had been set thirty-four days out was heard twenty-four days early, on one day's notice, with no emergency asserted and no basis for the acceleration stated; the client had objected in writing twice before it began, and it ended his representation.DENIED
Date
2024-12-13
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
a withdrawal motion that had been set thirty-four days out was heard twenty-four days early, on one day's notice, with no emergency asserted and no basis for the acceleration stated; the client had objected in writing twice before it began, and it ended his representation.
What the law required
A contested withdrawal requires reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Rule 4-1.16(b) puts the withdrawal justification on the lawyer.
What happened

Husband's own counsel, Vivian Cortes Hodz, had a withdrawal motion on file since December 3, 2024, set for hearing thirty-four days out on January 6, 2025. On December 11 at 4:09 PM she filed an expedited motion. Chambers offered three hearing slots at 5:22 PM that day, and counsel picked the earliest without consulting her client.

At 11:17 PM that night the client objected in writing. He asked for more time, described the prejudice, said "I have never practiced in circuit or county Court in my life," waived his attorney-client privilege, and stated his unavailability. At 9:09 AM the next morning chambers confirmed the December 13 setting for 4:30 PM. Eight minutes later he objected again, expressly: "I object to the hearing occurring without me." Nothing changed.

The hearing went ahead on December 13 at 4:30 PM, two days and twenty-one minutes after the expedited motion, on one-day notice, per the court's own recital in its order. No emergency was asserted, and no basis for moving the date up appears in the order or in the transcript. Judge Ayers granted the withdrawal from the bench over Husband's objection and cancelled the January 6 setting from the bench. A motion for judicial default premised on the unanswered petition was filed at 8:32 that same morning (N-013), and Husband answered self-represented three days later. Whether the extended response deadline fell on the hearing date itself is not pinned in the records reviewed, and the sequence does not depend on it. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
A lawyer who wants out over the client's objection carries the burden of justifying it. Rule 4-1.16(b) puts that burden on the lawyer, not on the client, and the client gets reasonable notice and a real chance to be heard. Moving a hearing up twenty-four days is the kind of act that rests on a stated emergency. None was stated. Judge Ayers later said so herself: setting it "in one day's notice might have been a little soon." The same court's speed of relief is distributed across the docket at N-123, N-128, N-134, and N-139.
Receipt
  • Doc 056, the 12/3/24 withdrawal motion.
  • Doc 058 paras. 1, 5, and 8, the 12/11/24 4:09 PM expedited motion; p. 4 recites that counsel "has sought all appropriate extensions of time and communicated the same so as to ensure no interim prejudice to the Husband,"
  • Doc 167, the Wednesday 12/11/2024 11:17 PM EST objection email, with the privilege waiver at p. 2.
  • Doc 168, the Thursday 12/12/2024 9:17 AM EST objection, which embeds the court's own 12/12 9:09 AM setting email eight minutes before it.
  • Doc 100 para. 1, the court's own "one-day notice" recital, and Doc 100 as the 1/13/25 re-grant despite that recited notice.
  • Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 17:13-17. Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 16:22-24.
  • Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing, Tr. 15:20-16:3 for the quoted concession that one day's notice "might have been a little soon."
  • Doc 059 p. 2 and Doc 061 p. 3, opposing counsel's written refusal of any further extension: "I cannot agree to an extension of time. He should be required to adhere to the same standards."
  • Doc 075, the 8:32 AM default motion of 12/13/24. Doc 079, Husband's self-represented answer of 12/16/24.
  • Doc 214 p. 1, Filing #227245890, the 10/21/24 email from counsel, found 8/7/26; quoted in text at N-023.
  • Fact ledger F146 and F147. Complaint v2.5 paras. 11 and 40A-B, as pleaded.
  • The velocity distribution under the successor judge: N-123 (about 4 hours, a non-party's proposed order), N-128 (19h54m, opposing counsel's exit order), N-134 (about 25 hours, an order billing Husband $3,000), against N-139, where a filed motion, a proposed order, and acceptance of the court's own offered dates drew no hearing, no order, and no reply. Cite that family for distribution only, never as purpose.
  • Related decision points: N-151.

Read the source document: Doc 158, Transcript of 12-13-24 hearing | Doc 90, Dec 19, 2024 hearing transcript (Judge Ayers)

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-014

N-0152024-12-13the rule puts the burden on the lawyer who wants to leave; the court demanded instead that the client produce a legal basis for keeping his own lawyer, kept the lawyer's stated reason free of any question, and made no findings when he asked for them.DENIED
Date
2024-12-13
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the rule puts the burden on the lawyer who wants to leave; the court demanded instead that the client produce a legal basis for keeping his own lawyer, kept the lawyer's stated reason free of any question, and made no findings when he asked for them.
What the law required
A contested withdrawal requires an actual determination of the basis, and findings on request. The burden sits with withdrawing counsel, not the client.
What happened

Husband waived attorney-client privilege in writing the night before the hearing and again on the record that day, so nothing on his side was left to protect. His written objection, filed at 1:21 PM on December 13, 2024, demanded that the withdrawing lawyer finish five identified tasks and said "Mr. Davis should have to answer for what changed."

At the hearing that afternoon Judge Ayers cut off the prejudice argument: "I've already ruled." She deflected the notice-fairness question: "That's not the legal standard." She then put the burden on the client to supply a legal basis for keeping the counsel he had hired. The January 13, 2025 written order records the result in its own words: Husband "failed to establish a legal basis," and all other relief was denied.

On January 9, 2025 allegations he describes as repugnant were aired with no specifics attached, and he asked her directly for findings: "I deserve some findings of fact here." None were ever made. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
When a lawyer withdraws over the client's objection, the lawyer has to establish the basis. Rule 4-1.16(b) puts it there and nowhere else. Determining that basis is the only thing that would have documented why the hearing was accelerated in the first place (N-014). No statement of that basis appears in either withdrawal transcript, in the written objection, or in the order that ended it, which is the record swept here. The court also told Husband "You have nothing pending" while the first-set subpoena ruling sat under advisement and four of Wife's motions had been filed that morning (N-013).
Receipt
  • Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 16:21-25, 17:13-17, 17:19-24, and 18:5-9.
  • Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing, Tr. 13:23-14:5 and 18:6-15.
  • Doc 098 paras. 8-11.
  • Doc 072, the written objection of 12/13/24 1:21 PM: the five-task demand, the privilege waiver, and the quoted sentence about Davis.
  • Doc 100, the written order of 1/13/25: "failed to establish a legal basis," all other relief denied.
  • Privilege waiver, three independent sources: the on-record waiver at Doc 158 Tr. 4, pleaded at F110; the written waiver at Doc 167 p. 2; and the opposing side's own Doc 075 para. 7.b asserting that Husband "thereby waiv[ed] attorney-client privilege."

Spawned by: N-014

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-015

N-0182024-12-19the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.DENIED
Date
2024-12-19
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.
What the law required
Under Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, agreements signed without financial disclosure are challengeable, and a challenge entitles the challenger to financial discovery.
What happened

The written ruling chambers had promised for December 16, 2024 never issued. The email said instead, "At this juncture, the Court is not issuing a ruling." What filled the sixty-three days from hearing to order was a memorandum Davis filed six days late, over an objection the court never ruled on (N-007).

At the December 19 hearing Judge Ayers said: "nobody has asked me to do anything with the premarital agreement or separation agreement. So at this juncture I'm not ruling on them with respect to anything because it's not in front of me, but as far as I'm concerned they're both in full force and effect and that would limit your discovery requests, Mr. Hanson." On the discovery objection she ruled: "I've sustained it actually. So that discovery is not going to be produced." Four months later she described the same ruling in her own words: "the only substantive ruling that I've made is you can't get your discovery because we've got the two agreements."

On December 30 she e-signed the order sustaining Wife's amended objection and killing the Chase non-party subpoenas. Paragraph 3 of that order declined to rule on whether either agreement is valid, because the issue "has not been challenged by either Party or properly brought before the Court."

The effect ran both directions. Husband got no bank records, and the records Wife had not produced stayed unproduced (N-006). Wife also owed no reciprocal discovery on the agreements that shut the subpoenas off. The court had named the missing step at the hearing, saying the agreements stand "unless you file something otherwise." Husband filed exactly that. No judge has ruled on it since (N-019, N-033). [DENIED: the discovery was cut off on the strength of agreements the same ruling refused to adjudicate]

Baseline deviation
Under Casto v. Casto, an agreement signed without financial disclosure can be challenged, and making that challenge entitles the challenging party to financial discovery. Casto also raises a presumption where one spouse lacks knowledge of the other's finances, and that presumption puts the burden on the spouse holding the records. What makes Casto apply here sits in Wife's own petition: no financial disclosures accompanied the agreement signed in October 2023. A subpoena to a bank is how a party gets records the other side will not hand over, and killing one takes a stated ground. The ground stated here was the agreements themselves.
Receipt
  • Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 4:3-11, 6:5-8, and 7:14-16 for the quoted rulings; Tr. 12:14-25 (the "Nope." exchange at 12:22-24), 13:2-5, 13:9-10, and 13:25-14:2 ("It's killing me to watch what it's doing to them").
  • Doc 091 Ex. A p. 14, the Heyward email of 12/16/24 9:30 AM. Its sentence opens "At this juncture, the Court is not issuing a ruling," and that opener travels with any use of the quote.
  • Doc 192, transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 29:6-9, the judge's own later description of the same ruling.
  • Doc 093, "Order Sustaining Wife's Amended Objection," e-signed by Judge Ayers 12/30/2024 4:03:22 PM. Decretal para. 2 names DIN 28 and 29 only. Para. 3 declines to rule on validity, quoted above. Doc 102's notice corroborates the 12/30 order date.
  • Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 10 and 19.
  • Doc 203 para. 5, no financial disclosures with the October 2023 agreement. The record's own name for that instrument is the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23; "postmarital" and "post-marital" are aliases; Judge Ayers says "postnuptial" on the record and quoted material stays verbatim.
  • Doc 090 Tr. 7:19-20 for the counsel-relayed refusal to void, "He said no. She's not willing to do it," Doc 205, Wife's deposition of April 2, 2025, Tr. 132:21 for the sworn refusal and Tr. 133:6-8 for the figures as Wife stated them.
  • Doc 146 para. 107 for the affidavit arithmetic, citing Docs 34 and 43: Wife's disclosed assets over liabilities at $104,611 against Husband's in excess of $800,000. The $104,611 is her disclosed net worth; the $100,000 is the payment she received under the agreement. Two different figures, and they should not be read as one.
  • Doc 181 (4/23/25) para. 2, bolded, on the reissued subpoenas. The second set did not exist for another sixty days (N-034).
  • Docs 127 and 129 for the challenge-chain dispositions (N-028). A template artifact appears at p. 2 of the challenge chain, an unfilled "[Wife's Name]" writ-of-bodily-attachment block.
  • Division check: every Ayers-era transcript cover and Doc 054 read "Division D"; Division A is the post-reassignment designation.

Spawned by: N-006, N-007

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-018

N-0192024-12-19the judge told Husband exactly which motion to file to get the financial records, he filed it in exactly that form, she confirmed on the record that it had worked, and as of August 2026, seventeen months on, no judge has ruled on it.IGNORED
Date
2024-12-19
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers (prescription + post-filing confirmations) -> Judge Felix (non-adjudication)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div.
Mechanism
the judge told Husband exactly which motion to file to get the financial records, he filed it in exactly that form, she confirmed on the record that it had worked, and as of August 2026, seventeen months on, no judge has ruled on it.
What the law required
Due process. A court that prescribes the exact procedural path to relief, receives full compliance, and confirms on the record that the compliance changed the movant's entitlement must then determine the motion in a meaningful time and manner.
What happened

Across four hearings between December 19, 2024 and February 12, 2025, Judge Ayers told Husband what to file. In her words: "I just told you how to do your whole case. You need to file a motion." She also said "I'm not saying that again."

Under Casto no motion was legally necessary to open the discovery. The challenge itself carries the entitlement, and it attaches when the motion is filed rather than when it is granted. The prescribed route also required Husband to move against the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23, which on its terms protected his interests, and whose protection depended on the honest disclosure that never came. He filed it anyway, sixteen days after the last of those hearings. Following the court's own instruction produced no relief.

The route rested on both agreements at once. The ruling that limited discovery reached the premarital agreement of 10/25/16 as well, and that agreement does not reach marital income and assets, which is what the subpoenas sought.

After the filing she confirmed twice on the same day that it had changed his position (N-040). At the April 22, 2025 hearing she described the whole sequence herself: ".I think I did 'wink wink', you got to do something before I consider it and then you finally said oh, okay. I will try to set aside the postnuptial because that does change the trajectory of the discovery." Then she recused without ruling on it. Judge Felix has not ruled on it either. [IGNORED: the motion the court itself prescribed to resolve this case has never been decided]

Baseline deviation
When a court tells a litigant the specific step that unlocks relief, receives that exact step, and confirms on the record that it changed what he is entitled to, the court then has to decide the motion. The measure here is not an outside standard. It is the judge's own words across four hearings, her own stated commitment to review the motion, and her own two confirmations after it was filed, set against zero adjudication by anyone. That combination forecloses the one innocent reading available, that he misunderstood the ruling. Under Casto the filing itself carried the entitlement.
Receipt
  • DIN 146, filed 2/28/25, with the Casto cite at para. 75.
  • Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 9:7-14 and 10:21-11:1.
  • Doc 118, transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing, Tr. 14:20-22 and 24:19-21.
  • Doc 152, transcript of the February 12, 2025 hearing, Tr. 44:12-16, 48:11, and 50:10-14.
  • Doc 198 Tr. 7:7-17 and 187:20-23. the hearing date on this transcript's cover page. It is not established in either source file, and R18 requires the hearing date, not the e-filing date.
  • Doc 192, transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 18:13-23 for the passage quoted above, and Tr. 29:6-22, "now you set up the posture for getting another bite at apple on your discovery."
  • Transcript of the April 17, 2026 hearing, Tr. 114:10-13, 115:3-12, 116:9-11. The reference at that hearing to an order on the first-filed compel motion turned out to be illusory (N-090, N-033).
  • June 10 corroboration at Tr. 110:17-111:4, where the entitlement-path arc was restated unchallenged.
  • the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23: pull the instrument and read the terms that protect Husband. "Protected me" is currently unreceipted.
  • the premarital agreement dated 10/25/16: pull it and read its scope before this proposition is pleaded or relied on.
  • Naming: the record's exhibit list says "Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23." Public cards have also used "postmarital" and "post-marital." Judge Ayers says "postnuptial" on the record and that quotation stays verbatim.
  • The seventeen-month span is carded and recomputes at build.

Read the source document: Doc 118, Transcript of 1-21-25 hearing

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-019

N-0212025-01-09Husband won his rehearing on paper, and by the day it was heard he had already lost his lawyer, answered the petition alone, and been served with a motion to default him.DENIED
Date
2025-01-09
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband won his rehearing on paper, and by the day it was heard he had already lost his lawyer, answered the petition alone, and been served with a motion to default him.
What the law required
The standards governing withdrawal of counsel over a client's objection control.
What happened
On January 9, 2025 Judge Ayers reheard the withdrawal and granted it again over Husband's objection. He had won the rehearing on paper: the court had stamped his motion GRANTED, setting it for hearing on the open docket. At the hearing the court told him he had not given a legal basis, acknowledged the one-day notice for the December hearing might have been too soon, cut him off mid-question with "Stop. Stop. Stop." and ended the hearing. She told him: "If you want to appeal me, that's fine. That's why they all have jobs." His grounds had been one-day-notice due process, absent findings, and prejudice. He is self-represented from here. [DENIED: the paper win arrived after the loss it was supposed to prevent]
Baseline deviation
A rehearing is a second look that can still change something; this one could not. The relief had already operated: counsel was removed December 13, 2024, before his response was due, and he answered self-represented December 16 (N-013). In candor, the ruling is defensible: there was a full hearing, and no basis compels a lawyer to stay. It does not answer: no findings were made, and the attorney whose conduct triggered the sequence was absent and excused that day (N-022).
Receipt
  • Docs 094 and 095, both slots holding Husband's 12/22/24 Rule 1.530 rehearing motion, Filing #213357446, stamped GRANTED with the quoted handwritten note, done and ordered 12/30/24 (the copy at Doc 094 mis-writes "25"; clerk stamp 12/31/24).
  • Doc 109 Tr. 3:9-20, 8:6-9, 12:18-21, 14:5, 14:20-23, 15:22-24, 16:25, 17:5-9, 17:14, and 18:6-15.
  • Doc 087 for the rehearing grounds, including Garden v. Garden and the 12/12 6:49 PM Dropbox transfer under twenty-four hours before the hearing.
  • Tally guard: this is one withdrawal. The notice defect counts at N-014, the findings refusal at N-015, the fiduciary reversal at N-010, and the 2026 Bar-response chronology at N-083. No tally counts the withdrawal more than once.

Spawned by: N-014

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-021

N-0222025-01-09the court answered a showing about opposing counsel's specific conduct with its own general impression of the lawyer, and the conduct in the case pending before her went unexamined.EXCUSED
Date
2025-01-09
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers (excusing); Scott Davis (non-appearance)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court answered a showing about opposing counsel's specific conduct with its own general impression of the lawyer, and the conduct in the case pending before her went unexamined.
What the law required
A hearing on an attorney's alleged misconduct examines that attorney. A party's objection to the accused's absence is ruled on, not deflected. Canon 3D(2) states the judge's duty when lawyer misconduct is credibly presented.
What happened

The evening before the hearing Davis wrote to chambers that he did "not plan on attending." Husband demanded his attendance in writing three minutes later. Chambers said nothing. The email loop included Husband, so nothing about attendance was said off the record.

In the courtroom on January 9, 2025 Husband put Davis's obstruction on the record at length. The court did not take up any of it. It answered with its own impression of the lawyer: "I'm starting my fifth year in this division. I see Mr. Davis all the time," and "So the fact that you're telling me that all of these lawyers are talking to Mr. Davis and they're afraid and running from him is complete opposite of how Mr. Davis practices in front of me. He's like a good, old teddy bear."

On the absence itself the court supplied the excuse from the bench: "Because he's not required to come. he also has the right not to come." It confined the hearing to the withdrawal motion and told Husband "I cannot discuss the case with you because Mr. Davis is not present," Davis wrote afterward that "I did not wish to waste your wife's money by attending a hearing that was not pertinent to her case."

A specific-conduct showing drew a general impression. The conduct was never examined. [EXCUSED: the showing about the accused lawyer's conduct was answered with an impression of him, and the objection to his absence drew no ruling]

Baseline deviation
When a litigant puts an officer of the court's conduct on the record, the court either examines it or says why it will not, and it rules on the party's objection rather than deflecting it. Examining the accused attorney is what would have documented the obstruction Husband presented (N-011). A general impression of how a lawyer usually behaves is not a finding about what he did in this case. The same duty was declined a second time three months later (N-045), and twelve days after this hearing the same substitution appears again with the lawyer present in the room (NEW-AYERS-0121).
Receipt
  • Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing: Tr. 3:4-5 (appearances), 4:8-12, 8:19-23 (the certification point Husband raised, which went unaddressed), 10:9-14, 11:4-7 (the confinement), 16:4-9 and 16:11-16 (the quoted vouching), 16:25, 17:14, 17:21-18:5 (the quoted excusal), and 18:6-8.
  • Doc 118, transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing, Tr. 4:3-7 and 26:2-5 for the echoes.
  • Doc 110 image exhibits for the 1/8/25 5:51 PM email in which Davis said he did not plan on attending, the 5:54 PM attendance demand three minutes later, and the 1/10/25 reply. Davis also wrote that "your request for our attendance did not necessitate our attendance."
  • The absence and the objection are docketed, not remembered. Doc 112, the first disqualification motion, e-filed 1/29/25 10:21 PM, sworn, stating the same facts. Doc 113, Wife's response at 2:53 AM the same night with a fee demand.
  • Doc 098 (1/9/25 3:22 PM), the same-day receipt. Doc 097, the hearing memo, paras. 4, 6, 35, and 40.
  • Pair the teddy-bear line with the 12/19 pre-affirmation at N-018 for the pattern. Its subject is the withdrawal rehearing and it never attaches to the certification point.
  • Related decision points: N-007, N-014.

Spawned by: N-011

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-022

N-0232025-01-21Husband had waived his own privilege three separate ways; the court still closed off any inquiry into the call that ended his representation, by invoking a privilege belonging to the other side that the other side had never claimed.EXCUSED
Date
2025-01-21
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband had waived his own privilege three separate ways; the court still closed off any inquiry into the call that ended his representation, by invoking a privilege belonging to the other side that the other side had never claimed.
What the law required
Privilege protects communications between a lawyer and that lawyer's own client (s. 90.502, Fla. Stat.). A conversation between opposing counsel is an attorney-client communication for neither side. And the client's express on-record waiver opens his own side's communications in any event. Discovery into the call that preceded the reversal was the relief requested (pleaded at para.111B(iv)).
What happened

On January 21, 2025 Judge Ayers answered Husband's request to inquire into the call from Davis to his own then-counsel this way: "Well, I can assure you, even if you waived privilege, Mr. Davis wouldn't have been able to discuss what he discussed with your lawyers because his client, I'm assuming, didn't waive privilege." She added, "Attorneys a lot of times work together to get things done." Privilege was assumed for a party who never asserted it, on the court's own initiative, with no motion on the subject pending and no ruling entered. Husband objected to the premise on the record, and the objection drew a generality (NEW-AYERS-0121).

That closed the loop. He was made to carry a burden the rule never placed on him, then barred from the only avenue of proof.

What sits on either side of the call is in writings on file. On October 21, 2024 his lawyer wrote: "This can be a long and difficult process but I assure you that you will get the answers that you need to move forward." Twelve days before this ruling, in open court and before this same judge, he described the change: "but for some reason, after each of my attorneys have had a conference with Mr. Davis, they went from, this is straight forward, we'll get you the records, to, I can't help you."

No fact and no ruling changed between those two positions. Only his own counsel's position changed. He had retained her already knowing Davis was difficult. No privilege existed, inquiry was barred anyway, and the conduct was never examined in any forum (N-045). [EXCUSED: the one conversation that would explain the withdrawal was closed off by a privilege no party asserted, and the subject never returned]

Baseline deviation
Privilege protects what a lawyer and that lawyer's own client say to each other. A call between opposing counsel is an attorney-client communication for neither side. Privilege also belongs to the holder, and it is the holder's to assert or to give up. Rule 4-1.16(b) put the burden of justifying the withdrawal on the withdrawing lawyer. The court had already inverted that burden, demanding that Husband justify keeping his own counsel (N-015). Discovery into the call was how he proposed to carry the burden he had been handed, and it was the relief he was asking for.
Receipt
  • Doc 118, transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing, Tr. 6:14-7:23, the full colloquy, quoted verbatim. The first quoted sentence ends at 7:4 and the second sits at 7:15-16. The exchange in which Husband objected to the premise is at Tr. 7:6-19 and is carded at NEW-AYERS-0121.
  • Fact ledger F199. Complaint para. 111B(iv), as pleaded.
  • Section 90.502, Florida Statutes, for the privilege definition.
  • Waiver, three independent sources: Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 4:19-24, pleaded at F110; Doc 167 p. 2, written, 12/11/24 11:17 PM; and Doc 075 para. 7.b, the opposing side's own assertion that Husband "thereby waiv[ed] attorney-client privilege."
  • The 10/21/24 email at Doc 214 p. 1. Its opening sentences ("I understand your frustrations and will do all that I can to shift the direction. Hang in there.") are on the page and are deliberately not quoted; the sentence that carries the point is the one in the text. Doc 087 p. 6 para. 35 refers to that email by date and time and reports it in Husband's own words. It is a corroborating reference, not a quotation.
  • Doc 167 p. 3 for the written before-and-after rendering of the same change, in a December 11, 2024 email to the judicial assistant. Doc 112 para. 12.K for the sworn rendering; the earlier pin to Doc 112 para. 9 was wrong and is superseded. These are different renderings by the same speaker on different occasions and each is recorded as it was said.
  • Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing, Tr. 10:11-14, and Doc 192, transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 40:13-18, both Husband speaking.
  • Doc 115, the 2/12/25 four-motion agenda, frames what the 1/21 to 2/12 window was set to adjudicate.
  • the pre-retention awareness that Davis was difficult, which is the stated reason Husband retained this lawyer. Unreceipted as of this build.

Spawned by: N-015

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-023

NEW-A1212025-01-21with the accused lawyer present in the room and the legal question put squarely twice, inquiry into his alleged misconduct was again refused on a privilege ground that does not exist.EXCUSED
Date
2025-01-21
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
with the accused lawyer present in the room and the legal question put squarely twice, inquiry into his alleged misconduct was again refused on a privilege ground that does not exist.
What the law required
A court presented with a specific showing about an officer of the court's conduct either examines it or states why it will not.
What happened

With Davis present, Husband put the legal question squarely. The exchange, at Tr. 7:6-19:

MR. HANSON: "Well, if he talks to my attorney, there's no privilege that attaches there, is there?"

THE COURT: "Well, I'm sure when Mr. Davis is talking to your attorney is talking about his client's information."

MR. HANSON: "It's waived when he talks to the attorney, right? You can't tell the other side something and say this is privileged from your client."

THE COURT: "Attorneys a lot of times work together to get things done. I'm sure, once attorneys get together and talk, they do the best they can to talk about legal perspectives and to tone down what their clients are feeling so they can get a resolution."

The legal question was asked twice and answered neither time. What answered it was a generality about

how attorneys behave. That is the same substitution recorded at N-022, now documented at two hearings

twelve days apart.

Earlier on the same pages the court said she did not know whether inquiry was available at all: "I

don't know really off the top of my head whether you could have even questioned him because I've

never seen anybody do that and I'm not sure how I would have addressed it. I probably would have

listened to the argument."

Husband stated the position on the record in real time: "There's no alternative explanation for why

Ms. Hodz withdrew other than what I said Mr. Davis' conversations. No one has disputed anything I've

said and there's no explanation."

Inquiry did not happen. [EXCUSED: with the accused lawyer present and the legal question put twice,

inquiry was refused on a ground no party had asserted, and the conduct was never examined]

Baseline deviation
A litigant who alleges misconduct by an officer of the court is entitled to an answer to the legal question that controls whether he may inquire. Privilege belongs to a holder, and it covers what a lawyer says to that lawyer's own client. It does not cover what one lawyer tells another. Twelve days earlier the same court had excused the same lawyer's absence rather than examine the same showing (N-022). This time he was present, and the question was answered with a description of how attorneys generally behave. A general practice is not a finding about a particular conversation.
Receipt
  • Doc 118, the transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing before Judge Kelly Ayers, held via Zoom, 4:41 to 5:24 p.m., 44 pages, reporter Nika M. Priestley. Pages 5 through 8 were rendered at 115 dpi and.
  • Tr. 7:6-19 for the quoted exchange, reproduced in full above.
  • Tr. 5:17-21 for the court's statement that she did not know whether inquiry was available.
  • Tr. 6:12-24 for Husband's contemporaneous statements, including "So it seems like there's definitely something there and it wasn't investigated."
  • Tr. 6:1-11, where the court stated "No. You were requesting it while we were having the hearing. At that juncture I can't do anything about it." and Husband corrected the record: "No. I requested it before the hearing, Your Honor. There was an email to your assistant where Mr. Davis told her there's a hearing next week."
  • Tr. 7:24-8:12, where the judge describes directing her own judicial assistant: "I told her to be a little lenient with you. She's there for procedural scheduling." This supports "the court" as actor over the judicial assistant under R6.
  • Section 90.502, Florida Statutes, for the privilege definition; the privilege ruling itself is carded at N-023, and the failure to examine the conduct in any forum is aggregated at N-045.
  • Husband's privilege waiver, three independent sources, receipted at N-015 and N-023.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-A121

N-0272025-02-05the first motion asking Judge Ayers to step aside was denied as legally insufficient with no reason given; twelve weeks later the same species of motion was granted with its ground stated on its face, and the denial has still never been explained.DENIED
Date
2025-02-05
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the first motion asking Judge Ayers to step aside was denied as legally insufficient with no reason given; twelve weeks later the same species of motion was granted with its ground stated on its face, and the denial has still never been explained.
What the law required
R. 2.330: a facially sufficient disqualification motion is granted, a denial states the basis for legal insufficiency, and the judge may not pass on the truth of the allegations.
What happened
Judge Ayers denied Husband's first disqualification motion on February 5, 2025 as "legally insufficient," stating no grounds. The motion she denied was sworn, filed a week earlier, and carried the Davis-absence facts among its grounds. Husband moved to vacate that denial on February 13. The response he got supplied only the cannot-comment rationale drawn from Bundy and Hill, which is an explanation in name only. When the second motion was granted twelve weeks later, the granting order described itself as ruling on an initial motion, while its own caption calls it the second verified motion (N-047). [DENIED: no explanation was given, so there is nothing to review]
Baseline deviation
The disqualification rule is unusual: the presumption runs toward the movant, whose allegations are taken as true. The comparison sits inside the same case: same movant, same species of motion, opposite outcomes twelve weeks apart. The granting order states its ground (N-047); the denial states nothing, though its grounds included the January 9, 2025 hearing where the accused attorney did not appear and the court excused it (N-022).
Receipt
  • Doc 112, e-filed 1/29/25 10:21 PM, sworn.
  • Doc 119 (2/5/25), the denial. Doc 128 (2/13/25), the motion to vacate. Doc 131 (2/17/25), the Bundy and Hill rationale.
  • Doc 184 for the initial-versus-second inconsistency. Rule 2.330.

Spawned by: N-022

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-027

N-0282025-02-10Husband's challenge to the order that killed the bank subpoenas was set for an evidentiary hearing; two days before it, the court denied the parent motion on paper, then denied the hearing motion as moot, and the hearing never happened.DENIED
Date
2025-02-10
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband's challenge to the order that killed the bank subpoenas was set for an evidentiary hearing; two days before it, the court denied the parent motion on paper, then denied the hearing motion as moot, and the hearing never happened.
What the law required
A motion noticed for an evidentiary hearing is heard at that hearing. Mooting it by an unnoticed paper order two days beforehand forecloses the record the hearing existed to make.
What happened
The evidentiary hearing was set for February 12, 2025. On February 10 at 5:05 PM Judge Ayers denied the parent motion on paper. On February 12 at 5:24 PM she denied the motion actually noticed for that hearing as moot, on the ground that the February 10 order "rendered this Motion moot." The whole challenge chain, the December 30 order, the clarification motion, and the rehearing motion, was extinguished in forty-eight hours, entirely on paper. No step in it engaged the merits. Husband objected in writing at the time, saying the sequence was "robbing Husband of the chance to create a record." The same February 10 order also denied his continuance request by quoting his own complaints about delay back at him. [DENIED: the challenge was closed on paper before the hearing that would have made the record]
Baseline deviation
A motion noticed for an evidentiary hearing is heard at that hearing, which is where a litigant makes the record an appellate court later reads. Deciding it on paper beforehand removes the record the hearing existed to produce. The hearing here would have tested the December 30 order that killed the bank subpoenas (N-018). In the same fortnight, the same court carried Wife's own motion to compel all the way to a merits order.
Receipt
  • Doc 127 (order, 2/10/25 5:05 PM, stamp), denying Doc 098.
  • Doc 129 (order, 2/12/25 5:24 PM, stamp), denying Doc 091 as moot in the quoted words.
  • Doc 115, the notice setting DIN 91 for 2/12. Doc 128 para. 10, the contemporaneous objection quoted above.
  • Doc 138 (2/19/25), Wife's compel granted in part in the same fortnight. The 2/12 transcript memo corroborates.

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-028

N-0292025-02-12the motion challenged the certificate of compliance under one subdivision of the disclosure rule; the order denied it for failing to identify a document under a different subdivision, and the same order recorded Wife's agreement to file a corrected certificate.DENIED
Date
2025-02-12
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the motion challenged the certificate of compliance under one subdivision of the disclosure rule; the order denied it for failing to identify a document under a different subdivision, and the same order recorded Wife's agreement to file a corrected certificate.
What the law required
R. 12.285 governs discovery enforcement and contempt.
What happened

By the February 12, 2025 hearing Wife had been under a court order compelling her financial disclosures since November 2024, entered after those disclosures ran about four months past the stipulated production date. Her own lawyer told the court: "I cannot as an officer [the] court say 100 percent" that she had complied. The contempt motion was denied anyway, without prejudice.

The motion and the order are about different subdivisions of the same rule. Husband's motion is a certificate challenge: Wife and her counsel "made no attempt to comply with the requirements in Rule FFLRP 12.285(j)." The order denies it because the motion "does not identify any document required to be produced by Wife in accordance with Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 (e) that was not produced by Wife." Subdivision (j) is the certificate. Subdivision (e) is production. The order does not reach (j).

The same order records that "Petitioner stipulated to file an amended certification of compliance" carrying the rule's full oath. The defect was conceded on the page that denied relief for it.

Two cure paths issued: Husband could refile identifying a document, and Wife would then have twenty days to produce it. Amended certificates were filed that night, about eleven hours later, twice, eleven minutes apart, from one DocuSign envelope. The written denial followed two days later. [DENIED: denied without prejudice; the subdivision the motion raised was not reached]

Baseline deviation
Rule 12.285 separates two duties. Subdivision (e) governs producing documents. Subdivision (j) governs the certificate of compliance, the sworn statement that the rule was followed. A motion attacking the certificate raises (j). Answering it requires reaching (j). Husband's motion never argued the certificate was unsworn. The problem was that it did not actually swear to compliance with mandatory disclosures. The court held the literal text satisfied without reaching the subdivision the motion raised.
Receipt
  • Doc 084, Husband's Motion for Enforcement and Contempt, filed 12/18/2024, paras. 15 and 21 (the Rule 12.285(j) certificate challenge), and paras. 24 to 26, which invoke Rule 12.380 and quote subdivision (b)(2)(C). Read from the page image 8/20/2026.
  • Doc 130, Order Denying Respondent's Motion for Enforcement and Finding of Contempt, e-signed 2/14/2025 6:26:10 PM: findings A and B (the Rule 12.285(e) ground), para. 2 (Husband may refile identifying a document), para. 3 (Wife then has 20 days), para. 5 (Petitioner's stipulation to file an amended certification). Read from the page images 8/20/2026.
  • Rule 12.380 appears nowhere in Doc 130.
  • Doc 152, transcript of the February 12, 2025 hearing, Tr. 30:14-19 for the quoted concession. The transcript reads "officer [the] court" with no "of" and the bracket is preserved as printed. Tr. 30 for the self-imposed audit quote, and Tr. 39.
  • Doc 084, the motion, resting on a December 6 deficiency email. It cites neither section 57.105 nor Doc 60, and it must not be linked to the 12/5 letter. Anomalies on Doc 084: no exhibit was actually attached, and the certificate of service says "13th day of December" against the 12/18 stamp.
  • Doc 102, Filing #214808284, 1/17/25 9:35 AM, set Docs 84 and 91 for 1/21/25 4:30 PM.
  • Doc 054, the compel order.
  • Doc 130 (2/14/25), the written denial on the name-a-missing-document rationale.
  • Docs 124 and 125, the same certificate filed at 11:15:25 PM and 11:26:49 PM from one DocuSign envelope, each sworn by Wife at p. 10, each carrying the qualified oath quoted above. Docs 044 and 046, sworn by Wife at p. 9, are the certificates that were actually before the court.
  • Ledger correction of 2026-08-16 supersedes V10's earlier note that Docs 124 and 125 were signed by counsel only.
  • The ruling is defensible on its own terms: it states a merits rationale, it names the missing document, and it invites a cure path. That concession is recorded here rather than argued in the card.
  • Related decision points: N-009.

Spawned by: N-009

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-029

N-0302025-02-18an order to show cause backed by an arrest warning issued against both parties without naming a single email, date, sender, or count, and a hearing on it had already been noticed before the order existed.EXCUSED
Date
2025-02-18
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
an order to show cause backed by an arrest warning issued against both parties without naming a single email, date, sender, or count, and a hearing on it had already been noticed before the order existed.
What the law required
A reported threat of violence from counsel is addressed to the counsel who made it. The reporting party is not placed under the same arrest-warning order as the reported party.
What happened
On February 7, 2025, Davis's email inserted the word bat into Husband's ball-and-go-home phrase and added a defamation warning about publishing. Husband objected that it was at least the second time Davis had alluded to violence. Davis answered: "The only time I would engage in violence is if it were necessary in self defense". Eleven days later Judge Ayers entered an order to show cause directing both parties to appear under an arrest warning; a hearing on it had already been noticed before it was signed. She reset it twice, heard it April 22, 2025 without evidence, with Wife excused over objection, made no findings, imposed only an email-only limit on Husband, and told him: "Do you realize you just won this hearing?" Davis's response had converted the order into a request to restrict Husband's emails. [EXCUSED: the email came from Wife's counsel, who drew no consequence]
Baseline deviation
An order that puts a person at risk of arrest tells that person what he is said to have done. This one does not: its only finding describes an extraordinary volume of email communication, naming no email, date, sender, or count. The stated reason, given three times, is volume alone. The email described below came from Wife's counsel, who drew no consequence, while the order issued against both parties, including the one who had objected to that email.
Receipt
  • Doc 137 exhibits pp. 5-8, the complete 2/7/25 email chain quoted above in both directions, including Davis's follow-up "I don't even own a bat."
  • Doc 120 p. 3, Husband's contemporaneous characterization.
  • Doc 136 (2/18/25), the order to show cause on the court's own initiative, with its only finding that "Counsels for the Parties are engaging in an extraordinary exchange of email communications between themselves and the Parties between the Judicial Assistant to the undersigned."
  • Doc 141, the amended order resetting to 4/3/25, the eve of the 4/4 hearing. Doc 135, Davis's response and email-restriction request.
  • Doc 123 (2/12/25 3:03 PM), noticing a 2/25 hearing on an order "to be entered by the Court prior to February 25"; Doc 136 was entered 2/18/25; Doc 123's footnote 1 is the email-restriction receipt.
  • Doc 192 Tr. 4:5-9 for the court's own 4/22/25 explanation, Tr. 46:5-22 for the email-limit ruling as corrected, and Tr. 46:24-25 for the quoted "won this hearing" line.
  • Doc 198 Tr. 4:19-24 and 180:9-24 for the 4/4 roadmap placement and the reset.
  • Docs 133 and 134, the Zoom-deposition order granted without hearing on unspecified good cause, and the document tying it to the 2/7 email.
  • Related decision points: N-014, N-022.

Spawned by: N-011

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-030

N-0352025-03-04in the same fortnight, Wife's motion to compel was granted in part with a deadline attached, and Husband's motion attacking the orders that left him with no disclosure came back to him as his own paper with the word DENIED stamped on it.DENIED
Date
2025-03-04
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
in the same fortnight, Wife's motion to compel was granted in part with a deadline attached, and Husband's motion attacking the orders that left him with no disclosure came back to him as his own paper with the word DENIED stamped on it.
What the law required
A motion challenging an order that suppresses enforcement of mandatory disclosure must be decided with at least a stated basis.
What happened
Husband filed his Motion to Vacate on February 26, 2025, aimed at the orders that left him without mandatory-disclosure compliance. It came back as the same paper, stamped "DENIED", March 4, 2025, Kelly Ayers, with no findings and no reasoning. He met the deadline the court had set on his own side: his sworn compliance certificate, one page, was filed on that same February 26 date. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A motion challenging an order suppressing mandatory disclosure gets decided with at least a stated basis, since that is the only thing a reviewing court can examine. A stamp gives none. Both sides sought the same relief in the same two weeks before the same judge; only one side's was processed on the merits. The motion here targeted the order denying Husband's enforcement motion on a naming technicality (N-029). A stated basis would have documented why that denial stood.
Receipt
  • Doc 145 (the 2/26/25 motion).
  • Doc 151 (the same paper returned stamped "DENIED" 3/4/25, stamp).
  • Doc 130 (2/14/25), the denial the motion targeted.
  • Doc 138 (2/19/25), Wife's compel granted in part with a comply-or-object deadline.
  • Doc 142, Husband's sworn compliance certificate filed on the 2/26/25 deadline, verified 8/7/26.

Spawned by: N-029

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-035

N-0382025-04-01the court asked Wife's lawyer in writing to summarize her testimony, he promised it the same day and never sent it, and the court told its own assistant not to remind him.IGNORED
Date
2025-04-01
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers (rescission and non-engagement); Scott Davis (the default)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court asked Wife's lawyer in writing to summarize her testimony, he promised it the same day and never sent it, and the court told its own assistant not to remind him.
What the law required
Relief that reshapes children's lives must rest on a stated good-faith basis. A party's child-welfare objections in the record must be engaged, not ignored.
What happened
On April 7, 2025 the court emailed Davis asking for a written summary of Wife's testimony while preparing its orders. He answered the same day that he was happy to and would need a couple of days. Nothing came in eight days. On April 16 the court's own order erased the ask: "No summaries have been provided to the Court. No summaries are being requested by the Court." Orders were prepared from the April 4 record anyway. On the other side of the same file, Husband's filed oppositions about the children were never engaged, including his statement that "Dragging happy, healthy, thriving children back into a conflict is counter-intuitive and cruel." His April 15 motion was never ruled on. The guardian ad litem was appointed fourteen months later with no finding of unfitness (N-125). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Relief that reshapes children's lives rests on a stated basis, and the court asked the movant to put that basis in writing. She had lost her staff attorney and was drafting the order herself; she was clear the ask was a request, not an order: "It wasn't order." On the other side of the file, Husband's documented objections about the children drew no ruling. The two halves are one shape: nothing required of the movant, nothing engaged from the objector.
Receipt
  • Doc 169 (4/1/25, Filing #220088124), the welfare showing including the Elovitz "Be Wary of Saviors" guardian-ad-litem risk literature.
  • Doc 173 (4/7/25 11:22 AM), paras. 5, 10, 14, and 25 for the quoted passages.
  • Doc 177 (4/15/25) para. 11 for the quoted sentence.
  • Doc 182 (order, 4/16/25) for the quoted rescission.
  • The 4/7 email pair is preserved inside Docs 173 and 177.
  • Doc 192 Tr. 51:11 for "It wasn't order" and for the judicial assistant instruction, "I actually said to Dee Dee, don't give him a reminder," with the court's own stated explanation in the same passage.
  • Caution: Doc 169's certificate carries a stale "13th day of December, 2024" template date, and Doc 177 says "April 3" where Docs 173 and 182 fix the hearing as 4/4.
  • Additional oppositions never engaged: cross-examination not completed; no affidavits, police reports, or teacher emails existed; and that there was "nothing that approaches any reasonable concern about Husband's parenting ability."
  • Related decision points: N-041.

Spawned by: N-041

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-038

N-0402025-04-04thirty-five days after Husband filed the motion the court itself had told him to file, the judge said on the record that he had "now opened a door to entitle yourself to more evidence"; twenty-four days after that she recused, without ruling on it.IGNORED
Date
2025-04-04
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
thirty-five days after Husband filed the motion the court itself had told him to file, the judge said on the record that he had "now opened a door to entitle yourself to more evidence"; twenty-four days after that she recused, without ruling on it.
What the law required
A court that confirms on the record that a filed motion changed the movant's entitlement must then decide it within a meaningful time. Confirmation without adjudication is its own determination point.
What happened
Judge Ayers prescribed the motion across four hearings (N-019). Husband filed it in exactly the prescribed form. On April 4, 2025 she confirmed twice on the record that it had changed his position, telling him: "You have now opened a door to entitle yourself to more evidence", and confirmed the filing itself and that the motion was going to open up the discovery. No adjudication ever followed, from her or anyone. She recused about April 28, 2025 with the motion unruled, and it is still unruled. A different set of events from the same hearing day, the courthouse video Judge Ayers volunteered and then declined to pursue, is carded separately at N-042. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A court that confirms on the record that a filed motion changed what a litigant is entitled to has to decide that motion within a meaningful time. Confirmation without adjudication is its own decision point: nobody can say the motion was insufficient when the judge who prescribed it said on the record that it had worked. The recusal left the confirmed and undetermined motion in the hands of a successor who has now carried it for months on end (N-033).
Receipt
  • Doc 198 Tr. 7:7-17 (the key phrase sits at 7:13-14), 187:20-23, 188:9-14, and 191:7-9 (also carrying "that will probably be open to you now receiving that discovery," "You have it filed," and the "going to open up the discovery" characterization).
  • DIN 146, filed 2/28/25.
  • Recusal lineage at Docs 184 and 187; note the 8/18/26 correction carried at N-047 that Doc 187 is Judge DePaul's own recusal order, not an Ayers instrument.
  • Day count in the card: 535 days as of 8/17/26; recompute at use.

Spawned by: N-019

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-040

N-0412025-04-04the court gave the day to the motion questioning Husband as a parent and pushed the discovery two months out, and in four years the only documented concern about either child was that each had once seemed tired.DENIED
Date
2025-04-04
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court gave the day to the motion questioning Husband as a parent and pushed the discovery two months out, and in four years the only documented concern about either child was that each had once seemed tired.
What the law required
Discovery disputes are ordinarily resolved before the merits they feed. That is especially so where the pending discovery bears on the merits of the very motion being advanced (the guardian ad litem's best-interest predicate).
What happened
On April 4, 2025 Judge Ayers put Wife's guardian ad litem and psychological-evaluation motions first and confined the day to the children. Husband's position, held since the guardian ad litem motion was filed, was that he needed the discovery to prove the retaliatory motive, and he argued on the record that his pending discovery fed the guardian ad litem question itself. The school administrator who testified that day said that in four years the only documented concern about either child was one notation that each had seemed tired. Wife's entire showing went to Husband, not to the children. The court twice announced it would rule on the guardian ad litem that day. It ended the day with no rulings at all and deferred discovery wholesale to June 10. The guardian ad litem request became an ultimatum: mediate, or take less than fifty percent. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Discovery disputes are ordinarily resolved before the merits they feed, especially where the pending discovery bears on the merits of the motion being advanced. This same court had already conditioned discovery on a future merits ruling (N-018, N-019), and here it advanced the merits instrument ahead of the discovery relevant to it. Taking discovery first would have documented the factual predicate of the guardian ad litem motion, which alleged no incident, no date, no observation, and no witness (N-001).
Receipt
  • Doc 198 Tr. 8:21-25 and 136:8-13 (the roadmap); 100:19-25, 101:3-13, and 115:12-14 (the discovery-first argument and the confinement of the day); 116:16-20 and 136:15-17 (the rule-today announcements); 193:18-20 (no rulings); 185:2-8, 188:15-17, and 191:16-18 (the deferral to June); 170:19-23 and 173:2-4 (the ultimatum); 20:10-14 (the tired-notation testimony); 68:2-3 (the court on chronic depression).
  • Born-digital text layer, twenty key pages.
  • Tally guard: the school administrator's April 4 testimony is counted once; the same testimony is carded at N-043 and at FNEW-W1 in the Wife lane and is never counted as three.

Spawned by: N-001

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-041

N-0422025-04-04the judge offered the courthouse camera footage as proof about her own conduct, and when Husband asked her to go get it she refused twice and ended the hearing, and it has never been produced.DENIED
Date
2025-04-04
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the judge offered the courthouse camera footage as proof about her own conduct, and when Husband asked her to go get it she refused twice and ended the hearing, and it has never been produced.
What the law required
Evidence a judge volunteers about her own conduct should be obtainable. R. 2.420 governs access.
What happened
On April 4, 2025 Judge Ayers volunteered courthouse-camera footage to disprove an alleged eye-roll: "I will go get the camera footage and do it because I have not rolled my eyes at you." Husband asked her to pursue that footage. She refused twice, telling him he was crossing a line, and ended the hearing. The footage has never been produced to Husband, and no court or party has ever examined it on the record (N-103 records the defendants' own denial that nobody viewed it). This is the April 4, 2025 courthouse video, called the video in later cards: courthouse demeanor footage, not a recording of the proceedings. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Evidence a judge volunteers about her own conduct should be obtainable; once she points to a record as her own proof, it has to be reachable by the other person in the room. The same footage becomes the object of the public-records litigation that follows, later confirmed to exist and withheld (N-053 lineage). The underlying eye-roll is Husband's sworn firsthand account in a verified motion later granted as legally sufficient; it is always "alleged," never a bare fact.
Receipt
  • Doc 198 Tr. 75:12-16 and 75:15-17 (the volunteered footage and the first refusal), and Tr. 193:9-11 with context at 193:13-14 (the second refusal, "No, sir," "you're crossing the line. This hearing is ended," and the end of the hearing).
  • Doc 183 p. 10, the verified second disqualification motion carrying the sworn eye-roll account under its own heading, filed 4/24/25 and granted as legally sufficient 4/28/25 (N-047).

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-042

N-0452025-04-22twenty-five pages of unrefuted evidence about opposing counsel's conduct produced no inquiry, no finding, and no conduct identified, in any forum; the court pointed to the Bar, the Bar had already closed the file and pointed back to the court, and the judicial commission later pointed back to the courts as well.EXCUSED
Date
2025-04-22
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
twenty-five pages of unrefuted evidence about opposing counsel's conduct produced no inquiry, no finding, and no conduct identified, in any forum; the court pointed to the Bar, the Bar had already closed the file and pointed back to the court, and the judicial commission later pointed back to the courts as well.
What the law required
Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3D(2) provides that a judge with knowledge of lawyer misconduct shall take appropriate action.
What happened

On April 22, 2025 Judge Ayers declined to take up Davis's conduct herself and pointed to the Bar, saying she is not the Florida Bar. In the same hearing Davis announced that the Bar had declined. The court's stated condition for acting was future: "if he comes to my courtroom and lies to me. order to show cause."

The finger-pointing is pinned on both ends of the loop. No forum ever addressed the misconduct described over twenty-five pages of unrefuted evidence. This was the third time the same duty was declined in the same case (N-022, NEW-AYERS-0121). [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation
A judge who learns of a lawyer's misconduct is expected to do something with what she learns. What she does with it is what would have produced a judicial record of the conduct. Here the pointing went in a circle. The Bar had closed the file six days after it arrived, saying the matter belonged to a court (N-031), and the judicial commission later dismissed on the same reasoning, pointing back to the normal court process (N-062). A judge is right that she does not discipline lawyers. The claim made here is narrower: no inquiry, no finding, and no conduct identified.
Receipt
  • Transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 36, the "I'm not the Florida Bar" loop, confirmed against the page image 8/7/26. The exact wording ships per the Draft 4 checklist.
  • N-031 for the six-day Bar closure and its quoted rationale. N-062 for the judicial commission dismissal.
  • N-046 for the same hearing's specification void.
  • N-022 for the first refusal of the same duty three months earlier, and NEW-AYERS-0121 for the refusal twelve days after that one.
  • Lane and actor confirmed at R17: this is a Judge Ayers card in the Judge Ayers lane, 13th Cir., 4/22/25. It is not a Bar card. Its content crosses forums, which is what made it read that way.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-045

N-0462025-04-22asked in court twice and under oath once to name one thing Husband had filed or done that was inappropriate, no motion, paragraph, or sentence has been identified; the only conduct ever named was an email exchange about baseball equipment, charged to both sides.EXCUSED
Date
2025-04-22
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers; Scott Davis (Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.)
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
asked in court twice and under oath once to name one thing Husband had filed or done that was inappropriate, no motion, paragraph, or sentence has been identified; the only conduct ever named was an email exchange about baseball equipment, charged to both sides.
What the law required
A party accused of misconduct is entitled to notice of the conduct alleged. A court asked to address an officer of the court's conduct either addresses it or states on the record why it will not.
What happened
Husband repeatedly asked, on the record, for anyone to name one thing he had done that was inappropriate. No one ever did. On April 22, 2025, pressed to address opposing counsel's conduct, Judge Ayers said she could not question him, then named the only conduct she attributed to either party: "the only thing that both of you have acted inappropriately were those emails about going to the baseball field with bats and balls and I called you both in and gave you both a lecture." He renewed the challenge twice more, drawing no answer. At deposition, asked for a specific example, Wife named two filings instead: his writ of certiorari and his motion to recuse the judge, the filings a litigant uses to ask a court to decide that question. No motion or sentence was ever identified. [EXCUSED: conduct named against Husband was an email exchange charged to both sides]
Baseline deviation
A party accused of misconduct is entitled to know what conduct is alleged, and a court asked to address counsel's conduct either addresses it or states why it will not. The measurable thing is the asymmetry: across more than two years, the filings and orders adverse to Husband rest on characterizations rather than incidents (N-001). In fairness, disciplining lawyers is the Bar's role, not the court's. The deviation is that no forum, court or Bar, ever named the conduct.
Receipt
  • Doc 192 Tr. 35:3-25 (4/22/25, including "I'm not the Florida Bar. I don't discipline lawyers" and "I can't ask him any questions").
  • Doc 212 Tr. 6:20-25 (6/3/25, Husband's renewed challenge: "I would ask Mr. Davis to show you one example of an inappropriate email I've sent.").
  • Doc 152 Tr. 55:1-8 (2/12/25, "No one can name anything negative about what I have done as a father").
  • Doc 205 Tr. 146:2-147:25 (the deposition passage, including Tr. 147:2-4 for "a specific example" and Tr. 147:17-25 for Wife's answer naming the writ of certiorari and the recusal motion).
  • The Doc 192 reporter's verbatim includes the garbled "I don't that I've ever done" and is preserved as spoken.
  • Specification-void family, cited as a family with each card's own candor limits traveling with it: NEW-P8 (Davis in correspondence), NEW-P6 (the Bar), N-062 (the judicial commission), N-064 (the Bar file and its sixteen demands), NEW-P7 (the invitation to name a false statement), and N-117 and N-136 (the mandamus court).

Spawned by: N-001, N-042

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-046

N-0472025-04-28the one time the disqualification rule was applied as written, Husband won and the judge left the case; not one of the things he had been asking that court to decide moved.WON-THEN-NULLIFIED
Date
2025-04-28
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the one time the disqualification rule was applied as written, Husband won and the judge left the case; not one of the things he had been asking that court to decide moved.
What the law required
R. 2.330(e)(1) requires that a facially sufficient disqualification motion be granted.
What happened
The second disqualification motion was filed on April 24, 2025 and granted four days later. Judge Ayers was disqualified and the case was reassigned to Judge Felix. After reassignment, the first-filed discovery motion stayed unruled (N-003), the psychological-evaluation prong stayed unresolved (N-016), and the 2024 fee entitlement was never liquidated (N-009). The granting order's operative sentence reads that "Because Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(h) requires the Court to accept all allegations in an INITIAL motion for disqualification as true, the Court finds the Motion to be legally sufficient," while its own caption calls it the second verified motion; a first motion had already been denied as legally insufficient without grounds twelve weeks earlier (N-027). Same movant, same species of motion, two orders that cannot both be applying the rule the same way. The order also expressly declines to rule on the venue request. [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
The rule requires that a facially sufficient disqualification motion be granted. The presumption inside it runs toward the movant: the allegations are taken as true and are not weighed. This is the one occasion where the rule was applied as written and Husband won, which defeats any claim that he loses because his positions are weak. What the grant changed was the identity of the judge. What it did not change is stated as observable effect only.
Receipt
  • Doc 183, the granted second disqualification motion, Filing #221772754, e-filed 4/24/25 11:24 PM, verified 4/23/25; pp. 1 and 8 (paras. 61-63) and p. 10 (the eye-roll heading and paras. 78-79 and 82).
  • Doc 184, the disqualification order, at its operative sentence.
  • Doc 181 (4/23/25, stamp) para. 2, bolded: neither the court nor Davis could produce "a single email, nor even a single sentence" of inappropriate conduct.
  • Doc 180 (4/21/25, stamp) para. 8, the first docketed capture of the summary position change.
  • Rule 2.330(e)(1).

Spawned by: N-042

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-047

NEW-P72025-11-24invited in writing to name one false statement in the article about her, she filed a Bar complaint the same afternoon; through July 23, 2026, across sixteen written demands, nobody has named one.IGNORED
Date
2025-11-24
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
13th Cir. / The Florida Bar (file 2026-10,395(13F))
Mechanism
invited in writing to name one false statement in the article about her, she filed a Bar complaint the same afternoon; through July 23, 2026, across sixteen written demands, nobody has named one.
What the law required
Two lawful paths sat side by side that morning, and the card states both honestly. A judge who believes a published statement about her is false can say which one, in a sentence; the invitation asked exactly that. And a judge who knows of a lawyer's misconduct may report it, and the Code of Judicial Conduct may even require reporting in defined circumstances. What no rule anywhere requires is the combination the record shows: no identification of any false statement, that day or ever, in a file that sixteen written demands have since asked to specify one.
What happened
A published article named Judge Ayers and described her conduct. Two days later, at 10:18 AM, Husband emailed her division: "If you believe that anything stated in the article is untrue, please let me know so I can consider amending the article if appropriate." The same ask went to circuit administration and to the Bar and JQC minutes later (N-065). No identification of any false statement ever came from her or her division. That same afternoon, Judge Ayers filed her Florida Bar complaint against Husband (N-064). Through July 23, 2026, across sixteen written demands, that file still has not specified a single false statement, and the Bar's own referral letter captions the matter as "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson," not as a complaint by the judge. In fairness, filing a Bar complaint is lawful, and the invitation went to her division inbox. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Anyone who believes a published statement about them is false can say which one; that fixes the record. Truth is an absolute defense in a disciplinary case, so naming the false statement is the one thing that could make the complaint stick. No rule requires the combination the record shows: no identification of any false statement, that day or ever, in a file sixteen written demands have since asked to specify one. Nothing here asserts purpose.
Receipt
  • Three 11/24/25 invitation emails at 10:18, 10:27, and 10:34 AM, per N-065; division email is the one that reaches her.
  • The article, posted on X 11/22/25 14:56 UTC, post 1992245722901577796, printed at Doc 267 pp. 14-56; complaint pleads publication on or about 11/21, conflict unresolved.
  • Bar complaint intake 11/24/25, carded at N-064 with sixteen written specification demands running 12/8/25 through 7/23/26.
  • Bar's referral letter to the grievance committee, dated December 3, 2025, and its caption.
  • Timing arithmetic carded at N-065 as 6 hours 22 minutes from the 10:34 AM send; intake timestamp is ACAP intake of "Hanson FL BAR Complaint.pdf" at 4:56:32 PM.

Spawned by: N-064, N-065

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P7

Husband's counsel5 nodes

Official public records: Florida Bar member profile, Grace Marica Samarkos | Florida Bar member profile, Vivian Cortes Hodz

N-0052024-05-30 -> 2024-08-14across eleven weeks the client supplied his own firm with the objective, the instrument, and the urgency, in writing, and asked again when nothing went out; the draft arrived the day of his second follow-up, after the first went unanswered.REFUSED
Date
2024-05-30 -> 2024-08-14
Actor
Harris, Hunt & Derr, Husband's own then-counsel
Institution
Own counsel
Mechanism
across eleven weeks the client supplied his own firm with the objective, the instrument, and the urgency, in writing, and asked again when nothing went out; the draft arrived the day of his second follow-up, after the first went unanswered.
What the law required
Rules 4-1.2 and 4-1.4: counsel pursues the client's lawful objective or states the professional reason for declining. The client's stated objective from the first filing was the financial discovery (Doc 22).
What happened
Between May and August 2024, Husband repeatedly pressed his own firm to act. On 5/30/24 he asked them to subpoena Wife's Chase accounts; on 6/2/24, with no subpoena out, he pressed again. On 7/11/24 he asked the firm to raise Wife's missed 6/28/24 production deadline at the coming hearing (N-006). On 7/19/24 he asked to see the interrogatories before they went out. On 8/9/24 his own counsel wrote that she needed to "touch base with her again about the request to produce". On 8/12/24 he asked directly: "I did want to ask about the request to produce. Have we sent that? I'd like to get that going ASAP." That message was not answered. On 8/14/24 he wrote again asking for status and warning that a clock should be ticking on his financial-information request. A draft arrived later that day; the record does not show whether it was ever served. [REFUSED]
Baseline deviation
No public duty is at issue; this is professional: the client sets the objective, the lawyer pursues it or explains in writing why not. Husband's objective never changed from his May 2024 filing: financial records covering years of marital income (N-003). In fairness, Vivian Cortes Hodz, the lawyer who took over, wrote on 10/18/24 that HH&D's recent discovery work was "appropriate, reasonable and consistent with actions I would recommend," an assessment limited to the emails she had seen.
Receipt
  • Emails of 5/30, 5/31, 6/2, 7/11, 7/19, 8/9, 8/12, and 8/14/2024, all filed at 1150, on HHD letterhead over the "Grace M. Samarkos, Attorney" signature block.
  • Source-generation limit on this set: the file is a text export of the original PDF, so the image is of the export, not of the mailbox original.
  • The 11/7/24 and 11/8/24 emails between Husband and the firm are verbatim, primary-sourced, and pleaded at complaint para. 36C; they travel here.
  • The stipulated 6/28/24 date and the non-production are receipted at N-006 (Doc 155 Tr. 21:8-11).
  • The objective's anchor is Doc 22, filed 5/16/24 (N-003).
  • Cortes Hodz counterweight: her email of 10/18/24 4:07 PM.

Read the source document: Doc 155, Transcript of 10-28-24 hearing

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-005

N-0082024-11-08counsel dated the delinquency at many months with zero documents received, called what had arrived partial, and in the same email handed the matter on. Nobody pressed it afterward.IGNORED
Date
2024-11-08
Actor
G. Samarkos (Harris, Hunt & Derr), Husband's own then-counsel
Institution
HHD
Mechanism
counsel dated the delinquency at many months with zero documents received, called what had arrived partial, and in the same email handed the matter on. Nobody pressed it afterward.
What the law required
Fiduciary duty requires counsel to pursue the client's lawful objective (the financial records) or withdraw. Rules 4-1.2 and 4-1.4 state that duty.
What happened

On November 8, 2024, at 9:24 AM, Husband's outgoing counsel stated the predicate and closed her involvement in one email: "That was part of the reason why Judge Ayers awarded you your fees, because it had been many months past the deadline with zero documents received, and she felt that was not acceptable." The same email calls what had arrived a partial production, and declines the client's request to ask opposing counsel for an explanation: "I am not going to send Scott an email asking for another explanation why it took him so long to send us the documents."

A reason for stopping was given, in writing, three times within nineteen hours, and it was the handoff: the substitution had been filed and incoming counsel would handle opposing counsel directly. No order on the substitution had entered, and incoming counsel had said she would act on its entry. Nothing in the email says the request itself was improper or wrong.

Incoming counsel did write to opposing counsel four days later. That letter asked for voluntary cooperation and an explanation of the history. It did not invoke the compel order, set a deadline, or demand a sworn certification (N-010). The delinquency outgoing counsel had just dated at many months with zero documents received drew no enforcement demand from anyone. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
Eleven days earlier the court had compelled the disclosures and found a fee entitlement (N-009). She was still counsel when she declined. The substitution had been filed that day but no order had entered, and incoming counsel had said she would take up the issues on entry of that order. A reason for stopping was given, in writing, three times in nineteen hours, and it was the handoff. Nothing in the email identifies any impropriety, inaccuracy, or legal problem with what the client asked to be sent. What a handoff does not do is discharge the demand.
Receipt
  • Email, Gracie Samarkos to Husband, copying Vivian Cortes Hodz and Katherine Scott, 11/8/2024 9:24 AM, subject "RE: Concern with providing records From 10-1-23 forward only." Both quotations above are from this one message.
  • Email, Samarkos to Husband, 11/8/2024 11:41 AM, stating the substitution had been executed and filed and directing future requests to incoming counsel.
  • Email, Cortes Hodz, 11/8/2024, stating she would address all issues with opposing counsel directly upon entry of the substitution order.
  • Native Outlook.msg files preserved in the 12/15/2024 mailbox export, intaken 8/20/2026 to 1150 correspondence.
  • The compel order and fee entitlement are receipted at N-009; the 11/12/2024 letter from incoming counsel at N-010.
  • The negative is scoped to these three emails as read: none of them states that the request was improper, inaccurate, or unlawful.
  • Federal complaint para. 36C pleads this exchange.

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-008

N-0102024-11-22seventy-two hours after sending a positive case update, Husband's own lawyer threatened to withdraw; she then moved her exit hearing up twenty-four days on one day's notice, and he met the four motions filed against him self-represented.REFUSED
Date
2024-11-22
Actor
Vivian Cortes Hodz, Husband's own then-counsel
Institution
Own counsel
Mechanism
seventy-two hours after sending a positive case update, Husband's own lawyer threatened to withdraw; she then moved her exit hearing up twenty-four days on one day's notice, and he met the four motions filed against him self-represented.
What the law required
Rule 4-1.16 governs withdrawal, and Rule 4-1.16(b) puts the justification on the withdrawing lawyer: withdrawal ordinarily requires good cause or no material adverse effect on the client.
What happened

On 11/19/24 Vivian Cortes Hodz sent a positive case update. On 11/22/24, seventy-two hours later, she threatened withdrawal. She filed the motion on 12/3/24 and it was set thirty-four days out. On 12/11/24 at 4:09 PM she filed an expedited motion, and the hearing came on 12/13/24 at 4:30 PM over Husband's objection (N-014). The expedited motion has not been pulled and no emergency is asserted here.

She did not carry the representation into the response window. Husband answered self-represented on 12/16/24, under the judicial-default motion filed against him at 8:32 AM on the same day counsel exited (N-013). The scope of the engagement was documented before any dispute existed: on 10/18/24 she wrote that she wanted to attend the litigation hearings, phase out existing counsel, and be "fully involved in how the discovery issues are handled" (N-023).

The only documented event inside that window is the 11/19/24 call from opposing counsel, and no inquiry into it has occurred (N-023, NEW-AYERS-0121). In her 3/11/26 Bar response she attributes the withdrawal to Husband's email of 11/25/24. Her own threat of 11/22/24 predates that email, and her own attachments are what show it (N-083). [REFUSED]

Baseline deviation
No public duty here. The professional rule on withdrawal puts the justification on the withdrawing lawyer: good cause, or no material adverse effect on the client. Notice periods exist to protect the client, not to be compressed by the client's own counsel. Both ran the other way here. A reason stated at the time would have created a contemporaneous record of what changed. The reason appears first in her 3/11/26 response to The Florida Bar, and her own attached exhibits contradict it (N-083). What follows is counsel's own conduct. The court's grant is a separate matter (N-014, N-015, N-021).
Receipt
  • Hodz response to The Florida Bar, 3/11/26, File 2026-10,601, with its own attachments: the 11/19/24 update email and the 11/22/24 withdrawal email.
  • Withdrawal motion 12/3/24; expedited motion 12/11/24.
  • Doc 100 para. 1 for the one-day-notice recital; receipted in full at N-014, which now owns the 12/3 to 12/13 sequence.
  • The 10/18/24 4:07 PM scope email, and the 10/21/24 email at Doc 214 p. 1, "I assure you that you will get the answers that you need to move forward." The 10/18 email carries the same source-generation limit as N-005.
  • Husband's privilege waiver, three independent sources, receipted at N-015 and N-023.
  • Firm affiliation is not stated publicly until verified.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-010

N-0832026-03-11she told The Florida Bar that her withdrawal was a "direct result" of a November 25 email; the response does not mention that she had already threatened to withdraw three days earlier, and the exhibit she attached herself is what shows itPENDING
Date
2026-03-11
Actor
Vivian Cortes Hodz
Institution
The Florida Bar File 2026-10,601 (13E->13C)
Mechanism
she told The Florida Bar that her withdrawal was a "direct result" of a November 25 email; the response does not mention that she had already threatened to withdraw three days earlier, and the exhibit she attached herself is what shows it
What the law required
A response to The Florida Bar requires candor. A stated reason for withdrawal must survive its own timeline.
What happened

On March 11, 2026 Husband's former counsel told The Florida Bar that her withdrawal was a "direct result" of his November 25, 2024 email. She had already threatened to withdraw three days earlier, on November 22. The response does not mention that threat.

Her own attached exhibit frames the reversal. After a same-day call with Wife's counsel, she reported that Wife "IS COOPERATING with voluntarily producing the retirement documents." Three days later she reversed and threatened withdrawal if Husband kept insisting on financial discovery.

The only event documented in that 72-hour window is the call, and no one has examined it: when Husband asked the trial court to inquire, with his own privilege waived three separate ways, the request was answered with a privilege ruling (N-023). The Bar has not resolved File 2026-10,601; the November 22 threat and the account given to the Bar have never been reconciled. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
A response to The Florida Bar requires candor. A withdrawal threatened on one date and carried out after a later email is an ordinary sequence, and nothing here says otherwise. What the response does not do is disclose the earlier threat, and the document that shows the earlier threat is the response's own attachment. That is what makes this checkable rather than arguable. The argument is the chronology, not motive.
Receipt
  • F123 (her own Bar-response exhibit, the 11/19/24 5:43 PM email, calling it a "very positive update")
  • F118 (the 11/22/24 withdrawal threat)
  • F124 (the 3/11/26 Bar response)
  • As pleaded at paragraphs 37-38 and 139
  • Same node species as N-103: a served statement whose gap is shown by the document served with it
  • The live fork is the disposition of File 2026-10,601
  • Status: proposed addition, 2026-08-07

Spawned by: N-015, N-023

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-083

N-1062026-05-27the witness with the most direct knowledge of the 2024 representation was subpoenaed and litigated against testifying rather than testify; six days later an order declared her "fully released," and what she had written in 2024 about Husband as a father never reached the record.REFUSED
Date
2026-05-27
Actor
G. Samarkos (Harris, Hunt & Derr), Husband's own former counsel
Institution
Own counsel
Mechanism
the witness with the most direct knowledge of the 2024 representation was subpoenaed and litigated against testifying rather than testify; six days later an order declared her "fully released," and what she had written in 2024 about Husband as a father never reached the record.
What the law required
A subpoenaed witness appears or shows cause; a former lawyer's duties to the client survive the representation.
What happened

Subpoenaed for the hearings that preceded the guardian ad litem decision, G. Samarkos of Harris, Hunt & Derr moved to quash on 5/27/26 rather than testify about the representation. Judge Felix granted the motion from the bench on 5/29/26, excusing her as "not relevant," with no other basis offered when asked. He directed the movants to draft their own orders (N-109). An order of 6/2/26 declared her "fully released," with no findings (N-112). She never testified.

Her motion ran two days from filing to the bench grant and six days to the written order. The four Bar officials' motion to quash ran forty-six days and spanned the guardian ad litem decision (N-130); those four were represented by outside counsel, and she was one local lawyer appearing for herself. The testimony about the 2024 discovery period (N-005) and the withdrawal window (N-010) was never given by anyone. [REFUSED]

Baseline deviation
A subpoenaed witness appears or shows cause. The fairness point cuts toward Husband: the testimony never given would not have been hostile to him. On 10/17/24 the same attorney had written that Husband had "shown us you're a great, involved, dad" and was "a consistent, loving, caring father to the girls." That assessment predates every guardian ad litem predicate later put before the court and never entered the record. The court's grants are recorded separately at N-109 and N-112.
Receipt
  • Motion to quash 5/27/26; bench grant 5/29/26, asked "any other basis?" the answer was "No." (N-109)
  • Release order Doc 325, 6/2/26, stating no legal basis on its face (N-112)
  • The four Bar officials' motion to quash, 5/22/26 to 7/7/26 (N-130)
  • The 10/17/24 3:37 PM Samarkos email at Doc 214, correspondence, pp. 5-6, quoting Husband as having "shown us you're a great, involved, dad" and "a consistent, loving, caring father to the girls"
  • Its "tactic to upset you" sentence is that attorney's own written characterization and may be quoted verbatim, never paraphrased into our voice

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-106

Judge Felix42 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

N-0032024-05-16the first motion filed in the case waited 23 months for a hearing while the other side's later motions were heard and grantedIGNORED
Date
2024-05-16
Actor
Judge Ayers, then Judge Felix
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
the first motion filed in the case waited 23 months for a hearing while the other side's later motions were heard and granted
What the law required
Due process: a pending motion must be heard and determined. Doc 22 embeds a motion to compel roughly three years of Wife's financial information.
What happened
Husband filed his motion to compel Wife's financial records on May 16, 2024. Neither Judge Ayers nor Judge Felix heard it until April 17, 2026: twenty-three months, 827 days as of August 21, 2026, and still no written order exists on it. In the same period Wife's later-filed motions advanced to hearings and orders; her motion to compel reached an order in nine weeks (N-013). The financial record his motion sought has never been compelled. One motion was granted on paper: the compel was granted 10/28/24 and the order entered 11/20/24, but the amount was never liquidated, compliance was never required, and the records it reached were never produced (N-006, N-009). When he moved in July 2026 simply to have the eventual bench ruling put in writing, that motion too drew no order (N-133). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Due process requires a court to hear and decide a pending motion. Husband's core objective since filing has been the records showing what happened to the marital income back to 2016, pursued through this motion, discovery requests, two generations of bank subpoenas, and follow-up motions. Wife and Davis opposed every attempt, and no court has compelled production in more than two years. This motion went unheard 23 months; no written order exists on it even now.
Receipt
  • Doc 22 (Filing #198450606, 5/16/24) paras. 1 and 16; argued 4/17/26 (disposition at N-090); day counts recomputed; Rule 2.215(g)(2) notice at 804 days (N-140); the written-order motion at N-133.
  • The core-objective sentence anchors across the record: Doc 22 itself, the Chase subpoenas in two generations, the Motion to Void's financial center (Doc 146), and the 7/22/26 written-order motion.
  • The "opposed every attempt" sentence is enumerated, one opposed attempt per receipt: the motion unheard 23 months; the first-generation subpoenas ended by sustained objection (Doc 93, 12/20/24); the second generation objected to and never ruled on; the 4/17/26 ruling preserving objections without compelling production; the certificates listing one month of the Chase records.
  • Separately, and counted with none of the above: one motion was granted on paper. The compel was granted 10/28/24 and the order entered 11/20/24. The amount was never liquidated, compliance was never required, and the records it reached were never produced (N-006, N-009).
  • "More than two years" runs from the 5/16/24 filing.

Read the source document: Doc 22, Response to Motion to Compel Payments and Motion to Compel Evidence of Marital Assets (filing record only, body withheld)

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-003

N-0162024-12-13 -> 2026-06-25Husband offered to sign the medical releases and to take the evaluations with no court order needed, Wife's counsel declined on the record, and the motions asking for those very things have gone twenty months without a ruling, as of August 20, 2026.IGNORED
Date
2024-12-13 -> 2026-06-25
Actor
Judge Ayers, then Judge Felix
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
Husband offered to sign the medical releases and to take the evaluations with no court order needed, Wife's counsel declined on the record, and the motions asking for those very things have gone twenty months without a ruling, as of August 20, 2026.
What the law required
Address what is before the court. When a party shows that motions were retaliatory, and that the relief they sought was offered and declined on the record, dispose of them. Carrying them indefinitely maintains a live threat with no adjudicative purpose.
What happened
Husband offered to sign medical releases and to attend psychological and vocational evaluations without compulsion. Davis declined on the record: "We haven't taken him up on these things, because we want a guardian ad litem appointed." Judge Ayers and then Judge Felix carried the 12/13/24 motion barrage indefinitely rather than address the retaliation showing (N-011, N-013). Of nine Wife-side motions in the motion-timing dataset, one was driven to a ruling: the guardian ad litem, granted 6/25/26 with no unfitness finding (N-125). The psychological evaluation motion sat unruled 602 days as of 8/7/26; the vocational evaluation motion was noticed once, then abandoned for about 16 months. Both remain pending, now set with eight other motions for an 8-hour block on 10/9/26. On the one motion pursued, the court asked Davis to summarize Wife's testimony; he promised it and never produced it (N-044). [IGNORED: retaliation showing never ruled on]
Baseline deviation
A court addresses what is put before it. When a party shows that motions were filed in retaliation, and that the relief sought was offered and refused on the record, the court disposes of them rather than carrying them. A motion left pending costs the movant nothing while keeping a standing threat alive. The same shape appears in the regulator's only-open file (N-064) and the arc runs forward from the May 2024 filings (N-002).
Receipt
  • 5/29 Tr. 59:6-11 (the offer to attend acknowledged on the record).
  • 6/10 Tr. 51:9-11 (offers), 101:1-9 (the declination and its stated reason), 80:12-18.
  • Motion-timing dataset on file (nine Wife motions, one ruled).
  • Doc 279 (2/3/26 case management transcript). Doc 224 pendency inventory.
  • Separately: Doc 138 (2/19/25), a distinct Wife-side motion to compel, granted in part (N-035); not counted in the nine-motion dataset above.
  • Day counts as printed on the card; recompute at build.
  • Related decision points: N-001.

Spawned by: N-107, N-001

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-016

N-0332025-02-28the court told Husband exactly what to file if he wanted discovery, he filed it in exactly that form, and as of 8/17/26, 535 days later, no judge has ruled on it; the gate the court built has never opened.IGNORED
Date
2025-02-28
Actor
Judge Ayers then Judge Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court told Husband exactly what to file if he wanted discovery, he filed it in exactly that form, and as of 8/17/26, 535 days later, no judge has ruled on it; the gate the court built has never opened.
What the law required
Due process requires the court to decide the motion it made dispositive. The court conditioned all discovery on voiding the agreements (see N-018), and Doc 146 is that Casto challenge.
What happened

Husband filed his Motion to Void Post-Marital Agreement and to open discovery on 2/28/25 (DIN 146), in the exact form Judge Ayers had prescribed across three hearings (N-019). Neither Judge Ayers nor Judge Felix has ruled on it: 535 days as of 8/17/26. It surfaced again on 4/17/26 as the acknowledged predicate and drew no ruling then either. He filed it the same day he refiled the Chase subpoenas, and Wife's objection to those has likewise never been ruled on (N-034).

The motion's para. 107 states the arithmetic the discovery would test. On the affidavits then on file, Wife's disclosed assets over liabilities were $104,611 against Husband's in excess of $800,000.

Thirty-three days after the motion was filed, at Wife's deposition on 4/2/25, Husband renewed the offer to void the agreements directly. Wife, sworn: "Chris, I'm not interested." Husband: "We can do it right now." Wife: "No. No. No. I'm not interested." She stated the figures as she understood them: "you're claiming 800,000 and I'm claiming 100,000". Asked why she would not void an agreement that on those numbers pays her more, her counsel objected: "No. 1, relevance because the Court hasn't set aside the agreement yet". The motion to set it aside was this motion, then thirty-three days old and unruled. It is still unruled.

Wife gave her own reasons, and they are recorded in the receipt. Set beside them is one dated fact: the disclosure that would test the arithmetic has been owed since the June 28, 2024 stipulated production date, and producing it required no motion, no hearing, and no judge. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
Under Casto v. Casto, an agreement signed without financial disclosure can be challenged, and the challenge itself entitles the challenger to financial discovery. The entitlement attaches when the motion is filed, not when it is granted. So a court that makes a motion the gate to all discovery has to decide it. At the 12/19/24 hearing the court said of the agreements, "Nobody's asked me to do anything different with them," and then named the step: "it stays in full force and effect unless you file something otherwise." Husband filed. The entitlement has been withheld every day since.
Receipt
  • Doc 146 (2/28/25), paras. 107 and 109. The instrument's name in the record's own exhibit list is the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23; the motion's title uses "Post-Marital Agreement" and the title is quoted as filed.
  • Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 7:6-23, the prescription and the "full force and effect" line.
  • Doc 205, Wife's deposition of April 2, 2025, Tr. 132:16-134:22 for the exchange quoted above.
  • Wife's stated reasons, recorded and not contested here: she wants the divorce over, she is not driven by money, her interest is the children, and her account of the agreement is a negotiation in which she asked for $250,000 and accepted $100,000. Nothing is asserted about her state of mind.
  • Transcript of the April 17, 2026 hearing, Tr. 101-103. Doc 200 pp. 4-28.
  • Docs 34 and 43, the affidavits behind the arithmetic. The $104,611 is Wife's disclosed net worth; the $100,000 is the payment she received under the agreement. Two different figures.
  • The 535-day figure is as of 8/17/26 and recomputes at use.

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-033

N-0392025-04-01 -> 2026-08-12Husband's written objection to the cost and risk of a guardian ad litem sat on the docket 450 days before the order granting one and 478 days before the order pricing it at $6,000; neither order mentions cost, risk, or ability to pay.IGNORED
Date
2025-04-01 -> 2026-08-12
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix (the two orders and the sustained objection); Judge Kelly Ayers (the filing period); Scott Davis (the relevance objection)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
Husband's written objection to the cost and risk of a guardian ad litem sat on the docket 450 days before the order granting one and 478 days before the order pricing it at $6,000; neither order mentions cost, risk, or ability to pay.
What the law required
F.S. 61.401 conditions an appointment on the child's best interest. A court that imposes a monetary obligation on a party must take evidence of the amount and of the party's ability to pay. A written objection squarely presented before the relief issues must be engaged, granted or denied with a reason, not passed over by the order deciding the same subject.
What happened
On 4/1/25 Husband filed a notice opposing Wife's guardian ad litem, psychological evaluation, and vocational-file motions, attaching a magazine article warning that "There is always a risk that a Guardian ad Litem will make recommendations that are not in a child's best interest". He raised it at the 5/29/26 hearing; Wife's counsel objected on relevance, Judge Felix agreed, and the question was narrowed to whether the witness had read that article. She had not. Doc 337 granted the appointment on 6/25/26 on findings that mention neither cost, risk, ability to pay, nor the notice; its only cost sentence divides an unstated amount equally. Doc 351 then ordered "$6,000.00 within 3 days of entry of this Order" at $325 per hour, with no cost evidence and no mention of the notice. 498 days from filing to 8/12/26, with no engagement in any order. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A court that orders a parent to pay takes evidence of what it costs and what that parent can pay. The objection here was not late or buried: captioned as opposition to the motion it opposed, it sat on the docket over a year before either order issued, and was raised aloud in court. In candor, the attachment is advisory literature, not authority. The documented objection sat through three hearing days and two orders and drew no sentence.
Receipt
  • Doc 169 (Filing #220088124, e-filed 4/1/25 5:32:32 PM, 3 pp.); the article text is at pp. 2-3, including the sentence that a party "will have spent thousands of dollars on an investigation and report that could cost them custody of their beloved child."
  • 5/29/26 Tr. 38:6-17, 38:24-39:2, 39:4-9, 39:21-24 (relevance objection, "I agree," narrowing, and the sustained speculation objection on the follow-up question).
  • Doc 337 (2 pp.) and Doc 351 (5 pp.), both read in full, neither referencing Doc 169, the article, cost evidence, or ability to pay.
  • Doc 345 (3 pp.), no reference. Doc 342 p. 5.
  • Caution on file: Doc 169's certificate of service carries a stale "13th day of December, 2024" template date; the 4/1/25 clerk stamp controls and every day count here uses it.
  • DINs 346-350 and 352-359 are absent from this tree, so the absence of an order on Doc 342 (the reconsideration motion raising this a third time) is stated as to this record, not as a certified docket absence.
  • Related decision points: N-038, N-134.

Spawned by: N-038, N-125

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-039

N-0432025-04-04the cooperative route to what the children's school knew was refused in writing, so the school was subpoenaed under a contempt warning, and the compelled witness said nothing had been documented about either child in four years beyond one instance of seeming tired.IGNORED
Date
2025-04-04
Actor
Judge Felix
Institution
24-DR-001150
Mechanism
the cooperative route to what the children's school knew was refused in writing, so the school was subpoenaed under a contempt warning, and the compelled witness said nothing had been documented about either child in four years beyond one instance of seeming tired.
What the law required
A guardian ad litem is appointed to obtain information about the children's circumstances. Where a less intrusive route to that same information is put before the court on the record, it bears on whether the appointment is necessary. A court is not required to adopt it. It is required to reach it.
What happened
Husband sought agreement from Wife's counsel that the children's school complete wellness forms; the school itself had named simple party agreement as one of three routes to its participation. Counsel substituted the still-pending guardian ad litem instead: "The Guardian Ad Litem, if appointed, will make those determinations and/or recommendations." No answer came to Husband's question of what the downside of trying the questionnaire first would be. The cooperative route was refused in writing (N-036), and the school was subpoenaed under a contempt warning instead. On April 4, 2025 the school's director testified that in four years nothing was documented about either child's health or welfare beyond one occasion each of seeming tired. Both of Husband's attempts to ask her about the forms request were objected to and sustained. He raised the point again on April 17, 2026 before Judge Felix; the court has not addressed it since. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A guardian ad litem is appointed to obtain information about the children's circumstances. A less intrusive route offered on the record is ordinarily adopted, rejected for a stated reason, or addressed by a finding; this drew none of the three. The school named three ways to participate, one being simple agreement. Husband sought that in writing; it was refused in writing. What remained was the route carrying a contempt warning. The order issued later contains no finding on it (N-125).
Receipt
  • Doc 165, the subpoena, dated 3/24/2025 and e-filed 3/25/2025, pp. 1-3; cited by docket entry and date only, because the map withholds what the instrument names.
  • Doc 166 pp. 3, 4, and 6, the 3/18 and 3/24/2025 emails including the quoted refusal, which carries a 2:20:05 PM stamp.
  • Doc 134 pp. 10-12, the complete 2/7/2025 exchange with Davis.
  • Doc 117 pp. 7-9, Husband's 2/7/2025 request and the judicial assistant's 2/10/2025 reply.
  • Doc 198, the certified 4/4/2025 hearing transcript, at Tr. 12, 18, 20, 28, and 29. The 4/17/2026 transcript at Tr. 119:6-8 and 125:21-25.
  • The school's own reply of 3/6/2025 at 8:54 AM.
  • Lane note: every decision point carded here sits in the Ayers era; she recused 4/28/25, and the later consequences run into the Felix era by cross-link.
  • Tally guard: this school-subpoena episode is counted once; the same episode is carded at N-036 in the Wife lane and is never counted as two. The school-records fact it rests on also appears at N-041 and at FNEW-W1 and is never counted as three.
  • Two limits: no document has been found in which Wife or Davis objects to the wellness forms themselves; Davis called that premise "blatantly and patently false" on October 17, 2025, and Wife answered "None" to a discovery request for any instruction to the school to withhold the forms. And Husband's statement that the subpoena damaged his relationship with the school is his own account, with no independent corroboration in the record.

Spawned by: N-001

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-043

N-0492025-06-24the venue motion was denied from the bench with no findings, the winning side was told to write the order, and fees were reserved for "both parties" when only one side had ever asked for them.DENIED
Date
2025-06-24
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the venue motion was denied from the bench with no findings, the winning side was told to write the order, and fees were reserved for "both parties" when only one side had ever asked for them.
What the law required
F.S. 47.122 governs venue transfer. Due process requires an impartial tribunal (Caperton preserved).
What happened
Judge Felix heard the venue transfer motion on 6/3/25 and denied it "at this time" from the bench with zero findings. The order entered 6/24/25. He directed Davis to draft it. He reserved fees for "both parties" though only Davis had requested them. He did not engage the structural impartial-tribunal argument. That argument does not apply here: in June 2025 the mandamus naming the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit and its judges (25-CA-010255) had not yet been filed (filed 10/14/25, N-058), so it attaches to rulings after that date and is scored on the disqualification and mandamus rows. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Venue is discretionary, and no baseline is asserted for the denial itself. Two things in the order are not discretion: fees were reserved for a party who never requested them, and an order drafted by the winning party is drafted after the decision, so its reasons are the drafter's, not the record's. This denial began the appeal (2D2025-1936) through which the 4/4/25 video was kept out of the appellate record (N-066, N-087).
Receipt
  • Doc 212 Tr. 15, 18.
  • Doc 204.

Spawned by: N-047

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-049

N-0502025-06-28Husband asked for an immediate ruling on discovery objections that had waited four to thirteen months; the answer was a form saying it was not an emergency and belonged in the normal course. That normal course has still not come, more than 13 months later.IGNORED
Date
2025-06-28
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband asked for an immediate ruling on discovery objections that had waited four to thirteen months; the answer was a form saying it was not an emergency and belonged in the normal course. That normal course has still not come, more than 13 months later.
What the law required
Due process requires a ruling on an emergency motion for an immediate ruling on subpoena and discovery objections.
What happened
Husband filed an emergency motion on 6/28/25 demanding an immediate ruling on the subpoena and discovery objections. The matters it asked about had already been waiting: DIN 22 for 408 days, DIN 146 for 120 days, DIN 149 for 118 days. Judge Felix entered a handling order only (Doc 210) and never ruled on the merits. The motion was re-listed 4/20/26 (Doc 295) and never reached. The objections stand unruled and the demand is unanswered, more than 13 months on as of August 20, 2026. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
An emergency motion asking for an immediate ruling gets a ruling or a reason. The form answer here, that the matter belongs in the normal course, presumes a normal course exists. The histories of the three matters it named were the evidence that one did not. Those unruled objections are the only thing standing between Husband and the subpoenaed bank records (N-018, N-034). A merits ruling would have produced a record either way.
Receipt
  • Docs 209, 210, 295.
  • Pendency arithmetic as printed on the card: 5/16/24 to 6/28/25 is 408 days; 2/28/25 to 6/28/25 is 120; 3/2/25 to 6/28/25 is 118.

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-050

N-0512025-06-28a filed record of dated interference with the children's time drew one checkbox and no finding on any item, and more than a year later no judge has made a finding on any of it.EXCUSED
Date
2025-06-28
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
a filed record of dated interference with the children's time drew one checkbox and no finding on any item, and more than a year later no judge has made a finding on any of it.
What the law required
A documented record of ongoing interference with parenting time, presented by motion, must be addressed on its content, by hearing or by findings.
What happened
By 6/28/25 Husband had filed the record (Docs 206, 207, 208). It covered the graduation-morning incident, the church-service incident, and the vacation dispute. The court's entire response, on 6/30/25, was one checkbox: "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." The normal course never came. No judge has ever made a finding on any item. The comparison sits on the same docket: Wife's filings have drawn hearings at speed, her contempt motion set in three days (N-151), while Husband's emergency filings have drawn the checkbox (this row, N-050, DIN 354). Neither her counsel's conduct (N-029, N-044) nor the interference carded here has ever drawn a finding or a consequence. [EXCUSED: the court treated the filing as an emergency-screening question and has still never reached its content.]
Baseline deviation
A filed record of ongoing interference with a parent's time with his children normally draws a hearing or written findings. This one drew a single checkbox, and no finding has ever been made on any of the dated incidents underneath it (mechanism at N-050). The comparison that follows is argued from the pattern, not from any court finding.
Receipt
  • Docs 206, 207, 208 (the filed record); Doc 210, the checkbox.
  • Two distinct incidents, stated separately: the Michigan-trip vacation dispute, and the extra overnight around Mother's Day 2025 after which Wife rather than Husband took their daughter to her kindergarten graduation the next morning.
  • The 6/17/25 letter pages have not been checked against page images.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-051

N-0522025-08-01two orders in three minutes fifty-one seconds, neither with a hearing and neither with reasons, froze the whole discovery queue while the parts of Husband's own motion that would have moved discovery forward went unruled.DENIED
Date
2025-08-01
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
two orders in three minutes fifty-one seconds, neither with a hearing and neither with reasons, froze the whole discovery queue while the parts of Husband's own motion that would have moved discovery forward went unruled.
What the law required
A stay that freezes all discovery rests on stated reasons. A motion's remaining prongs are ruled on, not silently dropped.
What happened
On 8/1/25, after the Second District sent the stay question down (Doc 223, 7/30/25), Judge Felix issued two orders without a hearing, three minutes fifty-one seconds apart. At 9:12 AM he denied the venue rehearing "on it's face" [sic] and gave no reasons. At 9:16 AM he granted the stay (Doc 225) and left its reasoning section empty. He left the discovery prongs of Doc 215 unruled, including the third request to produce and the Chase subpoenas. He took from Husband's own motion only the relief that required no findings against Davis, and froze the discovery queue. Wife's own 8/4/25 verified emergency motion to lift concedes the stay issued "without conducting a hearing or considering legal argument" (Doc 224 para. 11), while its own delay inventory omits every Husband motion. [DENIED: relief refused, and the reasons for refusing were never stated.]
Baseline deviation
A stay that freezes all discovery rests on stated reasons, and a motion's remaining parts get ruled on rather than dropped. Here the reasoning section is empty, and the discovery prongs of the same motion were dropped rather than ruled on. The stay is one event with four decision points: this grant, the lift never entered (N-060), the order-less status that followed (N-074), and the evidentiary day held under it (N-092).
Receipt
  • Doc 223 (Second District, 7/30/25).
  • The 8/1/25 twin orders stamped 9:12:41 and 9:16:32 (3 minutes 51 seconds, not four).
  • Doc 225 (reasoning section empty). Doc 215 (the dropped discovery prongs).
  • Doc 224 para. 11, plus the pendency-clock inventory (234, 234, 210, 185, and 200 days on motions heard February-April 2025 and never decided), read from page images because the text layer is ciphered.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-052

N-0562025-10-03an 82-page motion asking for findings on opposing counsel's conduct and for misconduct referrals has stood more than ten months with no order in either direction, as of August 20, 2026.IGNORED
Date
2025-10-03
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
an 82-page motion asking for findings on opposing counsel's conduct and for misconduct referrals has stood more than ten months with no order in either direction, as of August 20, 2026.
What the law required
Due process requires the court to hear and determine a sanctions motion, a request for findings, and misconduct referrals.
What happened
Husband filed the 82-page sanctions motion on 10/3/25 (Doc 239). Judge Felix has never entered any order on it. It was set for 10/17/25 and never reached (N-060), re-listed 4/20/26, and confirmed on the notice at the 5/29/26 hearing (Tr. 231:19-23). It appears as item 8 on the 5/29/26 notice (Doc 295) and again as item 8 on the 10/9/26 notice (DIN 361), so it remains pending and set. The second safe-harbor letter, 5/9/2025, carried five itemized cure conditions and is distinct from the 12/5/2024 letter at N-011. Its safe harbor ran out 5/30/2025, and the follow-on sanctions motion was not filed until 10/3/2025, 126 days later. The motion demanded findings and misconduct referrals. It has never been decided either way. [IGNORED: the motion was never decided either way.]
Baseline deviation
A sanctions motion normally draws a ruling. This one has drawn none, either way, in more than ten months. A motion to compel filed by Wife's counsel on the same docket was granted in part (Doc 138, 2/19/25, N-035). The statutory notice that preceded it, the section 57.105 letter at N-011, has itself never been heard: 610 days as of 8/7/26.
Receipt
  • Doc 239, Filing #232899712.
  • Doc 295 item 8 (5/29/26 notice). DIN 361 item 8 (10/9/26 notice).
  • Safe-harbor arithmetic as printed: 5/9/2025 plus 21 days is 5/30/2025; 5/30/2025 to 10/3/2025 is 126 days.
  • Related pendency: N-011 at 610 days to 8/7/26; this motion at 308 days to 8/7/26.

Spawned by: N-011, N-037, N-044

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-056

N-0572025-10-12the request that hearings be recorded was never decided, and while it waited the recordings that did exist were erased on a 30-day schedule; seven hearing dates now have no video at all.IGNORED
Date
2025-10-12
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the request that hearings be recorded was never decided, and while it waited the recordings that did exist were erased on a 30-day schedule; seven hearing dates now have no video at all.
What the law required
Public access and due process require a ruling on an emergency motion to record proceedings.
What happened
Husband filed the emergency motion to record proceedings on 10/12/25 (Doc 245). Judge Felix returned a checkbox 98 minutes later (Doc 251): "not an emergency. normal course". Doc 247 had promised the motion would be addressed at the 10/17/25 hearing; no order issued there either (Doc 250). It was first actually set for hearing six months later, at the 4/17/26 omnibus day, and was not decided there either. Wife listed it for 5/29/26 and it was never reached. Meanwhile the recordings went: the administrative office's 7/30/26 response states that for seven listed hearing dates the footage "had already been overwritten prior to the date of your request," under a 30-day retention schedule. The request to record has never been decided. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A motion asking that proceedings be recorded normally draws a decision one way or the other. The court answered the emergency half of that question in 98 minutes and has not answered the request itself in about nine months. The recordings that existed anyway were destroyed on the ordinary schedule while it waited. No motive is asserted; the schedule's own proviso is quoted in the receipt.
Receipt
  • Doc 245, Filing #233451400 (stamp); PDF-content authentication flagged.
  • Doc 247 (handling order reciting full title); Doc 250 ("no order was issued"); Doc 251 (98-minute checkbox).
  • Doc 276, read from page images (first hearing setting, 4/17/26 omnibus day, DIN 22 then 23 months old).
  • Seven overwritten hearing dates: 6/3/25, 10/9/25, 10/17/25, 2/3/26, 4/17/26, 5/29/26, 6/10/26; response: "There are no records satisfying this request."
  • Retention schedule text, p. 255 of 258: "RETENTION: 30 days, then erase and reuse provided any necessary images are saved."
  • Two receipted tensions: the stated grounds shifted (2025 exemption vs. 2026 overwriting) for the same records category; June 10, 2026 footage was overwritten with a three-day margin against the 7/13/26 request (6/10 plus 30 is 7/10).
  • Source: 13th Circuit administrative office's 7/30/26 response to the audio-video records request, analyzed 8/13/26.

Spawned by: N-042

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-057

N-0602025-10-17the court set three of Husband's own filings for the 10/17/25 hearing and reached none of them, and the one thing it did grant that day, lifting the stay, was never put in an order, so for six months nobody could say what was stayed.IGNORED
Date
2025-10-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the court set three of Husband's own filings for the 10/17/25 hearing and reached none of them, and the one thing it did grant that day, lifting the stay, was never put in an order, so for six months nobody could say what was stayed.
What the law required
The court rules on the motions its own handling order set for the hearing (Docs 239, 245, 60).
What happened
Judge Felix's own handling order set three of Husband's filings for the 10/17/25 hearing: Doc 239, the 82-page sanctions motion (N-056); Doc 245, the motion to record proceedings (N-057); and Doc 60, the section 57.105 notice of intent to seek sanctions. He lifted the stay, which both parties had sought, and never returned to any of the three. He declined to rule on any motion without a hearing and set no continuance date. The stay-lift order was never entered. Husband objected that with no order entered, the stay's status was unsettled and confusing to litigate under. On 4/17/26 Davis described the missing order as something that "slipped through the cracks," explaining: "Mr. Hanson had numerous objections to the order." [IGNORED: the motions the court itself had scheduled were left undecided.]
Baseline deviation
A court rules on the motions its own handling order set for hearing, and a stay is lifted the way it was imposed, by order. The reason given for not ruling, that the court would not decide a motion without argument, does not explain why the motions the court itself had noticed were never reached, or why the grant that day existed only as spoken words. A full evidentiary day went forward under the still-unlifted stay on 4/17/26 (N-092).
Receipt
  • OFF_DOCKET certified transcript 10/17/25, Tr. 4 and 37-40.
  • 4/17/26 Tr. p. 23 (both halves of the Davis passage; the shorter rendering is an elision and not used).
  • Court declined to rule "on the face of the motion. without a hearing".
  • Tally note: the stay is one event with four decision points: the grant (N-052), the unentered lift (this row), the order-less status (N-074), and the stayed hearing (N-092); any count of orders without reasons or unentered orders takes one from this family.

Spawned by: N-056, N-057

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-060

N-0612025-10-17Husband tried to ask opposing counsel why he filed for primary custody 26 days before the discovery hearing; the court shut the question off, and declined to set the guardian ad litem motion, later run to an order, while his older discovery motion stayed behind.DENIED
Date
2025-10-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
Husband tried to ask opposing counsel why he filed for primary custody 26 days before the discovery hearing; the court shut the question off, and declined to set the guardian ad litem motion, later run to an order, while his older discovery motion stayed behind.
What the law required
Sec. 90.612 and the relevance rules permit examination into filing timing where retaliatory purpose is squarely at issue. The docket is managed on the merits rather than to shield a party's litigation-timing choices from inquiry.
What happened
At the 10/17/25 hearing Judge Felix made two rulings that kept Davis's litigation timing off the record. He refused to permit the examination: "I'm not going to entertain you asking Mr. Davis things about why he filed things at certain times" (Tr. 35:9-11). And he declined to set the guardian ad litem motion for evidentiary hearing: "You're a couple of steps ahead, Mr. Hanson. I'm not setting any motion hearings on the guardian right now" (Tr. 37:7-9). The predicate for the shut-off question is dated: the primary-custody amendment was filed 10/2/24, 26 days before the 10/28/24 discovery hearing. Davis has never been questioned on that timing. [DENIED: the inquiry was shut off and the hearing was refused.]
Baseline deviation
Section 90.612 and relevance rules permit examination into a party's filing timing where retaliatory purpose is squarely at issue. What the record fixes is the bookend: the guardian ad litem motion Judge Felix would not set on 10/17/25 was later noticed, given full evidentiary days, and ordered on 6/25/26 (N-125), while Husband's older discovery stayed subordinated. Husband said on the record his motion was "513 days" old; recomputed from the 5/16/24 filing, 10/17/25 is day 519. No motive is asserted.
Receipt
  • 10/17/25 Tr. 35:9-11 (refusal to examine) and 37:7-9 (guardian ad litem not set), per the 10/17/25 and 2/3/26 cold-read ledger of 7/23/26, items CR-1 and U-3; both statements are Judge Felix.
  • Husband's predicate question at Tr. 35:2-5. Tr. 29:5 ("513 days," Husband speaking).
  • Doc 200 p. 10, read from page images (10/2/24 filing, 26 days before the 10/28/24 hearing).
  • Deviation bookend via N-125.

Spawned by: N-003, N-060

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-061

N-0692026-01-08the ground raised was that a judge named as a defendant in a pending case was presiding over the related one; the order answered with a procedural bar, contained no analysis of that question, and the follow-on denial cited no authority at all.DENIED
Date
2026-01-08
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the ground raised was that a judge named as a defendant in a pending case was presiding over the related one; the order answered with a procedural bar, contained no analysis of that question, and the follow-on denial cited no authority at all.
What the law required
Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330 governs disqualification. Due process addresses a structural conflict, here a judge named as a mandamus defendant while presiding.
What happened
On 1/8/26 Judge Felix denied Husband's motion to disqualify all 13th Circuit judges (Doc 255) by Doc 258. The order rests entirely on Rule 2.330(i) and contains no federal or structural-conflict analysis. It refers to Husband as "Defendant," which is a template artifact and is noted here only. Doc 280 attacks the order on those grounds. The follow-on motion to vacate and for rehearing was denied by Doc 260 on 1/22/26, and unlike Doc 258, Doc 260 cites no authority at all. The status ground has never been engaged on the merits by anyone. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.330(i), Determination, Successive Motions, is a real rule, but it does not reach the ground raised: whether a judge who is a named defendant in a pending mandamus (N-058) may keep presiding over the related family case. No judge in any forum has engaged that question on the merits: the disqualification order rested on the successive-motion track, and the Second District denied the prohibition petition in eight days without opinion (N-078, N-059).
Receipt
  • Docs 255, 258 (1/8/26) and 260 (cites no authority; electronic stamp 1/22/26 12:07:43 PM).
  • Doc 280 (attacks the order on due-process/structural grounds).

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-069

N-0732026-02-03asked to set an earlier hearing on a 20-month-old motion to compel, the court put the question to opposing counsel three times, was told "No, sir, I do not," and said "But I want his consent"; a court needs no permission to hear a motion.DENIED
Date
2026-02-03
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
asked to set an earlier hearing on a 20-month-old motion to compel, the court put the question to opposing counsel three times, was told "No, sir, I do not," and said "But I want his consent"; a court needs no permission to hear a motion.
What the law required
A court has inherent authority to set its own docket. A 20-month-old discovery motion needs no consent from the opposing party to be heard.
What happened
The question whether Davis would agree to an earlier, separate hearing on Husband's motion to compel came up three times in the same 2/3/26 hearing. Each time Davis declined, on the record: "No, sir, I do not, respectfully". When Husband pointed out the court could simply order the hearing, Judge Felix answered: "But I want his consent". He explained that he preferred to coordinate between the parties, and Davis had not agreed. Judge Felix then set everything, the discovery motion included, for the general 4/17 date, promising to take it first. It was argued first that day, and he never ruled on it (N-090). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A court has inherent authority to set its own docket and needs no party's consent to hear a pending motion. On 2/3/26 Judge Felix asked Davis whether he would agree to a separate, earlier hearing on Husband's two-year-old discovery motion; Davis declined each time, twice stating, "No, sir, I do not." The motion was folded into the general 4/17 calendar instead, so Davis's refusal, not the court's own docket authority, decided when it would be heard.
Receipt
  • Doc 279, the certified transcript of the 2/3/26 hearing.
  • Tr. 14:1-19 (first ask and both refusals, 14:14 and 14:17): "Mr. Davis, would you agree to setting that matter individually before?" / "No, sir, I do not, respectfully," and again "No, sir, I do not".
  • Tr. 18:21-23 (court's recap: "I've heard the request before. I asked Mr. Davis if he would agree to that and he said no").
  • Tr. 21:1-20 ("But I want his consent" at 21:8; coordination sentence at 21:12-14: "I prefer to coordinate between the parties and the counsels with regards to hearings and Mr. Davis has not agreed to that.").
  • Tr. 21:16-20 and 23:4-6 (everything set for the 17th, "We'll do that first"). Tr. 9 (surrounding discovery/guardian ad litem argument).
  • Transcript runs Tr. 1-24; hearing concluded 12:24 p.m.

Spawned by: N-003

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-073

N-0742026-02-03the stay that froze discovery for six months was imposed in writing in under four minutes and was never lifted by any order at all; Husband asked in writing which order lifted it, and the question has never been answered.IGNORED
Date
2026-02-03
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the stay that froze discovery for six months was imposed in writing in under four minutes and was never lifted by any order at all; Husband asked in writing which order lifted it, and the question has never been answered.
What the law required
A stay is lifted the way it is imposed, by order. A party's motion asking the court to identify or enter the lifting order must be determined.
What happened
No order lifted the 8/1/25 stay. A title-level sweep of Docs 250 through 365 found it was never lifted, vacated, dissolved or modified by any order. His Motion to Clarify Status of Stay (Doc 283, 4/14/26) states he was "unable to locate any order lifting, vacating, dissolving, or modifying the August 1, 2025 stay. No such order appears on the docket". No responsive order ever issued through Doc 365 (8/4/26). Wife's same-day response concedes the lift is order-less: "The Court has already lifted the stay. Following two hearings, the Court removed the stay," citing no order, no date and no reason, while attacking the stay's merits retroactively. The question is still open: by what order, entered on what date, was the stay lifted? Either an order exists and can be named, or there is none. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A stay is lifted the way it is imposed, by order, and a motion asking the court to identify the lifting order gets determined. This stay was imposed in writing in under four minutes with zero reasons (N-052), and un-imposed with zero writing at all, so the freeze has no recorded end. After it dissolved, Wife received the 4/17 evidentiary day and the guardian ad litem, while Husband's revived discovery drew granted quash and protective orders.
Receipt
  • Doc 283 para. 3 plus WHEREFORE clauses a through c.
  • Doc 286 paras. 2 and 14 (Wife's response, also citing "Not a single case, rule, or statute supports a stay").
  • Doc 279 Tr. 5:3-15 plus word-index confirmation ("I do not see any stay as a result of that writ").
  • Title sweep of Docs 250-365.
  • Tally note: the stay is one event with four decision points (N-052, N-060, the unwritten lift recorded here, and N-092).
  • Related decision points: N-073, N-090.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-074

N-0762026-02-09two writs, an appellate motion, and four trial-court motions have asked a court to watch the 4/4/25 courthouse video; asked on 4/17/26 whether he had reviewed it, Judge Felix answered "I have not."IGNORED
Date
2026-02-09
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
two writs, an appellate motion, and four trial-court motions have asked a court to watch the 4/4/25 courthouse video; asked on 4/17/26 whether he had reviewed it, Judge Felix answered "I have not."
What the law required
Due process requires a ruling on the motions to supplement and review the 4/4/25 video and to preserve the stay.
What happened
Husband asked the trial court four times to look at the 4/4/25 video: Doc 267 (2/9/26), Doc 280 (3/17/26), and Docs 283 and 284 (4/14/26). On 4/17/26 he asked the court directly whether it had reviewed the video. The court first answered, "I have reviewed your motion." Asked again, the court answered: "I have not." Judge Felix entered a handling order only (Doc 285). No responsive order on any of the four appears anywhere in the records tree. The appellate side ran the same way: the Second District denied the motion to supplement the record with that video in an order naming no panel and giving no reason, and denied rehearing the same way (N-066, N-087). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A motion asking a court to look at the central piece of evidence gets a ruling. The video's existence is not in dispute: the court's own administrative office confirmed in writing that "a video record does exist" and withheld it (N-053), and the judge who invoked it in her own defense then declined to pursue it (N-042). The bench answered the question directly on 4/17/26. The absence of responsive orders still needs confirmation against a live docket pull.
Receipt
  • Docs 267, 280, 283, 284, and the handling order at 285.
  • Doc 280 is the Motion for Judicial Review of the April 4, 2025 hearing video, e-filed 3/17/26 at 8:46:17 PM, 11 pp.
  • 4/17/26 exchange at Tr. 8:10-16 (including "Have you reviewed that video, Judge." and "Have you reviewed the video?"), lines 17-19 read for context; full transcript 423 pp., substantive text pp. 1-363; PDF page 8 renders reporter's own "[Page 8]" header, pagination one to one. No text-layer extraction used for the quoted material.
  • Speaker of "I have not." is the court, Judge Felix, presiding that day.
  • Unresolved-motions list in the matter file plus the docket pull; absence of responsive orders is a records-tree conclusion, no live docket pull has been run.

Spawned by: N-042, N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-076

N-0902026-04-17after 23 months the motion was finally heard and granted from the bench, and the grant moved nothing: the objections that block production were expressly preserved, production was not compelled, and no written order was ever entered.WON-THEN-NULLIFIED
Date
2026-04-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
after 23 months the motion was finally heard and granted from the bench, and the grant moved nothing: the objections that block production were expressly preserved, production was not compelled, and no written order was ever entered.
What the law required
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 and 12.350 require the court to compel and enforce production on a 23-month-old motion.
What happened
On 4/17/26, after 23 months, Judge Felix orally ordered three years of Rule 12.285 disclosure. He expressly preserved Wife's prenuptial and postnuptial objections. He did not compel production. He entered no written order. Later the same day, asked about the same motion, he said: "We already handled that matter." No written ruling exists in the record, and no production followed. When Husband moved in July 2026 simply to have that bench ruling reduced to writing, that motion drew no order either (N-133). [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
A court that grants a motion to compel compels something. Rules 12.285 and 12.350 exist so a party owed financial disclosure gets it. Here the grant was shaped so nothing had to move: disclosure was ordered, the objections that stop it were preserved, production was not compelled, and nothing was written down. A court speaks through written orders, so an oral grant never entered cannot be enforced or appealed. The motion is the first-filed motion in the case (N-003).
Receipt
  • 4/17/26 Tr. 73, 114-116, 120-121, and 344 (the "We already handled that matter." line at Tr. 344)
  • Unwritten-ruling family, cited as a family whenever any one is used: N-060 and N-074 (the stay lift), NEW-P5 (the quash order never submitted), N-133 (the entry motion ignored)
  • Related decision points: N-073.

Spawned by: N-003, N-073

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-090

N-0912026-04-17asked six times to make findings of fact, the court answered: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so."DENIED
Date
2026-04-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
asked six times to make findings of fact, the court answered: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so."
What the law required
Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330 requires a ruling on the merits of the structural conflict, and findings of fact.
What happened
On 4/17/26 Judge Felix refused to make findings of fact six times. In his own words: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so." He orally denied the structural-conflict disqualification "at this time" in reliance on Doc 258, an order that had itself rested purely on the successive-motion bar (N-069). He denied a recess. No findings of fact were entered. Findings here would have created the factual record on the structural conflict that N-069 and N-078 each disposed of without reaching. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Findings of fact are how a decision becomes reviewable. A judge who says in advance he will not find facts unless reversed inverts the appellate sequence, since the higher court reviews the findings. Six weeks later, asked whether he would ever find facts about Husband's constitutional rights, the same judge answered "Maybe." (N-108). The findings the court declined to make are the same findings the Bar's 6/16/26 closure letter requires for any resubmission (N-121).
Receipt
  • 4/17/26 Tr. 50, 181, and 353-357
  • The main quote is at Tr. 181; "at this time" is at Tr. 50
  • The quote "You've already brought that up and I ruled on that" (Tr. 344:11-12) belongs here, answering Husband's structural-conflict point, per the 8/18/26 eye sweep; it is not on N-090
  • The "Maybe." answer is at 5/29/26 Tr. 53:9-15 and is carried at N-108

Spawned by: N-069, N-078

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-091

N-0922026-04-17an eight-hour trial day on Wife's motion, held while the case was stayed; Husband's noticed motions had waited nine months for any hearing at allDENIED
Date
2026-04-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
an eight-hour trial day on Wife's motion, held while the case was stayed; Husband's noticed motions had waited nine months for any hearing at all
What the law required
The 8/1/25 Stay Pending Appeal was entered and left standing. On 9/8/25 the 2D DCA said relief from the stay was to be sought in the trial court. "No order ever lifted the August 1, 2025 stay" (as pleaded at paragraphs 58 and 58A).
What happened
On April 17, 2026, Judge Felix presided over an eight-hour evidentiary day, primarily on Wife's guardian ad litem motion, while the August 1, 2025 stay stood unlifted by any order. The hearing ended unfinished. This unlifted stay is also the predicate the Bar's later closure letter got wrong (N-121). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A stay means the case stops. The August 1, 2025 stay was never lifted by any order, and Wife's counsel conceded on the record that "it slipped through the cracks, and I didn't submit it." He attributed the initial delay to Husband's objections, which went to a draft's wording; the stay stood regardless. The same court that had not reached Husband's noticed motions in nine months convened a full evidentiary day for Wife's motion while the stay stood.
Receipt
  • 4/17/26 transcript 23:1-9: Wife's counsel conceding "it slipped through the cracks, and I didn't submit it," and attributing delay to Husband: "Mr. Hanson had numerous objections to the order"
  • 1150 Doc 225
  • 2D2025-1936 Doc 014
  • the never-entered stay-lift order at N-060
  • the waiting motions at N-056 and N-057

Spawned by: N-060

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-092

N-0952026-05-01Husband asked the court to write down its own factual findings; the entire answer was a checked box reading "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course," and the findings are still unwritten.IGNORED
Date
2026-05-01
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Husband asked the court to write down its own factual findings; the entire answer was a checked box reading "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course," and the findings are still unwritten.
What the law required
The card's duty statement needs its authority and currently has none beyond the general rule. In-tree support: Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(f) (every judge shall rule upon and announce an order on every matter submitted within a reasonable time, as quoted in the tree's rule research).
What happened
On 5/1/26 Husband's emergency motion for written findings of fact (Docs 296 and 297) drew handling orders only, Docs 298 and 299. The checked disposition on each reads "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." No merits ruling issued and the findings remain unwritten. Doc 297 contains the wrong document, the Bar's motion to quash, and the corrected motion is missing from the records tree. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A judge rules on every matter submitted within a reasonable time. Written findings would have put the underlying facts on the record where they could be reviewed. Deferring the request matches the declaration at N-091, that findings would be made only if an appellate court required them. Limit: the only in-tree authority is Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(f), its text not pulled, and no authority requiring written findings for the underlying relief is cited in the tree.
Receipt
  • Docs 296 and 297
  • Docs 298 and 299 at p. 2, the checked-box disposition, quoted
  • The corrected motion does not appear in the record as swept.

Spawned by: N-091

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-095

N-1042026-05-18asked to take judicial notice of the case in which he is himself a named defendant, the judge sustained the other side's relevance objection from the bench, stated no ground of his own, and entered no written order.IGNORED
Date
2026-05-18
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
asked to take judicial notice of the case in which he is himself a named defendant, the judge sustained the other side's relevance objection from the bench, stated no ground of his own, and entered no written order.
What the law required
F.S. 90.202 permits judicial notice of related court proceedings.
What happened
Docs 303, 304 and 305, filed the night of 5/18/26 into the early hours of 5/19/26 and running roughly 761 pages, asked the court to take judicial notice of the mandamus case and related records. On 6/10/26 Judge Felix refused them from the bench: "At this time I'm going to sustain the objection to the request for judicial notice on those matters." He adopted the opposing relevance objection, stated no ground of his own, and entered no written order. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Section 90.202 permits a court to take judicial notice of related court proceedings. An order either way, granting or denying, would have put the mandamus at N-058 and the judge's own status in it on the 1150 record. What issued instead was an oral ruling adopting the opposing party's objection, with no ground of the court's own and nothing in writing, so there is nothing on the record that states why.
Receipt
  • Docs 303, 304 and 305, filed 5/18-5/19/26, 761 pages across the three
  • Doc 303 is the Request for Judicial Notice and Docs 304 and 305 are the compendium volumes it attaches
  • 6/10/26 Tr. 22:17-19

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-104

N-1072026-05-28a motion asking the court to hear the discovery first and the guardian ad litem second went unruled, and four weeks later the guardian ad litem was appointed with the sequencing question still open.IGNORED
Date
2026-05-28
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
a motion asking the court to hear the discovery first and the guardian ad litem second went unruled, and four weeks later the guardian ad litem was appointed with the sequencing question still open.
What the law required
R. 12.380(a)(4) and R. 12.280 require the court to rule on a motion to compel and on sequencing.
What happened
Husband filed Doc 321 on 5/28/26, seeking the return or escrow of $6,000 paid to Davis, a separate sum from the guardian ad litem retainer (N-134); an order compelling Davis's billing, source-of-funds records, and Bar-communication records; and priority for the discovery and recording motions before any guardian ad litem. Judge Felix never ruled on it. Four weeks later he appointed the guardian ad litem with the sequencing motion still unresolved (N-125). The underlying third request to produce has itself never drawn a response, an objection, or a ruling, 532 days of silence as of 8/7/26 (N-037). The motion remains unruled. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Rules 12.380(a)(4) and 12.280 require a ruling on a motion to compel and on sequencing. An order compelling what this motion sought would have documented Davis's billing, the source of his funds, and Bar communications (N-031). None was entered. The sequencing motion asking that discovery come first sat unruled while the guardian ad litem track ran to completion. In candor, the statement that the $6,000 was "not denied" rests on the motion's characterization of Wife's reply, not an independent source.
Receipt
  • Doc 321, Filing #249121023 (DIN confirmed against the live docket; formerly cited as "311")
  • Ruling sweep complete as of 8/7/26: every order-titled file after Doc 163 was checked, 35 or more, and none touches the third request to produce
  • Doc 210's emergency finding had no substantive follow-through
  • The "not denied" statement rests on the motion's own characterization of Wife's reply
  • Third request to produce #140

Spawned by: N-011, N-031, N-037

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-107

N-1082026-05-29asked whether he knew he was a defendant in a pending case against the circuit, the judge answered "I may be"; asked whether he would ever find any facts about Husband's constitutional rights, and after reframing the question himself, he answered "Maybe."DENIED
Date
2026-05-29
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
asked whether he knew he was a defendant in a pending case against the circuit, the judge answered "I may be"; asked whether he would ever find any facts about Husband's constitutional rights, and after reframing the question himself, he answered "Maybe."
What the law required
A court must hear noticed motions, permit cross-examination (F.S. 90.608), find facts, and rule on a renewed disqualification motion under R. 2.330.
What happened

At the 5/29/26 hearing Judge Felix was asked whether he knew he was a defendant in the mandamus case; he said he might be, and declined to disqualify himself. Asked whether he would ever find facts about Husband's constitutional rights, the court reframed the question and answered "Maybe." He barred cross-examination on the Bar complaint entirely, and left unanswered the filed representation that the Bar took no action on Husband's complaint, the paragraph carded at N-105 that the Bar has never corrected.

He confirmed the sanctions motion was on the notice. Eighteen pages of transcript later he removed the remaining motions from the hearing, giving this reason on the record: "That's my lunch break." [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
A court hears the motions that are noticed, permits cross-examination, finds facts, and rules on a renewed disqualification motion. The refusal to find facts is not a one-off on this docket. It is on two certified transcripts, 4/17/26 at Tr. 181 and 5/29/26 at Tr. 53, which makes it a practice. A ruling on the renewed disqualification motion would have put the judge's status in the mandamus case (N-058) on the record. He declined the motion and found no facts.
Receipt
  • 5/29/26 review memo and extracts, page and line
  • Tr. 43:2-5, 45:5-9, 46:7-14, 47:9-13, 52, 53:9-15, 231:19-23, 249:19-250:2
  • "I may be." is at Tr. 46:7-14; the court's reframed question, "Are you asking me in the future at some point if I might?", always travels with the "Maybe." at Tr. 53:9-15
  • "That's my lunch break." is at Tr. 250:2, the court speaking
  • Tr. 45:5-9: the Bar "did not act" representation, quoted verbatim
  • Standing citation rule: Tr. 231:19-23 (the noticing) and Tr. 249:19-250:2 (the stripping) are cited as two connected passages, never as one quote, because the second refers only to unnamed "other motions" and "the rest of that stuff" and does not name the sanctions motion

Spawned by: N-091

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-108

N-1092026-05-29all three of Husband's witnesses were excused from the bench in one hearing, and the motion excusing the court's own records custodian was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends this judge in the records case.DENIED
Date
2026-05-29
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix (custodian motion argued by Sr. AAG Schwieterman)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
all three of Husband's witnesses were excused from the bench in one hearing, and the motion excusing the court's own records custodian was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends this judge in the records case.
What the law required
Relief from a subpoena requires stated grounds. Impartiality is required where the judge's own litigation counsel argues the motion.
What happened
On 5/29/26 Judge Felix quashed all three of Husband's witness subpoenas from the bench. He excused Vivian Cortes Hodz as "not necessary". He excused G. Samarkos of Harris, Hunt & Derr as not relevant to any other basis. He excused the 13th Circuit records custodian as "not the appropriate avenue". The custodian motion was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends Judge Felix in the mandamus case. He directed the movants to draft their own orders. None of the three witnesses ever testified. The written orders that followed carry no findings either (N-112, N-113). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Relief from a subpoena rests on stated grounds, and impartiality is required where the judge's own litigation counsel argues the motion. Section 119.11(1), Fla. Stat. requires an immediate hearing with priority over other pending cases; that case has been pending for months (N-058). In candor, the quash motions were filed one to two days before the hearing, and one movant's counsel conceded that the request "is the most logical request that Mr. Hanson has made." The concession changed nothing.
Receipt
  • 5/29/26 Tr. 101-157 (the quash extract): excusing Samarkos "not relevant," and to "any other basis?" the answer was "No."
  • The Attorney General's dual role is preserved on the record
  • Downstream written orders: Doc 325 (6/2/26) and Docs 326 and 327 (6/3/26)

Spawned by: N-058, N-108

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-109

N-1102026-05-30the same chambers gave the guardian ad litem hearing a date twelve days out; for the 30-minute hearing Husband needed first, the 5/27/26 offer was 63 days out, and it was heard on 7/7, twelve days after the guardian ad litem had already been granted.DENIED
Date
2026-05-30
Actor
Judge Felix / Div A chambers
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
the same chambers gave the guardian ad litem hearing a date twelve days out; for the 30-minute hearing Husband needed first, the 5/27/26 offer was 63 days out, and it was heard on 7/7, twelve days after the guardian ad litem had already been granted.
What the law required
Hearing time must be allocated even-handedly, and sequencing must not moot a prerequisite matter.
What happened
The court fast-tracked the guardian ad litem hearing, set for June 11, 2026, twelve days from the 5/30/26 email. For the 30-minute hearing on the Bar's protective-order and quash motion, the same chambers made two offers: on 5/27/26 the earliest window for a 30-minute Zoom hearing was 63 days out; on 6/2/26 the judicial assistant offered 7/7 and 7/14. It was heard 7/7/26, after the 6/25/26 grant. The disparity is documented in writing on 5/30/26 and again on 6/2/26. The 5/30 question was put in a scheduling channel, so no email-channel rule explains what followed: it has drawn no answer in 79 days as of 8/17/26. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Hearing time is allocated even-handedly. Both requests were pending in the same chambers the same week. One drew multi-hour blocks within days; for the other, a 30-minute hearing, the earliest offer was 63 days out. That let the guardian ad litem question be decided on 6/25 before the Bar-handling evidence was heard on 7/7, where it was then quashed (N-130). Heard in order, that evidence would have entered the record before the appointment was decided.
Receipt
  • F223 (Master Fact Ledger, sourced to the 5/30 and 6/2/26 emails as sent)
  • The 5-30-26 email PDF; offer dates at pages 3 and 6
  • The 6/2/26 email at its page 6 contains dates only and no sentence addressing the explanation request; it offers 7/7 and 7/14 for the 30-minute hearing
  • Comparator: on 5/8/26 a 5-hour in-person block was reset 21 days out; nineteen days later, on 5/27/26, the earliest 30-minute window was 63 days out
  • Intervals recomputed and confirmed: 5/8 to 5/29/26 is 21 days; 5/27 to 7/29/26 is 63 days; 5/30/26 to 8/17/26 is 79 days
  • The twelve-day figure is machine-computed
  • Standing caution: do not assert "offered all day June 1"

Spawned by: N-107

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-110

N-1122026-06-02the witness who holds Husband's own former firm's record of the 2024 discovery refusals was "fully released" by an order that states no findings and no legal basis anywhere on its face.DENIED
Date
2026-06-02
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the witness who holds Husband's own former firm's record of the 2024 discovery refusals was "fully released" by an order that states no findings and no legal basis anywhere on its face.
What the law required
Relieving a subpoenaed witness rests on stated grounds and findings.
What happened
On 6/2/26 Judge Felix signed Doc 325 releasing G. Samarkos of Harris, Hunt & Derr, Husband's own former counsel. The order says she is "fully released". It contains no findings and states no legal basis on its face. Samarkos never testified. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Relieving a subpoenaed witness rests on stated grounds and findings. Findings here would have put the ruling's grounds on the record. There are none. This order is the written form of the 5/29/26 bench quash (N-109), and the witness released is Husband's own former counsel at Harris, Hunt & Derr, the firm whose file covers the 2024 discovery refusals.
Receipt
  • Doc 325, e-signed 6/2/26 9:08:34 PM
  • Comparator on timing: this order and the custodian order at Doc 326 issued about 6 days after their motions were filed on 5/27/26, while the Bar officials' motion carried 46 days to an oral ruling and has produced no written order at all (N-130)

Spawned by: N-109

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-112

N-1132026-06-03the order releasing the court's own records custodian states no findings and no legal basis, and it was entered twice: Doc 327 is a byte-identical duplicate of Doc 326.DENIED
Date
2026-06-03
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the order releasing the court's own records custodian states no findings and no legal basis, and it was entered twice: Doc 327 is a byte-identical duplicate of Doc 326.
What the law required
Relieving a subpoenaed witness rests on stated grounds and findings.
What happened
On 6/3/26 Judge Felix signed Doc 326, which "fully released" the 13th Circuit records custodian and the Trial Court Administrator. He entered no findings. Doc 327 is a byte-identical duplicate. The custodian never testified. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Relieving a subpoenaed witness rests on stated grounds and findings. This is the order that closed the records-custodian route, seeded at N-037. It is the written form of the 5/29/26 bench quash (N-109), where the motion excusing this same custodian was argued by the Senior Assistant Attorney General whose office defends the signing judge in the mandamus. Findings would have put that ruling's grounds on the record. There are none in either copy.
Receipt
  • Docs 326 and 327, e-signed 6/3/26 4:55:51 PM

Spawned by: N-109

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-113

N-1182026-06-10the motion pled a status ground the rule treats separately, that the judge was himself a named defendant in a pending case; the order denying it 9 hours and 27 minutes after filing called the motion "legally insufficient" and never mentions that groundDENIED
Date
2026-06-10
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the motion pled a status ground the rule treats separately, that the judge was himself a named defendant in a pending case; the order denying it 9 hours and 27 minutes after filing called the motion "legally insufficient" and never mentions that ground
What the law required
R. 2.330 limits review to legal sufficiency. Caperton, Murchison, and Williams supply the due process standard. The motion pled (e)(2)(C) status grounds distinct from the prior (e)(1) motion.
What happened
Doc 329 was filed at 12:00 AM on 6/10/26. At 8:34 AM Davis filed a fee request limited to the fees of responding to the motion (Doc 330). At 9:27 AM, 9 hours and 27 minutes after the filing, Judge Felix denied the motion to disqualify himself (Doc 331). He cited rule 2.330(i), called the motion "legally insufficient," and stated that he is able to be fair and impartial. He never addressed the separately pled (e)(2)(C) status ground or the due-process argument. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Under Rule 2.330(h), the judge named in an initial motion determines only its legal sufficiency and does not pass on the truth of the facts alleged; a same-day disposition is fast but not improper in itself. The defect is narrower and on the order's face: the motion pled a status ground under subdivision (e)(2)(C), distinct from the earlier (e)(1) motion, and the order is silent on it. The due process standard comes from Caperton, Murchison and Williams.
Receipt
  • Doc 329 (filed 12:00 AM 6/10/26).
  • Doc 330 (8:34 AM).
  • Doc 331 (9:27 AM), with the DIN confirmed by a docket pull.

Spawned by: N-108, N-113

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-118

N-1232026-06-17a non-party's lawyer submitted a proposed order at 9:42 AM and had it signed by 1:47 PM the same day, about 4 hours and 5 minutesPENDING
Date
2026-06-17
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix (signing); Lawrence Hodz, counsel for non-party Vivian Cortes Hodz (proposing the order)
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (Judge Felix)
Mechanism
a non-party's lawyer submitted a proposed order at 9:42 AM and had it signed by 1:47 PM the same day, about 4 hours and 5 minutes
What the law required
Nothing prescribes signing velocity. Velocity is a choice, and choices are the dataset (same frame as N-128).
What happened
On 6/17/26 Judge Felix signed a protective order about 4 hours and 5 minutes after Lawrence Hodz, counsel for non-party Vivian Cortes Hodz, submitted the proposed order at 9:42 AM. Doc 336 carries a Felix stamp of 1:47:24 PM. It grants the motion, finds the subpoena "not relevant", denies fees, and recites that the matter was heard 5/29. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Nothing in any rule prescribes how fast an order gets signed. Velocity is a choice, and the choices are the dataset. Two like-for-like figures exist for proposed orders submitted to the same chambers in the same case: about 4 hours 5 minutes here, and about 19 hours 54 minutes at N-128. A third number, the 813-day age of the N-003 lineage as of August 21, 2026, is offered as scale only, not a matched comparison.
Receipt
  • Doc 336 (Felix JAWS stamp 6/17/2026 1:47:24 PM).
  • The proposed order as served is in the tree at OFF_DOCKET, Filing 250544732 per the e-service receipt, 9:42 AM.
  • The 9:42 AM leg has no page image and Filing 250544732 has not been pulled, so the 4h05m figure rests on the e-service receipt alone.
  • Tally note: the pendency comparator is owned at N-003 and counted once.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-123

N-1252026-06-25the order appointing a guardian ad litem over Husband's children makes no finding that either parent is unfit, cites no statute and no rule, names no guardian, and recites a hearing on a date when no session took placeDENIED
Date
2026-06-25
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the order appointing a guardian ad litem over Husband's children makes no finding that either parent is unfit, cites no statute and no rule, names no guardian, and recites a hearing on a date when no session took place
What the law required
F.S. 61.401 sets the guardian ad litem standards and requires findings. Brandauer (2d DCA) calls for discovery-first sequencing. The order must be accurate.
What happened
On 6/25/26 Judge Felix ordered a guardian ad litem (Doc 337) on Wife's motion of 12/13/24. There is no unfitness finding. No statute or rule appears on the order's face. No guardian ad litem is named. The order recites hearings including "May 22, 2026," and no session occurred that day; the actual date was 5/29, confirmed by four documents. He entered it while the sequencing motion asking that discovery be heard first sat unruled (N-107) and while every discovery motion sat unruled. The motion it granted alleged no incident, no date, no observation and no witness about the children, and its only factual allegations about Husband were four quotations from his own May 2024 filing (N-001). Discovery-first sequencing would have produced rulings on the older motions before any appointment issued. The appointment issued first. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Section 61.401 conditions an appointment on the child's best interest and requires findings, and Brandauer calls for discovery first. The order states three things: Wife's concerns, Husband's own non-adverse statement that he is a good parent, and the court's belief that a guardian would aid its decision-making. The wrong hearing date is most likely stale-notice copying, not fabrication. The motion's age was on the record at 532 and 544 days, and the order issued 15 days later.
Receipt
  • Doc 337, e-signed 6/25/26 4:11:37 PM.
  • 5/29/26 Tr. 59:2-5 (Davis: the guardian ad litem and psychological evaluation motions "pending for 532 days").
  • 6/10/26 Tr. 29:3-4 (Davis: "pending for 544 days"). Both quotations rest on the transcript text layer; the page images have not been separately checked.
  • Older gating discovery motions drew no hearing in the same courtroom in the same period; the psychological-evaluation motion recited in the same breath still sat unruled at 602 days as of 8/7/26.
  • Tally note: this row owns the grant event; the appointment-terms instance at N-024, the pricing at N-134, the amendment at N-147, and the enforcement at N-148 and N-151 are downstream decision points and not additional grants, so any "orders without findings" tally counts Doc 337 once.

Spawned by: N-018, N-107, N-061

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-125

N-1282026-07-03opposing counsel's own exit order, sent direct to chambers, was signed in 19 hours and 54 minutes; the entered order gave him more than the stipulation asked, releasing him "forever relieved of the responsibility's attendant thereto" [sic]PENDING
Date
2026-07-03
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix (signing); Scott Paul Davis (withdrawing counsel; e-service address thereafter Hunter Law Group)
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (Judge Felix)
Mechanism
opposing counsel's own exit order, sent direct to chambers, was signed in 19 hours and 54 minutes; the entered order gave him more than the stipulation asked, releasing him "forever relieved of the responsibility's attendant thereto" [sic]
What the law required
Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.505(f) allows withdrawal by leave of court on motion with client consent or stipulation. No rule prescribes how fast an order gets signed. Signing speed is a choice, and the choices are the dataset.
What happened
The joint stipulation for leave to withdraw was e-filed 7/2/26 at 11:56:53 AM (Doc 338), and a proposed order and a letter went direct to chambers at 12:22 and 12:28 PM. Judge Felix signed the order the next morning at 7:50:35 AM (Doc 344), 19 hours 53 minutes and 42 seconds later. The stipulation asked only that Wife and Davis "agree to the release of Scott P. Davis, Esq. and HUNTER LAW, P.A. to withdraw as counsel for the Wife." The entered order grants more: Davis and Hunter Law "are allowed to withdraw as attorney of record and are forever relieved of the responsibility's attendant thereto" [sic]. No reservation of jurisdiction over withdrawing counsel appears anywhere in it. Husband's motion for rehearing of this withdrawal order is still pending. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.505(f) allows withdrawal by leave of court on motion with client consent or stipulation. No rule prescribes signing speed; same judge, same case, same mechanism: counsel's exit order was signed in under 20 hours. Husband's proposed order memorializing the court's own 12/19/24 oral ruling has never been signed, standing 827 days as of August 21, 2026 (N-003). His 7/23/26 written request to the same chambers drew "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email".
Receipt
  • Doc 338 (Filing #251698136, e-filed 7/2/26 11:56:53 AM; e-signatures Sarah Hanson 11:42 AM, Scott Paul Davis 11:09 AM; submitted by Hunter Law).
  • Doc 344 (e-signed 7/3/26 7:50:35 AM), single page; quotes verbatim from the faces. Elapsed 19 hours, 53 minutes, 42 seconds.
  • E-service notices for Filings 251698136, 251701417 and 251702076; JAWS signing notice 7/3.
  • On 7/6/26 Husband filed a Notice of Objection and Motion for Clarification re Retained Jurisdiction (Doc 341) directed at the release language; Wife, self-represented thereafter, responded 7/12 (Doc 345).
  • The conformed-copies block lists both parties as self-represented at entry.
  • The proposed order as served to chambers on 7/2 at 12:22 and 12:28 PM has not been retrieved for comparison against the entered order's language, and the portal links have expired.
  • Clarity note: the pending motion here is Husband's rehearing motion on this withdrawal order, not the sanctions motions, which are pending on their own rows at N-056 and N-057.
  • Related decision points: N-133, N-139.

Spawned by: N-003, N-110

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-128

N-1302026-07-07Bar counsel argued three rule grounds by name, the court found none of them, and the four Bar officials' subpoenas were quashed with two of the four sitting in the roomDENIED
Date
2026-07-07
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir. (Bar's Doc 309 vs. Hanson's DIN 316)
Mechanism
Bar counsel argued three rule grounds by name, the court found none of them, and the four Bar officials' subpoenas were quashed with two of the four sitting in the room
What the law required
A motion to quash is ruled on with stated grounds. The Bar subpoenas are the discovery route into the Bar-handling record.
What happened

On 7/7/26 Judge Felix granted the four Bar officials' motion to quash and made no rule-factor findings. Two of the four sat in the hearing: Kelley and Courtemanche both confirmed their presence. Bar counsel argued the subpoenas were oppressive, harassing, and irrelevant. The court found none of those grounds; its sole ground was that subpoenaing those individuals was not procedurally appropriate in a family law case.

Husband set a September 2025 letter describing a multi-level Bar investigation against the Bar's own filed statement that it "did not act" (N-105). The court replied: "I heard that. I heard that, Mr. Hanson." Then it quashed. Husband gave an oral preservation demand for the Bar's electronics, 32 days after the Bar wrote the records had been disposed of (N-116). Judge Felix directed Bar counsel to prepare the order; none has been entered (NEW-P5). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
A motion to quash is ruled on with stated grounds: oppression, harassment, relevance, burden. Bar counsel argued three by name; the ruling contains a finding on none of them, and does not differentiate among the four subpoenas. What those subpoenas were the route to is the whole stake: which account of the Bar's handling of Husband's complaint is accurate, the September 2025 letter describing a multi-level investigation (N-055), or the Bar's own filed statement that it "did not act" (N-105).
Receipt
  • July 7 mini transcript (Guldin, RPR, certified 7/13/26), filed OFF_DOCKET, not docketed; hearing 4:00 to 4:32 PM, 32 minutes. Every cite read off a rendered page image on 8/10/26 at 230 dpi per quadrant, every speaker tag read from the image rather than the text layer.
  • Cites: Tr. 4:19-23, 5:5-22, 6:23-7:3, 7:10-20, 8:9-18, 9:1-12, 9:13-10:8, 11:17-12:13, 12:25-13:3, 17:17-18:8, 20:3-10, 21:19-23:4, 23:18-24:14, 24:15-25:23, 26:10-16, 27:9-13, 27:20-28:6, 29:20-25, 30:9-10, 30:22-31:5, 31:6-18, 31:19-32:1.
  • Kelley announced himself "for The Florida Bar" (Tr. 4:22-23); Courtemanche confirmed his own presence (5:21-22).
  • Wife had argued in the same hearing that the Bar dispute was "procedurally improper to be raised within these proceedings" and that the court lacked jurisdiction "to permit the questioning or the depositions of these individuals because this is a divorce proceeding" (21:19-23:4). The word match ("procedurally") is recorded, and nothing is asserted about why.
  • The ruling came in two parts, cut off at "I'm not --" (29:25) and resumed at 30:22 with "I've already ruled on the motion for guardian ad litem."
  • Husband's preservation demand: "I've asked for The Florida Bar to maintain the electronics" (12:25-13:3).
  • Asked whether the parallel oversight failures would simply continue, the court said "I'm not going to answer that question." (31:6-18). Asked whether it would decide due process: "There was a motion filed, it was duly noticed, I heard all sides, and I made a ruling." (31:19-32:1).
  • Four transcript anomalies, none quoted on this card: a "MR. LONDOT: Yes." tag at 31:8 landing inside Husband's sentence, unattributable from the page; "the closure of the market" at 24:11 where context indicates "the matter"; "even mute" at 8:18 where "moot" is evident; "intentionally cursed and confusing" at 26:20 inside Husband's own remarks.
  • Doc 309 p. 1 (movant list: Courtemanche, Schuyler, Kelley and Sheridan; Gangi is not a movant) and para. 5.
  • Differential-timing comparators: Doc 325 (6/2/26) and Doc 326 (6/3/26), about 6 days from filing; this motion, filed 5/22/26, carried 46 days to the oral grant, machine-verified, and the written order was still absent 77 days from filing and 31 days from the ruling as of 8/7/26, current as of the records tree as swept on 8/7/26 and not checked against a live docket.
  • Note against the standing caution at N-055: "reviewed on three levels" is Husband's phrase in open court and is not the letter's phrase.

Spawned by: N-055, N-105, N-121

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-130

N-1332026-07-22Husband asked the court to put its own Doc 22 ruling in writing; the answer was "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email" and seven August slots that all lapsed; the same court signed Wife's emailed order in 25 hours and set her an eight-hour hearing one day after she asked.IGNORED
Date
2026-07-22
Actor
Judge Felix / Div A chambers (judicial assistant Ellen Courtemanche, no known relation to Bar Deputy General Counsel Richard Courtemanche)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
Husband asked the court to put its own Doc 22 ruling in writing; the answer was "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email" and seven August slots that all lapsed; the same court signed Wife's emailed order in 25 hours and set her an eight-hour hearing one day after she asked.
What the law required
Due process requires the court to hear and determine a motion asking that an announced bench ruling be reduced to writing. A court speaks through written orders.
What happened

On July 22, 2026 at 12:01 PM Husband filed his Motion to Set Pending Motions for Hearing and for Entry of an Order on Docket #22, and transmitted a five-page proposed order at 12:39 PM.

The court's entire engagement came the next afternoon: "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email", plus seven case-management slots. Eight minutes later, in the same thread, the same court answered Wife's question with three offered eight-hour October dates (N-139). His request to notice one of the August slots drew no scheduling response, and all seven lapsed (N-139).

No order on the motion has ever been entered. This followed the court's own July 7 commitment, recorded in the opposing party's contemporaneous account, that its assistant "would reach out with proposed dates". Fifteen days later none had come.

As of August 7 the underlying Doc 22 motion stood at 813 days, its ruling still not in writing. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
A court speaks through written orders. By July 2026 the court's ruling on Husband's Doc 22 motion existed only as spoken words: granted from the bench on April 17 after 23 months of waiting, never entered, never enforced (N-090). So Husband filed a motion asking for two ordinary things. Enter the written order, and set his still-unheard motions for hearing. His filed motion produced one sentence about email etiquette, seven offered August slots, and no order. Through that same email channel the same court signed Wife's proposed order in about 25 hours (N-134) and set her an eight-hour hearing one day after she asked (N-139).
Receipt
  • Filing #253018138 (7/22/26 12:01 PM), the motion. The proposed order, Submission #253023609, 12:39 PM, unsigned and not docketed.
  • The chambers email of 7/23 at 4:24 PM. The 4:24 PM figure is the capture; the quoted header reads 4:25 PM, so both are reported, and the interval to 4:32 PM is seven or eight minutes. Three captures agree.
  • The 4:32 PM answer to Wife in the same thread, offering three eight-hour October dates (N-139).
  • The seven offered August slots and their lapse (N-139).
  • The opposing party's 7/22/26 written account of the 7/7 commitment.
  • The chambers emails issue over the signature block of judicial assistant Ellen Courtemanche, no known relation to Bar Deputy General Counsel Richard Courtemanche.
  • Day counts recomputed at build.

Spawned by: N-003

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-133

N-1342026-07-23a party's email asking for the order was followed by a signed order in about 25 hours; the order bills Husband $3,000 within three days, imposes a paid communication service no motion asked, and was entered while his briefed challenge to the appointment sat unruledDENIED
Date
2026-07-23
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
a party's email asking for the order was followed by a signed order in about 25 hours; the order bills Husband $3,000 within three days, imposes a paid communication service no motion asked, and was entered while his briefed challenge to the appointment sat unruled
What the law required
The court must rule on a fully briefed motion for reconsideration (Doc 342) before implementing the order under review. A complete order must be served. Due process comes before the imposition of monetary obligations.
What happened
Wife wrote to chambers at 10:27 AM on 7/22/26: "We are waiting on the Order approving one of the individuals". Judge Felix e-signed Doc 351 at 11:37:14 AM on 7/23/26, about 25 hours later. He made no finding of unfitness, no finding of harm, and no best-interest finding naming a fact about either parent. Paragraph 16 orders a $6,000 retainer due within three days at $325.00 an hour, split evenly, so it bills Husband $3,000, with a cease-work term on nonpayment. Paragraph 7 imposes mandatory paid OurFamilyWizard, which appeared in no motion. Paragraph 12 makes the guardian's file unobtainable by the parties. No proposed order circulated and no selection hearing was held. The order as served breaks mid-sentence at every interior page break, and its numbering jumps from 16 to 20. Judge Felix entered it while the briefed reconsideration of Doc 337 sat unruled, and it is still unruled. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Section 61.401 conditions the appointment on the child's best interest, and an order that bills a parent $3,000 is the kind that rests on findings. This one has none. Husband's repeated discovery requests to contest the appointment were never permitted. A ruling on the pending reconsideration motion (N-125) would have answered those challenges; it was implemented instead. Against that, the velocity: one day from a party email to a signed order, while seven older motions stood undecided (N-140).
Receipt
  • Doc 351, e-signed 7/23/26 11:37:14 AM; verified-quotes and incoherence memos on file. Paragraph 16 retainer due "within 3 days of entry" at "$325.00 per hour,"
  • Wife's 7/22/26 10:27 AM email. Order PDF created 7/22 at 4:32 PM per metadata.
  • Paragraph 16 also carries an ex parte enforcement clause on nonpayment. Paragraph 7's OurFamilyWizard duty carries a 24-hour response requirement. No complete copy of the order exists anywhere in the record.
  • Docs 342 (reconsideration of Doc 337, filed 7/6, opposed 7/12) and 345.
  • Doc 198 Tr. 87 (Wife's 4/4/25 testimony about Husband's refusal to enroll in OurFamilyWizard, the only prior surfacing of that subject; no motion ever requested it).
  • F230, F231, and the 59C table ("1 day"). Doc 337 to Doc 351 is 28 days.
  • The certified Clerk copy has not been obtained, and the Clerk and JAWS copies have not been compared.
  • Pendency comparators are carried at N-003 and counted once.

Spawned by: N-125

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-134

N-1352026-07-23the three-day clock to pay a guardian ad litem $3,000 ran out before the guardian had ever contacted Husband, and the motion he filed that same morning to stay or extend it drew no ruling of any kind before the deadline passedIGNORED
Date
2026-07-23
Actor
Judge Felix (unruled pre-maturity stay request); Wife (private enforcement)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
the three-day clock to pay a guardian ad litem $3,000 ran out before the guardian had ever contacted Husband, and the motion he filed that same morning to stay or extend it drew no ruling of any kind before the deadline passed
What the law required
An obligation imposed by court order carries process. A verified stay or extension request filed before the deadline matured should be determined. An appointee's funding obligation ordinarily follows some appointee function.
What happened
The retainer deadline matured Tuesday 7/28/26. At 7:45:45 AM that morning, before maturity, Husband filed a verified emergency motion for reconsideration, stay, or extension. No ruling of any kind issued through the end of the deadline window. The court's three most recent emergency responses had been checkbox denials marking the request not an emergency. At 8:18 AM Wife wrote: "If you are going to copy our GAL, you need to pay her retainer so she is properly paid", with OurFamilyWizard enforcement. At 11:57 AM the next day, the guardian ad litem sent her first substantive communication: "I just found my introduction email in my drafts, so I have just sent it out. I apologize it was not sent out last week when it was intended." The payment obligation ran to term before the person to be paid had ever contacted the payor. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
An obligation imposed by court order carries process, and a verified stay or extension request filed before the deadline matures gets determined. What is receipted is internal to the order's mechanics: a payment clock that matured on 7/28 against an appointee whose first substantive contact came the day after. The court signed the appointment in about 25 hours (N-134) and issued nothing on the pre-maturity stay request. A determination would have produced a record before the term matured; none issued.
Receipt
  • The guardian ad litem's 7/29/26 email PDF, both pages.
  • The 7/28 thread capture. The Filing #253388797 portal capture (the emergency motion).
  • Deadline computation under Rule 2.514(a)(2).
  • F235, F236 and F239.
  • The court's three most recent emergency responses were "not an emergency" checkbox forms: Docs 285, 298 and 299.
  • The docket number assignment has not been pulled from the docket.

Spawned by: N-134

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-135

N-1392026-07-28Husband sought a hearing by filed motion, by proposed order, and by an email accepting the court's own offered dates, and got no hearing, no order and no reply; Wife asked by email and had an eight-hour day set the next day, by the same court that six days earlier had written "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email."DENIED
Date
2026-07-28
Actor
Judge Felix chambers (judicial assistant Courtemanche)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
Husband sought a hearing by filed motion, by proposed order, and by an email accepting the court's own offered dates, and got no hearing, no order and no reply; Wife asked by email and had an eight-hour day set the next day, by the same court that six days earlier had written "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email."
What the law required
Even-handed docket administration. A court that declares a scheduling channel closed may not run the same channel for one side.
What happened

At 8:14 AM on 7/28/26 Wife wrote to chambers: "Can you please reserve the October 9, 2026 at 9AM 8 hour day for this matter. Mr. Hanson has been unresponsive to coordination requests." That was sent 60 to 120 seconds after, and directly beneath in the same thread, Husband's 8:13:43 AM email: "I am available at any of the times you mention below."

After Wife's 7/29 10:45 AM follow-up, the court replied at 12:52 PM: "The hearing has been set for October 9, 2026 at 9:00am for 8-hours in-person." That is 2 hours and 7 minutes from her follow-up, one day from her request, and six days after the same court wrote "The court will not get involved in scheduling disputes via email" when the pending request was Husband's (N-133). Eight minutes after writing that sentence the same court answered Wife's 4:27 PM question with three 8-hour October dates, and the September 25 date was gone.

Husband's 7/29 11:28 AM email asking to notice one of the court's own offered August slots drew no scheduling response and remains unanswered. Seven August slots lapsed. Wife's Notice of Hearing was filed 7/30 at 9:24:11 AM (DIN 361). It reserves no court reporter. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
A docket is administered even-handedly, and a court that declares a scheduling channel closed does not then run that same channel for one side. The answer to any channel defense is in the channel's own history: in the ten weeks before that sentence was written, eight chambers emails on the same case set hearings, reset hearings, offered slots, waived a cancellation notice, and instructed a party to file a notice of hearing. An eight-hour hearing had been discussed at the 7/7 case management conference. The deviation claimed is the channel, the speed, and the lapse of the August slots, never that an October date was set.
Receipt
  • The 7/28 thread capture. The 7-30-26 court email PDF pp. 3-4. The 7-29-26 guardian ad litem email PDF p. 4 for the 8:13:43 header. The Notice portal capture, Filing #253595130. F236 and F240.
  • Husband's route in full: the court's own 7/7 commitment that its assistant "would reach out with proposed dates" and none came; the filed motion with a five-page proposed order (N-133); his 7/29 email accepting one of the court's own offered August slots. It produced one sentence about email etiquette, no order, no scheduling reply, and seven lapsed slots.
  • Channel history: eight chambers emails between 5/8/26 and 6/17/26, from the same judicial assistant on the same case, across five pages.
  • An 8-hour hearing had been discussed at the 7/7 case management conference for motions "previously set but not addressed," in Wife's own 7/22 words. Recorded here rather than argued.
  • The 1-day figure is machine-recomputed. 7/28/26 8:14 AM to 7/29/26 12:52 PM is 28 hours 38 minutes, so the interval is stated as the next day and never as within 24 hours.
  • The 4:24 PM text appears in full at page 1 of the 7/28 thread capture. The 4:24 and 4:32 bodies are snippet captures, not full-body captures, and the native messages are not held.
  • The 7/30 notice PDF is not in the tree, and which motions it sets was unknown at capture, so this card asserts nothing about its scope.
  • The chambers emails issue over the signature block of judicial assistant Ellen Courtemanche.
  • Setting one of the court's own August slots would have produced a hearing on the motions Husband asked to set (N-133). The slots lapsed.

Spawned by: N-133

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-139

N-1402026-07-29the rule requires a judge to report to the chief judge every month on any matter he has held more than 60 days; on 7/29/26 Husband filed six formal notices in one morning for six matters standing at 290 to 804 daysPENDING
Date
2026-07-29
Actor
Judge Felix (2.215(g)(1) reporting duty)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the rule requires a judge to report to the chief judge every month on any matter he has held more than 60 days; on 7/29/26 Husband filed six formal notices in one morning for six matters standing at 290 to 804 days
What the law required
Rule 2.215(g)(1) requires a judge to report matters under advisement 60 days or more to the chief judge each month. Rule 2.215(g)(2) and Form 2.604 are the litigant's prescribed notice instrument.
What happened
On 7/29/26 at 6:40:33 AM Husband filed six Form 2.604 Notices of Pending Matter in one filing, one each for six matters left undecided on this docket. The notices state day counts computed as of the filing date: DIN 22 at 804 days, DIN 111 at 548, DIN 163 at 491, DIN 177 at 470, DIN 239 at 299, and DIN 245 at 290. As of August 21, 2026 the same six stand at 827, 571, 514, 493, 322 and 313 days. Every party-computed figure recomputes exactly from the Clerk's docket dates. Six is the count of notices filed, not everything undecided: the pendency inventory at N-134 carries a seventh undecided matter, DIN 146, for which no notice was filed. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.215(g)(1) sets the trigger at 60 days, and the litigant's prescribed instrument for raising it is the Form 2.604 notice under 2.215(g)(2). The deviation here is measured by the rule itself, the same construction as section 119.11's word "immediate" at N-058. The answer is checkable either way: a monthly report either lists these six matters or it does not. The same six went to the chief judge's office the same day (N-141).
Receipt
  • Filing #253488214. Portal capture; the filed packet; the recomputation ledger, machine-verified with zero mismatches, study completed 8/1/26; F237 and F238.
  • Docketed as DIN 360.
  • Note: Husband's 7/29 email said "5 notices"; the filed packet is six, and the filing record controls.

Spawned by: N-003, N-133

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-140

N-1422026-07-29on the same afternoon the same chambers set Wife's 8-hour hearing by email in 2 hours 7 minutes, Husband asked for the August dates the court had already offered and that any refusal be put in writing; no response to either appears in the recordPENDING
Date
2026-07-29
Actor
Judge Felix chambers (August-dates fork); Sr. AAG Schwieterman (embedded supervisor fork)
Institution
13th Cir. / OAG
Mechanism
on the same afternoon the same chambers set Wife's 8-hour hearing by email in 2 hours 7 minutes, Husband asked for the August dates the court had already offered and that any refusal be put in writing; no response to either appears in the record
What the law required
The Question Protocol makes any answer evidence. They set the August dates, they refuse with a stated basis, or silence ratifies with the supervisory layer on notice.
What happened
On 7/29/26 at 1:40 PM Husband emailed for the August hearing dates the court had already offered, copying Chief Judge Sabella's judicial assistant and Attorney General counsel: "I am requesting the dates in August previously offered." He asked that any refusal be stated, and reiterated a separate demand to speak with a supervisor at the Attorney General's office. As of August 21, 2026 no response to either appears in the record, a statement scoped to the period searched. The only chambers communication after it in the window is the 7/30 10:12 AM case-manager redirect (N-143). [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
The request left three possible answers: set the August dates, refuse with a stated basis, or let the silence stand with the supervisory layer on notice. The channel was demonstrably open that same afternoon: the same chambers set Wife's 8-hour October hearing by email in 2 hours and 7 minutes (N-139). As of August 21, 2026 no response addressing either demand appears in the record, scoped to the period searched.
Receipt
  • The as-sent PDF, "7-29-26 my email 140pm. (as sent).pdf"; F241.
  • Full text: "If the court is refusing to schedule anything before October, please respond to this email stating so, with any explanation the court will offer."
  • Full text: "I'm reiterating my demand to speak with a supervisor within the attorney general's office. If you are continuing to refuse that request, please confirm so here."
  • This card rests on the court's silences rather than on the email's adjectives, which are themselves in the record.

Spawned by: N-133, N-140

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-142

N-1432026-07-30the court closed itself as a correspondence channel and routed both parties to a case manager, the morning after Husband escalated to the chief judge's office.PENDING
Date
2026-07-30
Actor
Judicial assistant Courtemanche / 13th Cir. (case manager Bekida Lee)
Institution
13th Cir. Fam. Div. A
Mechanism
the court closed itself as a correspondence channel and routed both parties to a case manager, the morning after Husband escalated to the chief judge's office.
What the law required
Court administration may assign case managers. The record questions are the stated premise and the timing.
What happened

On 7/30/26 at 10:12 AM the court wrote: "Because neither party in this matter is currently represented by legal counsel, this case has been assigned to a case manager. Please direct any future communication regarding your case to your assigned case manager."

The email issued the morning after Husband's 7/29 1:40 PM escalation copying Chief Judge Sabella's judicial assistant and Attorney General counsel (N-142). It issued one day after he filed the six notices of pending matter (N-140), and eight days after the motion asking the court to put its own Doc 22 ruling in writing (N-133).

The chronology is stated. Nothing beyond it is claimed. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
Court administration may assign case managers, and nothing here is asserted about that authority. The record question is the timing. The stated ground is accurate on its face, because both parties are in fact unrepresented, this routing may be routine for dockets postured that way, and the new channel may prove useful. None of that is established or contested here. The timing is the fact. Nothing beyond the chronology is claimed, and no purpose is attributed to anyone for the sequence recorded below.
Receipt
  • 7-30-26 court email PDF p. 1, rendered page read at intake 8/1/26. F242.
  • The email issues over the signature block of judicial assistant Ellen Courtemanche. The case manager named in DIN 362 is Bekida Lee, 13th Cir.
  • Whether this routing is routine for dockets postured as self-represented is not established on this record.

Spawned by: N-142, N-139

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-143

N-1472026-08-04four pages of obligations Husband had never been served, among them a ban on posting about his own case, first reached him on August 4, 2026, entered on a non-party's letter with no motion, no notice, and no hearingPENDING
Date
2026-08-04
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (Judge Felix)
Mechanism
four pages of obligations Husband had never been served, among them a ban on posting about his own case, first reached him on August 4, 2026, entered on a non-party's letter with no motion, no notice, and no hearing
What the law required
An order that restricts a party's speech, waives the rules of evidence as to that party, grants a third party access to that party's confidential records, and releases all future claims against that third party is entered on notice and an opportunity to be heard, and rests on findings. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(a) permits correction of clerical mistakes on the court's own initiative. It does not supply authority to add substantive obligations. No rule requires a court to announce what an "Amended" order amended. The silence is the choice this row records. The choice to correct silently is a choice, and choices are the dataset. RULE TEXT PULLED 8/17/26 (three concordant secondary sources; pull the official flcourts version before any filing cites it): Rule 12.540(a): 'Clerical mistakes in judgments or other parts of the record and errors arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.' HONEST APPLICATION, and it cuts both ways: the rule expressly permits sua sponte correction with whatever notice the court chooses, and even pages dropped at e-filing are a textbook 'error arising from oversight or omission,' so the AMENDMENT ITSELF is likely proper and the card must never argue otherwise. What the rule does not do is answer the live question this card actually scores: whether eleven paragraphs of obligation that first existed in served form on 8/4/26 can bind a party for the period before they were served, and whether an enforcement motion may run on obligations from the never-served pages. That is a notice and due process question (Art. I, sec. 9), not a 12.540 question. Argue the enforceability window, never the correction's validity.
What happened

The 7/23/26 order appointing a guardian ad litem (Doc 351) was entered as a five-page document, only the odd pages of a nine-page order. On 8/3/26 the guardian ad litem wrote Judge Felix that "several of the pages of the Order are missing" and asked for a complete copy. The next day Judge Felix entered a nine-page Amended Order; no paragraph was deleted or reworded, only the restored pages and signature block changed.

Obligations never before served came into existence against Husband on 8/4/26: a waiver of the section 61.403(1) notice requirement, blanket self-executing authority over confidential records, a waiver of the hearsay rules, a duty to fund the guardian's counsel in advance, a prospective waiver of all claims, and: "Any postings to social media about the case shall be immediately removed". No motion, notice, or hearing preceded any of it. The fifteen-day rehearing window closed 8/19/2026. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
A restraint on speech about one's own case normally requires notice, a hearing, and findings tailored to the harm. This order has one finding total: that a guardian ad litem is in the children's best interest, saying nothing about speech. A duplex-scanning accident is the likely explanation for the missing pages, and Rule 12.540(a) permits a court to correct such an error. The live question: whether paragraphs first served on 8/4/26 can bind a party for the period before service.
Receipt
  • The guardian ad litem's letter to Judge Felix, "Correspondence to Judge Felix 26.08.03.pdf," 1 p., dated August 3, 2026, Via E-Portal, signed over the title GUARDIAN AD LITEM, copying both parties; saved to 1150 OFF_DOCKET.
  • Full quote: the order "appears to have at some point been printed double-sided, but only one side of each page was captured when it was signed and uploaded into Hover."
  • Amended Order, 8/4/26, all 9 pp., at 1150 OFF_DOCKET; text layers unusable, no OCR used, so the delta was built from page images.
  • Doc 351 as entered, all 5 pp., in 00_DOCKET; the Clerk's e-filing footer numbers those five pages 1 through 5 consecutively, so nothing was lost in transmission; four of five page transitions break mid-sentence.
  • Doc 337 (2 pp.).
  • DIN 365 confirmed from a docket screenshot; Clock-In Event Date 08/04/2026, creation 08/05.
  • Rule text pulled 8/17/26 from three concordant secondary sources rather than from the official flcourts publication.
  • No certified Clerk copy of Doc 351 is held, so the five-page defect is shown here from a downloaded PDF rather than from the record.
  • Process comparison: the appointment itself consumed roughly 15 hours of hearing time across three dates before a two-page order issued; the paragraphs added on 8/4 consumed no hearing time at all. A non-party appointee's letter drew action from the court in one day, while Husband's own first-filed discovery motion stood at 827 days as of August 21, 2026 with no ruling (N-003).
  • The guardian ad litem asked only that a complete copy be entered; she did not ask for an amended order, and what the amendment added is the court's act, not hers.
  • Tally note: N-125 owns the grant event; this is a downstream decision point.

Spawned by: N-019

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-147

N-1512026-08-07no order to show cause was ever issued; the unsworn contempt motion itself was set for hearing three days after it was filed, with one hour reserved for three motions, one of which asks the court to cut Husband's time with the children to alternate weekends as a sanction.PENDING
Date
2026-08-07
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir. 24-DR-001150 (Judge Felix)
Mechanism
no order to show cause was ever issued; the unsworn contempt motion itself was set for hearing three days after it was filed, with one hour reserved for three motions, one of which asks the court to cut Husband's time with the children to alternate weekends as a sanction.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. Civil contempt in a family case proceeds by an order to show cause that states the essential facts, is served, advises of the right to counsel, and sets a hearing, under Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.615. The burden is the movant's: she must prove a prior order, notice of it, and non-compliance, and a coercive sanction for non-payment requires a present-ability-to-pay finding. The lawful options available on 8/7/2026 were to issue an order to show cause and set the return, to deny the motion, or to set it behind the matters already noticed. The court set the motion itself.
What happened

On 8/4/2026 at 9:49:26 AM Wife filed a motion asking the court to hold Husband in contempt, to compel compliance, and to sanction him (DIN 364), 4 pages of motion plus 5 of exhibits, signed "/s/ Sarah Sorgie Hanson, Esq., Florida Bar No. 065956." It is unsworn. No oath, no verification, no affidavit and no section 92.525 declaration appears anywhere in the nine pages. It cites no rule, no statute and no case, and it does not distinguish civil from criminal contempt.

On 8/7/2026 at 11:42:18 AM Judge Felix signed DIN 366, e-served the same day, setting it for hearing on 8/27/2026 at 2:00 PM with one hour reserved for all three motions. One of those three asks the court to reduce Husband's time with the children to alternate weekends as a stated sanction. No order to show cause has issued and none appears on the docket.

Three comparisons sit inside this same docket. Nine days before setting this motion, the same court checked "NOT AN EMERGENCY" on Husband's own 7/28 verified motion (DIN 354). The 7/30/2026 notice of continued evidentiary hearing sets 10/9/2026 for eight hours on ten enumerated matters under a footnote binding the court to hear motions "in the Order that they were filed," and this motion was filed after all ten and is being heard first. And Husband's own first-filed discovery motion, DIN 22, stood at 823 days as of 8/17/2026.

He filed a verified response and a motion to continue and re-set to 10/9/2026 on 8/15/2026. Both are undecided. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. Civil contempt in a family case proceeds by an order to show cause stating the essential facts, served, advising of the right to counsel, and setting a hearing. The burden is the movant's: a prior order, notice of it, and non-compliance, and a coercive sanction for non-payment requires a finding of present ability to pay. The options available on 8/7/2026 were to issue an order to show cause and set the return, to deny the motion, or to set it behind the matters already noticed. The court set the motion itself. Setting a motion for hearing is an ordinary act. The departure recorded is the absence of the show-cause step, on a motion the court could see on its face was unsworn and cited nothing.
Receipt
  • DIN 366, the order setting hearing entered 8/7/2026, at its title, body, execution line, signature block, footer and copies list.
  • DIN 364, filed 8/4/2026, all 9 pages read from the page images rather than the text layer. The only signature in the filing, at p. 4, is expressly a certificate-of-service signature, which is not a sworn verification.
  • Two face-level mismatches, recorded verbatim and characterized as nothing: the clerk's docket event description reads "ORDER SETTING FINAL HEARING WITHOUT PRETRIAL CONFERENCE" while the word FINAL appears nowhere on the instrument, and the caption reads "Division: AP" while the case is Division A.
  • DIN 354, the 7/28/2026 emergency-handling form. DIN 361, the 7/30/2026 notice, its ten matters and the filing-order footnote.
  • The clerk docket snapshot of 8/15/26 covers DINs 347-366. Husband's 8/15/2026 filings: verified response, 24 pp.; motion to continue, 17 pp.
  • Intervals: 8/4 to 8/27 is 23 days; 8/7 to 8/27 is 20 days.
  • The DIN 361 phrase "No court reporter reserved" is a paraphrase and must never be promoted into quotation marks. The actual text is "A court reporter has not been reserved at this time."
  • Speed-of-relief distribution on this docket: N-123 (about 4 hours, a non-party's proposed order), N-128 (19h54m, opposing counsel's exit order), N-134 (about 25 hours, an order billing Husband $3,000), against N-139, where a filed motion, a proposed order, and acceptance of the court's own offered dates drew no hearing, no order, and no reply. Cite for distribution only, never as purpose.

Spawned by: N-148, N-147

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-151

Chief Judge Sabella2 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

N-0252025-01-22told three times in writing that its own circuit had a problem, the chief judge's office answered that it has no investigative powers and pointed Husband back to the judge he was complaining aboutIGNORED
Date
2025-01-22
Actor
Chief Judge Christopher Sabella / 13th Cir. administration (AOC GC Katchuk, responding)
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
told three times in writing that its own circuit had a problem, the chief judge's office answered that it has no investigative powers and pointed Husband back to the judge he was complaining about
What the law required
R. 2.215 places administrative responsibility for the orderly operation of the circuit's courts on the chief judge.
What happened
Husband put the chief judge on notice three times: by email on January 22, 2025, by letter on February 12, 2025, and again on March 11, 2025. The March 13, 2025 answer from the Administrative Office of the Courts General Counsel confirmed receipt of all three, stating "the chief judge does not possess any independent investigative powers," and directing him instead to file a motion in the case or pursue the appellate process. The closing position was that Judge Sabella is "unable to take any action on your behalf in this matter." The remedies named were the case itself and the appeal, the judge complained of and the court that had already declined the record. Nothing followed the March 13, 2025 answer, and nothing has followed in the seventeen months since. The July 29, 2026 letter opens the second notice cycle (N-141). [IGNORED: receipt acknowledged, then no administrative response]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.215 places administrative responsibility for a circuit's courts on its chief judge, a supervisory duty that exists because a litigant cannot supervise the judge assigned to him. Written receipt plus a stated position of inability puts the office on both sides of the record: it knew, it wrote back, and it fixed its position in writing. Being unable to act "on your behalf" is not the same as being unable to act administratively.
Receipt
  • Doc 120 (letter of 2/12/25) with Docs 121 to 122 (exhibit chain), per the V8 report.
  • Doc 154 (Katchuk, 3/13/25), fully transcribed by eye (V11), which is the source of all three quoted sentences and of the confirmation that the 1/22, 2/12 and 3/11 emails were received.
  • Interval anchors, stated because the sentence turns on which one is used: from the 3/13/25 answer to 8/20/26 is seventeen months and seven days; from the first notice of 1/22/25 to the same date is eighteen months and twenty-nine days. The prose runs from the answer.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-025

N-1412026-07-29the chief judge, a named defendant in the records lawsuit, now holds written notice that matters in his circuit had been pending 290 to 804 days as of the July 29, 2026 notice, and the rule governing him requires examining dockets and requiring reportsPENDING
Date
2026-07-29
Actor
Chief Judge Sabella
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
the chief judge, a named defendant in the records lawsuit, now holds written notice that matters in his circuit had been pending 290 to 804 days as of the July 29, 2026 notice, and the rule governing him requires examining dockets and requiring reports
What the law required
Rule 2.215(b) gives the chief judge administrative supervision, including the (b)(7) duty to 'regularly examine the dockets. and require reports'. Rule 2.250 sets time standards.
What happened
On July 29, 2026 at 10:11 AM Husband sent the chief judge an administrative-review letter with twelve attachments, including the notices of pending matter filed that morning, showing day counts from 290 to 804 as of that date, 299 to 813 as of August 7, and 312 to 826 as of August 20. One recipient address returned a delivery failure the next day. At 1:40 PM the same day Husband added the chief judge's judicial assistant to case correspondence going forward; that address did not bounce. The officer this letter went to is also a defendant in the pending records case: Attorney General filings in 25-CA-010255 are signed for "Defendants 13th Judicial Circuit, Trial Court Administrator Gina Justice, Chief Judge Sabella, Judge Ayers, and Judge Felix." This is the second notice cycle; the first, January to March 2025, produced a written statement of inability and nothing else (N-025). [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
The rule gives the chief judge administrative supervision of his circuit: examine the dockets, require reports. What the record fixes is the date his office was told, what it was told, and that the same officer is a named defendant in the pending records case. The choice now sits at the supervisory layer, correct or ratify, and the rule's own mechanism would produce a written record of the same matters (N-140).
Receipt
  • The as-sent capture with the delivery failure; the 1:40 PM email; ledger entry F241.
  • Bounce identification closed 8/17/26 per the qualification pass. Limit that travels with any use: the first bounce alone has a pulled body and it is text-layer only (Gmail id 19fb363997718103); the other two are recorded by message id and snippet only. The three failing addresses are circuit addresses; the assistant's address did not bounce.
  • Named-defendant receipt: the Attorney General's signature block in 25-CA-010255 reads "JAMES UTHMEIER, ATTORNEY GENERAL" over "/s/ Jessica Schwieterman," Senior Assistant Attorney General, identical on Docs 055, 065, 072, 083 and the 5/15/26 Defendants' Responses to Request for Admissions.
  • Day counts recompute from the Clerk's docket dates (N-140): 7/29/26 range 290 to 804; 8/7/26 range 299 to 813; 8/20/26 range 312 to 826.

Spawned by: N-140

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-141

Florida Bar15 nodes

Official public records: The Florida Bar, official about page

NEW-P62025-02-24 -> 2025-10-10seventeen emails in this chain, six replies out, three emailed status formulas and three mailed letters, and not one of his questions answered; when he asked in writing whether there was a rule against speaking with him, no one repliedIGNORED
Date
2025-02-24 -> 2025-10-10
Actor
The Florida Bar, ACAP (Allie F. Huston; review by Alicia Gangi, Chair, Grievance Committee 13A)
Institution
The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861)
Mechanism
seventeen emails in this chain, six replies out, three emailed status formulas and three mailed letters, and not one of his questions answered; when he asked in writing whether there was a rule against speaking with him, no one replied
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b) provides that bar counsel "must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath," and 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal only "after complete investigation" (both as quoted in the tree's Bar-intake research). The Bar's own 5/6/25 letter set the review pace: "may take as long as 60 days." Whatever discretion the Bar has over outcomes, its own stated process is engagement on a stated clock. [Chris's in-chain citations of 3-7.3(c) and 3-7.4(g) are his characterizations; the text of those two subsections has not been checked against the official rule.] Complainant-notice provisions, quoted from the official RRTFB Chapter 3 text (floridabar.org publication, 2019 edition;): Rule 3-7.3(a): 'The complainant and respondent shall be notified of a decision not to pursue an inquiry and shall be given the reasons therefor.' Rule 3-7.3(d) (Dismissal of Disciplinary Cases): 'If a disciplinary case is dismissed, the complainant shall be notified of the dismissal and shall be given the reasons therefor.' Rule 3-7.4(f) (Counsel and Investigators): bar counsel 'shall prepare status reports for the committee, notify complainants and respondents of committee actions as appropriate.' Rule 3-7.4, Notice of Committee Action provision: 'Bar counsel shall notify the respondent and complainant of the action of the committee.' Notice of Board Action provision: 'Bar counsel must give notice of board action to the respondent, complainant, and grievance committee.' Honest scope: these duties attach at DECISION POINTS (inquiry declined, dismissal, committee action, board action). No quoted rule compels mid-investigation status updates; the 'as appropriate' clause in 3-7.4(f) is the only status-flavored duty and it is discretionary on its face.
What happened
Between the six-day closure on 2/24/25 and the letters sustaining it on 9/23-9/24/25, Husband sent seventeen emails to the Bar's intake office and reviewers, offering documentation and asking for status. The Bar replied three times, all status formulas, including on 9/19: "This matter remains under review of the grievance committee chair. You will be informed of the outcome of that review via US mail." Five days later he wrote the same reviewers enclosing a photograph, telling them the failures have consequences; the photograph is not described here and no one in it is named. That email drew no response, nor did his 10/3 or 10/10 follow-ups. The reviewers had already given themselves permission to stop: the 9/24/25 letter states that "Further correspondence from you regarding this matter will be placed in the file without response" (N-055). In fairness, the Bar sent three mailed letters inside the window. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
An institution that takes evidence from a complainant either engages it or says why not. The Bar's rules require investigating a written complaint meeting the form requirements, and permit dismissal only after complete investigation. The complainant here was a member of the same Bar, offering transcripts it had not asked for. What came back was status formula. He finally asked the question that measures the whole arc: "Is there a rule against speaking with me?" No one answered that either.
Receipt
  • 22-page as-sent chain, Husband to the Bar's intake office and reviewers, 5/14 to 10/10/25, held in the matter's Bar correspondence file.
  • Court-filed copies in the Leon mandamus exhibit bundle at pp. 15-19 (9/29/25 email; picture sentence at p. 19) and 1D2026-0728 Record on Appeal pp. 53-57.
  • Picture sentence and 9/29/25 header at exhibit bundle pp. 15 and 19; the three Huston replies are text-layer only from the as-sent chain pp. 8, 18, 20, and their page images have not been checked.
  • 140 days computed 5/6 to 9/23/25 (31+30+31+31+17), and NOT used in prose: the Bar's 60-day figure is per review and is a ceiling, not a promise.
  • N-124 carries the Bar's own plural formula, "Each of these reviews may take as long as 60 days to complete," and N-055 records three reviewers, so a sixty-against-a-hundred-forty ratio is defeated by the Bar's own words.
  • The out-count is six, not three: three emailed status formulas plus the three mailed letters this card's own candor records. The seventeen-email count is from this chain alone, and the headline carries "in this chain" on its face.
  • The pre-announced no-response sentence is at Leon ROA p. 641 (Schuyler 9/24/25).
  • Rules 3-7.3(b) and (d) as quoted in the tree's Bar-intake research; Husband's in-chain citations of 3-7.3(c) and 3-7.4(g) are his characterizations and those subsections are unchecked.
  • The 9/12/25 statement that the intake auto-reply promises responses within 7 days is an uncontradicted in-chain characterization, not an imaged Bar document.
  • Children are never named and the photograph is never described beyond its existence and his own accompanying words.
  • The 9/29/25 email postdates the sustained closure by five days: this card carries 9/29/25 and never "mid-review."
  • Status emails: 5/14, 6/30, 9/19/25. Requests/offers: 5/15, 6/13, 6/26, 7/8, 7/21 (x2), 9/1, 9/12/25.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P6

N-0312025-02-24the regulator closed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without ever asking him to answer it, and told the complaining lawyer to come back once a court made the finding that court has since refused to makeDENIED
Date
2025-02-24
Actor
Allie Huston
Institution
The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861)
Mechanism
the regulator closed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without ever asking him to answer it, and told the complaining lawyer to come back once a court made the finding that court has since refused to make
What the law required
R. Reg. Fla. Bar 3-7.3(a)-(b) governs intake handling of a facially sufficient sworn complaint.
What happened
Husband signed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's counsel Scott Davis on February 18, 2025. Six calendar days later, Bar Counsel Allie F. Huston closed it: "The matters upon which your allegations are premised present questions of law and involve a dispute over which a court has jurisdiction." No response cycle began; Davis was never asked to respond. The letter disclosed no review process, no timeframe, and no reconsideration path, and started a one-year clock on the file's destruction. Every Bar decisional letter to Husband on this file came by U.S. mail with no email address, while the same bar counsel answered him by email three times on status alone, deciding nothing (NEW-P6). On files where Husband was respondent or complainant elsewhere, the Bar emailed him; he asked why this file alone came by mail, and no answer is in the record. [DENIED: closed without a response cycle]
Baseline deviation
The Bar's rule requires investigating allegations in a signed written complaint and permits dismissal only "after complete investigation." The published cycle gives the accused lawyer 15 days to answer; that cycle never began, so Davis was never asked a question. The letter offered resubmission only if a court later made a supporting finding. The presiding judge had said she does not discipline lawyers and declined to question Davis (N-046); her successor has refused to make findings six times (N-091).
Receipt
  • Huston closure letter 2/24/25, RFA 25-6861, at 1150 Doc 200 p. 29 of 42, filed by Davis himself 6/4/25, Filing #224549972; also at Leon ROA p. 103.
  • The complaint signed 2/18/25; Exhibit A is the 2/12/25 Chief Judge letter, Exhibit B is Wife's 12/13/24 motion for a psychological examination, Filing #212815329, incomplete in the filed copy.
  • The grammatical subject of the quoted sentence is "The matters upon which your allegations are premised," never "the allegations": quote the full sentence outward.
  • Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from the current rule as printed in the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 13 (June 30, 2026 / July 1, 2026 edition); Rules 3-7.3(a), (c) and (d) come from the tree's Bar-intake research, edition unpinned.
  • The 15-day and 10-day windows come from the Bar's public ACAP process page, which is NOT yet captured and filed as a record.
  • Six calendar days and four business days both computed from 2/18/25 to 2/24/25; the federal complaint's "six business days" at paras. 2 and 49 is wrong and four is both accurate and stronger.
  • Channel list sourced to BAR_ADDRESSED_VS_OUTSTANDING_2026-08-02 secs. 5.1(d) and 5.2.
  • Husband's quoted question is at p. 2 of his 6/10/26 6:58 AM email to Bar leadership re the Davis grievance and conflicts, as sent; that file's text layer is ciphered. The file that holds it carries a bounce assertion in its name that the document itself does not show (N-124); cite the email by date and page, never by that name.
  • Good-standing certificate: Cynthia B. Jackson, CFO, 8/7/26, CTM-428037.
  • The 12/19/24 pre-affirmation of Davis by the same court sits at N-018.
  • Court-side receipts for the locked exit: N-046 (4/22/25), N-091 (4/17/26 Tr. 181).
  • Husband's own standing: admitted 9/28/2007, active, in good standing, 10-Year Discipline History: None. The only Bar complaint ever filed against him came nine months later, from the judge who had been disqualified from this case (N-032, N-064).
  • Related decision points: N-121.

Spawned by: N-011, N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-031

N-0322025-02-24 -> ongoingone family-law docket, two opposite answers from the same regulator: the reason it would not examine the opposing lawyer, and the source of the material it examined when the complaining lawyer was the one accusedDENIED
Date
2025-02-24 -> ongoing
Actor
The Florida Bar (Allie F. Huston; Christopher Stephen Wackes; Jason R. Kelley)
Institution
The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861; RFA 26-13570; File 2026-10,395(13F))
Mechanism
one family-law docket, two opposite answers from the same regulator: the reason it would not examine the opposing lawyer, and the source of the material it examined when the complaining lawyer was the one accused
What the law required
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(a) permits a screening closure only on a determination that the facts, taken as proven, would not constitute a violation warranting discipline. Rule 3-7.3(b) provides that bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath.' Rule 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal only 'after complete investigation.' No rule makes the pendency of a civil proceeding a jurisdictional bar to intake, and neither closure letter cites a rule for the deferral. Whatever weight a pending court proceeding carries at intake, the rule that assigns it is the same rule whether the lawyer accused is opposing counsel or the complainant.
What happened
Both of Husband's grievances against Wife's counsel closed at intake on the same ground, in near-identical words, sixteen months apart: six days for one, twenty-three for the other, finding only that the allegations "involve a dispute over which a court has jurisdiction." Neither reached the merits. A third file ran opposite: Judge Ayers, disqualified 4/28/25, filed a complaint against Husband on 11/24/25. Bar Counsel Jason Kelley referred it, describing its scope: "You have an extensive social media footprint I have had to go through, as well as your filings and documents in your family law case." As of 8/10/26 that file had been open 259 days, with no statement identified as false. In candor, Davis's conduct sits inside a case with its own sanction authority; the complaint against Husband concerns public statements about a judge. That distinction does not explain why the family-law filings were the material reviewed. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 3-7.4(e) bars deferring an investigation for civil litigation without a reviewer's approval. Deferral is therefore an approved exception, not a default, and the approval is the Bar's to produce. The Bar's counsel described a deferral policy in open court: the Bar defers to the presiding judge because discipline "can happen there." But the judges declined on the record to examine that same conduct and expressly left it to the Bar (N-046), so the policy is circular in practice.
Receipt
  • Huston letter 2/24/25 (RFA 25-6861) and Wackes letter 6/16/26 (RFA 26-13570) pp. 1-2; the Della-Donna year prints in the Wackes letter as "(Fla. 1989)," quote as printed and do not adopt it.
  • NOT jurisdiction-ground letters and not to be cited for it: Gangi 9/23/25 and Schuyler 9/24/25, neither of which contains the phrase.
  • Kelley referral letter to Joshua Gammon Sheridan, Chair, 12/3/25, p. 1, certifying the complaint "forwarded to your committee for further investigation and disposition," captioned "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson."
  • Kelley scope email 3/19/26 11:45 AM, at pp. 2-3 of the 3/30/26 email to Kelley (the standalone 3/19 and 3/20 PDFs are empty export stubs; cite the 3/30 document).
  • Deferral policy in Bar counsel's own words: 7/7/26 PM Tr. 6:23-7:3 for the back-and-forth sentence and Tr. 7:10-20 for the closure-language sentence; the corrected cite to 7:10-20 is the one used here.
  • Rule 3-7.4(e) is quoted verbatim, and Rules 3-4.4, 3-7.16(a)(2) and (a)(3) and 3-3.5 are summarized, from the current Chapter 3 (June 30, 2026 edition) as printed in the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 15; Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from Item 13 of the same ledger.
  • Husband's 4/30/25 questions are at p. 21 of the 10-10-25 Huston-Gangi chain PDF, sent 10:37:03 AM to ACAP intake; quote them as his questions, never as a syllogism he did not write.
  • Court-side receipts: N-046 (Doc 192 Tr. 41); 5/29/26 Tr. 45:12-19 (held from the transcript text layer); 7/7/26 PM Tr. 31:17-18.
  • Ayers disqualification Doc 184, 4/28/25 (N-047). Day counts machine-computed 8/10/26: 2/18/25 to 2/24/25 = 6; 5/24/26 to 6/16/26 = 23; 11/24/25 to 8/10/26 = 259.
  • Two captions from the same office five months apart, reported without inference: 12/3/25 "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson"; 5/21/26 "Complaint of Christopher Alan Hanson against Vivian Cortes Hodz." No second referral letter exists in the tree for comparison (documented negative); a records request for two or three unrelated 13F referral cover letters is the next concrete step and either answer is evidence.
  • Related decision points: N-064, N-085.

Spawned by: N-031, N-064, N-121

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-032

N-0552025-09-24the Bar described three internal reviews of the closure but produced no record of what any of them did, and told the complainant that anything further he wrote would go in the file without responseDENIED
Date
2025-09-24
Actor
Alicia Gangi + Shanell M. Schuyler
Institution
The Florida Bar
Mechanism
the Bar described three internal reviews of the closure but produced no record of what any of them did, and told the complainant that anything further he wrote would go in the file without response
What the law required
R. 3-7.3 requires meaningful review of a challenge to a file closure.
What happened
On 9/24/25 the Bar sustained its own closure. Its Director of Intake described three internal reviews of the closure: by a Senior Staff Attorney, by the Director of Intake, and by the Chair of Grievance Committee 13A. The letter stated: "While your disagreement with the outcome of the Bar's investigation is duly noted, there is no further review afforded to closed files and no right to appeal. Further correspondence from you regarding this matter will be placed in the file without response." A day earlier the Chair had made the same point in her own sustaining letter, copying Davis on it. A later public-records request for the file that review would have generated produced, from the closed file, one email about a typographical error (FNEW-B1). The Bar has never reconciled this account with its later, inconsistent statements about the same closure (N-105, N-116). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A review that examined a closure documents what was actually done; this letter describes a review instead of producing one. Later Bar statements do not square with it: a filed paper said the Bar "did not act" (N-105); its Deputy General Counsel said the file was "disposed of" (N-116). What remains unanswered is what each of the three reviews produced, and no product of any of them appears in any Bar letter, filed paper, or brief across the record swept.
Receipt
  • Schuyler letter 9/24/25, Leon ROA p. 641: also states "Extensive rules, procedures, and policies exist to ensure that bar complaints are fully aired, investigated, and reviewed at multiple levels," and "The review of your allegations against Mr. Davis included investigation by a Senior Staff Attorney, review of the closure by the undersigned as Director of Intake, and a review by the Chair of Grievance Committee 13A."
  • Gangi letter 9/23/25, Leon ROA p. 641 vicinity and Bar file copy: "I am also copying Mr. Davis on my response so that the attorney is aware that an additional review of this matter has taken place and that I am sustaining the former decisions to close this file as proper and correct."
  • Both filed by the Bar's own counsel as Composite Exhibit A to the 1/27/26 motion to dismiss, judicial notice requested at ROA p. 626.
  • Answer Brief admissions at 1D2026-0728 Answer Brief p. 24 (PDF p. 30), filed 6/30/26, signed M. Hope Keating: file "was closed without further investigation" and review "limited to the submissions and court records."
  • Huston letter 5/6/25, Doc 200 p. 1 (single-Director, up-to-60-days process). Standing Board Policy 15.75 gives complainant 30-day review windows and sets no time standard for the Bar's own reviews.
  • "Three-level review" is NOT the letter's phrase and is barred, as are "three-layer," "three-stage," "three-tier"; name the letter's own three steps instead.
  • Later inconsistent statements at N-105 (5/22/26) and N-116 (6/5/26). Produced set at FNEW-B1.
  • Related decision points: N-126.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-055

N-0642025-11-24the complaint against Husband says he said something untrue in public; he has asked in writing, again and again, which statement, and the Bar has never named one, while the file stays open and the Bar's own rules keep an open file confidentialPENDING
Date
2025-11-24
Actor
Judge Ayers (complainant); Jason Kelley (Bar Counsel)
Institution
The Florida Bar (File 2026-10,395(13F))
Mechanism
the complaint against Husband says he said something untrue in public; he has asked in writing, again and again, which statement, and the Bar has never named one, while the file stays open and the Bar's own rules keep an open file confidential
What the law required
Rule 3-7.3 and due process require identifying the allegedly false statement, investigating promptly, and taking the sworn testimony offered. Rule 3-7.1(a)(4) sets the disclosure consequence: "Any disciplinary case that has been concluded by a finding of no probable cause for further disciplinary proceedings is public information." Under Rule 3-7.3(g), a closure or dismissal by staff counsel before a grievance committee hearing is treated as a finding of no probable cause. A pending file is confidential. A concluded one is not.
What happened
Judge Ayers filed a Bar complaint against Husband on 11/24/25, about seven months after she was disqualified from his case. The file has stood open since, 259 days as of August 10, 2026, without a single allegedly false statement ever identified. Husband first demanded that the Bar name the statement or close the file on 12/8/25, and repeated the demand sixteen times through 7/23/26, seven months and fifteen days later. No response has ever named a statement. On 3/20/26 the Bar announced it would subpoena him for a sworn statement, "expecting 3-4 hours," listing the resources it would need to schedule. Husband accepted at once, waived confidentiality, and asked that the proceeding be public. The subpoena was never served and the statement was never taken (N-085). This is the first Bar complaint ever filed against him in a career admitted 9/28/2007, active and in good standing. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Truth is an absolute defense to the charge this complaint makes; it has never identified a false statement. The complaint form's Part Three reads "Mr. Hanson has violated Bar Rules 4-8.2(a) and Rule 4-8.4(d)." A closure before a grievance committee hearing becomes public under the Bar's own rules (3-7.1(a)(4), 3-7.3(g)); an open file stays confidential. Husband's two complaints against Wife's counsel closed in six and twenty-three days and became public; the one against him stays open and confidential (N-031, N-121).
Receipt
  • Bar File 2026-10,395(13F), complaint filed 11/24/25; 259 days machine-computed 11/24/25 to 8/10/26.
  • Complaint form Part Three quoted in full from the intake form.
  • The sixteen demands: 12/8/25, 12/18/25, 1/7/26, 1/15/26, 2/13/26, 3/17/26, 3/19/26, 3/30/26, 4/17/26, 4/27/26, 5/13/26, 6/19/26, 7/4/26, 7/10/26, 7/11/26, 7/23/26; first to last is 7 months 15 days.
  • Date requests (a smaller, different set): 3/30, 4/27, 5/13, 7/10/26 on this card; N-085 enumerates five, adding 4/17/26.
  • Underlying emails in the matter's Bar correspondence file, including 3/30/26 email to Kelley, 4/17/26 email reiterating unanswered questions, 7/10/26 sworn-statement and preservation letter, 7/11/26 letter to Bar leadership and Board of Governors, 7/23/26 followup (13 pp.).
  • Kelley 3/20/26 3:05 PM email, image-only PDF, no text layer; pp. 2-16 not read.
  • "the bar is not an investigative agency like law enforcement. Our investigative resources are limited." (Courtemanche, 11/24/25, Leon ROA p. 44; source spells "investigative"; motion to dismiss and Answer Brief render it "investitive").
  • Kelley 12/3/25 referral letter, caption "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson."
  • Rules 3-7.1(a)(4) and 3-7.3(g). Good-standing certificate CTM-428037, 8/7/26: "10-Year Discipline History: None."
  • Acceptance chain verbatim in the 7/10/26 letter, Gmail id 19f4d070ee6ec12a; arc card N-085.
  • The 11/24/25 same-day sequence (article emailed 10:18 AM, chambers forward 11:43 AM, forward to counsel 12:17:07 PM, personal-to-official email 4:52 PM, intake submission 4:56:32 PM) is a composite exhibit, sequence only.
  • Intervals by true endpoints: 10:18 AM to 4:56:32 PM intake is six hours thirty-eight minutes; 11:43 AM chambers forward to 4:56:32 PM intake is five hours thirteen minutes. "Six hours thirty-eight minutes chambers to intake" is wrong and barred; N-065 states the same-day interval correctly and controls.
  • Related decision points: N-032, NEW-P9.

Spawned by: N-031, N-062

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-064

N-0772026-02-09asked whether communications with Wife's lawyer ever existed, the Bar's counsel answered, three minutes later, that none were withheld from production; his own filed paper thirteen days earlier had said flatly that they do not existPARTIAL
Date
2026-02-09
Actor
John Londot, Greenberg Traurig, counsel for The Florida Bar
Institution
2025-CA-2469 (Leon)
Mechanism
asked whether communications with Wife's lawyer ever existed, the Bar's counsel answered, three minutes later, that none were withheld from production; his own filed paper thirteen days earlier had said flatly that they do not exist
What the law required
A public-records respondent asked whether records ever existed answers whether they existed. Rule 3-7.1(b) defines the Bar's public record to include any reports, correspondence and papers furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent. A narrower answer about what was withheld from production does not reach the question.
What happened
On 12/1/25 Husband asked the Bar's Deputy General Counsel whether the Bar had ever communicated with Davis about the complaint, apart from one email about a typo. No reply appears in the record swept. On 1/27/26 the Bar's motion to dismiss, signed by John Londot, stated without qualification: "Such records were not provided because they do not exist." Thirteen days later, Husband asked the same lawyer directly whether any such communications ever existed. Three minutes later: "there are no comms with Mr. Davis at all withheld from public record production. There aren't any to withhold." The filed paper says the records do not exist; the email says only that nothing was withheld. Read against later Bar statements on this closure, that it did not act on the complaint (N-105) and that records were disposed of (N-116), the accounts do not converge. Which is correct is not asserted here. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
A respondent asked whether records ever existed answers whether they existed; saying nothing was withheld from production is a narrower answer. The Bar's own rule defines a closed case's public record to include correspondence with the respondent lawyer "or the complainant," and Husband is the complainant. The Bar's counsel has since conceded the obligation in its brief: "the Bar would be obligated to provide it." What remains is a fact question the Bar has answered two different ways.
Receipt
  • 1/27/26 motion to dismiss, Filing #240404774, e-filed 4:38:07 PM, Leon ROA p. 634 (motion internal p. 10); motion occupies ROA pp. 625-643, signature block at ROA p. 638; footnote 4 on the same page as the quoted sentence.
  • 2/9/26 chain, subject "Re: 2025CA2469 - Hanson v The Florida Bar," Londot's message timestamped 5:04:46 PM EST from his firm address, Husband's question at 5:01 PM same day; Bar correspondence folder and Leon matter tree.
  • 12/1/25 email in the same folder.
  • Answer Brief footnote 3, 1D2026-0728, PDF p. 31 (brief p. 25), filed 6/30/26: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it."
  • Courtemanche no-reply negative is a FILENAME-LEVEL sweep only, 8/17/26, of the Bar correspondence folder and Leon matter tree; scoped to filenames, no full-text or mailbox sweep run.
  • Londot statement carried standing alone; Husband's own replies in the same chain are argumentative and not reproduced.
  • Rule 3-7.1(b) quoted in full at FNEW-B1 from the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 16; "or the complainant" is part of the subdivision.
  • Stored 16-page text export of the motion to dismiss is not the filed original; nothing on this card is quoted from it.
  • N-105, filed 5/22/26: "the Bar did not act on his complaint and so did not share it with or request a response from Mr. Davis". N-116, 6/5/26: records "disposed of pursuant to judicial branch and bar records retention schedule and are no longer available".
  • Related decision points: N-055.

Spawned by: N-055, N-116

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-077

N-0822026-03-09the records showing what the Bar spent on the law firm defending it against its own member were priced and made payable in advance, with the letter noting on its face that Florida law provides no waiver for indigency or public interestDENIED
Date
2026-03-09
Actor
Rick Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, The Florida Bar
Institution
The Florida Bar (W016061-022526)
Mechanism
the records showing what the Bar spent on the law firm defending it against its own member were priced and made payable in advance, with the letter noting on its face that Florida law provides no waiver for indigency or public interest
What the law required
Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(3) and F.S. 119.07(4) allow a custodian to charge only a reasonable fee.
What happened
On 3/9/26 the Bar's records office demanded prepayment before releasing the outside-counsel engagement and billing records it had identified. The letter states on its face that Florida law provides no fee waiver for indigency or public interest, and it states the Bar's own policy that "any time spent in excess of 30 minutes constitutes 'extensive labor' and will be charged." The records stayed behind the demand. Fees are lawful and this card makes no claim otherwise. The same page carries the internal IT rate that later recomputes a four-figure estimate exactly (N-132). Two more requests reaching the same subject were priced afterward and also lapsed behind their fees: $89.36 on 6/5/26 and $101.09 on 7/6/26 (N-116, N-129). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
The Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of justifying any barrier on the custodian, not the person asking. A custodian may charge a reasonable fee, and a fee is not a denial. The question is not lawfulness. It is what sits behind the price. These are not the grievance-file records. They are the records of the Bar's own use of member resources to retain outside counsel to resist a member's records requests.
Receipt
  • Fee letter 3/9/26, request W016061-022526, signed Rick Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, p. 1; the $43.58 per hour IT Labor rate is on that page
  • Article I, section 24(a) and (c), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(3); section 119.07(4), Fla. Stat.
  • Later fee gates: $89.36 (6/5/26, N-116 lineage) and $101.09 (7/6/26, W016548-070626, N-129)
  • Fee figures are per custodian and are never summed across custodians without listing each

Spawned by: N-079

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-082

NEW-P92026-05-22 -> ongoingthe Bar's own letter sent this complaint to its Tampa office for additional investigation; seventy-five days later the office running that investigation had not answered its own complainant's two requests to know whether anything was happeningPENDING
Date
2026-05-22 -> ongoing
Actor
The Florida Bar, Tampa Branch (Michelle Robertson, Bar Counsel, Lawyer Regulation; file TFB 2026-10,601(13C), the Cortes Hodz complaint)
Institution
The Florida Bar
Mechanism
the Bar's own letter sent this complaint to its Tampa office for additional investigation; seventy-five days later the office running that investigation had not answered its own complainant's two requests to know whether anything was happening
What the law required
Complainant-notice provisions, quoted from the official RRTFB Chapter 3 text (floridabar.org publication, 2019 edition;): Rule 3-7.3(a): 'The complainant and respondent shall be notified of a decision not to pursue an inquiry and shall be given the reasons therefor.' Rule 3-7.3(d) (Dismissal of Disciplinary Cases): 'If a disciplinary case is dismissed, the complainant shall be notified of the dismissal and shall be given the reasons therefor.' Rule 3-7.4(f) (Counsel and Investigators): bar counsel 'shall prepare status reports for the committee, notify complainants and respondents of committee actions as appropriate.' Rule 3-7.4, Notice of Committee Action provision: 'Bar counsel shall notify the respondent and complainant of the action of the committee.' Notice of Board Action provision: 'Bar counsel must give notice of board action to the respondent, complainant, and grievance committee.' Honest scope: these duties attach at DECISION POINTS (inquiry declined, dismissal, committee action, board action). No quoted rule compels mid-investigation status updates; the 'as appropriate' clause in 3-7.4(f) is the only status-flavored duty and it is discretionary on its face. Interval check (Chris asked 8/17; full-text sweep of the official Ch. 3 PDF): NO rule sets a 15-day-after-request or every-90-day complainant-update interval. The objective day-counts that exist sit at other stages: 10 days (committee-direct complaint resolution reporting), 15 days (respondent rejection of a minor-misconduct report), 90 days (the REFEREE must report after appointment, a different stage entirely), 20/30/60 days (pleading and review windows). The 90-day figure in circulation is the referee deadline plus informal contact-the-agency guidance, not a complainant right. No complainant-update interval is asserted here, because none appears in the rules. The applicable measure is whatever time standard the Bar states for itself in writing.
What happened

On 5/21/26 the Bar transferred Husband's complaint against his former counsel to its Tampa Branch Office for additional investigation. He complied the next day, filing a litigation-disclosure notice listing six related proceedings. Bar Counsel replied the same day: "Thank you for the additional information. If you have any questions, etc., please let me know." That is the Bar's last substantive communication on the file.

He asked for status on 7/30 and 8/5/26: "I respectfully request a brief written status of the investigation. I remain ready to provide any additional documents". Neither request drew a reply. From 5/22 to 8/5 is 75 days.

Measured against the same institution's other files: this file drew a written response from the accused attorney by 3/11/26. On the Davis file, by the Bar's own brief, the file was closed without further investigation, and the lawyer was never asked anything. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
The Bar's rules promise the complainant notice, with reasons, whenever a complaint is declined, dismissed, or acted on. Nothing has been decided here, so those rights have not triggered. In candor, no rule compels a status update mid-investigation. This is the third file with the same shape: seventeen letters to three form replies on the Davis file (NEW-P6), sixteen demands with no statement named on the Ayers file (N-064), and here, silence toward a complainant who kept offering evidence.
Receipt
  • The 8/5/26 email chain on the Hodz complaint, File 2026-10,601, received 8/17/26, all 3 pages, containing the 5/21 transmittal, the 5/22 litigation notice and reply, and the 7/30 and 8/5 requests
  • 7/30/26 request: it had "been at least a couple of months since I've heard anything," requesting someone contact him "for details and additional information about the violations that was difficult to fit in the complaint"
  • 8/5/26 request, full text: "I respectfully request a brief written status of the investigation. I remain ready to provide any additional documents, correspondence, sworn statement, or other information."
  • 75 days computed 5/22 to 8/5/26 (9+30+31+5)
  • Complainant-notice provisions quoted from the official Rules Regulating The Florida Bar Chapter 3 text, 2019 edition PDF pulled 8/17/26
  • Interval check run 8/17/26 against the full official Chapter 3 text: NO rule sets a 15-day-after-request or every-90-day complainant-update interval; the 90-day figure in circulation is the referee's post-appointment deadline, a different stage, plus informal contact-the-agency guidance
  • The accused attorney's 3/11/26 written response, filed in the Leon mandamus matter, pp. 1 and 5, opening "Thank you for your letter of February 24, 2026"; pp. 6-25 are enclosures and were not read
  • The Davis-file comparison is the Answer Brief, 1D2026-0728, brief p. 24 (PDF p. 30)
  • The no-reply negative covers the captured chain and the tree as swept 8/17/26 and should be re-scoped at each use
  • Do not double-count with N-032 (the caption comparison) or N-083 (the respondent's own filing)

Spawned by: N-032, N-083

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P9

N-1052026-05-22the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copiedPENDING
Date
2026-05-22
Actor
John Londot / Greenberg Traurig, for Florida Bar Recipients
Institution
The Florida Bar (in 1150)
Mechanism
the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copied
What the law required
Candor toward the tribunal is required (R. 4-3.3). Statements about records must be accurate.
What happened

On 5/22/26 the Bar's outside counsel filed Doc 309 for the four Bar recipients. Paragraph 5 states: "Mr. Hanson simply refuses to believe that such records were not produced because they do not exist—the Bar did not act on his complaint and so did not share it with or request a response from Mr. Davis."

Three things in the Bar's own record run against the first two clauses. Its closure letter recites a docket review. Its review letter describes three levels of internal review (N-055). Two Bar letters on that file, predating the statement, cc Scott Paul Davis with enclosure.

Husband put paragraph 5 to Judge Felix on 5/29/26. No one answered it. The same judge barred cross-examination on the Bar complaint (N-108), and later quashed all four Bar officials' subpoenas without a rule-factor finding (N-130). The determination remains pending. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
A lawyer's statement to a tribunal has to be accurate, and stays the lawyer's responsibility after filing. This one was put to the judge seven days later and has never been answered or corrected. The sentence separates cleanly: "did not request a response from Mr. Davis" is consistent with the record; "did not act" and "did not share it with" are not. A narrower reading of "did not act" is available to the Bar; it has not been argued.
Receipt
  • Doc 309 paras. 1 and 5, filed 5/22/26; Husband's opposition is DIN 316, docket-confirmed, not 310
  • 5/29/26 Tr. 45:5-9
  • Closure letter: "In addition to the submitted documentation, I also reviewed the underlying docket in Hillsborough County Case No. 2024-DR-1150."
  • Review letter describes a Senior Staff Attorney investigation, a Director of Intake review, and a Grievance Committee Chair review of the same file (N-055)
  • The cc lines are on four letters: Huston 2/24/25 p. 1; Schuyler 9/24/25 p. 1; Wackes 6/16/26 p. 2; Wackes 7/24/26 p. 2
  • The stated reason is Gangi, Chair of Grievance Committee 13A, 9/23/25 p. 1: "I am also copying Mr. Davis on my response so that the attorney is aware that an additional review of this matter has taken place and that I am sustaining the former decisions to close this file as proper and correct."
  • SET SPLIT, load-bearing and it always travels: of the four cc letters, only Huston 2/24/25 and Schuyler 9/24/25 sit on RFA 25-6861, the file Doc 309 para. 5 is about, and only those two predate the 5/22/26 filing; Wackes 6/16/26 and 7/24/26 are on RFA 26-13570 and both postdate it. The set bearing on the filed sentence is those two, not four
  • SCOPE THAT ALWAYS TRAVELS: the enclosures are not identified on the cc lines, and the 9/24/25 body identifies its enclosure as a Bar document. No enclosure has been produced, so the record does not show that the complaint itself went to Davis
  • The 2/24/25 docket-review sentence is at Leon ROA p. 103 and 1150 Doc 200 p. 29
  • The 6/30/26 Answer Brief states the same posture in signed appellate form: the file "was closed without further investigation" and the review "was limited to the submissions and court records" (brief p. 24, PDF p. 30)
  • Cross-links: N-055, N-116, N-108 (Tr. 43:2-5), N-130 (7/7/26 Tr. 31:1-3)
  • The quoted paragraph contains an em dash in the original and is reproduced verbatim

Spawned by: N-055, N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-105

N-1162026-06-05the Bar reported the file destroyed while the appeal about that very file was pending, and named no disposal date, no schedule provision and no one who authorized itDENIED
Date
2026-06-05
Actor
Richard Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel
Institution
The Florida Bar (W016446-060426)
Mechanism
the Bar reported the file destroyed while the appeal about that very file was pending, and named no disposal date, no schedule provision and no one who authorized it
What the law required
A preservation duty applies. Records that are the live subject of pending appeal 1D2026-0728 may not be destroyed. The two authorities the Bar relies on for declining to identify records: Bivens v. Tony, 368 So. 3d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023); Doe v. DeSantis, 390 So. 3d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
What happened

On 6/5/26 the Bar's Deputy General Counsel stated that the records of RFA 25-6861 "have been disposed of pursuant to judicial branch and bar records retention schedule and are no longer available." Appeal 1D2026-0728 was pending when he wrote it. His letter names no disposal date, no schedule provision and no authorizer.

Eleven days later, a second Davis complaint's closure letter calendared that file for disposal too, one year out, in the same words: "In light of the foregoing, this file has been closed effective February 24, 2025. Pursuant to the Bar's records retention schedule, the computer record and file of this matter will be disposed of one year from the date of closure." In fairness, that clock was disclosed, not concealed. What matters is what was disposed of during a pending appeal, and the three facts the statement leaves out. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Records subject to a pending appeal cannot be destroyed while it is pending, and a custodian who says a record is gone can state when it went, under what provision, and on whose authority. Article I, section 24(a) presumes records open and puts that burden on the custodian. The file reported destroyed would show how the complaint at N-031 was handled, which the Bar's own papers describe three ways (N-055, N-077, N-105). None of the three required facts appears here.
Receipt
  • Courtemanche letter 6/5/26, request W016446-060426; the $89.36 Category 2 charge recomputes exactly as $65.89 attorney plus $23.47 clerical.
  • Wackes letter 6/16/26 p. 2 for the second file's clock, wording identical to Huston 2/24/25 p. 1.
  • Huston retention sentence at Leon ROA p. 103; Schuyler restatement at Leon ROA p. 642, 7/16/25, filed by the Bar's own counsel as Composite Exhibit A with a judicial-notice request at ROA p. 626.
  • Dates recomputed in the Leon position mine: closure 2/24/25, one year from closure is 2/24/26; records request made 11/10/25; Leon petition filed 12/17/25; dismissal order entered 2/13/26 and rehearing denial 2/24/26, the same calendar day the announced disposal date fell.
  • Authorities the Bar relies on for declining to identify records: Bivens v. Tony, 368 So. 3d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) and Doe v. DeSantis, 390 So. 3d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
  • The Leon action's pendency is stated here against the 2/24/26 disposal date; the arithmetic has not been independently rechecked.
  • The operative sentences of the 8/17/26 qualification email sweep are held in that sweep and are not reproduced verbatim on this card.

Spawned by: N-079, N-105

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-116

N-1212026-06-16the second complaint arrived with a written conflicts notice on its face, and closed in 23 days without a word about the conflicts, from an institution that was at that moment an active defendant in the complainant's pending lawsuit against itDENIED
Date
2026-06-16
Actor
Christopher Stephen Wackes
Institution
The Florida Bar (RFA 26-13570)
Mechanism
the second complaint arrived with a written conflicts notice on its face, and closed in 23 days without a word about the conflicts, from an institution that was at that moment an active defendant in the complainant's pending lawsuit against it
What the law required
R. 3-7.3 requires investigation of a sworn, rule-keyed resubmission. Noticed conflicts must be addressed.
What happened

On 6/16/26 Bar counsel closed Husband's second complaint against Wife's counsel in 23 days. The letter named no rule of professional conduct, made no finding on most allegations, and said nothing about the conflicts notice. Its one adverse finding: "A review of court records indicates that the appeal was disposed of prior to the hearing mentioned in your complaint." It closed with the same door the first closure offered: a supporting court order would reopen review.

That condition was already met by Exhibit A, the 11/20/24 order compelling Wife's compliance with mandatory disclosure and awarding Husband fee entitlement (N-009), which the letter never mentions. The exit it names is one the court has repeatedly declined to open, refusing more than once to find any fact. In fairness, Exhibit A runs against the party, not her counsel. That gap has a real answer available. The Bar has not given one. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
The Bar's rule states the duty plainly: "Bar counsel must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath as provided in this rule." This resubmission named the conflicts in writing; whether its oath block satisfies the rule is unchecked. The conflicts run two layers deep: the Bar was an active defendant in Husband's pending suit against it when it closed this complaint, and the 2026 complaint sits atop the Bar's handling of the 2025 file.
Receipt
  • Wackes letter 6/16/26, RFA 26-13570, pp. 1-2; the adverse stay/appeal finding is on p. 1 and must never be characterized as "no ground was engaged." The full condition sentence includes the affirmative promise.
  • The 5/24/26 complaint with the conflicts notice on its face.
  • Exhibit A is the 11/20/24 "Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Compel Petitioner's Compliance with Mandatory Disclosure (Hon. K. Ayers)," 1150 Doc 054 (N-009).
  • Pending-litigation posture on 6/16/26: Leon County 2025-CA-2469 and the appeal 1D2026-0728.
  • Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from the current rule as printed in the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 13; Rules 3-7.3(c) and (d) come from the tree's Bar-intake baselines research, edition unpinned. The same rule permits dismissal only "after complete investigation."
  • Court-side receipts for the locked exit: N-091 (4/17/26 Tr. 181, findings refused six times); N-108 (5/29/26 Tr. 53:9-15, "Are you ever going to find any facts about my constitutional rights?" answered "Maybe."); N-046 (4/22/25, misconduct named against both parties only); 7/7/26 PM Tr. 31:17-18 ("I'm not going to answer that question.").
  • 23 days computed 5/24 to 6/16/26. The Della-Donna year misprint is noted, not weaponized.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-121

N-1242026-06-19the routine request got the routine answer in twenty days; the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and the request for executive-committee review drew nothing in writing from anyonePARTIAL
Date
2026-06-19
Actor
Bar leadership (Orr, Greenlee, Baker-Barnes, Doyle, et al.)
Institution
The Florida Bar
Mechanism
the routine request got the routine answer in twenty days; the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and the request for executive-committee review drew nothing in writing from anyone
What the law required
An oversight duty applies. Ordinary professional practice is to answer a documented governance complaint.
What happened

On 6/19/26, the new Bar president's swearing-in day, Bar leadership received the full record, a litigation-hold demand, and a request for a conversation. No named officer replied in writing. A nine-point objection followed on 7/4/26, asking the Bar to "proceed with all additional review and oversight options relating to my complaint," including review through the executive committee.

Twenty days later, on 7/24/26, the Bar answered that one point only: the Director of ACAP "will review this file and decide if closure was appropriate." That review may take up to 60 days. The letter does not mention the conflicts notice, the litigation hold, or the executive-committee request, and no named officer answered personally in any document in the file. Through 8/7/26, forty-nine days, no named officer replied at all. In fairness, several officer addresses reportedly bounced and were later corrected, though no bounce notice confirms it. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation
An oversight body that answers a documented objection in twenty days is doing the ordinary thing. What differs is which parts got answered. The request that fit an existing channel, review of a closed file, came back with a written grant. The three requests that reached the institution itself produced no writing from any person. It answered where a form existed and not where a decision would have been required.
Receipt
  • The 6/19/26 send as an as-sent PDF.
  • The 7/4/26 objection as sent, 6:16:15 PM EDT, preserved as.eml with a true-copy PDF read from its text layer, not from a page image.
  • The Bar's answer, Wackes letter 7/24/26 p. 2, granting ACAP Director review of the RFA 26-13570 closure, scanned as received, on letterhead naming Joshua E. Doyle as Executive Director; the board of governors policy the letter says is attached is NOT in the scan.
  • All seven pages of the 6/11/26 email to Bar leadership were rendered and contain NO bounce notice; the stored file's name asserts a bounce the document does not show, and the bounce assertion must not be repeated as fact until a notice is filed. The message itself and its twelve-address recipient list are at p. 1.
  • Forty-nine days computed 6/19 to 8/7/26, scoped to the matter's Bar correspondence file and its Gmail archive.
  • The 7/24/26 letter also carries "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)" at p. 2 (N-105).

Spawned by: N-116, N-121

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-124

N-1292026-07-04 -> ongoinga dues-paying member asked who funds the outside firm his own Bar retained against him, four times between July 4 and July 11, two fifty-six minutes apart the same evening; the Bar priced the question at $101.09 and has never answered itPARTIAL
Date
2026-07-04 -> ongoing
Actor
The Florida Bar (Richard Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel; Gypsy Bailey, General Counsel); demand directed also to Jason Kelley and to outside counsel John Londot
Institution
The Florida Bar (PRR W016548-070626; prior W016061-022526 and W016446-060426 Category 2)
Mechanism
a dues-paying member asked who funds the outside firm his own Bar retained against him, four times between July 4 and July 11, two fifty-six minutes apart the same evening; the Bar priced the question at $101.09 and has never answered it
What the law required
Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(3) and section 119.07(4), Fla. Stat., allow a custodian to charge only a reasonable fee, and 2.420(m)(1) requires a custodian to respond to a request for records. A member of an integrated bar may be compelled to fund the regulation of the legal profession and the improvement of legal services, but not activities outside that purpose, Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); the compelled-subsidy analysis was tightened in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878 (2018). A member who asks which category his dues are funding is asking the question those cases make relevant.
What happened

The Bar retained Greenberg Traurig to defend it in Husband's Leon County records action, to carry the appeal, and to move in the family case to quash the subpoenas of four Bar officials. Husband pays dues to that Bar. He asked who funds the engagement four times between 7/4/26 and 7/11/26, including a formal records request, Category D, seeking records identifying who authorized the engagement and its funding source.

What came back was a price: $101.09, on a 30-day pay-or-close clock. On 8/6/26 the General Counsel answered the fee questions in detail, confirming the financial records exist, but did not say who pays. No exemption and no denial was ever asserted as to Category D. Two earlier requests reaching the same subject also lapsed behind fees, $254.67 (N-082) and $89.36 (N-116). The request remains priced and unproduced as of 8/10/26 (N-150). [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation
The cost of answering is the measure: one sentence, and the Bar's own counsel confirmed Finance and Accounting already located the records. No exemption was claimed; nothing was refused. The request was priced. A member of an integrated bar may be compelled to fund regulation of the profession, not activities outside it. In fairness, the Bar answered both requests promptly. Nothing establishes that dues pay for this engagement. The question was asked four times and remains unanswered.
Receipt
  • Demands: (1) 7/4/26 6:16:15 PM objection letter item 8; (2) 7/4/26 7:12:36 PM records request Category D (the companion file marked MISDIRECTED and resent; the 7:12 PM version is operative); (3) 7/10/26 1:15 PM email sec. 1; (4) 7/11/26 8:35:37 PM Request 5.
  • Interval, stated at its true width: the four demands run 7/4/26 to 7/11/26, seven days; demands (1) and (2) are fifty-six minutes and twenty-one seconds apart the same evening (6:16:15 PM and 7:12:36 PM). "Four times in eight days" is wrong and is barred.
  • 7/4/26 6:16 PM letter: "I am a dues-paying member of The Florida Bar. As a member, I object to that allocation of the Bar's resources, and I ask the Bar's leadership to account for it."
  • 7/10/26 email: "Please confirm in writing the funding source for that engagement, including whether it is paid from mandatory member dues."
  • Courtemanche's fee letter: "The bar is not obligated to divide its efforts by category, regardless of whether you accept our prior estimate."
  • Responses held as native text captures with no page image: Courtemanche 7/6/26 acknowledgment and $101.09 estimate; Bailey 8/6/26 7:00 PM inline reply that Finance and Accounting "had to produce these records and spent more time than our customary 30-minute period"; "The bar will not waive the $101.09 estimate"; the clerical hours were to "locate the records and pull records that do not contain confidential attorney-client information".
  • W-number mapping, counterintuitive on its face: W016548-070626 is the Greenberg Traurig BILLING request; W016547 is the RETENTION and DISPOSITION request.
  • Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878 (2018).
  • Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(1) and (m)(3); section 119.07(4), Fla. Stat.
  • The 6/19/26 letter contains no Greenberg Traurig, dues or funding-source content, across all 10 of its pages; any draft dating the funding demand to 6/19/26 is unsupported.
  • The 7/15/26 ESI demand and the 7/23/26 followup name the firm but contain no funding ask; the 8/5/26 fee letter deliberately omits it.
  • Searched for any Bar answer on funding, and none appears in: the Bar correspondence and JQC file, the Leon mandamus matter, the 1D2026-0728 appeal file including the 6/30/26 Answer Brief, and the node ledger.

Spawned by: N-082, N-105, N-131

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-129

NEW-P52026-07-07the Bar's lawyer won the ruling, accepted the court's assignment to write the order, and six weeks later the ruling still did not exist as an order, so the party that lost it has nothing to appealIGNORED
Date
2026-07-07
Actor
John Londot, Greenberg Traurig (drafting counsel for the Bar recipients); Judge Felix (bench grant, assignment)
Institution
The Florida Bar (outside counsel), in 13th Cir. 24-DR-001150
Mechanism
the Bar's lawyer won the ruling, accepted the court's assignment to write the order, and six weeks later the ruling still did not exist as an order, so the party that lost it has nothing to appeal
What the law required
The duty is the acceptance, not a rule debate: the court directed 'Mr. Londot, will you please prepare an order?' and Londot answered 'Yes.' (7/7 PM Tr. 31:4-8). Counsel who accepts a tribunal's drafting assignment owes performance or a stated withdrawal. No rule is stated here as the duty: the texts of R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-4.4(a) and 4-8.4(d) are not confirmed in this record, and 4-4.4's 'third persons' scope is unresolved.
What happened
On 7/7/26 the court granted the Bar recipients' motion to quash from the bench, gave one ground, and asked the Bar's outside counsel to prepare the order. He accepted on the record. No deadline was set. That evening he emailed the proposed order to an address Husband says he had directed him in writing three weeks earlier not to use. Husband found it and objected two days later, on 7/9/26, raising constitutional issues and stating that the proposed order offered no explanation for the decision and should address each witness and the relevance of their testimony. No reply ever came. No revised order issued. As of the 8/15/26 clerk review no order had been entered. The ruling the Bar won on 7/7/26 still cannot be appealed because it does not exist on paper. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A lawyer who accepts a drafting assignment either finishes it or says why not. The court asked, "Mr. Londot, will you please prepare an order?" and he answered "Yes." A bench ruling that never becomes a written order binds no one and cannot be appealed, so the party holding the unwritten win keeps it. This is the fourth unwritten ruling on this record (N-060, N-074, N-092, N-090). Three other orders were entered within about a day (N-123, N-128, N-134).
Receipt
  • 7/7/26 PM transcript (Guldin, certified 7/13/26): bench grant at 29:24-25, the single stated ground at 31:1-3, the assignment and acceptance at 31:4-8. The 31:4-8 duty anchor rests on the 8/17 first-read digest; its page image has not been checked.
  • The 7/9/26 email to Londot: "As far as the proposed order, I object. I have raised constitutional issues. The proposed order fails to offer any explanation or basis for the decision." It goes on to ask that each witness and the relevance of their testimony be addressed and that objections be noted if submitted as is. Both pages; no reply and no new proposed order followed.
  • The unentered-order negative is CLERK-REVIEW-SCOPED to 8/15/26 (PROV-JN-7), current as of the docket as reviewed on 8/15/26. No deadline was set for the order, so the claim here is not a missed deadline; it is silence against an accepted assignment.
  • The 6/16/26 address directive rests on Husband's 7/9 account only and the native 6/16 message is NOT in the tree (documented negative 8/18/26).
  • The 7/9 message asserting "I have never emailed you from this email address other than to request that you NOT use it" was itself sent from that address, per its From line.
  • No rule is cited here. Velocity comparators: N-123 (about 4 hours), N-128 (about 19h54m), N-134 (about 25 hours). Unwritten-ruling family: N-060, N-074, N-092, N-090, N-133.
  • The same hearing's commentary about Husband's mental health is its own card, NEW-P10.

Spawned by: N-129

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P5

NEW-P102026-07-07the Bar's lawyer told a judge he had a "spidey-sense" about the other side's mental health, said he is not a doctor, and advised the self-represented father to spend better time with his children; the objection was immediate and drew no answer, correction, or withdrawalIGNORED
Date
2026-07-07
Actor
John Londot, Greenberg Traurig (outside counsel for the Bar recipients)
Institution
The Florida Bar (through outside counsel, in open court)
Mechanism
the Bar's lawyer told a judge he had a "spidey-sense" about the other side's mental health, said he is not a doctor, and advised the self-represented father to spend better time with his children; the objection was immediate and drew no answer, correction, or withdrawal
What the law required
[PENDING RULE PULL: Rules 4-4.4(a) and 4-8.4(d) texts have not been pulled and scoped; per standing guard no rule citation ships until they are. The present anchor is the record itself: statements by counsel to a tribunal about an opposing party's mental health, and an objection that drew no response from counsel or the court.]
What happened
At the 7/7/26 afternoon hearing, counsel for the Bar recipients told the court: "I got a very strong spidey-sense, and I'm not a doctor, but I think there are -- is some emotional mental difficulties happening there. I heard Mr. Hanson acknowledge that," adding that he hoped Husband would recalculate and devote better family time than litigation. Husband objected on the record: "Mr. Londot's comments about my mental health status, and how I should be spending time with my children are unconscionable." Neither counsel nor the court addressed the objection. No correction and no withdrawal appears anywhere in this record. Inside the same speech sits one checkable factual dispute: counsel said he called Husband and was refused further phone contact; Husband, on the record, said no such call happened, only email. Which account is correct has not been established. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Husband had already said it himself, at the same hearing: "The Florida Bar is even well aware of some emotional and mental difficulties that I've had". Husband has had some physical and mental health challenges; his own testimony stays verbatim. What followed is the deviation: a lawyer offered the diagnosis-shaped statement anyway, disclaiming his own qualification, and moved from that to how Husband should spend time with his children. The objection is in the same transcript, unanswered.
Receipt
  • 7/7/26 PM transcript (Guldin, certified 7/13/26), 23:15-26:4: the two quoted lines at 25:8-21; the objection at 26:10-16; the phone-call statements at 24:20-21, 25:7-8 and 26:17-19.
  • No rule is cited here: 4-4.4(a) and 4-8.4(d) were not pulled.
  • Husband's own same-hearing statement, "The Florida Bar is even well aware of some emotional and mental difficulties that I've had" (18:24-19:1, held from the transcript text layer only), is what "I heard Mr. Hanson acknowledge that" points at, and it leads the baseline above.
  • Counsel: "when I first got the file I called Mr. Hanson" and Husband "refused to talk to me on the phone any more." Husband: "I never got on the phone with him. We had an e-mail communication."
  • His 7/9 email calls the Bar this lawyer's "client and co-conspirator" and announces him and his firm as federal defendants.

Spawned by: NEW-P5

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P10

Thirteenth Circuit administration4 nodes

Official public records: Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, About the Court and court administration | Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, contact and public information

N-0482025-04-28the judge who inherited the case signed an order of recusal the same day, stating no reason, and that order was left out of the circuit's records production and refused entry into the appellate recordDENIED
Date
2025-04-28
Actor
Judge Wendy J. DePaul (recusal); 13th Cir. Admin (non-production)
Institution
13th Cir. Div. C
Mechanism
the judge who inherited the case signed an order of recusal the same day, stating no reason, and that order was left out of the circuit's records production and refused entry into the appellate record
What the law required
R. 2.330(k) allows voluntary recusal with no reason given. R. 2.420 governs access to the recusal document referenced at docket 187.
What happened
On April 28, 2025, the day Judge Ayers was disqualified (N-047), the case went to Judge Wendy J. DePaul. She entered a case management conference order setting an August 13 hearing, then recused on her own motion the same day, on an order carrying an electronic stamp of 5:37:56 PM, stating no reason, and routed reassignment to Judge Felix under a standing administrative order. The order of recusal states no reason for declining a file inherited that same day. It was not produced in response to Husband's records request to the 13th Circuit, and on April 6, 2026 the Second District declined to allow it into the appellate record. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A rule lets a judge step away from a case and say nothing about why. Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian, so the document still has to appear in a public-records production or be denied in writing on a stated ground. Only the second duty was missed. In candor, the recusal itself is lawful. The evidentiary weight sits on the non-production, not the recusal.
Receipt
  • Docs 186 and 187 chronology (Order of Recusal, 4/28/25, electronic stamp 5:37:56 PM); Doc 187 is in the tree.
  • Administrative Order S-2025-013 for the reassignment.
  • The appellate denial at Doc 282 (4/6/26).
  • The 9/23/25 supplement motion in 2D2025-1936.

Spawned by: N-047

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-048

NEW-P12025-08-21the circuit certified twice in writing that the records existed, counted them, took the copying fee, and handed over a paper box that did not contain the judge-level communications the certification covered. The August 31, 2025 request for an explanation was unanswered a year later.PARTIAL
Date
2025-08-21
Actor
Gina Justice, Court Administrator (letter signed by her, cc Judge Ayers and JA Heyward); Mike Moore, PIO (acknowledgments)
Institution
13th Judicial Circuit, Administrative Office of the Courts
Mechanism
the circuit certified twice in writing that the records existed, counted them, took the copying fee, and handed over a paper box that did not contain the judge-level communications the certification covered. The August 31, 2025 request for an explanation was unanswered a year later.
What the law required
Art. I, sec. 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy any public record, expressly including the judicial branch, and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder. Implemented for judicial-branch records by Rule 2.420. The Circuit's own 8/21/25 letter concedes the framework applies: 'we are treating your public records request as a request for administrative records of the judicial branch in accordance with Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420 and article 1, section 24 of the Florida Constitution' (006 p.13, eye). The lawful path: produce the located records in the electronic format requested, complete as certified, or state in writing with specificity what was withheld and under what exemption. No Rule 2.420(d)/(e) confidentiality determination was ever identified (012 para. 20).
What happened
Between July 24 and 25, 2025 Husband emailed three requests: communications about scheduling for two hearings, and recordings of eight hearings. The August 21, 2025 letter certified twice: "Records do exist that satisfy this request." It counted them at 226 pages and demanded prepayment for pickup. Husband paid and picked up paper. His August 31, 2025 email itemized what the box did not contain: no records showing the judge directing or being informed of the emergency scheduling, nothing on the after-hours decisions, and no indication the judge knew opposing counsel would not attend. It also reported that "Many pages are unreadable due to low ink," while the box included unrequested pages. Follow-ups went out through October 9, 2025; after September 8 the circuit's only response was a form acknowledgment. No explanation of the gap has issued through August 20, 2026. Forty-four days later, the mandamus was filed (N-058). [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
When a custodian certifies in writing that records exist and takes the copying fee, the requester gets those records, or a written statement of what was withheld and why. The state constitution puts that burden on the custodian, including the judicial branch, and the circuit's own letter concedes the framework applies. The requests asked for electronic records. What came back was a mailed letter, a prepaid paper box, and no electronic files even after the unreadable pages were reported.
Receipt
  • Exhibit 006 pp. 13-15 (8/21/25 letter: both certifications, 226-page count, both fee figures, cc line).
  • 006 pp. 4, 6 (electronic-format request: "Please provide the records in electronic format if available.").
  • 006 p. 23 (8/31/25 omissions email, native e-filed text layer).
  • 006 p. 20 (9/15/25 acknowledgment: "responses to your requests will be made in a reasonable manner").
  • Doc 012 paras. 17-21, 23, 26 (text layer); exhibit 010, the scanned 377-page production, interior not read.
  • Fee arithmetic recomputes from 226 pages at the stated per-page rate. Interval 8/31/25 to 10/14/25 is 44 days.
  • Exact paper-pickup date.
  • Follow-ups: 8/26, 8/31, 9/9, 9/12, 9/24, 10/9/25.
  • Scope note: production did include some December 2024 scheduling traffic among judicial assistants and counsel, so the claim is the narrower one: nothing showed the judge's own involvement, the after-hours decisions, or the non-attendance exchange.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P1

N-0532025-08-21the court confirmed the hearing video exists, then withheld it on an exemption whose factual basis it has never stated, through ten months of litigationDENIED
Date
2025-08-21
Actor
Gina Justice / Mike Moore
Institution
13th Cir. AOC
Mechanism
the court confirmed the hearing video exists, then withheld it on an exemption whose factual basis it has never stated, through ten months of litigation
What the law required
R. 2.420(m)(2) requires a written basis stated with particularity. A claimed F.S. 119.071(3)(a) exemption requires its factual predicate.
What happened
On August 21, 2025 the 13th Circuit's administrative office confirmed in writing that "a video record does exist" for the April 4, 2025 hearing, and withheld it as confidential surveillance video without ever stating that the recording is a security-system record, the fact its own exemption requires. The same letter said no records existed for the seven other hearings requested that year. A September 8, 2025 letter restated the exemption in verbatim-identical words while ignoring the questions built to test it. The same defendants later admitted in discovery that no court order determines the video confidential (N-102). The video has never been released. The same records category drew a different ground the next year: for a later set of seven hearing dates the office said the footage had already been overwritten under a 30-day retention schedule (N-057). [DENIED: access refused on an exemption whose factual basis was never given]
Baseline deviation
A court office that withholds a record must state a written basis with particularity. The exemption invoked, section 119.071(3)(a), reaches security-system records, but the office has never stated that this recording is one, a predicate that takes one sworn sentence. In ten months of litigation, no affidavit from court administration or its defense counsel makes that showing. The recording is the one Judge Ayers herself invoked and then declined to pursue (N-042).
Receipt
  • Justice letter 8/21/25 (10255 Doc 6 p.14; Doc 083 Exs. D and E).
  • Letter 9/8/25 (Doc 6 p.44; exemption paragraph verbatim identical to 8/21/25).
  • RFA No. 4 admission that no court order determines confidentiality (N-102).
  • 2026 overwriting ground and retention schedule at N-057 (schedule text p. 255 of 258).
  • Defense filings swept for the affidavit negative: Doc 013, Doc 038, Doc 040, Doc 053, Doc 054, Doc 055, Doc 056, Doc 063, Doc 065, Doc 070, Doc 072, Doc 075, Doc 077, Doc 083, and the Responses to Request for Admissions served 5/15/26 (101 pages across the set).
  • Sweep documented at NEW-P12 and in the 8/20/26 verification memo on the 10255 defense filings; the negative reaches that set and no further.
  • Seven other hearings that year drew a "no records" response in the same letter.

Spawned by: N-042

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-053

NEW-P22025-10-14the three requests that asked how the chief judge's office handles complaints, what one judge communicated about eight emergency filings, and another judge's disqualification history drew one forwarding sentence and, through the pleaded window, nothing elsePARTIAL
Date
2025-10-14
Actor
13th Judicial Circuit, Administrative Office of the Courts (JA Christina Novia, acknowledgment; legal department, non-response)
Institution
13th Judicial Circuit, Administrative Office of the Courts
Mechanism
the three requests that asked how the chief judge's office handles complaints, what one judge communicated about eight emergency filings, and another judge's disqualification history drew one forwarding sentence and, through the pleaded window, nothing else
What the law required
Art. I, sec. 24(a), Fla. Const., implemented by Rule 2.420: access is the presumption, the custodian carries the burden, and a denial requires a written basis. The lawful path: produce, or state in writing what is withheld and why, or state that no responsive records exist.
What happened
The three requests went out on October 14, 2025, the same day the mandamus petition was filed. The only response ever received came that afternoon: "I have received your public records request. I will be forwarding your email to our legal department for response." Follow-ups went out on October 27 and November 12, 2025. As of November 12, twenty-nine days from the requests, there had been no substantive response, production, timeline, or explanation. The amended petition states the contrast on its face: "This total silence contrasts with partial responses to earlier requests." The earlier requests at least drew letters (NEW-P1). These drew a forwarding sentence. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
A custodian has three lawful moves: produce, deny in writing with a stated basis, or state that no responsive records exist. Silence is none of them, and under the state constitution the burden never shifts to the requester. The requests it answered with formal certifying letters concerned hearing scheduling. The requests that drew nothing concerned oversight: how complaint correspondence was handled, what a judge communicated on emergency filings, and a disqualification history.
Receipt
  • Exhibit 011 pp. 1-11 (the three requests, same-day acknowledgment at p. 11, both follow-ups at pp. 8-10; text layer).
  • Doc 012 para. 25 (text layer). Doc 003 p. 1 stamp (same-day filing).
  • Silence scope: as pleaded through 11/13/25. Every item here is held from the text layer; no page image has been checked.

Spawned by: NEW-P1, N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P2

Second District Court of Appeal10 nodes

Official public records: Second District Court of Appeal, official site

N-0542025-09-12the petition asking for the first written review of the orders that shut off the financial records was dismissed in three words, and the order that later denied every post-dismissal motion carries no judge's name at allDENIED
Date
2025-09-12
Actor
2D DCA panel (per curiam)
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-0681)
Mechanism
the petition asking for the first written review of the orders that shut off the financial records was dismissed in three words, and the order that later denied every post-dismissal motion carries no judge's name at all
What the law required
R. 9.100 provides certiorari review of the discovery freeze.
What happened
On September 12, 2025 the Second District dismissed the certiorari petition per curiam, naming the panel: "NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur." Every post-dismissal motion was denied on February 2, 2026 by an order naming no one, reading in full: "Petitioner's motion for rehearing, clarification, oral arguments, en banc review, and/or written opinion is denied." A written opinion was asked for in terms and refused in terms, by an order that gives no reason and identifies no judge. The mandate issued February 19, 2026. The discovery freeze below was left undisturbed, and the orders that produced it remain unexamined. [DENIED: review refused without a written explanation.]
Baseline deviation
Certiorari review would have been the first written look at the orders that cut off the records below (N-018, N-018). It never happened. Per curiam dispositions are routine and one alone means little; the weight rests on the pattern of three unexplained appellate silences (N-066, N-088). This dismissal at least names its judges; the order five months later denying every post-dismissal motion names nobody. Asked in writing which judges decided, the court answered that no record shows who participated (N-114).
Receipt
  • 9/12/25 dismissal, eDCA original, 2D2025-0681 docket 065: "PER CURIAM." / "Dismissed." Panel: "NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur." Lower tribunal: Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, Kelly A. Ayers, Judge. Footer: "Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication."
  • Also in 1150 record at Doc 248 p.2 (filed by Wife 10/14/25) and Doc 275.
  • 2/2/26 order, eDCA original, docket 066: "BY ORDER OF THE COURT:", denies "Petitioner's three motions for oral argument, all filed on November 4, 2025", and denies the notice of filing error/request to strike as moot; no judge named; certified by Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk. Also at 1150 Doc 263.
  • Mandate 2/19/26.
  • Orders that cut records off below: N-018, N-018. Three-doors pattern: N-066, N-088. Refusal to identify deciding judges: N-114.

Spawned by: N-018, N-018

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-054

N-0662025-11-26the appellate court kept the courthouse video out of the record in orders that name no judge and give no reason, and when asked who decided, answered that no such record is filed anywhere a party can reachDENIED
Date
2025-11-26
Actor
2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named)
Institution
2D2025-1936
Mechanism
the appellate court kept the courthouse video out of the record in orders that name no judge and give no reason, and when asked who decided, answered that no such record is filed anywhere a party can reach
What the law required
Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(f) governs supplementing the appellate record. A motion central to the appeal is entitled to a reasoned disposition.
What happened
On November 26, 2025 the Second District denied the motion to supplement the record with the April 4, 2025 courthouse video, the video Judge Ayers herself invoked and then declined to pursue (N-042), and the recusal documents, naming no panel and giving no reasoning. It denied rehearing on January 27, 2026, again naming no judge. Two more followed the same pattern, April 6 and May 12, 2026 (N-087, N-101). Asked in writing to identify who decided, the court refused: writing for Chief Judge Lucas on July 27, 2026, Clerk Kuenzel answered that no document reflects which judges participated, and any unfiled record is confidential under rule 2.420(c)(1). Chief Judge Lucas wrote the same on July 14, and Marshal Haynes again on August 4, 2026 (N-149); Clerk Kuenzel had denied the same category on June 3, 2026 (N-114). Four written refusals, and not one name on any of the orders. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 9.200(f) lets a party supplement an incomplete appellate record. Three orders from the same court kept the same video out; none names a panel, none gives a reason. One denial proves nothing; three on the same central evidence does. Asked in writing which judges decided, the court answered four times that no document shows who participated, and anything outside the record is exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1), though the exemption's burden sits with the withholding custodian (Art. I, sec. 24(a)).
Receipt
  • As pleaded at complaint para. 30E (F134).
  • 11/26/25 order denying Appellant's "Motion to Supplement the Record with Video of 4/4/25 Hearing and Recusal Documents", filed 2D2025-1936 docket 041: issues "BY ORDER OF THE COURT", carries Kuenzel certification, names no judge.
  • 1/27/26 order denying "Motion for Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc, for Clarification, for Formal Written Order, and/or Certification" under Rules 9.330/9.331, filed 2D2025-1936 docket 042; no judge named.
  • Chief Judge Lucas's 7/14/26 letter and Marshal Haynes's 8/4/26 email.
  • Clerk Kuenzel's 6/3/26 email on file as native PDF; her 7/27/26 response held only as a mailbox text capture, no page image, quoted at N-114 on that basis.
  • Video's origin at N-042; withholding of it at N-053.
  • Related decision points: N-115.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-066

N-0782026-02-10the petition asking whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may keep presiding over the related one was denied in a single sentence, seven days after filing and one day after the fee posted, with no response ever required from anyoneDENIED
Date
2026-02-10
Actor
2D DCA panel: Villanti, Sleet, Smith
Institution
2D DCA (2D2026-0279)
Mechanism
the petition asking whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may keep presiding over the related one was denied in a single sentence, seven days after filing and one day after the fee posted, with no response ever required from anyone
What the law required
Fla. R. App. P. 9.100 governs prohibition review of the structural conflict.
What happened
On February 10, 2026 a panel of Villanti, Sleet, and Smith denied the prohibition petition seven days after it was filed, and one day after the fee posted. The order reads: "Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied." No opinion, no order to show cause, no response ever required. The petition had asked for a writ "disqualifying Judge Matthew Felix and all judges of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit from presiding over Case No. 24-DR-001150 and directing a transfer of venue to a neutral circuit pursuant to Fla. Stat. s. 47.122", and named the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit itself as a respondent. The order does not mention venue, transfer, section 47.122, or the circuit as an entity; its caption lists only the two spouses. Judge Felix remained presiding. The structural question this petition raised has now been put to four tribunals and answered by none (N-059). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 9.100 provides prohibition review, and this petition put a first-impression structural question to the court: may a judge named as a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related one. None was required, and none issued. Quick denials are permitted, and this order at least names its judges; nothing here is claimed beyond pattern weight. The petition asked for two things, disqualification and a venue transfer under section 47.122; the order addresses only the first.
Receipt
  • Denial order 2/10/26, 2D2026-0279 docket 001, p.1, and copy at docket 008, Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel clerk certification, served on Hillsborough Clerk, Davis, Felix, Hanson.
  • Petition of 2/3/26, 2D2026-0279 docket 007, PDF pp. 4-5, 16, 26-27, verified: prayer at section III, para. 44 and WHEREFORE clause: "remanding with instructions to transfer venue to the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Pasco County, or another neutral venue".
  • 2D2026-0279 docket sheet, text layer, seven entries, no order-to-show-cause and no response entry.
  • Disqualification ruling this followed: N-069. Structural-conflict spine: N-059.

Spawned by: N-069

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-078

N-0872026-04-06one week before it affirmed, the court refused to add the video to the record and struck five filings in a one-page order naming no judge, while an order from the same court fifty-five days earlier named all three of its judges.DENIED
Date
2026-04-06
Actor
2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named)
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-1936)
Mechanism
one week before it affirmed, the court refused to add the video to the record and struck five filings in a one-page order naming no judge, while an order from the same court fifty-five days earlier named all three of its judges.
What the law required
Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(f) permits supplementing an incomplete record. Orders ordinarily issue over the names of the deciding panel.
What happened

On April 6, 2026 the Second District refused to supplement the record with the April 4, 2025 video and the recusal documents, and struck five filings in the same one-page order. The order names no judge. It issues only "BY ORDER OF THE COURT". The per curiam affirmance came one week later, on a record that still did not contain the video (N-088).

Fifty-five days earlier the same court had denied the prohibition petition in an order that did name its judges: Villanti, Sleet, and Smith (N-078).

Four written refusals followed the question of who decided: by the Clerk on June 3 and again on July 27, 2026, by the Chief Judge on July 14, 2026, and by the Marshal on August 4, 2026, each resting on rule 2.420(c)(1). This is the middle order in the series opened at N-066 and continued at N-101. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Rule 9.200(f) permits supplementing an incomplete record, and orders ordinarily issue over the names of the judges who make them. The comparison is like for like: same court, same year, two orders, one with names and one without. The one without decided whether the central evidence would be in the record at all, one week before the court affirmed on that record. Husband asked which judges decided. The court refused four times in writing. Article I, section 24(a) presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of proving an exemption on the custodian. The question is closed by refusal.
Receipt
  • The 4/6/26 order, filed in 2D2025-1936 at docket 043, one page. It strikes five filings (Appendices 1 through 3 of 3/31 and the Notices of Filing of 4/1), treats the 4/3 "Updated Notice of Related Cases, Supplemental Motion to Supplement the Record, and Motion for Panel Review of 4-4-25 Video" as a motion to supplement and denies it, and names no judge.
  • The named comparator at Doc 270, the 2/10/26 prohibition denial (N-078), naming Villanti, Sleet, and Smith.
  • The four written refusals to identify the deciding judges: Clerk Kuenzel on 6/3/26 and again on 7/27/26 (N-114), Chief Judge Lucas on 7/14/26 (N-115), and Marshal Haynes on 8/4/26 (N-149).
  • Complaint receipt F134.

Spawned by: N-042, N-049

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-087

N-0882026-04-15the appeal ended in three words, on the same record the court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video at the center of the caseDENIED
Date
2026-04-15
Actor
2D DCA panel
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-1936)
Mechanism
the appeal ended in three words, on the same record the court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video at the center of the case
What the law required
The appeal calls for merits review of the venue and impartial-tribunal issues.
What happened
On April 15, 2026 the Second District affirmed per curiam. The order reads "PER CURIAM. Affirmed." The panel line reads "KHOUZAM, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and SMITH, JJ., Concur." The mandate issued June 2, 2026. One week earlier the same court had struck five filings and refused to put the April 4, 2025 video into that record (N-087), and five months before that it had refused the same thing without naming a panel or giving a reason (N-066). The rulings below stood, and no court has written an examination of them. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
The appeal called for merits review of the venue and impartial-tribunal issues. A per curiam affirmance with no opinion ends that review and leaves no reasoning to examine. In candor, unelaborated affirmances are routine and this one carries three judges' names; nothing here is claimed beyond pattern weight. It is the third of three unexplained appellate dispositions on this record. The record it affirmed on is the record the same court had twice refused to supplement with the courthouse video.
Receipt
  • The 4/15/26 per curiam affirmance in 2D2025-1936, the eDCA original, filed at docket 045, two pages: the disposition and the panel line as quoted
  • The appeal taken "pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Matthew L. Felix, Acting Circuit Judge"
  • The copy at docket 036 is a KB-layer copy and is superseded by 045 for citation
  • Mandate at Doc 035
  • The refusals to supplement at N-087 and N-066; the first of the three unexplained dispositions at N-054

Spawned by: N-049

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-088

N-1012026-05-12Husband asked the court in writing to state its reasoning; the order refusing that request states no reasoning and names no judge, and it is the fifth of its kindDENIED
Date
2026-05-12
Actor
2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named; clerk certification only)
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-1936)
Mechanism
Husband asked the court in writing to state its reasoning; the order refusing that request states no reasoning and names no judge, and it is the fifth of its kind
What the law required
Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 and 9.331 govern rehearing, rehearing en banc, and requests for a written opinion. A court may deny them. What is at issue here is not the denial but the anonymity: the order that resolves an express request to be told the court's reasoning identifies no judge who decided it.
What happened
On May 12, 2026 the Second District denied, in one order, Husband's motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, written opinion, clarification, and certification. The order issues "BY ORDER OF THE COURT". It names no judge and no panel. The only name on it is the clerk's certification that it is a true copy. The four orders before it are the November 26, 2025 and January 27, 2026 orders (N-066), the February 2, 2026 denial at Doc 263, and the April 6, 2026 order (N-087). The rulings below stood without any written examination, and no judge is identified as having made that choice. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rules 9.330 and 9.331 let a party ask for rehearing, a written opinion, clarification, and certification; rehearing denials without opinion are ordinary. The point is that this order, resolving a request to be told the court's reasoning, gives none and identifies no judge. That is the fifth anonymous order in this series; the same court named its judges three months earlier (N-078), so the practice was available. Asked which judges decided, the court refused, resting on rule 2.420(c)(1) (N-066, N-114).
Receipt
  • Doc 301 in the 1150 docket, one page, dated May 12, 2026, 2D2025-1936, L.T. 24-DR-001150, signed by Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk, electronically filed 05/12/2026 10:35:30 AM
  • The named comparator at Doc 270
  • The earlier anonymous orders at N-066, Doc 263, and N-087
  • The refusals to identify the panel at N-066 and N-114

Spawned by: N-088

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-101

N-1142026-06-03the court withheld its own machinery, case assignment, scheduling, the case-management system, and phone logs, behind an exemption that protects deliberation, and the category asking which judges decided the unnamed orders drew the same boilerplate as the restDENIED
Date
2026-06-03
Actor
Clerk Mary Beth Kuenzel
Institution
2D DCA
Mechanism
the court withheld its own machinery, case assignment, scheduling, the case-management system, and phone logs, behind an exemption that protects deliberation, and the category asking which judges decided the unnamed orders drew the same boilerplate as the rest
What the law required
R. 2.420(m)(2) requires particularity. Under (b)(3), the chief judge is the custodian. Subdivision (c)(1) protects deliberation, not machinery.
What happened

On June 3, 2026 the Second District's clerk, Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, denied nearly all of a nine-category administrative-records request. Every administrative category drew the identical line: non-court-file records "are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1)." The administrative records have still not been produced.

Asked specifically who decided, she answered in writing on July 27, 2026, for Chief Judge Lucas, again citing rule 2.420(c)(1) for anything not filed in the court record: "There are no documents filed as part of the court record that reflect which judges participated in those orders."

Read precisely, that is not a statement that no such records exist. It is a statement that none is in the court record, and anything outside it is withheld as exempt. The effect is that the orders deciding these appeals name no judge, and the court's own record contains nothing that would (N-066, N-087, N-101). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Rule 2.420(c)(1) protects a court's deliberation, not its machinery. Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a written basis for denial. Identical boilerplate across nine categories identifies no record and gives no basis specific to any, so nothing can be tested. Assignment records are how a reader learns which judges issued an order that names none (N-087, N-101). In fairness, the order in case 0279 does name its judges (N-078).
Receipt
  • Clerk Kuenzel's 6/3/26 email from 2dcaclerk@flcourts.org, Wednesday, June 3, 2026 at 2:53 PM EDT, her substantive response to the Rule 2.420 request, on file as a native PDF export received from Chris on 8/10/26
  • On the judge-identification category it states: "There are no other documents filed as a part of the court record that are responsive to this request, and any records not filed as a part of the court record are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1)."
  • The 6/3 email states on its face that it responds to a request of May 18, 2026
  • Full 7/27/26 answer: "You have asked for any 'records that reflect which judges participated in those orders' prior to or following the disposition in each case, but these records are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1) unless filed as a part of the court record. There are no documents filed as part of the court record that reflect which judges participated in those orders." This is a complete mailbox text capture whose operative sentence also appears at p. 5 of the 7/30/26 email to the Second District clerk; the native message itself is not held
  • Intake note, recorded as the clerk's stated reason and not as a departure: the clerk's office declined to open the 5/14/26 request because it arrived as an attachment, stating verbatim "we do not generally open attachments from unknown senders", which cost five days at the front of the request and supports a Question Protocol ask for the written policy

Spawned by: N-087

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-114

N-1152026-06-04the chief judge answered forty days after the request reached him and six days after the follow-up, produced a record for free, then placed every other record behind one rule citation naming no document, and the supplement he promised has not issuedPARTIAL
Date
2026-06-04
Actor
Chief Judge Matt Lucas
Institution
2D DCA
Mechanism
the chief judge answered forty days after the request reached him and six days after the follow-up, produced a record for free, then placed every other record behind one rule citation naming no document, and the supplement he promised has not issued
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect and copy judicial-branch records. Access is the presumption and secrecy is the exception. The burden of establishing an exemption rests on the custodian, not on the requester, and it does not shift because the custodian is a judge. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420 implements that right for the judicial branch; 2.420(b)(3) makes the chief judge the custodian of administrative records; and 2.420(m)(2) sets the response duty, requiring the custodian to determine whether a requested record is subject to the rule and, if so, whether it or portions of it are exempt, and to state the basis for a denial in writing. Constitutional provision first, rule second, which is the order this custodian used himself. A categorical assertion over an entire class of requested records, identifying nothing withheld and stating no basis as to any particular item, leaves nothing a requester or a reviewing court can test, and so does not carry the custodian's burden. Rule 2.420(l)(1) supplies the review route once a denial has issued.
What happened

On June 4, 2026 Husband's narrowed records request was redirected to Chief Judge Lucas as custodian. A follow-up went by email July 8. Lucas responded by signed letter dated July 14, forty days after the routing and six days after the follow-up. He named the governing law correctly, citing the Constitution before the rule, and produced the Court's Internal Operating Procedures at no charge.

Everything else he placed behind one sentence: "Other than the case records provided previously by Clerk Kuenzel, any other records that may exist relating to this request are confidential and exempt pursuant to Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420(c)(1)." No record was identified and no index accompanied the claim.

On the two remaining categories he found nothing responsive and said a report was coming: "We expect a report this week; when it is received, I will update this response." No update issued. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) presumes judicial-branch records open, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for any denial. In fairness: he answered within six days of the follow-up, cited the constitution first, and produced a record at no charge. But withholding an entire class under one rule citation, naming no document, leaves nothing to test. And he wrote that he would update his response when a report arrived. He did not.
Receipt
  • Chief Judge Lucas's signed letter response, dated July 14, 2026, pp. 1-2, wet signature over "Matthew C. Lucas", "Encl."
  • Record produced: Second District's Internal Operating Procedures, effective 12/1/2025, 22 pages, produced 7/14/26.
  • Cover email 7/14/26 8:53 AM EDT from 2dcaAdministrative: "Please see the attached response from Chief Judge Lucas."
  • Follow-up and pre-suit notice sent 7/8/26 2:14 PM, demand paragraph setting 7/14 and closing paragraph setting 7/15; the 7/6/26 files are drafts, not send copies.
  • Kuenzel's 6/4/26 8:04 AM EDT routing confirmation: "Your request will be forwarded to the Chief Judge of the Second District Court of Appeal, Chief Judge Matt Lucas."
  • Letter states it "responds to yours of June 4, 2026, and July 8, 2026."
  • Full chronology and search scope for every negative held in the 2D DCA records-front status memo of 8/16/26.
  • Elapsed as of 8/16/26: 73 days since the 6/4 routing, 94 days since the original 5/14/26 request, 32 days of Rule 2.420(l)(1) ripeness attaching 7/15/26.
  • Letter dated Tuesday 7/14/26; the week he named ended Sunday 7/19/26. 28 days ran from that date to 8/16/26, 33 days from the letter itself.
  • Kuenzel answered on his behalf 7/27 and Marshal Haynes answered 8/4 (N-138, N-149); neither purports to be the promised update.
  • Which of the two answers (categorical exemption vs. no-records-identified) governs which category is unresolved; ambiguity raised in writing 7/20 and again 7/30, unresolved.
  • Search scope for the negative: 60-day Gmail sweep across the court's domains, both 2D DCA records folders, the four 2D DCA matter folders, and the downloads folder, as of 8/16/26; Husband's Yahoo address was not searched.
  • RE line on the letter mistypes the first case number as "2D20225-1936" and reads "Office of State Courts Administrator" without "the".
  • Two limits: the current text of Rule 2.420(m)(2) is held here only as Husband's own verbatim quotation in the 7/30/26 letter; and which court reviews a DCA chief judge's denial is answered here as (l)(1) rather than circuit-court mandamus under (l)(2).

Spawned by: N-114

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-115

N-1372026-07-25the certiorari challenge to the guardian ad litem order is pending, the Second District has ordered a response, and nothing here is charged against anyonePENDING
Date
2026-07-25
Actor
2D DCA
Institution
2D2026-1955 (L.T. 24-DR-001150)
Mechanism
the certiorari challenge to the guardian ad litem order is pending, the Second District has ordered a response, and nothing here is charged against anyone
What the law required
Rule 9.100 provides certiorari review of the guardian ad litem order (Doc 337).
What happened
On July 25, 2026 Husband filed a certiorari petition challenging the June 25, 2026 guardian ad litem order, 38 pages with a 429-page appendix, asking the court to "quash the June 25, 2026 order". The Second District docketed it July 27 as 2D2026-1955. A first fee submission was rejected for a case-number error; the resubmission, $311.85, was confirmed docketed the next morning, though its status still read "Processing" at that capture, so nothing here says the payment settled. On August 3, 2026 the Second District ordered a response within thirty days, ordered a reply thirty days after that, and imposed on both parties a duty to keep the court apprised of hearings affecting the proceeding. The order under challenge is being reviewed while the trial court's retainer terms run (N-134, N-135). [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Rule 9.100 provides certiorari review of the guardian ad litem order. There is no determination yet and nothing here counts against the Second District. The court's earlier dispositions in this lane (N-054, N-078, N-087, N-088) are noted for context, not asserted as a pattern. What the record shows at this step is a schedule: a response ordered, a reply ordered, a respondent named, and a duty on both sides to keep the court advised.
Receipt
  • Filing #253269488 (the petition, draft version 19 as filed). The relief quoted at para. 44, PDF p. 18, and again in the conclusion at para. 93, PDF p. 37; the string "Doc 351" appears nowhere in the 38 pages, and the 7/23/26 appointment order is mentioned once, descriptively, at para. 46, PDF p. 19.
  • Filing #253628363 (the rejected fee submission), clerk's stated reason: "Case Number Cannot Be Determined or Case Number Not for This Court", with a refund auto-generated; whether the refund posted is unknown.
  • Filing #253668293 (the accepted $311.85 fee, Order #19922246, memo line "Statutory Convenience Fee: $11.85 / Total Paid: $311.85"), with the 7/31/26 8:24 AM clerk processing confirmation, native PDF p.1.
  • The 8/3/26 order was entered as DIN 363 (F283); the fee sequence at F284; F305.
  • As-filed word count 7,932 per the compliance certificate, PDF p. 38; the 7/25 service-record.md's 7,746 is a stale draft figure. Appendix tab 35 is the same facially incomplete Doc 351 artifact.
  • Three limits: the rejection notice is held without a page image; the portal returned "No Matching Entries" for the certificate of service, and service went by a separate 10:08 AM email; the para. 92 "For 800 days" figure is not recomputed here.
  • The 7/30 fee record still displayed "NEW CASE", so this card does not state the case as docketed.

Spawned by: N-134, N-125

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-137

N-1492026-08-04the appellate court's custodian asserted a blanket exemption over records "referencing me by name," attached two records of exactly that description in the same email, and put everything else behind $313 in advancePARTIAL
Date
2026-08-04
Actor
Marshal Jacinda (Jo) Haynes
Institution
2D DCA
Mechanism
the appellate court's custodian asserted a blanket exemption over records "referencing me by name," attached two records of exactly that description in the same email, and put everything else behind $313 in advance
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, and it places the burden of establishing an exemption on the entity asserting one. Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to determine whether a requested record is subject to the rule and, if so, whether it or portions of it are exempt, and requires that "[i]f the request is denied, the custodian must state in writing the basis for the denial." A determination is per record or per described set. Internal Operating Procedures section 4.1(K) is the provision under which this request was directed to the marshal. Presumption and burden: access is presumed, and the withholder carries the burden, so an unstated basis is an unmet burden and not a neutral silence.
What happened
On August 4, 2026 the Second District's marshal answered a request pending since July 20. Two categories drew a blanket exemption as confidential and exempt. Four lines later the same email reads: "Or records 'referencing me by name.' I have attached two administrative records referencing you by name." One attachment is a Teams message reading, in full, "Pro Se, Christopher Hanson has arrived". The telephone-records category drew only that the logs contain phone numbers and voicemails would be reviewed as part of the same process, with no existence statement and no denial. Everything further was priced at $313.00, payable before any review would proceed. No privilege log, no list of what is withheld, and no description of the search have ever issued. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24 presumes records open and puts the burden of proving an exemption on the withholder; an unstated basis is an unmet burden, not neutral silence. A categorical exemption's test is whether it is applied categorically. Here it was not: the same officer, over the same category, on the same day, asserted the exemption and then attached two records of that description four lines later. Withholding while stating no basis leaves the burden unmet.
Receipt
  • The marshal's 8/4/26 email with both attachments, produced by the court itself.
  • The 7/20/26 request and 7/21/26 acknowledgment in the quoted chain of the same PDF.
  • On the telephone-records category, the same email neither produced a record, nor stated one exists, nor cited an exemption.
  • Full quote: "Telephone records (call detail logs) contain phone numbers. Voicemails will be reviewed as part of the email process above."
  • Full quote: "The charge for this time is $313.00. Upon receipt of payment, I will proceed with the review of these e-mail messages and attachments."
  • The unattributed supplement denials at N-066 (denied without panel name or reason).
  • Cross-links N-115 (the request chain) and N-138 (the IOP provision).

Spawned by: N-115

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-149

Judge Coleman10 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Sixth Judicial Circuit

N-0582025-10-14the statute says a public-records case gets an immediate hearing ahead of everything else; this one waited 91 days for its first substantive look and, as of August 20, 2026, ten months after filing, has had no final hearing and no writ enteredIGNORED
Date
2025-10-14
Actor
13th Cir. respondents; assigned judges Wolfe (Div. B), then Frayman (FSC Assignment Order 2026-40), then Coleman (FSC Assignment Order 2026-63)
Institution
25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the statute says a public-records case gets an immediate hearing ahead of everything else; this one waited 91 days for its first substantive look and, as of August 20, 2026, ten months after filing, has had no final hearing and no writ entered
What the law required
F.S. 119.11(1) requires an immediate hearing on a priority docket. R. 2.420(l) requires expedited review.
What happened
The petition was filed October 14, 2025 and amended November 13, 2025. The first assigned judge's opening act was a next-day order transferring the case for lack of jurisdiction, vacated one day later as "entered in error." No judicial act appears for the next 48 days. The petition's first substantive review came 91 days after filing, from a specially assigned outside judge. Hearings were held January 13, February 6, April 13 and July 24, 2026. The writ remained unentered after each, and remains unentered as of August 20, 2026, ten months on. On the June 10 record Husband stated the chain as he sees it: "from Mrs. Hanson to Mr. Davis to Judge Ayers, to yourself, to Judge Frayman, to Judge Sabella, who's been on notice of this, to Judge Coleman currently who's delaying entry of the writ on the expedited mandamus procedures." [IGNORED: the statutory fast track never started.]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) grants the right of access to records and puts the burden of any exemption on the state actor asserting it. The public-records statute commands an immediate hearing and gives the case priority over other pending cases. This case exists because a recording and administrative records were withheld on an exemption whose factual basis was never stated (N-053). A hearing would put the withholding, and the reason for it, on a court record. None has been held.
Receipt
  • Docs 003 and 012 (filing and amendment); Docs 005 and 008 (transfer order and its next-day vacatur).
  • Doc 016 (first order of specially assigned judge, 12/3/25).
  • Doc 040 p.1 stamp (first defense response, 1/8/26, at exactly 20 days from claimed 12/19/25 service; Clerk's counsel gives 12/23/25, discrepancy preserved at Doc 54 para. 2).
  • Day counts: 10/16 to 12/3 is 48; 10/14/25 to 1/13/26 is 91. Interval to publication: 10/14/25 to 8/20/26 is ten months six days.
  • The same day the petition was filed, three further records requests drew no substantive answer (NEW-P2).
  • Amended petition re-grounds the case on the state constitution's records right and judicial-branch rule first, statute as an argued extension.
  • June 10 transcript Tr. 88:5-11; wording/speaker rest on the transcript text layer, page image not separately checked; reporter mis-tags a speaker elsewhere ("Freeman" is Frayman).
  • First judge's departure reason is outside this record.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-058

N-0752026-02-09the vacate-and-restart route, the case that justified it, and the argument that Husband had invited it all came from the bench, while the defendants' own lawyer told the court there was no case law giving that guidanceDENIED
Date
2026-02-09
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned per FSC Order 2026-63), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the vacate-and-restart route, the case that justified it, and the argument that Husband had invited it all came from the bench, while the defendants' own lawyer told the court there was no case law giving that guidance
What the law required
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d) calls for facial-sufficiency review.
What happened
By order signed February 9 and filed February 17, 2026, the successor judge denied the neutral-judge request as moot, vacated the alternative writ pending his own review, and denied the family-case transfer for lack of authority. At the hearing, the court built the vacate-and-restart route itself, before any defense lawyer addressed writ procedure: "If I vacate Judge Frayman's order. then don't I move back to a point in time where this court needs to conduct its responsibilities under the rules of making its own determination about whether or not there's a prima facie case?. So don't I just end up all the way back at the status quo ante of January 12th." No defendant had raised that authority or the invited-error point that followed. Husband offered the narrower path, "You can vacate the order in parts," but the court vacated everything, restarting the response clock again (NEW-P3). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A court rules on what the parties argue. When the winning theory, its controlling authority, and its rebuttal all originate with the judge, no party has been heard on any of them. In fairness: the order is granted in part, the vacatur was relief Husband's own combined motion had sought, and the order's footnote acknowledges the delay objection. The same judge signed his alternative writ the next day, finding a prima facie entitlement on the same petition (N-080).
Receipt
  • Doc 061 (signed 2/9/26, filed 2/17/26); Doc 61 p. 3 n.3 (delay footnote, comparing only against partial vacatur); date confirmed against Doc 64 p. 1 recital.
  • Doc 66 (2/6/26 transcript, 79 pp., read in full): 31:16-33:1, 33:2-9, 35:14-25, 45:9-11, 48:15-17, 51:11-23, 68:6-9, 69:6-7, 70:5-21, 72:12-73:9.
  • Court's own authority cite: "I would cite you to some other authorities. Ake vs. Moore seems to anticipate that The Court is supposed to engage in the prima facie review."
  • AAG's answer: "I don't think there is specific case law that gives that kind of guidance."
  • Invited-error exchange: "Well, you moved for his disqualification, didn't you, Mr. Hanson?" and "Oh, so you want to keep what you liked, but if he disagreed with you, you want The Court to disregard it?"
  • Vacatur order signed 2/9/26; successor's own alternative writ signed 2/10/26; both entered 2/17/26.

-

Spawned by: N-070

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-075

N-0802026-02-17the day after vacating his predecessor's writ, the second outside judge looked at the same petition and again found Husband entitled on its face, set a date to produce the records or show cause, and nothing was produced and nothing was enforcedWON-THEN-NULLIFIED
Date
2026-02-17
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the day after vacating his predecessor's writ, the second outside judge looked at the same petition and again found Husband entitled on its face, set a date to produce the records or show cause, and nothing was produced and nothing was enforced
What the law required
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630 requires that, on a facially sufficient mandamus complaint, the court issue an alternative writ and set a return date.
What happened
Signed February 10, 2026, the day after the order vacating his predecessor's writ, and entered February 17, 2026 alongside it, the successor's own alternative writ found that the complaint "alleges a prima facie entitlement to some or all of the relief requested," and ordered production or a showing of cause by March 4, 2026. No merits ruling and no peremptory writ has followed it. Pressed directly at the July 24, 2026 hearing to enter the writ or state what remained in dispute, the court entered nothing and named no disputed issue (N-136). The motion to enforce this writ and its predecessor has sat unruled since April 2026 (N-089). [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
When a mandamus complaint is facially sufficient, the court issues an alternative writ and sets a return date: produce the records, or come to court and say why not. The judge ruled for Husband here. Two outside judges have each found a prima facie case for him, the second the day after vacating the first judge's writ (N-075), and in both instances enforcement stopped there. That is evidence about what happens after a finding, not an accusation against him.
Receipt
  • Doc 062, quote at p. 1; p. 2 para. 3 (March 4, 2026 return date) and para. 4 (e-filing deemed sufficient service); signed "this 10th day of February 2026."

Spawned by: N-075

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-080

NEW-P32026-03-04one amended petition drew four responsive filings, every extra chance came from the court and not from any motion the defendants filed, and the exemption grounds the case now runs on first appeared inside the second court-created windowIGNORED
Date
2026-03-04
Actor
Judges Frayman and Coleman (windows); AG defendants (filings)
Institution
25-CA-010255
Mechanism
one amended petition drew four responsive filings, every extra chance came from the court and not from any motion the defendants filed, and the exemption grounds the case now runs on first appeared inside the second court-created window
What the law required
F.S. 119.11(1) sets an immediate hearing on a priority docket. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d) and 1.140 supply the writ-response mechanics. Honest statement of the duty, which governs every use of this card: no rule forbade any single one of these steps. Rule 1.140 gave a lawful 20-day window after each writ, and Coleman's full vacatur was relief Husband's own 1/27 motion partly invited (candor carried on N-075). What the law does not contemplate is the sum: 75 days from service to the last permitted response on a statute that says immediate.
What happened

Four filings met one amended petition. Only the first was compelled by service; each later window was opened by a court act.

At the January 13 conference the court reset the clock although a response was already on file: "even though they did file a response in opposition, technically I can't consider that," it said. Husband objected that he had already had far more than twenty days since service. The court took responsibility for the delay and reset the clock anyway.

The successor judge then vacated that writ and reissued it with a March 4 return date. The third response arrived on the deadline day; when Husband moved to strike the second as untimely, the ruling was that the third "supersedes the February 2, 2026 Response in Opposition."

The exemption grounds now controlling this case first appear inside that second window; Husband's alternative, to vacate in part, was declined. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution grants the right of access to records and puts the burden of any exemption on the state actor asserting it. The statute sets an immediate hearing. No rule forbade any single step here; each gave a lawful twenty-day window after a writ. What the law does not contemplate is the sum: from service to the last permitted response is seventy-one to seventy-five days, on two conflicting service dates the defense itself gives.
Receipt
  • Doc 40 p. 1 stamp (first response, 1/8/26, at 20 days from claimed 12/19/25 service; the Clerk's counsel gives 12/23/25, discrepancy preserved)
  • Doc 51 Tr. 14:4-7, 14:18-15:6, 15:7-12 (the "I got to give them the twenty days" continuation, and Husband's on-record objection, "they've had a lot more than twenty days since they've been formally served")
  • Doc 55 p. 1 stamp and title (2/2/26, again at 20 days)
  • Doc 61 p. 3 n.3 (the court's own delay footnote; compares the reset only against a partial vacatur and does not address enforcement of a writ already answered)
  • Doc 62 p. 2 para. 3 (the 3/4/26 return)
  • Doc 65 p. 1 stamp and title (3/4/26, deadline day)
  • Doc 73 p. 2 (the supersession ruling)
  • Doc 66 Tr. 31:16-33:1, 33:2-9, 45:9-11, 70:5-18 (the vacate-and-restart origin and Husband's on-record alternative, "You can vacate the order in parts," declined; N-075)
  • Doc 40 read in full, all ten pages, for the grounds negative
  • Total responses by all defendants: four, including the Clerk's
  • Arithmetic, both service dates: from 12/19/25, 12 + 31 + 28 + 4 = 75; from 12/23/25, 8 + 31 + 28 + 4 = 71; 26 + 4 = 30
  • Service-date conflict inside the defense's own papers: Doc 040 para. 3 states "On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff served," and Doc 054 para. 2 states that "Plaintiff appears to have effected service of process for several other defendants in this case on December 23, 2025."

Spawned by: N-070, N-075, N-080

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P3

N-0862026-03-23the order denying the writ certifies that the court "has adhered to the procedural requirements," makes no finding about the records themselves, sets no next step and no deadline, and explains that fees are premature because no final judgment has been enteredDENIED
Date
2026-03-23
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the order denying the writ certifies that the court "has adhered to the procedural requirements," makes no finding about the records themselves, sets no next step and no deadline, and explains that fees are premature because no final judgment has been entered
What the law required
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630 and F.S. 119.12 require a ruling on the peremptory writ request and on the public-records fee claim.
What happened

By order signed March 23, 2026, all three rulings rest on procedure. The motion to strike was denied for lack of any cited legal basis, and because a later filing had superseded the one being struck.

The peremptory writ was denied because "Plaintiff has not demonstrated a legal basis for the Court to deviate from the requirements established under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.630". That writ would have enforced the alternative writ the same judge had issued five weeks earlier (N-080); it has not issued.

Fees were held premature because "The Court has not yet entered a final judgment determining whether any party is entitled to relief on the merits." Four months later the same judge announced summary judgment as the exclusive path forward, a second controlling procedure pointing away from the same pending motion (N-089, N-136). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution grants the right of access and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder. This order resolves three requests on procedural grounds: no disputed fact, no merits finding, no next step, no deadline, no hearing. The court that has not entered the final judgment the fee ruling waits on is the court. In candor, the fee ruling is a reservation, not a refusal; it preserves Husband's right to seek relief.
Receipt
  • Doc 073, 3 pages, read in full: title p. 1
  • Strike ruling p. 2 para. 1, including "cite[s] no legal basis upon which the Court could appropriately grant the requested relief"
  • Peremptory ruling and the Rule 1.630 sentence p. 2 para. 2, including "The Court has adhered to the procedural requirements for extraordinary remedies by issuing an alternative writ of mandamus and ordering a response"
  • Fee ruling p. 3 para. 3
  • Signature block p. 3 (signed in Chambers in Clearwater, Pinellas County, 23rd day of March 2026)
  • Filed stamp p. 1, April 2, 2026, 11:11 AM
  • The no-findings negative is scoped to this three-page document and is not a docket-wide claim

Spawned by: N-080

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-086

N-0892026-04-15two judges each found the case sufficient on its face, and the motion to enforce those findings has sat unruled since April 15, 2026, 127 days as of August 20, 2026, while the court announced two different controlling rules, each pointing away from itIGNORED
Date
2026-04-15
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
two judges each found the case sufficient on its face, and the motion to enforce those findings has sat unruled since April 15, 2026, 127 days as of August 20, 2026, while the court announced two different controlling rules, each pointing away from it
What the law required
Mandamus practice calls for a decision, after two alternative writs and the returns, on whether a peremptory writ should issue. F.S. 57.105 also applies.
What happened

Husband moved on April 15, 2026 for sanctions and for entry of the peremptory writ on five grounds. The motion stood unruled at 127 days as of August 20, 2026; two later filings are also pending.

Meanwhile the court named two different controlling procedures, each pointing away from ruling on this motion: in March, the writ was denied for lack of a Rule 1.630 basis (N-086); in July, the court called summary judgment "the exclusive remedy for you to move forward,"

At that same July hearing the court also said: "You have not had to wait for hearings. You have not had to wait for responses. You have not had to wait for orders." That claim is checkable: the motion it was said about had been filed April 15, was unruled, and stood at 124 days that day.

The court entered nothing and named no disputed issue. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution grants the right of access to records and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder. Mandamus practice calls for a decision on the peremptory writ once returns are in. A court that has already found a complaint facially sufficient rules on the motion to enforce it. In candor, the court's stated procedural rationale is coherent on its own terms, and this same judge has ruled for Husband before (N-080).
Receipt
  • Doc 078 (4/15/26, sanctions and peremptory writ on five grounds, safe-harbor letter served the same day, running about 5/6)
  • Docs 085 and 086 (5/28)
  • the 5/16/26 motion for clarification
  • Certified 7/24/26 transcript for the July quotations (N-136 ledger)
  • June 10 Tr. 111:8-19 and 88:9-10: "I think that the law is clear that it's time to enter the writ or at least provide some clarifi[cation]"; that wording and speaker rest on the transcript text layer, and the page image has not been separately checked
  • Day counts run from 4/15/26: 4/15/26 to 8/17/26 is 124, and 4/15/26 to 8/20/26 is 127

Spawned by: N-080, N-086

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-089

N-0982026-05-05the order signed May 5, 2026 recites and commands compliance with "an order dated April 18, 2026," an order that appears nowhere in the docket or the case file, and two motions asking the court to confirm the error have gone unansweredDENIED
Date
2026-05-05
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the order signed May 5, 2026 recites and commands compliance with "an order dated April 18, 2026," an order that appears nowhere in the docket or the case file, and two motions asking the court to confirm the error have gone unanswered
What the law required
A mandamus plaintiff retains discovery rights. An order must recite accurate predicates.
What happened

The order signed May 5, 2026 recites at its first paragraph "an order dated April 18, 2026" and commands compliance with it. April 18, 2026 was a Saturday, and the docket runs from an April 14 entry to this order with nothing between. Husband raised it in two filings and asked for formal confirmation of a scrivener's error; none has come.

The same order restricted chambers email: "substantive arguments concerning the merits of the case, disagreement with rulings, or requests for court action are not to be communicated via email," it states. It says nothing about the motion for entry of the peremptory writ, then three weeks old and still pending (N-089).

A week earlier, the order signed April 28, 2026 stayed all of Husband's discovery except requests for admission. The same April 18 recital also appears on the arc card at N-024, counted once across the two. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
An order must recite accurate predicates, because a party can only obey what exists. In candor, Husband's own filings call the recital a probable typing error for the order signed April 28, the likeliest explanation. The order recited a dated order not in the file or docket, commanding compliance anyway; the point was raised twice in writing and has not been corrected. A discovery stay that closes every channel but one also leaves a one-way record.
Receipt
  • Docs 080 and 081; the April 18 recital at Doc 81 para. 1
  • the email restriction at Doc 81 para. 3, including "Email communications must be limited to scheduling matters only."; that paragraph's full text is held in the 8/17/26 email sweep and is not reproduced on this card
  • Certified 4/13/26 transcript, Tr. 30 (Lexitas 446278): "At past times, you have not been correct on the law," with no instance identified when pressed
  • Husband's Docs 085 and 086 for the confirmation request
  • the April 28, 2026 stay (Doc 080) arrived retroactively over a deadline the defense had already let run in silence (N-081); the one channel it left open later produced the defendants' written admission that no court order determines the video confidential (N-102)

Spawned by: N-089

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-098

N-1172026-06-05a court set a hearing in a records case the statute puts first in line and never said what the hearing was about, before it or after; six weeks later the same court held that facts were disputed and declined to name one.IGNORED
Date
2026-06-05
Actor
Chambers of Judge Sherwood Coleman, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Section 6, over the signature block of Nichelle Ramsay, Judicial Assistant
Institution
25-CA-010255 (13th Cir. mandamus, Sixth Circuit judge assigned)
Mechanism
a court set a hearing in a records case the statute puts first in line and never said what the hearing was about, before it or after; six weeks later the same court held that facts were disputed and declined to name one.
What the law required
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution guarantees due process, and notice of a hearing that does not identify what will be heard is not notice a party can prepare against; the burden of giving that notice sits with the court when the court sets the hearing on its own initiative rather than on a party's notice of hearing. Article I, section 24(a) and section 119.11(1), Florida Statutes, place records cases on an immediate-priority footing, which is what makes an unexplained setting and unsetting consequential rather than merely untidy. The lawful path in one sentence: state what would be heard on June 15.
What happened

On June 5, 2026 the court wrote: "The Court has decided to set hearing on 6/15th at 10AM in Courtroom A on 49th street in Clearwater." No motion or matter was identified.

On June 11 Husband asked the court to "let me know either the subject for the 6-15 hearing or confirm that the Court is cancelling the hearing given the incoming motion to disqualify." The next morning the answer came that the hearing "regarding Mr. Hanson's most recent motion has been cancelled as requested." The subject was never stated, before or after.

Six weeks later the same court held at a case management conference that issues of material fact remained in the case and declined to name one (N-136). The pattern is the same actor's own: twice asked what is at issue, twice not saying.

The narrow fact that survives every fair reading is this one. A court set a hearing in a records-priority case and never said what it was for. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
Due process guarantees notice, and notice of a hearing that does not say what will be heard is not notice a party can prepare against. When a court sets a hearing on its own initiative rather than on a party's notice, the burden of giving that notice sits with the court. Florida's constitution and statute also put records cases on an immediate-priority footing, which is what makes an unexplained setting and unsetting consequential rather than merely untidy. The lawful path was one sentence long: state what would be heard on June 15. Husband's own email did offer cancellation as one of two branches.
Receipt
  • All four chambers and party emails from the 6/5 to 6/12/26 exchange, in the 10255 correspondence folder. The chambers emails issue over the signature block of Nichelle Ramsay, Judicial Assistant.
  • The subject of the June 15 setting has never been identified as of 8/17/26.
  • This chambers answers scheduling email promptly and civilly throughout, and reading Husband's own email as a cancellation request is defensible on its face. Both are recorded here.
  • Question Protocol: identify the motion or matter that was to be heard on June 15, 2026. An identification answers it. A statement that no subject had been assigned establishes that the setting was made before the court determined what it would hear. A refusal preserves the question as outstanding and dated.

Spawned by: N-136, N-098

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-117

N-1272026-07-01the motion was denied on the successive-motion track, counting a different judge's disqualification as the first motion, and that track is the one that let the order find that the undersigned judge "has been fair and impartial in this case"DENIED
Date
2026-07-01
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the motion was denied on the successive-motion track, counting a different judge's disqualification as the first motion, and that track is the one that let the order find that the undersigned judge "has been fair and impartial in this case"
What the law required
Rule 2.330(h) limits review to legal sufficiency. A judge does not certify his own impartiality.
What happened
On July 1, 2026 the judge denied the motion to disqualify himself. The order treats the motion as successive, which permits review of the truth of its allegations. It holds the motion untimely under the twenty-day rule. It holds that adverse rulings and a "preconceived opinion" are insufficient. And it states: "the record demonstrates that the undersigned judge has been fair and impartial in this case." The order is hand-dated July 1, 2026. It was emailed that day and is not docketed. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.330(h) confines the judge to legal sufficiency; subdivision (i) permits ruling on the truth of the facts alleged, and the rule assigns that determination to the named judge, so his deciding it is not the deviation. What is recorded is which track the order took: it counted a different judge's disqualification as the first motion, and on the successive track found the undersigned judge's own conduct fair and impartial. This judge has also ruled for Husband (N-080).
Receipt
  • Order PDF in OFF_DOCKET orders, rendered pages; Doc 88 (filed 6/15/26; the DIN is provisional pending a docket pull).
  • Authorities cited in the order: Kokal and Cano.
  • Rule 2.330 subdivision lettering per the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 11: (h) Determination, Initial Motion; (i) Determination, Successive Motions.
  • Correction recorded 8/18/26 by eye: the order is hand-dated, "1st day of July 2026." The earlier "day left blank" statement was wrong.
  • The order identifies no specific factual allegation as false; this is pattern evidence about a decision point, not a charge.

Spawned by: N-098

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-127

N-1362026-07-24the court held that facts were still in dispute and, asked three lines later to name one, pointed to a document instead: "Those issues are contained and delineated within their response," and then "don't ask me to explain those matters to you"IGNORED
Date
2026-07-24
Actor
Judge Sherwood Coleman
Institution
25-CA-010255 (13th Cir. Civil Div.; Sixth Circuit judge assigned)
Mechanism
the court held that facts were still in dispute and, asked three lines later to name one, pointed to a document instead: "Those issues are contained and delineated within their response," and then "don't ask me to explain those matters to you"
What the law required
Once alternative writs have issued and returns are filed, mandamus practice calls for a decision on whether the peremptory writ issues. Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. makes access to public records a constitutional right, s. 119.11(1), Fla. Stat. gives records cases immediate priority over other pending cases, and Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420(e) places on the party asserting confidentiality the burden to move for it. A court that holds that issues of material fact remain identifies them, so the party can meet them.
What happened

At a 37-minute Zoom conference on July 24, 2026, the motion for entry of the peremptory writ and a motion for rehearing on the discovery stay were both pending. Husband asked for entry or a statement of what remained in dispute. Counsel for the circuit asked for a final hearing; she was not asked to identify an issue of fact.

The court stated it had found issues of fact requiring a final hearing. Husband asked directly what those issues were. The court answered: "Those issues are contained and delineated within their response. If you can't comprehend it or you don't agree with it, then the rule regarding summary judgment is the procedural vehicle available to you." It routed Husband to summary judgment and closed with no ruling on either pending motion. The writ-entry motion had been filed 100 days earlier and remained unruled after the hearing. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
A court that holds issues of material fact remain identifies them, because the party has to be able to meet them. Access to public records is a right under Article I, section 24(a), the statute gives records cases immediate priority, and the judicial-branch rule places the burden of establishing confidentiality on the party asserting it. In candor, summary judgment is the designated vehicle for such a claim, and Husband had filed and withdrawn exactly that motion.
Receipt
  • Certified 7/24/26 transcript, Guldin RPR, certified 8/1/26, signed electronic transcript.
  • Cites: 4:17-20, 8:5-8, 9:4-21, 9:22-10:3, 10:11-16, 12:15-24, 13:3-5, 15:25-16:9, 20:25-21:12, 23:8-16, 24:13-25:16, 25:19-22, 26:15-21, 27:8-18, 28:17-22, 32:11-14, 33:10-21, 34:8-9.
  • Reporter anomaly at 9:7; that clause is not quoted here.
  • Husband: "I think that the law is clear that it's time to enter the writ or at least provide some clarification on what the Court sees as a genuine issue of material fact." (9:22-10:3.)
  • Husband directly: "What are the issues of material fact based upon any of defendant's responses?" The court's fuller answer included, "So, don't ask me to explain those matters to you."
  • Counsel for the circuit, asked whether she meant a final hearing or summary judgment hearing, answered "No, your Honor, a hearing as in a final hearing." She then said "Thank you, your Honor": the whole of the respondents' participation.
  • The confidentiality-burden rule Husband raised drew one remark, "And (e)(1) is a matter for the Appellate Court jurisdiction; right?", and was not returned to.
  • The court also stated: "You have not had to wait for hearings. You have not had to wait for responses. You have not had to wait for orders." That is testable against the docket, where the writ-entry motion had sat unruled 100 days.
  • Docket numbers are as spoken on the record and are not independently confirmed.
  • A public redacted version of the transcript is on file. The court agreed to have its assistant coordinate hearing time on the two pending motions and stated Husband could propound discovery with objections ruled on as brought.
  • Related decision points: N-080.

Spawned by: N-089, N-098, N-127

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-136

JQC2 nodes

Official public records: Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, official site

N-0622025-10-28a complaint about a concealed courthouse video was closed in a one-page letter that never mentions the video and identifies not one thing the Commission didDENIED
Date
2025-10-28
Actor
Blan L. Teagle, Executive Director
Institution
Judicial Qualifications Commission (Docket 25-762)
Mechanism
a complaint about a concealed courthouse video was closed in a one-page letter that never mentions the video and identifies not one thing the Commission did
What the law required
Article V, section 12 of the Florida Constitution creates the Judicial Qualifications Commission and gives it jurisdiction to investigate and to recommend discipline to the Florida Supreme Court. Constitutional provision first, rule second, which is the order the Commission itself uses: its letter's footer reads "Inquiries by the Commission are confidential pursuant to Art. V, Sec 12(a)(4) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 2.420, Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration." Two consequences follow from that grant, and both limit what this entry can claim. First, the provision grants jurisdiction to investigate. It does not command an investigation of every complaint. Second, no presumption of access runs to a Commission file. Article I, section 24(a) is not the operative provision here, unlike the records nodes, and the Commission carries no burden to justify withholding its inquiry materials. The only thing this node can measure is the Commission's own written account of what it did.
What happened
On October 28, 2025 the Judicial Qualifications Commission closed Docket 25-762. Executive Director Blan L. Teagle wrote that "The Investigative Panel of the Commission has completed its review of your complaint in the above matter and has determined, that the concerns you have expressed are not allegations involving a breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct warranting further action by the Commission but may be matters for review through the normal court process," and that "The Commission has found no basis for further action on your complaint that therefore has been dismissed." The judge had already deferred the same conduct to the Bar (N-045), closed in six days (N-031). A reconsideration and records request later drew no response, 268 days as of August 16, 2026 (N-063). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Article V, section 12 creates the JQC and gives it jurisdiction to investigate judicial conduct. No presumption of access runs to a Commission file: inquiries are confidential by provision and Rule 2.420, so the Commission carries no burden to justify withholding. What is measured is the Commission's written account of what it did: one page, recording no interview, no record obtained, and no finding on any allegation. The complaint concerned a concealed courthouse video, which the letter does not mention.
Receipt
  • JQC closing letter, October 28, 2025, "Docket No. 25-762; Ayers", one page, signed "Blan L. Teagle, J.D. / Executive Director", initials BLT/mc.
  • Letter's footer states confidentiality basis: "Inquiries by the Commission are confidential pursuant to Art. V, Sec 12(a)(4) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 2.420, Florida Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration."
  • Referral-circle receipts held separately: N-031 (Huston 2/24/25 closure) and N-045 (4/22/25 Tr. 36).
  • 11/21/25 reconsideration and records request held at N-063.
  • Letter addressed to Chris at his home address; address redacted from every outward layer by default.

Spawned by: N-042, N-045

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-062

N-0632025-11-21the follow-up asked one plain question, whether the Commission had ever tried to get the video, and it drew no answer of any kind, not a denial, not an exemption, nothing reviewable, for about eight months as of August 16, 2026IGNORED
Date
2025-11-21
Actor
JQC
Institution
Judicial Qualifications Commission
Mechanism
the follow-up asked one plain question, whether the Commission had ever tried to get the video, and it drew no answer of any kind, not a denial, not an exemption, nothing reviewable, for about eight months as of August 16, 2026
What the law required
A records-access request carries a response duty, and ordinary practice is to answer a reconsideration inquiry.
What happened
On November 21, 2025 Husband asked the Commission to reconsider. He asked the direct question: "did the JQC make any effort to obtain video of the 4-4-25 hearing that Judge Ayers offered on the record?. If the JQC did not obtain that, why not?". He also raised a conflict naming the firm: "attorney Schifino is at the same law firm as Alicia Gangi". And he served public records request #10 for records and preservation. The Commission has answered none of it. About eight months later there is no response, no denial, and no claimed exemption. The question of whether anyone ever tried to obtain the video is exactly where the closing letter left it. [IGNORED: no response of any kind was given.]
Baseline deviation
Confidentiality is a reason to say so in writing; none was given. A Commission inquiry file sits outside the ordinary access presumption by constitutional provision (N-062), so the expected answer was a written statement of the exemption, which would also have documented whether the Commission ever sought the video before closing the file. Nothing was written, so there is nothing a requester or a court can review. Contrast the written dismissal at N-062, which at least exists on paper.
Receipt
  • 11/21/25 email and attachments, six pages ("11-21-25 email to JQC requesting reconsideration.pdf", Yahoo capture, sent 11/21/25 09:19 AM EST to contact@floridajqc.com).
  • Husband also asked: "I can't tell if that's acknowledging that there are violations just not ones that warrant JQC actions or if you've concluded there is no violation of the code".
  • Silence from the Commission since 11/21/25, across a tree-wide scan as of 8/18/26; responds to the dismissal at N-062.
  • GAP, material: the PRR #10 and "schifino correspondence" attachments exist only as filenames and sizes on p.6, not otherwise in the tree.

Spawned by: N-062

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-063

Judge Frayman3 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Sixth Judicial Circuit

N-0702026-01-13the outside judge who first read the petition found a case for Husband and, in the same order, removed the administrative-records claims against the three judges on a rule no defendant had cited and no defendant had arguedWON-THEN-NULLIFIED
Date
2026-01-13
Actor
Judge Evan Frayman
Institution
6th Cir. (specially assigned), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the outside judge who first read the petition found a case for Husband and, in the same order, removed the administrative-records claims against the three judges on a rule no defendant had cited and no defendant had argued
What the law required
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630 and section 119.11, Fla. Stat., call for an alternative writ once a prima facie case is shown, then a peremptory writ if the return is insufficient.
What happened
On January 13, 2026 an outside judge, specially assigned, found "an, albeit inartful, prima facie case" and issued the alternative writ. The same order struck the administrative-records claims against the chief judge and two trial judges, and dismissed the declaratory count. Both rulings were announced from the bench before any defense lawyer had addressed writ procedure. When the court asked defense counsel to confirm she would not need to respond to what it had just exempted, the answer was "That's correct." The carve-out then traveled into the writ itself and the next two defense responses as the operative limit on the case. At the case management conference the same day, the court muted Husband. No peremptory writ has ever followed. This is the control group: an outside judge on first look found a prima facie case for Husband, and the finding moved nothing. [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
A court decides what the parties put before it. When a limit on a case enters from the bench rather than a filing, nobody has been heard on it, and the limit still binds. The defense had filed one ten-page document that nowhere cites the rule the carve-out rests on, and the assistant attorney general's speaking record that day contains no legal argument. The court also volunteered discovery guidance to Husband on the record.
Receipt
  • Doc 047 (writ; quoted finding at p. 3; carve-out at n.1).
  • Doc 051 Tr. 8:15-25 and 9:1-6 (carve-out announced sua sponte); 14:18-15:6, 17:22-23, 20:11, 20:21-24 (the muting); 21:4-8 (counsel's confirmation, "would not need to respond"); 26:19-23 (discovery guidance volunteered); 27:8-13 (court disclaims having considered the defense response); 27:14-17.
  • Doc 040, all ten pages read, does not cite the rule.
  • Carve-out carried forward at Doc 55 para. 4 and Doc 65 para. 4.
  • The later vacatur was relief Husband's own 1/16 combined motion invited (N-075, NEW-P13).

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-070

NEW-P132026-01-21the motion asked the judge to explain rulings he had made on his own initiative, and to step aside only if the explanation failed; five days later he stepped aside, addressed his order "solely to the alternative relief", and never explained the rulingsPARTIAL
Date
2026-01-21
Actor
Judge Evan Frayman
Institution
6th Cir. (specially assigned, Assignment Order 2026-40), 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the motion asked the judge to explain rulings he had made on his own initiative, and to step aside only if the explanation failed; five days later he stepped aside, addressed his order "solely to the alternative relief", and never explained the rulings
What the law required
Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(h) limits the ruling to legal sufficiency and directs the judge to proceed no further once a motion is granted. A motion's primary relief is ordinarily ruled on before its alternative relief, and this motion said so on its face.
What happened
Husband's verified motion of January 16, 2026 asked first that the court vacate parts of the writ dismissing his administrative-records and declaratory claims without notice or a hearing, and provide clarification for the court's sua sponte actions. Disqualification was the fourth request, conditional: grant it only if he remained unsatisfied after clarification and rehearing. Five days later the court granted the consequence without the condition. Its order states: "This Order is addressed solely to the alternative relief requested in the Motion, namely the request to disqualify the undersigned," and "the Motion is GRANTED, as legally sufficient." The order says nothing about reassignment, the vacatur, or the rehearing requests, or the alternative writ then on day 8 of its 20-day window. Husband called the order incomplete. A successor was assigned January 29 and on February 9 vacated the entire writ, including the finding in Husband's favor (N-075). [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
A motion's primary relief is ordinarily ruled on before its alternative relief. Once an initial disqualification motion is found legally sufficient, Rule 2.330(h) confines the ruling to that determination, so the self-limitation was not improper; no claim is made that it was. What the sequence left behind: rulings that entered from the bench, that their maker never explained or reviewed, and that his successor then vacated wholesale, including the one finding that had gone Husband's way.
Receipt
  • Doc 049 pp. 1, 9, 10; Doc 050 pp. 1-2, full document; Doc 052 p. 1.
  • Doc 061 p. 2 para. 7 (successor assignment, 1/29/26); Doc 055 p. 1 (defense response at 20 days, 2/2/26); Doc 047 p. 3 n.3 (special designation).
  • Rule 2.330 subdivision lettering per the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 11.
  • Doc 049 pp. 2-6 have not been read; nothing on this card is quoted from the motion's body.

Spawned by: N-070, N-072

This decision point also appears in:

Link to NEW-P13

N-0722026-01-21the one disqualification motion in this case that a judge had no discretion to refuse was granted, and the case's direction did not changeWON-THEN-NULLIFIED
Date
2026-01-21
Actor
Judge Evan Frayman
Institution
6th Cir. (specially assigned)
Mechanism
the one disqualification motion in this case that a judge had no discretion to refuse was granted, and the case's direction did not change
What the law required
Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(h) limits the judge to deciding legal sufficiency. The judge may not dispute the facts alleged.
What happened
On January 21, 2026 the judge found the disqualification motion legally sufficient and granted his own disqualification, expressly deciding nothing else (NEW-P13 carries what that left unruled). His successor then vacated the alternative writ in its entirety pending his own review (N-075), issued his own writ (N-080), and no merits ruling and no peremptory writ has followed. The motion to enforce those writs has gone unaddressed (N-089), and the successor denied his own disqualification on July 1, 2026 (N-127). [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 2.330(h), Determination, Initial Motion, confines the deciding judge to one question, whether the motion is legally sufficient on its face; he may not pass on the truth of the facts alleged. A grant under that subdivision certifies the paper, never the judge. The same judge had muted Husband at that day's conference and tagged the petition "inartful," his own conduct receipt. What the record shows is a rule that left no room and a ruling that followed it.
Receipt
  • Doc 050 (the order). Doc 051 Tr. 17, 20 (same day's muting).
  • Rule 2.330 subdivision lettering per the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 11: (h) Determination, Initial Motion; (i) Determination, Successive Motions.
  • Class set to WON-THEN-NULLIFIED per the 8/8/26 reclass, on the same fail-safe framing as N-047; successor conduct carried as documented effect with cross-references, never as purpose.

Spawned by: N-070

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-072

Office of the Attorney General4 nodes

Official public records: Florida Office of the Attorney General, official site

N-0812026-02-17the deadline to answer seven admissions, six interrogatories, and five document requests came and went with nothing answered and nothing objected to; those requests asked who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it, and most have never been answeredIGNORED
Date
2026-02-17
Actor
10255 defendants and Senior Assistant Attorney General Schwieterman (OAG)
Institution
25-CA-010255
Mechanism
the deadline to answer seven admissions, six interrogatories, and five document requests came and went with nothing answered and nothing objected to; those requests asked who watched the withheld video and who decided to withhold it, and most have never been answered
What the law required
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.340, 1.350, and 1.370 require a response within 30 days. A written demand for deposition dates is answered in the ordinary course.
What happened
On February 17, 2026 Husband asked in writing for deposition dates: "I'd like to start by getting Judge Ayers and her JA, Ms. Heyward." No answer came. On March 18, 2026 he served one combined set, seven requests for admission, six interrogatories, and five requests for production, all directed at the withholding of the April 4, 2025 video. On April 1 the office moved for a protective order staying all discovery. On April 17 the deadline to respond passed with no answers and no objections filed. On April 28 the court signed the stay, leaving only the requests for admission open. Those admissions were answered on May 15 (N-102, N-103). The interrogatories and the requests for production have never been answered. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A party served with discovery has thirty days and three lawful ways to spend them: answer, object, or seek protection. On the interrogatories and production requests the deadline expired. The instruments asked who viewed the video, who decided to withhold it, and what basis the exemption rests on. The office's bare denial says someone viewed it and does not say who (N-103). Every other route has closed: no deposition was taken, and the custodian's subpoena was quashed (N-109).
Receipt
  • F191 through F193, F193 verified page by page 5/16/26
  • Filing #244103616 (the 3/18/26 combined discovery set); the 2/17/26 written demand
  • Doc 072 (Motion for Protective Order to Stay Discovery, "Filing # 245071283, e-filed 04/01/2026 12:33:22 PM,")
  • Doc 080, signed 4/28/26 (N-098)
  • the 5/15/26 responses (N-102, N-103)
  • the quashed custodian subpoena at N-109 (Tr. 101-157)

Read the source document: 10255 Doc 80, Order on Defendant's Motion for Protective Order (4/28/2026) | 10255 Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions (5/15/2026, AAG Schwieterman; incl. 'No analysis was needed', Nos. 6-7)

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-081

N-1022026-05-15asked to admit that nobody weighed the public interest and nobody considered redaction before the video was refused outright, the office admitted both, giving the same reason twice: "No analysis was needed as the video is confidential"PARTIAL
Date
2026-05-15
Actor
Defendants 13th Judicial Circuit Court, trial court administrator Gina Justice, Chief Judge Sabella, Judge Ayers, and Judge Felix, by Senior Assistant Attorney General Jessica Schwieterman (Fla. Bar 116460)
Institution
Office of the Attorney General, Tampa / 13th Cir. - 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
asked to admit that nobody weighed the public interest and nobody considered redaction before the video was refused outright, the office admitted both, giving the same reason twice: "No analysis was needed as the video is confidential"
What the law required
R. 1.370(a) requires a party to answer each request: admit, deny in terms that fairly meet the substance, or state in detail why the party can neither admit nor deny. Objections must be stated with specificity. R. 2.420(m)(2) and sec.119.07(1)(d)-(f) require a particularized, record-specific basis for withholding.
What happened

On May 15, 2026 the defendants answered all seven requests for admission on the merits. They admitted that no existing court order determines the April 4, 2025 video confidential; confidentiality rests only on rule, statute, and a 2015 Attorney General opinion.

Asked whether anyone weighed redaction before the complete denial, they admitted there was none: "No analysis was needed because the entire video is confidential pursuant to Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420(c)(8)". The same reason was given for the failure to weigh the public interest.

Asked whether Judge Ayers said she could obtain video of the proceedings, they denied it and supplied her words: "The exact quote is 'I will go get the camera footage and do it because I have not rolled my eyes at you.'"

The seventh drew a bare denial (N-103). One instrument out of three, a partial win at most. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation
The Florida Constitution presumes records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the state actor asserting it. The law requires a custodian to redact and release non-exempt material. "No analysis was needed" concedes an absence of process, not the merits; the same four pages assert the entire video confidential. Measured against all the discovery Husband served, the deposition demand was ignored and the interrogatories and production requests were never answered (N-081), so this answer cannot be tested.
Receipt
  • RFA Responses 5/15/26, all 4 pages read in full
  • Full quotes: No. 6 and 7, F258 and F259: "No analysis was needed as the video is confidential pursuant to Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420(c)(8); Florida Statutes §119.071(3)(a); and Op Att'y Gen. Fla. 2015-06 (2015)."
  • Volunteered integrity sentence, F260: "The video has not been altered in any way."
  • Demeanor qualifier, F263: "Admit. The video captures at least some of the physical demeanor, however the capture of facial expressions is limited."
  • Corrective Ayers quote, F261: "The exact quote is 'I will go get the camera footage and do it because I have not rolled my eyes at you.'"
  • Bare denial, F262 (N-103)
  • The confidentiality triad first reaches a defense court filing in these responses and in Doc 083 (5/26/26), though it was in the custodian's letters from 8/21/25
  • Signature block on the responses: "JAMES UTHMEIER, ATTORNEY GENERAL" over "/s/ Jessica Schwieterman," certificate of service dated May 15, 2026
  • The supporting negative, scoped: no affidavit of any kind appears in any of the defense filings in this case as swept. Swept set: fifteen documents, 101 pages: Doc 013, Doc 038, Doc 040, Doc 053, Doc 054, Doc 055, Doc 056, Doc 063, Doc 065, Doc 070, Doc 072, Doc 075, Doc 077, Doc 083, and the 5/15/26 Responses to Request for Admissions. Across that set there is no affidavit, declaration under penalty, sworn statement, notarization, jurat, or custodian certification of any kind (NEW-P12), so within the swept set the confidentiality predicate is unsworn
  • Related decision points: N-053, N-098, N-105, N-109, N-142.

Spawned by: N-053, N-098

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-102

N-1032026-05-15asked to admit that nobody had watched the video before it was withheld, the office answered in one word, "Denied," disputing that nobody watched it, and the record still does not say whoPENDING
Date
2026-05-15
Actor
Same Defendants, by Senior Assistant Attorney General Jessica Schwieterman
Institution
Office of the Attorney General, Tampa / 13th Cir. - 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
asked to admit that nobody had watched the video before it was withheld, the office answered in one word, "Denied," disputing that nobody watched it, and the record still does not say who
What the law required
R. 1.370(a) requires that a denial 'shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission.' A custodian withholding a record under a claimed exemption must state the basis with particularity (R. 2.420(m)(2); sec.119.07(1)(f)).
What happened
Request No. 2 asked the defendants to admit that before the September 8, 2025 denial, no employee, agent, or representative of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit actually viewed the requested video footage. On May 15, 2026 the entire response was: "RESPONSE: Denied." Every other response in the four-page filing carries a stated basis or a volunteered explanatory sentence. No. 2 is the only one-word answer in the document, and the only response asserting a fact about the defendants' own internal handling of the record. Who watched it, when, in what capacity, and under what authority stays open. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
A denial in discovery must meet the substance of what was asked; this one puts the defendants on record disputing that nobody viewed the recording before the September 8, 2025 refusal. It names no viewer, no date, no capacity, no authority. In candor, a bare denial is procedurally permissible, and an innocent reading exists: the file may have been opened to confirm the record existed. The interrogatories asking this were never answered (N-081), and the custodian's subpoena was quashed (N-109).
Receipt
  • RFA Responses 5/15/26 p.2 (F262); the companion admissions at Nos. 6 and 7 are F258 and F259 (N-102)
  • all four pages read in full; signed "/s/ Jessica Schwieterman," Senior Assistant Attorney General, under "JAMES UTHMEIER, ATTORNEY GENERAL"
  • The unanswered interrogatories that asked the same question are Filing #244103616 (N-081)
  • the stay is Doc 080, signed 4/28/26 (N-098)
  • the quashed custodian subpoena is at N-109

Spawned by: N-102, N-053

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-103

N-1222026-06-17the Attorney General's office called its production complete while answering one of eight categories; the two categories about its own authority remain wholly unansweredDENIED
Date
2026-06-17
Actor
Darya Massoudi
Institution
Office of the Attorney General
Mechanism
the Attorney General's office called its production complete while answering one of eight categories; the two categories about its own authority remain wholly unanswered
What the law required
F.S. 119.07(1) requires an itemized disposition of every category: produce the record, state that none exists, or cite an exemption.
What happened
The Attorney General's office answered one of the eight categories in Husband's request, under a cover letter stating that its 37-page May 8, 2026 production "will serve to complete" the request. A June 17 production cured one more category and partly answered two others. The two categories asking for the office's own memos on its sections 16.01 and 16.015 authority are still wholly unanswered, and the office has never stated that no such records exist. One further category it declined as too vague. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
The records law requires an itemized disposition of every category: produce the record, state that none exists, or cite an exemption. On the two categories asking for the office's own memos about its authority to act, the office has done none of the three, and it is the office that co-publishes the state's Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual. In fairness, two categories drew facially adequate none-located answers. The core is the silence on the authority memos.
Receipt
  • 5/8/26 cover letter.
  • Preserved production package (SHA-256 manifest; Phase B verification completed 7/6/26).

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-122

Leon (Judge Dempsey)1 node

Official public records: Official judicial page, Second Judicial Circuit, Leon County

N-0792026-02-13the court solicited the dismissal order from the Bar's counsel the day before Husband's opposition was even filed, granted the dismissal without ever holding a hearing, and denied rehearing with the file ordered closedDENIED
Date
2026-02-13
Actor
Judge Dempsey
Institution
2d Cir. Leon Co. (2025-CA-002469)
Mechanism
the court solicited the dismissal order from the Bar's counsel the day before Husband's opposition was even filed, granted the dismissal without ever holding a hearing, and denied rehearing with the file ordered closed
What the law required
A ripe motion is ruled on after the response is filed or waived. Chapter 119 and mandamus supply jurisdiction over a records suit against the Bar.
What happened
On February 4, 2026 the judicial assistant to Judge Dempsey emailed the Bar's counsel: "Please provide an order in word granting the Motion to Dismiss." Counsel returned a draft the same day. Husband filed his opposition the next day and asked for a hearing. On February 13 the court dismissed with prejudice, adopting the Bar's own grounds, whose operative assertion, that the records "were not provided because they do not exist," is not sworn. Rehearing was denied five days later for lack of any legal or factual basis, with no further motions allowed and the file ordered closed. The certified docket's hearing table is empty; no hearing was ever held. In fairness, the court added the grounds itself; the Bar's draft had granted the motion in one line. The signed order recites having considered a response that did not exist when the order granting the motion was solicited. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A ripe motion is decided after the response is in; a court that asks the winning side to draft the order does so after deciding. Here the sequence runs backward: order requested first, opposition filed second, dismissal signed third, reciting a response that did not yet exist when the order was requested. Husband asked for a hearing four times in writing; none was set.
Receipt
  • Chambers email chain of 2/4, 2/5, and 2/19/26.
  • Both orders and the certified Leon progress docket (First DCA record pp. 4-5, 769-770, 775).
  • The Bar's motion (pp. 625-638): "for all the reasons articulated in the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,".
  • Husband's response (pp. 644-713).
  • Draft-vs-signed comparison by exact text extraction, not OCR.
  • Rehearing denial: "no legal or factual basis,".

Spawned by: N-055

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-079

Sixth Circuit administration0 nodes

Official public records: Sixth Judicial Circuit, court administration

University of Florida9 nodes

Official public records: University of Florida, official site | Brechner Center for the Advancement of the First Amendment, UF College of Journalism and Communications

N-0932026-04-23the University of Florida held a records request twenty-eight days and gave no reason of any kind; it answered only after Husband followed up, and then, the next day, in a single sentence saying the request was under legal review, a line its own lawyer wrote for the custodian that same dayIGNORED
Date
2026-04-23
Actor
John Hines, Director of Public Records; Amy B. Quillen, Associate Counsel, Office of the General Counsel
Institution
University of Florida
Mechanism
the University of Florida held a records request twenty-eight days and gave no reason of any kind; it answered only after Husband followed up, and then, the next day, in a single sentence saying the request was under legal review, a line its own lawyer wrote for the custodian that same day
What the law required
Section 119.07(1)(c) requires a custodian to acknowledge a request promptly and to respond in good faith. A delay is permitted only for the reasonable time it takes to retrieve and review the records. Section 119.07(1)(d) through (f) requires that any withholding be stated with the statutory basis. A request may be held for a reason. It may not be held for a label.
What happened
Husband's request went to UF on March 26, 2026. Twenty-eight days passed with no reason of any kind before he followed up. UF's entire reply was one sentence, written inside its Office of the General Counsel minutes earlier when Associate Counsel Amy Quillen instructed the records custodian: "You can let him know that his request is undergoing the legal review." Three weeks earlier the same lawyer had written internally, "I think very little of this may be responsive, so no invoice for now." Production followed thirty-nine days after the request: fifty-three pages, entirely correspondence between Husband and UF representatives (N-096). No reason has ever been given for the twenty-eight days. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
The Florida Constitution presumes every state record open and puts the burden of justifying any withholding on the agency. Article I, section 24(a). UF had two honest answers available in April: say it was still searching, or name the exemption. It gave neither for four weeks. In fairness, a records office may lawfully take time; that is not a basis a requester can test, and an untestable basis is what the statute was written to prevent.
Receipt
  • Request 3/26/26 (petition App. 8)
  • Husband's 4/22 9:52 AM follow-up
  • UF's 4/23 12:39:01 PM reply (petition App. 11, petition para. 16), whose page image has not been checked
  • Quillen to Hines, 4/23 12:25:18 PM, emails_1 p. 68, the top-level original
  • Quillen 4/3 9:15:05 AM, emails_1 p. 60
  • Day counts machine-computed at build: 3/26 to 4/23 is 28 days; 3/26 to 5/4 is 39
  • The 7/30/26 public filing of the withheld set is at N-144
  • The 5/4 production and its contents are at N-096

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-093

N-0942026-04-24 -> 2026-07-30UF's own file counted the pages it found, batch by batch, and in the same messages asked whether to prepare an invoice; the requester was told the request was complete at fifty-three pages and was given no count of what had been located until 103 days later, after he suedPARTIAL
Date
2026-04-24 -> 2026-07-30
Actor
University of Florida: the records custodian, the Office of the General Counsel, and UF Information Technology
Institution
University of Florida (W018463-032626; 8th Cir. 01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
UF's own file counted the pages it found, batch by batch, and in the same messages asked whether to prepare an invoice; the requester was told the request was complete at fifty-three pages and was given no count of what had been located until 103 days later, after he sued
What the law required
Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution presumes openness. Section 119.07(1)(c) requires a good-faith response. UF's own processing file computed page counts of located batches from April 24 forward, some for invoicing. A good-faith response could state to the requester what a billing memo already stated internally.
What happened

UF's May 4 production was fifty-three pages, and UF told Husband: "This completes the public records request" (N-096). It gave no count of anything it had located, then or in the two months that followed.

Its own processing file had been counting all along: 621 pages logged on April 24, 109 rerun pages plus seventeen recovered messages on May 4 (N-097), and 88 extraction pages on May 7 (N-099).

A larger figure reached Husband only after he sued. On July 7, 2026, 103 days after the request, UF's court response put the number at over 470 pages gathered. On July 30 UF filed papers stating 479 gathered and 426 withheld, with the withheld set attached as a public exhibit (N-144). UF has identified no individual record as withheld and has produced no privilege log. The 621-page batch, the 109 rerun pages, and the 88-page extraction appear in no production, affidavit, or motion UF has filed in this case.

Baseline deviation
The Florida Constitution presumes the records open and puts the burden of justifying a withholding on the agency. A custodian whose file carries a page count can tell the requester what it counted. UF stated counts internally in the same weeks it stated none outward, and told the requester the request was complete. Every figure UF has since stated came after suit, and none has been reconciled to the batches its own file logged.
Receipt
  • emails_1.pdf p. 119 (Wood 5/4 11:11 AM, 109 rerun pages plus 17 messages) and pp. 267-268 (the 621-page 4/24 batch and the 88-page 5/7 extraction)
  • Production email 5/4 3:22 PM (petition App. 13-15)
  • UF Response, Filing 251907242, p. 3 and the custodian's affidavit para. 6 (over 470)
  • Doc 006 para. 24 and Exhibit D; Combined Response, Filing 253756192 (479/53/426, per the 8/8 correction recorded on N-144)
  • Day counts computed from UF's own dates: 3/26 to 7/7 is 103 days; 5/4 to 7/7 is 64 days

Spawned by: N-093, N-096

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-094

N-0962026-05-04UF's own IT office wrote at 10:40 that morning that the search had stalled and that seventeen messages should have been included; four and a half hours later the records office marked the request complete and wrote, "This completes the public records request"DENIED
Date
2026-05-04
Actor
UF's records custodian (UF Information Technology / Office of the General Counsel)
Institution
University of Florida (W018463-032626)
Mechanism
UF's own IT office wrote at 10:40 that morning that the search had stalled and that seventeen messages should have been included; four and a half hours later the records office marked the request complete and wrote, "This completes the public records request"
What the law required
Chapter 119 requires good-faith production. A custodian may not declare a request complete over same-day written notice that the search failed.
What happened

Husband asked UF for records referencing his case numbers, the judges in those cases, and surveillance video. On May 4, 2026, UF Information Technology wrote to the records custodian that the search "stalled before completing the search of Professor Bambauer's mailbox" and that seventeen messages should have been included previously.

Four and a half hours later the records custodian marked the request complete, and within minutes UF wrote to Husband: "This completes the public records request." What was produced was fifty-three pages, entirely correspondence between Husband and UF representatives, containing no UF-internal email and no record authored by Bambauer.

The custodian's July 7 affidavit presents May 4 as a clean completion. It says nothing about the stalled search, the seventeen missed messages, the 621-page April 24 batch (N-094), or the 88-page extraction built three days later (N-099). The whole sequence surfaced only because Husband filed a second records request. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
The Florida Constitution presumes the records open and puts the burden on the agency to justify what it holds back. When a custodian is told its search failed, good faith leaves three doors open: finish the search, say it is incomplete, or produce what exists and identify the gap. The record shows a fourth door: the request was closed four and a half hours after the stall notice, at UF, home of the Brechner Freedom of Information Project.
Receipt
  • emails_1.pdf pp. 93, 119, 199 (the 10:40 AM UFIT stall notice at p. 119; a 7:40 AM rendering of the same message also exists, both reported)
  • W018964_Granicus.pdf pp. 6-7 (status Completed/Closed 5/4 3:11:24 PM)
  • Production email 5/4 3:22 PM (App. 13-15)
  • Custodian's affidavit para. 8, sworn to the best of his knowledge and unnotarized; both copies in this tree are the same two-page, eight-paragraph document (Response Ex. A, PDF pp. 16-17; Doc 006 Ex. C, PDF pp. 30-31)
  • Intervals machine-computed: 10:40 AM to 3:11:24 PM is 4h31m; 3:11:24 PM to 3:22 PM is 10 minutes 36 seconds, which is why the prose says "within minutes" and never "eleven minutes after"; 3/9/26 precedes the 3/26/26 request by 17 days
  • F246; RECORD_FIRST_UF B6

Read the source document: UF/Brechner - UF's Response to Order to Show Cause + Affidavit of Records Custodian John Hines

Spawned by: N-100

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-096

N-0972026-05-04the rerun that finished after the stalled search returned 109 pages and 17 recovered messages that same morning; UF's lawyers put them in a folder for review and release approval and asked about an invoice, and that afternoon UF closed the request at 53 pagesIGNORED
Date
2026-05-04
Actor
UF Information Technology; Barbara L. Wood, Office of the General Counsel; the records custodian
Institution
University of Florida (W018463-032626)
Mechanism
the rerun that finished after the stalled search returned 109 pages and 17 recovered messages that same morning; UF's lawyers put them in a folder for review and release approval and asked about an invoice, and that afternoon UF closed the request at 53 pages
What the law required
Section 119.07(1)(a) requires a custodian to permit inspection of non-exempt public records located for a request, and section 119.07(1)(e) requires a stated statutory basis for anything withheld. Records located by the request's own search do not stop being responsive because the request is marked closed.
What happened

On May 4, 2026, UF's IT office reported that the first search had stalled and that a rerun had run to completion. Minutes later the General Counsel's office confirmed receipt of 109 rerun pages, plus seventeen messages that should have been included previously, copied them to a drive folder for review and release approval, and asked whether to prepare an invoice.

That afternoon the request was marked Completed/Closed, and UF produced fifty-three pages and called the request complete (N-096). The 109 pages and the seventeen messages appear in no production, no affidavit, and no motion UF has filed in this case. Three days later a second file was built and routed the same way, to a drive folder for release approval, and it too was never released (N-099). [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
The Constitution presumes the records open and puts the burden of justifying a withholding on the agency. A custodian must let the requester inspect non-exempt records located, and state a basis for anything held back. A located record stays responsive after the request is closed. UF's office asked how many pages, for an invoice; the answer went to a review-and-release folder, and closure followed that afternoon at fifty-three pages. UF has never disclosed that the 109 pages exist.
Receipt
  • emails_1.pdf p. 119: Wood to Hines and Quillen, 5/4/26 11:11:08 AM, 109 rerun pages excluding attachments, copied to the PRR drive at W018463-032626\Fr UFIT 05-04-26, with the invoice question; the same page carries the UFIT 10:40 AM stall-and-rerun notice and the seventeen-messages line
  • W018964_Granicus.pdf p. 6: status Completed/Closed 5/4 3:11:24 PM
  • Production email 5/4 3:22 PM (petition App. 13-15)

Spawned by: N-096

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-097

N-0992026-05-07three days after declaring the records request complete, UF's own lawyer asked for the disputed records "as a separate pdf"; UF's staff routed the 88-page file "for approval to be released"; it was never released, logged, or mentioned in any filingIGNORED
Date
2026-05-07
Actor
Amy B. Quillen, Associate Counsel (Office of the General Counsel), with UF Information Technology and Hines
Institution
University of Florida
Mechanism
three days after declaring the records request complete, UF's own lawyer asked for the disputed records "as a separate pdf"; UF's staff routed the 88-page file "for approval to be released"; it was never released, logged, or mentioned in any filing
What the law required
Chapter 119 requires a located responsive record to be produced, or withheld under a cited exemption with the statement required by sec.119.07(1)(e)-(f).
What happened

On May 7, 2026, three days after UF declared Husband's request complete, Associate Counsel Amy Quillen asked UF Information Technology to pull results for the case numbers, the judges' names, and surveillance video, and to "provide those results as a separate pdf." IT delivered the same morning: sixteen messages, eighty-eight pages. Within the hour, UF's legal assistant recorded in writing: "I have copied the records to Amy Q's PRR U: Drive to be reviewed by the General Counsel and for approval to be released." The release never happened.

The next day Husband demanded those records and a privilege log. UF produced neither, and no UF filing since mentions the file. UF produced the correspondence that created, named, transmitted, and filed the extraction, but not the extraction. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation
The records law gives a custodian two lawful moves with a located record: produce it, or withhold it under a stated exemption with the required written statement. UF's counsel created a file of exactly the disputed material and made neither move. The next day UF told Husband that what it had not produced was records of other people named Hanson (N-100). One sentence saying where the 88 pages went would settle it. It has never been written.
Receipt
  • UF email production emails_1.pdf pp. 267-268: the Quillen 9:16 AM request (p.268), the Quiros 10:11 AM delivery, and the Wood 10:28 AM routing email (p.267), naming the file ISS-444193-W018463-032626-16-88-opt-SpecificKeywords.pdf and flagging a possible invoice "based on the number of pages"
  • Full Quillen request: "can you pull out the results with the search terms 13th Circuit, 2025-CA-002469, 25-CA-10255, Judge Kelly Ayers, Judge Matthew Felix, and surveillance video? If yes, please provide those results as a separate pdf."
  • keyword chart same page (Hanson 113 messages, 98.26%)
  • p. 190; Exhibit D to Doc 006 searched in full (479 pages, text layer plus eye for the 27 pages without one)
  • the never-released scope statement checked against UF's four filings, each read in full: not the protective-order motion, not its exhibits, not the response to the order to show cause, not the case management statement

Spawned by: N-096

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-099

N-1002026-05-08UF said it had found records and was keeping them because they concerned other people named Hanson, a ground that exists nowhere in the records law; its file shows hits on both case numbers, judges' names, and surveillance video, none of which is a surnameDENIED
Date
2026-05-08
Actor
UF records office
Institution
University of Florida (W018463-032626)
Mechanism
UF said it had found records and was keeping them because they concerned other people named Hanson, a ground that exists nowhere in the records law; its file shows hits on both case numbers, judges' names, and surveillance video, none of which is a surname
What the law required
Chapter 119 requires an agency to produce the record or cite a statutory exemption. No exemption exists for a shared surname.
What happened

On May 4, 2026 UF declared the request complete after producing fifty-three pages, entirely correspondence between Husband and UF representatives (N-096). On May 8, UF said it had located records responsive to the Hanson search and was withholding them as records of other Hansons.

UF's processing file, produced July 17, 2026, shows a three-category parse, a 177-page bucket never mentioned, and keyword hits on 13th Circuit, both judges' names, both case numbers, and surveillance video, none of which is a surname.

UF has since made the position explicit: no exemption was needed because "Petitioner did not ask for them and said he did not want them." That has to meet UF's own keyword chart, which records hits on terms Husband did ask for. A second set of 426 pages drew the position that "No exemptions apply to such materials, because public records exemptions only apply to public records." [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Exemptions in Florida are created by law, not by a case team. The Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of proving an exemption on the agency. Article I, section 24(a) and (c). An agency has two lawful moves with a located record: produce it, or name the statute that lets it keep it, in writing. A shared surname is not a statute. UF's contemporaneous file, produced later, shows the ground was false when UF made it.
Receipt
  • Petition Exs. D-G (the petition text layer is ciphered; visual reads required)
  • W018964 production, emails_1 pp. 190, 268 (keyword chart and the Cuillier 5/6 email placing "a few dozen" non-Hanson surveillance-video emails in his own mailbox); both pages held from the production text layer, page images not separately checked
  • Doc 006 paras. 12-15, fn. 5 (p. 7), Ex. B App. 74-76
  • Response from UF (Filing 251907242, 7/7/26, Kirkconnell), p. 6 and p. 7: "The University did not cite an exemption for these records, because no exemption is necessary for records that are not responsive to a request."; the "Petitioner did not ask for them" sentence sits on the same p. 6; the italic emphasis inside UF's statutory quotation on p. 7 is UF's own
  • A footnote to UF's July 30, 2026 motion dates the first request for those two categories to July 13, 2026; UF's own Exhibit B to that motion contains the May 8, 2026 demand
  • The 479 / 53 / 426 figures are N-144's
  • F253
  • Related decision points: N-120.

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-100

N-1442026-07-30UF put all 479 gathered pages onto the public docket unsealed, including pages it had refused the requester since May; for 98 pages the same filing takes both positions at once, records it need not produce and records it need not logPENDING
Date
2026-07-30
Actor
UF Board of Trustees, by counsel Kirkconnell
Institution
8th Cir. 01-2026-CA-001794 (Judge Keim)
Mechanism
UF put all 479 gathered pages onto the public docket unsealed, including pages it had refused the requester since May; for 98 pages the same filing takes both positions at once, records it need not produce and records it need not log
What the law required
Section 119.11(1) gives public-records cases priority. A mandamus petitioner has discovery rights. A protective order requires good cause. Exemptions require per-record statements.
What happened

On July 30, 2026, four days before the noticed depositions, UF filed two motions. Doc 006 sought a protective order over all discovery pending a threshold compliance ruling, stating Husband "has not, and cannot, offer any evidence," without mentioning the processing file UF had produced thirteen days earlier. Doc 005 demanded an immediate evidentiary hearing while asking that both motions be heard at the August 24 conference.

The same filing placed all 479 gathered pages on the public docket, unsealed, including 177 pages UF maintains are not public records. For 98 pages UF holds both positions in the same filing on the same day. Exhibit D is not the whole of what UF located: an internal 621-page batch and an 88-page extraction targeting "surveillance video" appear in neither the exhibit nor either motion (N-099). UF has identified no individual record as withheld and has produced no privilege log. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
A document a university can file on a public docket is one it could always have handed the requester. Article I, section 24(a) presumes records open and puts the burden of justifying withholding on the agency; UF's stated ground for four months was that the pages were not public records at all. Then UF published them. Separately, UF demanded an immediate hearing under the records-priority statute while asking, the same day, that both motions be heard three weeks later.
Receipt
  • UF Motion for Protective Order, Doc 006 (Filing 253616687), paras. 5, 9, 11, 18, 21, 24, fn. 4, fn. 5, and Exhibit D; Motion to Dispense, Doc 005 (same filing envelope), paras. 3 and 9.
  • Petitioners' Combined Response, Filing 253756192, paras. 28, 30-32, and 38-39.
  • Deposition notices at Doc 006 Ex. A.
  • Doc 005 para. 9 demands an "immediate evidentiary hearing"; para. 3 asks that both motions be heard at the August 24 conference.
  • The 621-page batch and 88-page extraction targeted the case numbers, both judges, and "surveillance video". Husband's Combined Response states in terms that UF took both positions on the same 98 pages.
  • Exhibit D category stamps counted across all 479 pages, boundary pages re-checked: Category 1 = 53, Category 2 = 346 stamped plus 1 unstamped, Category 3 = 79, total 479, confirming the 98-page double label.
  • The 621-page and 88-page batches at emails_1 pp. 267-268; the 621-page reference is not pinned to a page. The 88-page extraction was built May 7, three days after UF declared the request complete.
  • A footnote to Doc 006 dates the first request for those categories to July 13, 2026, which its own Exhibit B contradicts.
  • Docketing-lag advisory, from the 8/11/26 message.
  • UF's counsel made scheduling commitments on July 14 and 15 and did not perform them; UF's filed position is that no exemption log is owed at all (N-120).
  • F243, F244, F245, F250, F252, F256; RECORD_FIRST_UF B3 through B7.
  • Related decision points: N-094.

Spawned by: N-096, N-099, N-100, N-120

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-144

N-1452026-08-03the only person who swore to UF's account, its own records custodian, was noticed for deposition with ten days' notice; on the day, no witness and no lawyer for UF appeared at either setting, and no order had ever excused attendanceIGNORED
Date
2026-08-03
Actor
UF Board of Trustees, by counsel Kirkconnell. Witnesses John Hines (Director of Public Records, records custodian, sole affiant to UF's response to the order to show cause) and Prof. Jane Bambauer
Institution
8th Cir. 01-2026-CA-001794 (Judge Keim)
Mechanism
the only person who swore to UF's account, its own records custodian, was noticed for deposition with ten days' notice; on the day, no witness and no lawyer for UF appeared at either setting, and no order had ever excused attendance
What the law required
A pending motion is not an order. A party noticed under Rule 1.310 must appear unless a protective order is entered (Rule 1.280(c)). Relief must be obtained, not assumed. Rules 1.380(d) and 1.380(e)(1)(A) govern failure to appear.
What happened
Both settings convened on August 3, 2026 with stenographic and audiovisual coverage arranged: Bambauer at 1:00 p.m. Eastern, Hines at 3:00 p.m. Eastern, by Zoom. No witness appeared at either setting. No counsel for UF appeared at either setting. No order excused attendance, and none has been entered since. UF had conferred by telephone on July 24 on precisely this relief, and its July 30 motion names both depositions expressly, so this is not a case of silence: UF said it wanted the depositions stopped, but never said it would simply not appear if no ruling came. On August 21, 2026 the court reporter confirmed in writing: "I was the court reporter on August 3, 2026 for the depositions that were to be held. The CNAs have been completed." No testimony was taken at either setting, and the non-appearance has drawn no consequence. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A pending motion is not an order. A witness noticed for deposition must appear unless a court enters a protective order. UF conferred by telephone on July 24 and moved on July 30, but never got the order and sought no interim relief, against a written invitation to bring any such motion promptly. UF's own motion puts the burden on Husband to prove noncompliance, while UF's own filed position is that no certification or log is owed (N-120).
Receipt
  • 7/24/26 deposition notices, served on counsel (Doc 006 Ex. A; service email plus the 7/27 chambers reply, OFF_DOCKET, archived).
  • Doc 006 para. 4 (the burden sentence) and the Chandler line in UF's Response, both born-digital text layer.
  • Court reporter Valerie Gunning, Vincent M. Lucente & Associates, email of 8/7/26 1:01 PM EDT, captured to the Brechner correspondence folder.
  • Ten days' notice recomputed 7/24 to 8/3.
  • The 8/3 demand letter is N-146.
  • In fairness: Bambauer's service was never confirmed (the July 24 question about accepting service for her went unanswered), so her absence has an innocent explanation Hines does not share; only Hines, UF's sole affiant and records custodian, carries the compulsion argument (N-096, N-099).

Spawned by: N-144, N-096, N-099, N-100

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-145

N-1462026-08-03the one demand that costs UF nothing to answer, written confirmation it is preserving the search outputs and logs, was put to UF on July 13, 15, 16, and 18, and again August 3; no answer has been found in any channel searchedPENDING
Date
2026-08-03
Actor
Kirkconnell and UF OGC on the demand fork. UF Board of Trustees on the sec.57.105 fork
Institution
8th Cir. 01-2026-CA-001794 (Judge Keim)
Mechanism
the one demand that costs UF nothing to answer, written confirmation it is preserving the search outputs and logs, was put to UF on July 13, 15, 16, and 18, and again August 3; no answer has been found in any channel searched
What the law required
Section 57.105(4) gives a 21-day safe harbor in which the challenged position may be withdrawn or corrected.
What happened
A letter dated August 3, 2026 puts five demands to UF's counsel in writing, due 5:00 p.m. Friday, August 7. No as-sent copy has been located, so transmission is unconfirmed. The demands: three deposition dates for Hines by Friday, August 14; an answer whether counsel accepts service for Bambauer, first asked July 24; written confirmation UF will not oppose the out-of-pocket expenses of the unattended August 3 settings (N-145); and the preservation confirmation already demanded July 13, 15, 16, and 18, covering the search outputs, hit lists and logs, and specific batches (N-094, N-097, N-099), or in the alternative an expedited hearing on UF's own protective-order motion. Enclosed, drafted under section 57.105(4) and withheld from filing by design, is a motion for sanctions on two of UF's positions (N-144). Through the period swept, ending August 20, 2026, no answer to the preservation demand has been found. [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Every branch of this letter costs UF something only if its position cannot be supported: producing dates loosens the withholding, a refusal puts a testable position on the record, and silence leaves the assertion standing on nothing. The preservation demand is the backstop, because confirming records still exist costs an agency nothing, so a refusal to confirm cannot be explained by burden. The Constitution puts that burden on UF, so a free question is one its position must survive.
Receipt
  • SEND_COPY_letter_2026-08-03.md and.docx; ENCLOSURE_57105_Motion_v2_2026-08-03.docx; the F10 and F3 passes on both.
  • Doc 006 para. 5 (the accelerated-adjudication assertion) and para. 24 (the Exhibit D categories).
  • The Dropbox folder that transmitted the seventeen recovered messages (N-097); the U: Drive path where the extraction was placed for approval to be released (N-099); the April 24 batch (N-094); the mailboxes and devices searched.
  • Scope of the search: the Brechner matter's correspondence folder; Husband's Yahoo mailbox has not been swept for this card. Nothing here claims that nothing was sent, only that nothing was found where the search ran.
  • Arithmetic as recorded on the card, and conditional on a service date the file does not yet confirm: 8/3 plus 21 days is Monday, August 24, 2026, the same day as the case management conference.

Spawned by: N-145

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-146

Florida Supreme Court1 node

Official public records: Florida Supreme Court, official site

N-1112026-06-01the Florida Supreme Court's records office answered seven of ten categories with a single rule citation that identifies no record, and three categories it never answered at allDENIED
Date
2026-06-01
Actor
Paul Flemming, PIO
Institution
Florida Supreme Court
Mechanism
the Florida Supreme Court's records office answered seven of ten categories with a single rule citation that identifies no record, and three categories it never answered at all
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect judicial-branch records, and access is the presumption. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420 implements that right for the judicial branch, and subdivision (m)(2) requires a written basis for a denial. There is no privilege-log rule in the text, but a written basis that identifies nothing does not tell a requester or a court what is being withheld. The burden of establishing an exemption rests on the custodian.
What happened

On June 1, 2026 the Florida Supreme Court's public information officer, Paul Flemming, asserted blanket confidentiality under Rule 2.420(c) over seven of the ten categories in a May 30 request about SB 1652 and the Vexatious Litigant Workgroup. He identified no record and cited no sub-provision. Categories 1, 5, and 9 he did not address at all. The file carries a promise: "A response to your request will be given in a reasonable amount of time."

A follow-up and pre-suit letter went by email on July 8, 2026, setting a deadline of "no later than Tuesday, July 15, 2026". That deadline passed with no response in the channels searched, and the request is still open. In fairness: the June 1 response arrived at the Yahoo address, which has not been swept, so nothing here claims nothing was sent, only that nothing was found where the search ran. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect court records. Access is the presumption, and the burden of proving an exemption sits on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for denial. A basis that identifies nothing tells no one what is withheld, so one rule citation across seven categories leaves nothing to test; three of the ten categories drew no answer, not even a refusal.
Receipt
  • Flemming's response of 6/1/26, "6-1-26 FL Supreme Court response (Flemming) to public records request re SB1652.pdf", held as a native PDF; the 6/1/26 text is carried verbatim
  • The original request of 5/30/26 as sent and the 6/2/26 reply as sent
  • The as-sent follow-up, "7-8-26 Follow-Up and Pre-Suit Notice to Flemming re SB1652 PRR (AS SENT by email 7-8-26).md", an archive built from the Gmail copy, message id 19f41c10b40d43cf; sent 8:42 AM ET as a reply on the existing thread; it is a verbatim text archive rather than an image of the send
  • The 7/6/26 files are drafts, not send copies, and a 7/14/26 version was drafted and exported but never sent, as the folder record says in terms
  • Search scope for the silence: the Florida Supreme Court public-records matter file, which holds no inbound after the 6/1/26 response, and the Gmail account, checked 7/14/26
  • The Yahoo mailbox has not been swept, and there is no exported page image of the 7/8 send

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-111

Eighth Circuit (Judge Keim)1 node

Official public records: Official judicial page, Eighth Judicial Circuit | Eighth Judicial Circuit of Florida, official site

N-1202026-06-12a judge outside the case read the petition and ordered UF to show cause; UF answered by denying that either duty exists, under a heading of its own writing: "Florida Law Does Not Require Certification of Diligent Search or a Privilege Log"PENDING
Date
2026-06-12
Actor
Judge Donna M. Keim
Institution
8th Cir. Alachua Co. (01-2026-CA-001794)
Mechanism
a judge outside the case read the petition and ordered UF to show cause; UF answered by denying that either duty exists, under a heading of its own writing: "Florida Law Does Not Require Certification of Diligent Search or a Privilege Log"
What the law required
A Ch. 119 mandamus petition is measured against a facial-sufficiency threshold.
What happened

On June 12, 2026, Judge Donna M. Keim, a third judge outside the family case, found Husband's petition facially sufficient and ordered UF to show cause within twenty days. UF answered on time, standing on having already produced everything, under a heading declaring neither is required: "Nowhere does Chapter 119 require that a state agency certify to a requestor that it has made a diligent search for records, nor is there any requirement that a state agency produce a privilege log."

UF carried the position into its later protective-order motion, describing a privilege log and sworn certifications as things Husband has no right to. It claimed no exemption for anything it declined to produce, while asserting FERPA and section 119.071(5)(b) redactions, and asked for denial without a hearing. This is the third outside-judge facial-sufficiency finding; the first two produced writs never enforced (N-070, N-080). [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) presumes the record open and puts the burden of justifying withholding on the agency. Two ordinary instruments let a requester test that: a certification of the search, and a log of what is withheld and why. UF says Florida law owes him neither, closing the loop, and puts the burden on him to prove what those withheld instruments would show. In fairness, no court has rejected this argument; the finding here is threshold only.
Receipt
  • Order to show cause, Filing #250268011, plus the 6/17 verified return; the case number and OSC stamp are on the face of the filing.
  • UF Response, Filing #251907242, e-filed 7/7/26 12:32:51 PM, signed /s/ James W. Kirkconnell: p. 8, Section IV heading and second paragraph; the same position restated at pp. 2, 9, 10, and 14.
  • Attribution pin: the paragraph-21 sentence is from the protective-order motion, Doc 006 (Filing 253616687) p. 6, attorney argument, not from the custodian's affidavit, which is two pages, eight numbered paragraphs, and has no paragraph 21.
  • Doc 006 paras. 17 and 19 at pp. 5-6, stating "the burden shifts back to the Petitioner" and "Petitioner's inference is not enough." The motion asks for denial without a hearing.
  • FERPA and section 119.071(5)(b) redaction assertions are Doc 006 fn. 4, p. 7; that footnote also cites section 1006.52.
  • UF's Response was read in full.
  • First two facial-sufficiency findings and their unenforced writs: N-070 (Doc 047, alternative writ, 1/13/26, Judge Frayman found "an, albeit inartful, prima facie case") and N-080 (Doc 062, alternative writ signed 2/10/26 by Judge Coleman, return date 3/4/26). Unruled motion to enforce both is N-089.
  • The 7/30 motions are N-144; the 8/3 non-appearance is N-145.

Spawned by: N-100

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-120

First District Court of Appeal1 node

Official public records: First District Court of Appeal, official site

N-1262026-06-30the appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decisionPENDING
Date
2026-06-30
Actor
The Florida Bar, appellees in 1D2026-0728, by Keating and Londot, Greenberg Traurig
Institution
1D2026-0728
Mechanism
the appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decision
What the law required
The appeal calls for appellate review of the Leon dismissal.
What happened

On 6/30/26 the Bar appellees filed their Answer Brief in 1D2026-0728. It states that "Mr. Hanson's grievance file against Mr. Davis was closed without further investigation," and that because review was limited to submissions and court records, the file held no communications with Davis. In a footnote it concedes the condition on which its production duty binds: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it."

The brief also restates settled law that a person has neither the right to compel discipline nor standing to appeal a non-discipline decision, and describes the 2/24/25 closure as a no-jurisdiction finding, wording absent from the letter. The appeal record carries the Bar's own letters, including a 9/24/25 letter describing a Senior Staff Attorney investigation and two further reviews of the same file the brief says was closed without further investigation (N-055). [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
An appeal exists to review whether a case was rightly ended. This one asks whether a records case could be dismissed with prejudice before the opposition was even filed, without a hearing (N-079). Nothing has been decided yet. What the appellate papers supply is the regulator's positions, in writing and unhedged. Two concede more than any letter did. A third restates settled law on standing, recorded here as the Bar's framing, not an admission.
Receipt
  • Answer Brief of Appellees, 1D2026-0728, filed 6/30/26, Filing 251514921, 34 PDF pages and 28 numbered, signed M. Hope Keating and John K. Londot, held in the appeal's brief file.
  • Quotes at PDF pp. 8 (brief p. 2, the "no jurisdiction" characterization), 18 (brief p. 12, the standing sentence), 30 (brief p. 24, both admissions), and 31 (brief p. 25 fn. 3, the conditional concession).
  • Precision note, load-bearing: "no jurisdiction" is the BRIEF's phrase, anchored to Standing Board Policy 15.75(d)(1), and does NOT appear in the Huston letter; attribute the phrase to the brief and the deferral language to the letter.
  • Composite Exhibit A to the 1/27/26 motion to dismiss with the judicial-notice request at Leon ROA p. 626; the letters at ROA pp. 640-643.
  • Underlying letters quoted by the brief at ROA pp. 44 and 103.

Spawned by: N-079

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-126

Bar and 13th Circuit custodians (preservation demand)1 node

Official public records: The Florida Bar, official about page | Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, contact and public information

N-1312026-07-11one complaint drew three different written statements from the Bar: that it investigated, that it did not act, and that it disposed of the file; this letter set them side by side and put the good-faith-basis question to sixteen Bar officers, board members, and counselPENDING
Date
2026-07-11
Actor
Bar leadership (email draft 4) and 13th Cir. custodians Justice and Moore (video records request, draft 2)
Institution
The Florida Bar / 13th Cir. AOC
Mechanism
one complaint drew three different written statements from the Bar: that it investigated, that it did not act, and that it disposed of the file; this letter set them side by side and put the good-faith-basis question to sixteen Bar officers, board members, and counsel
What the law required
The Question Protocol designs the ask so that any answer is evidence. They produce, they state a particularized basis, or silence ratifies.
What happened
On 7/11/26 Husband sent a letter to nineteen addressees, sixteen of them Bar officers, board members, or Bar counsel. It put a good-faith-basis question to each by name, made demands under the Bar's discipline rule 3-7.3(a) and (b), and set out the Bar's three conflicting written statements about the same complaint. It raised the 7/7/26 quash of the four Bar officials' subpoenas (N-130) and a dues objection with an accounting demand on the Bar's outside-counsel engagement. It invoked review under the Bar's own policy SBP 15.75 with a no-waiver clause and set a July 17, 2026 deadline. A companion public-records request for the hearing video completed its full review pipeline on 7/13/26, addressed to the new Court Administrator, Rob Snyder. A separate nine-point objection of 7/4/26 drew a written answer on 7/24/26 that granted an ACAP review of the closure and addressed none of the other eight points (N-124). [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
This is Husband's own letter. No institution is accused here and none is measured against a duty. It is on the map because of how the instrument is built: it leaves three branches and no innocent one. They produce, they state a particularized basis, or their silence answers. The reason it can be built that way is that the underlying inconsistency is the Bar's own writing, not a characterization of it.
Receipt
  • The preserved.eml file and its text extraction, filed as sent 7/11/26 8:35 PM.
  • Addressees on the To line: Orr, Greenlee, Baker-Barnes, Doyle, Wackes, ACAP, four 13th Circuit Board of Governors members, two 6th Circuit Board of Governors members, Chilson; on Cc: Kelley, Courtemanche, Bailey, Londot, Davis, and self.
  • Of the nineteen addressees, three are not Bar officers, board members, or counsel: the Bar's intake program, opposing counsel, and Husband himself.
  • The companion video-records request final version expands to all proceedings since 4/22/25.
  • Both drafts carry verified receipt maps.
  • The three-statements stack and the closure answer are receipted at N-124; the quash at N-130.

Spawned by: N-057, N-124

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-131

Judge Ayers to Judge Felix (handoff)2 nodes

Official public records: Official judicial page, Judge Kelly A. Ayers, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit | Official judicial page, Judge Matthew L. Felix, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

N-0042024-05-22 -> ongoingon the one issue this case turns on, from May 2024 through February 2025, the excusals ran one way.EXCUSED
Date
2024-05-22 -> ongoing
Actor
Judge Kelly Ayers, then Judge Matthew Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
on the one issue this case turns on, from May 2024 through February 2025, the excusals ran one way.
What the law required
Rule 12.285's mandatory-disclosure text and stipulated deadlines bind both sides. A documented violation squarely presented draws a consequence. A compliance certificate is verified by the party under section 92.525, Florida Statutes, under penalties of perjury, and the verification reaches only as far as the periods and items the certificate itself covers.
What happened

On May 22, 2024 Wife stated in writing that she would supplement and amend her financial disclosures. The lawyers then stipulated a June 28, 2024 production date. Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that date. Wife's disclosures ran about four months past it, and the compel order that followed was granted with a fee finding and never enforced (N-009).

Three compliance certificates followed, and the sworn words moved each time. The first, filed six days before the October 28, 2024 hearing, swears only that a list of documents is accurate to the best of the signer's knowledge. It never swears that the rule was complied with. The second, filed three days after that hearing, is verified the same way. Husband's December 2024 motion named the limit: the certificates "made no attempt to comply with the requirements in Rule FFLRP 12.285(j)"; they "only certify that Wife held no interest in any relevant accounts or assets in 'the last 12 months'"; "Wife is only swearing that she had no interest in relevant accounts from October of 2023 forward."

The third was filed twice, eleven minutes apart near midnight, about eleven hours after that motion was denied on the rule's literal text (N-029). It states the rule and takes it back in the same sentence: the disclosure is "complete, accurate, and in compliance with Fla. R. Fam. L. P. 12.285 unless otherwise specifically stated herein." What the document specifically states is a twelve-month window. The qualifier returns to the certificate whatever the certificate itself limits. Wife signed under penalties of perjury. The open question is how far the signature reaches, and a window fixed at "the last 12 months" moves forward with every month of delay. [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation
The disclosure rule binds both sides the same way. A compliance certificate is the party's own statement, sworn under penalties of perjury, and it reaches only the periods and the items the certificate itself names. When one party documents that the other missed the rule and puts that in front of the court, something is supposed to happen. Every innocent explanation for what followed predicts a random distribution: excusals falling on both sides, scattered across issues. This chain is one issue, one beneficiary, and nine months, all inside Judge Ayers's tenure. A single excusal is discretion.
Receipt
  • Doc 156, the 5/22/24 supplement statement.
  • Doc 155 Tr. 21:8-11 (transcript of the October 28, 2024 hearing), Samarkos, the June 28 date as "an agreement between Counsel"; Tr. 13:20-14:12 for Husband's answers on that date.
  • Docs 044 p. 9 and 046 p. 9, the certificates of October 22 and October 31, 2024, each signed by Wife under section 92.525, Florida Statutes, "under penalties of perjury," e-signed 13:57 EDT and 09:30 EDT.
  • The first-certificate defect (the verification swears a list is accurate to the best of the signer's knowledge and never that the rule was complied with) is carried from gate GATE_FNEW-W3 v2 and is stated here in characterized form. **The verbatim certificate text of Docs 044 p. 9 and 046 p. 9 is not reproduced in either source file, so no words are quoted from those two pages. `` pull both page images and quote the operative sentence of each before publish.**
  • Doc 054, the compel order, e-filed 11/20/24.
  • Doc 084 paras. 15-17, 19, and 21, the quoted language-gap passages; para. 19, "six months late from the stipulated due date."
  • Docs 124 and 125 p. 10, the two identical amended certificates of 2/12/25, Filing #216669496 at 11:15:25 PM and Filing #216669860 at 11:26:49 PM, same DocuSign envelope 0518E64D-6C12-4C6B-BDFC-A83E1B488B9A, each carrying the qualified oath quoted above.
  • Doc 130, the written denial, 2/14/25.
  • Doc 142, Husband's on-deadline certificate, 2/26/25.
  • Doc 203 para. 5, the postmarital agreement signed 10/8/23 without financial disclosures. The record's own name for that instrument is the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23; "postmarital" and "post-marital" are aliases, and quoted material stays as spoken.
  • The nine-month span runs from the first enumerated event (5/22/24) to the last (2/26/25) and recomputes at build, as does every day count.
  • Carded elsewhere and deliberately not counted in this chain: the post-disqualification conduct (N-047), the undecided prescribed motion (N-019, N-033), and the never-ruled objection to the second subpoena set (N-034).
  • Related decision points: N-003, N-007, N-040.

Read the source document: Doc 155, Transcript of 10-28-24 hearing

Spawned by: N-006, N-007, N-009, N-016, N-029

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-004

N-0342025-03-02Wife objected to the second set of bank subpoenas and told the court a fifteen-minute hearing would resolve it; as of August 17, 2026 the objection had gone more than five hundred days without a ruling, blocking the records that whole time.IGNORED
Date
2025-03-02
Actor
Judge Ayers then Judge Felix
Institution
13th Cir.
Mechanism
Wife objected to the second set of bank subpoenas and told the court a fifteen-minute hearing would resolve it; as of August 17, 2026 the objection had gone more than five hundred days without a ruling, blocking the records that whole time.
What the law required
Rule 12.351 governs non-party production: an objection stops issuance until the court acts on it, so an objection that is never ruled on operates as a permanent quash without adjudication. Rule 2.215(f) requires judges to conclude submitted matters promptly. The burden posture matters: the objection is Wife's instrument, she asked for an expedited hearing on it herself, and the non-ruling has given her its full benefit without her ever having to carry it.
What happened
Husband refiled the Chase subpoenas February 28, 2025, the day he filed the motion that was the route to that discovery (N-033). Wife objected two days later, joined motions for sanctions and fees, and sought an expedited hearing, writing that "the undersigned attorney believes that this issue can be resolved by the Court at the conclusion of a 15-minute hearing." No order has ever ruled on that objection. Husband moved for an immediate ruling June 28, 2025; the court's entire answer was a form order checking one box: "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." A contemporaneous hearing memo records the successor judge would not rule on the request. More than a year later, Wife's own notice of continued hearing still lists it among matters yet to be heard. [IGNORED: an untested objection has functioned as a quash no judge ever signed]
Baseline deviation
An objection to a non-party subpoena stops it until the court rules; until then the records stay blocked and no judge passes on whether the objection was any good. Wife's objection is her own instrument; she asked for the expedited hearing herself, and years of non-ruling have given her its benefit without ever carrying it. The first set of subpoenas at least drew an order (N-018). This set has drawn nothing, over records both sides call the financial center.
Receipt
  • DIN 147 (JPMorgan Chase, Filing 217820385, 2/28/25 1:49 PM) and DIN 148 (Chase Bank, Filing 217820597, 1:51 PM), each with the Exhibit A scope quoted above.
  • DIN 149 (Filing 217872880, 3/2/25), the objection, paras. 17-18, including her own para. 17 calling these Husband's "latest" notices.
  • DIN 209 (6/28/25) para. 32. DIN 210 (6/30/25), the checked-box form order.
  • The hearing-memo characterization that the successor judge "does not rule on the subpoena request" is drawn from a memo of that period.
  • DIN 361, Wife's 7/30/26 notice for the 10/9/26 setting, still listing DIN 209.
  • Doc 93's decretal para. 2 names DIN 28 and 29 only, and Set 2 was filed sixty days after it was signed.
  • Day counts in the card: 535 days from 2/28/25 and 533 days from 3/2/25, both to 8/17/26, per ledger sec. 3e; recompute at use.

Spawned by: N-018, N-033

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-034

Systemic (cross-institution)5 nodes

Official public records: Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, About the Court | The Florida Bar, official about page | Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, official site

N-0242025-01-21 -> ongoinga court order barred both parents from writing anything critical about the guardian ad litem or her private law firm, recited that they had waived the right to, and no party had asked for any of itDENIED
Date
2025-01-21 -> ongoing
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix; Judge Sherwood Coleman; Judge Kelly Ayers
Institution
24-DR-001150 (13th Cir. Fam. Div. A); 25-CA-010255
Mechanism
a court order barred both parents from writing anything critical about the guardian ad litem or her private law firm, recited that they had waived the right to, and no party had asked for any of it
What the law required
In the adversarial system the parties frame the issues and the court is the neutral arbiter of what they present. A court may not grant relief no party requested or decide on grounds no party raised. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) (a court of appeals may not increase a sentence on its own initiative where the government never appealed); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020) (a panel that recast the case around an issue the party never raised departed so drastically from the principle of party presentation as to be an abuse of discretion). Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(a) permits correction of clerical mistakes on the court's own initiative, which is a narrow exception and not a source of substantive terms. Notice and an opportunity to be heard attach before an obligation is imposed.
What happened
Wife's motion for a guardian ad litem asked for three things: appoint a guardian, make Husband pay subject to reallocation, and any other relief appropriate. The order granting it, signed June 25, 2026, carried terms in no motion by any party. Paragraph 19 states: "The parents acknowledge that they are prohibited from posting any online reviews concerning the Guardian ad Litem and [the firm named in the appointment order]. Any postings to social media about the case shall be immediately removed and the parents authorize, Google, Avvo, Facebook, etc. to immediately remove the posts based upon this specific waiver." No such acknowledgment or waiver appears in the record. The order also has each parent waive future claims against the guardian, requires prepaying the guardian's counsel, and imposes mandatory paid OurFamilyWizard (N-134), none requested. A parallel pattern recurred in the mandamus case, receipted below. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
A court rules on what somebody asked for; these terms were requested by nobody. In fairness, Wife's motion did include a catch-all for "any other relief the Court finds necessary," and standard guardian-appointment forms may explain some boilerplate, without answering why no one was heard on it. What survives every fair reading: terms binding two parents appear in no party's papers, and an order commanded compliance with a dated order that appears nowhere, uncorrected after two motions asked about it.
Receipt
  • Wife's Motion for Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, 12/13/2024, prayer at p. 3, verified.
  • Doc 337 (order granting, signed 6/25/2026, 2 pp., verified). Appointment-order terms quoted from the amended order, DIN 365, p. 8, verified; its 7/23/26 predecessor was served as a five-page odd-pages-only artifact and the page restoration is documented at N-134, where the Guardian's 8/3/26 request that "a complete copy of the Order be entered into the electronic court file so that I can fully carry out the duties the Court has entrusted to me" also sits.
  • Mandamus-case scrivener pattern: Doc 81 para. 1 (5/5/2026) for the April 18 recital of a non-existent order; Doc 80 para. (e), signed 4/28/26, carries the actual dates directive; Husband's Docs 85 and 86 para. 30, verified.
  • Negative search scope, stated because it bounds the claim: filename patterns and full-text scan across the entire 10255 matter tree, plus the ACIS docket sheet read end to end (DIN 79 clocked in 4/14, DIN 80 on 5/5, nothing between). Email was not searched.
  • Party-presentation authority: Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020).
  • Doc 337 DIN.
  • Related decision points: N-023.

Spawned by: N-023, N-098, N-134

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-024

N-0592025-10-14 -> ongoingone structural question was put to four courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related oneIGNORED
Date
2025-10-14 -> ongoing
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix; the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; a 2D DCA panel (Villanti, Sleet, Smith); The Florida Bar
Institution
25-CA-010255 (13th Cir.); 24-DR-001150 (13th Cir.); 2D2026-0279; 2025-CA-2469 (Leon)
Mechanism
one structural question was put to four courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related one
What the law required
Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330 governs disqualification, and 2.330(h) requires that a facially sufficient motion be granted without passing on the truth of the facts alleged. Due process supplies an independent floor: no one may judge a cause in which he has an interest, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); disqualification is required where the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); and a judge who had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case may not later sit on it, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016). Mandamus supplies the frame that makes the question answerable either way. A Chapter 119 mandamus is a summary, duty-focused proceeding in which the respondent's role is to answer the alternative writ, Radford v. Brock, 914 So. 2d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), and the dispute is whether a ministerial duty exists and has been performed, Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 674 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). So either the named judges are nominal custodians with no substantive stake, in which case no merits advocacy on their behalf is proper, or they have a stake, in which case Murchison and Williams are engaged. None of these authorities turns on a finding of actual partiality, and none has been applied to this fact pattern by any court in this record.
What happened
The conflict takes three forms across four cases: Judge Felix, a named defendant in the records mandamus, kept presiding over the family case; the mandamus was filed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, with the Attorney General appearing for the judicial defendants; and The Florida Bar is itself a party in two of the forums. Every tribunal asked about this disposed of it without reaching it: a successive-motion rule, an eight-day denial without opinion, and on 4/17/26 the trial judge refused six times to make findings: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so". Asked the same question on 7/7/26, the answer was "I'm not going to answer that question." In fairness, the rule applies on its face, and an out-of-circuit judge was later assigned. The record contains no answer to the question itself. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Due process forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest. Florida's disqualification rule gives successor judges a narrower, discretionary track, and that track is what the order here rested on. That question was put to four tribunals, each disposing of it on a ground that made the merits unnecessary; no court has yet said why a judge named as a defendant in a pending case may preside over the related one.
Receipt
  • Amended mandamus petition caption (e-filed 11/13/25, 25-CA-10255).
  • Disqualification order rested on the successive-motion rule (Rule 2.330(i)).
  • 2D DCA denial: prohibition petition denied 8 days after filing, one day after fee paid, no opinion, no response required (N-078).
  • 4/17/26 transcript (six refusals to make findings). 7/7/26 transcript ("I'm not going to answer that question").
  • Two of the judges in this chain have ruled for Husband.
  • Defendants have a nominal-party answer available; naming a court and its judges in a mandamus about the court's own records is how such petitions are normally styled.

Spawned by: N-058, N-069, N-078, N-091

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-059

N-0652025-11-24every institution named in the article was invited in writing to point out anything false in it, with an offer to amend; in the nearly nine months from November 24, 2025 through August 20, 2026, not one has named a single sentenceIGNORED
Date
2025-11-24
Actor
Judge Ayers and Judge Felix (Div. A and D chambers); Chief Judge Sabella, the 13th Circuit General Counsel, and the trial court administrator; the Florida Bar ACAP and the Judicial Qualifications Commission; Scott Davis
Institution
13th Judicial Circuit / The Florida Bar / JQC
Mechanism
every institution named in the article was invited in writing to point out anything false in it, with an offer to amend; in the nearly nine months from November 24, 2025 through August 20, 2026, not one has named a single sentence
What the law required
No rule obliges an official to answer a critic, and none is asserted here. Two settled principles do apply. A regulator that receives a specific, documented allegation of attorney or judicial misconduct processes it. And an official who has a correction available has the means to make it, so a documented failure to identify any false statement is evidence of what the record contains.
What happened
On November 24, 2025, within sixteen minutes, Husband sent three emails under one subject line, each linking a published article and naming specific officials, to the judicial divisions and Wife's counsel, to circuit administration, and to the Bar and JQC. Each carried the same offer: "If you believe that anything stated in the article is untrue, please let me know so I can consider amending the article if appropriate," with a request for comment. No deadline was set. The Bar, the JQC, and the 13th Circuit produced no reply. Wife's counsel answered same-day with a cease-and-desist letter naming no false statement; asked which order he meant, he wrote: "certain discovery was withheld or delayed pursuant to a valid court order." Six hours twenty-two minutes after the third email, Judge Ayers filed a Bar complaint against Husband, kept open since without the Bar naming a false statement (N-064). [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
No rule obliges an official to answer a critic. A regulator that receives a specific, documented allegation of misconduct processes it, and an official who can correct a false statement has the means to. Correcting this cost nothing: the sender offered in writing to amend the article. The silence does not prove the article true; it is evidence that nobody positioned to correct it has tried.
Receipt
  • Three sends of 11/24/25 at 10:18, 10:27 and 10:34 AM, in the correspondence folder; the 4:40 PM cease-and-desist; the 11/25/25 reply chain.
  • Wife's counsel's reply to which order he meant: "I'll see you in court."
  • The article, 16 pages, published on X on or about November 21, 2025, filed at Doc 267 pp. 14-56.
  • Scope of no-reply finding: rests on the 7/13/26 Gmail sweep and correspondence folder; these three sends originated from a Yahoo account, so a Yahoo-side reply cannot be excluded.
  • The two 11/25/25 capture PDFs are text-layer only.

Spawned by: N-064

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-065

N-0712026-01-15the executive branch was asked to investigate the Thirteenth Circuit, and instead entered an appearance as that circuit's defense counsel; the written demand asking it to explain the conflict has never been answeredIGNORED
Date
2026-01-15
Actor
AG Uthmeier / OAG (Sr. AAG Schwieterman appearing)
Institution
Office of the Attorney General
Mechanism
the executive branch was asked to investigate the Thirteenth Circuit, and instead entered an appearance as that circuit's defense counsel; the written demand asking it to explain the conflict has never been answered
What the law required
A conflict-of-interest analysis precedes undertaking a representation. A written conflict demand and litigation-hold notice calls for a response.
What happened
In or about January 2026 the Office of the Attorney General appeared as counsel for the judicial defendants in the records mandamus, case 25-CA-010255. Every AG filing since is signed by Jessica Schwieterman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, under the block "JAMES UTHMEIER, ATTORNEY GENERAL," over the designation "Counsel for Defendants 13th Judicial Circuit, Trial Court Administrator Gina Justice, Chief Judge Sabella, Judge Ayers, and Judge Felix." As pleaded, Husband and a State Representative had already asked the executive to investigate that circuit. Husband then demanded in writing that the Attorney General withdraw, issue a corrective disclosure, honor a litigation hold, and produce named deponents. The office did not withdraw, did not cure, and did not answer. The demand stands unanswered. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
A conflict analysis ordinarily comes before a representation. As pleaded, Husband and a Florida State Representative asked the executive to investigate the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; the office then appeared for that circuit's judges and has defended them at state expense since (N-058, NEW-AG1). Husband's written demand asked the office to withdraw, issue a corrective disclosure, honor a litigation hold, and produce named deponents. The office has since been asked twice to state its authority; both asks sit unanswered (N-122).
Receipt
  • Requests to investigate pleaded at complaint paras. 80-81, carried as pleaded, not independently verified.
  • Appearance: Doc 038 in 25-CA-010255, "Filing # 238833280 E-Filed 01/06/2026 08:54:23 AM" (native e-filed text layer).
  • Signature block identical on Docs 055, 065, 072, 083 and the 5/15/26 responses, each signed "/s/ Jessica Schwieterman," Senior Assistant Attorney General.
  • Demand letter: F144 in the fact ledger.
  • Unanswered authority-memo categories: N-122's receipt (5/8/26 cover letter and preserved AGSFT package).

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-071

N-0852026-03-20 -> ongoingthe regulator announced it would put Husband under oath, he agreed the same week without conditions, waived confidentiality, and invited the public; he renewed his availability repeatedly in writing, and as of August 20, 2026, 153 days later, no subpoena and no dates have issuedIGNORED
Date
2026-03-20 -> ongoing
Actor
Bar Counsel Jason Kelley (Florida Bar)
Institution
Florida Bar
Mechanism
the regulator announced it would put Husband under oath, he agreed the same week without conditions, waived confidentiality, and invited the public; he renewed his availability repeatedly in writing, and as of August 20, 2026, 153 days later, no subpoena and no dates have issued
What the law required
A subpoena to a non-party witness is quashed on stated grounds and, where the rule requires them, on findings. A regulator that announces it will take a respondent's sworn statement either takes it or withdraws the demand. The settled principle underneath both is the same: a proceeding that decides facts has to let someone test them.
What happened

On March 20, 2026, Bar counsel told Husband the regulator would put him under oath: "I am going to send you a subpoena to appear in person for a sworn statement." Husband accepted three days later, without condition, waived confidentiality, and asked that the proceeding be public.

He renewed his availability in writing five times over the following months. On July 10 he wrote: "I agreed at once and without condition. More than 110 days have passed; no subpoena and no dates have issued. I renew my unconditional availability."

No subpoena and no dates have issued, 153 days as of August 20, 2026. In the same period every other witness Husband subpoenaed in this proceeding was released, quashed, or did not appear, with no protective order obtained for those who did not appear. [IGNORED: the announced statement was never taken, and the request for dates stands unanswered.]

Baseline deviation
A regulator that announces it will take a respondent's sworn statement either takes it or withdraws the demand. A witness who agrees without condition and renews his availability in writing cannot be the reason the statement never happened. In candor, a regulator may decide it does not need the statement after all. The record shows neither answer: it did not take the testimony and it did not close the file.
Receipt
  • The 3/20/26 email and Husband's 3/30, 4/27, 5/13 and 7/10/26 follow-ups are carried verbatim in one document, the 7/10/26 as-sent letter (Gmail id 19f4d070ee6ec12a, sent 2026-07-10T17:15:34Z)
  • Full 3/20/26 announcement, 16-page chain PDF, Bar correspondence folder, p. 3: "It appears you have a lot to say, and I am going to give you the opportunity to make it all part of the record. I am going to send you a subpoena to appear in person for a sworn statement. I will send you some dates and give you your choice. I am expecting 3-4 hours."
  • Counsel's 3/19/26 message at p. 4; Husband's 3/19/26 12:10 PM reply at p. 3, "Can you tell me one statement that I've made that is false?"; Husband's 3/23/26 unconditional acceptance and his request that the proceeding be public, "I request that they be public and I would even invite the public to attend the deposition if that is an option," at p. 2
  • Renewals, enumerated: five, on 3/30, 4/17, 4/27, 5/13 and 7/10/26; the 4/17/26 1:05 AM email states the interval on its own face
  • Intervals machine-computed: 3/20/26 to 8/20/26 is 153 days; 3/20/26 to the 7/10/26 letter is 112 days
  • Negative, with scope: no subpoena, no dates, and no identification of any allegedly false statement appears in any document across the three swept Bar roots through 8/6/26, and no reply from that counsel after 3/20/26 appears there either
  • Other witnesses in the same period, each counted once at its own row and not recounted here: three quashed from the bench 5/29 (N-109), former counsel released with no findings (N-112), the circuit's records custodian released with no findings (N-113), a protective order signed about four hours after the proposed order reached chambers (N-123), four Bar officials quashed 7/7 with no written order in the following thirty-one days (N-130), two university witnesses who did not appear (N-145)
  • No fact originates here; every element is receipted on an underlying row

Spawned by: N-109, N-064

This decision point also appears in:

Link to N-085