Court Oversight and Conflict Judges in the Sixth Circuit

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-04-28

Actor

Judge Wendy J. DePaul (recusal); 13th Cir. Admin (non-production)

Institution

13th Cir. Div. C

Mechanism

the judge who inherited the case signed an order of recusal the same day, stating no reason, and that order was left out of the circuit's records production and refused entry into the appellate record

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a denial of access to state its basis in writing. Rule 2.330(k) lets a judge enter an order of recusal on her own initiative.

What happened

On April 28, 2025, the day Judge Ayers was disqualified (N-047), the case went to Judge Wendy J. DePaul. She entered a case management conference order setting an August 13 hearing, then recused on her own motion the same day, on an order carrying an electronic stamp of 5:37:56 PM, stating no reason, and routed reassignment to Judge Felix under a standing administrative order. The order of recusal states no reason for declining a file inherited that same day. It was not produced in response to Husband's records request to the 13th Circuit, and on April 6, 2026 the Second District declined to allow it into the appellate record. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

A rule lets a judge step away from a case and say nothing about why. Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian, so the document still has to appear in a public-records production or be denied in writing on a stated ground. Only the second duty was missed. The evidentiary weight sits on the non-production, not the recusal.

Receipt

• Docs 186 and 187 chronology (Order of Recusal, 4/28/25, electronic stamp 5:37:56 PM).
• Administrative Order S-2025-013 for the reassignment.
• The appellate denial at Doc 282 (4/6/26).
• The 9/23/25 supplement motion in 2D2025-1936.

Spawned by: N-047

This decision point also appears on: Public Records Litigation, the full ledger.

Date

2025-07-28 -> 2025-09-15

Actor

Mike Moore, Public Information Officer, 13th Judicial Circuit

Institution

13th Cir. Administrative Office of the Courts

Mechanism

fifteen days after four specific written questions were sent testing whether the withheld video is really security footage, the office's entire response was to acknowledge receipt again and promise an answer "in a reasonable manner"

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy judicial-branch records, and the custodian carries the burden of justifying any withholding. Rule 2.420(m) requires that responses to records requests "be made in a reasonable manner" and that a denial state its basis in writing. The Circuit's own August 21, 2025 letter processed these requests under Rule 2.420 and Article I, section 24.

What happened

Husband sent three records requests to the 13th Circuit in July 2025. On July 28 the public information officer acknowledged them: "This email response serves as acknowledgment of your public records request. At this time, please note that our office does not need anything further from you, and a response to your three (3) requests will be made in a reasonable manner." On August 31 Husband put the four questions in writing. On September 15, after two further follow-ups, the office's entire response was the same formula: "This email response also serves to acknowledge receipt of your prior requests as well as any new requests. Please note that responses to your requests will be made in a reasonable manner." Neither email answered any pending question. The exhibit record filed with the petition shows no substantive response from the office between September 15 and October 14, 2025, when Husband filed the mandamus petition (N-058). The one letter that did engage, dated September 8, restated the exemption without stating its factual basis (FNEW-A2). [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution grants the right of access to records and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian asserting it. A custodian owes a prompt, good-faith response to the request actually made. The second acknowledgment is the measurable act, and the questions are what make it measurable: each of them has a one-sentence answer if the exemption's factual basis is true. Which camera system recorded the hearing. Whether the courtroom microphones connect to it. What the video shows. Why routine surveillance video exists for one hearing out of eight requested. Routine security footage would have had routine answers to those questions. The first acknowledgment was a receipt, and a substantive letter followed within four weeks (N-053).

Receipt

Both emails are in the record of the mandamus case, filed October 15, 2025 as a 170-page exhibit (25-CA-010255, DIN 6): the July 28 email at page 23 and the September 15 email at pages 20-21. Both quotes were checked against the page images on September 26, 2026. Fifteen days runs from the August 31 questions to the September 15 acknowledgment. The office's own August 21, 2025 letter placed these requests under Rule 2.420 and Article I, section 24.

This decision point also appears on: Public Records Litigation, the full ledger.

Read the source document: 10255 Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions (5/15/2026), No. 4 at p. 2 (no court order determines the video confidential)

Spawned by: N-042, N-098

This decision point also appears on: Public Records Litigation, the full ledger.

Date

2025-08-21

Actor

Gina Justice, Court Administrator (letter signed by her, cc Judge Ayers and JA Heyward); Mike Moore, PIO (acknowledgments)

Institution

13th Judicial Circuit, Administrative Office of the Courts

Mechanism

the circuit certified twice in writing that the records existed, counted them, took the copying fee, and handed over a paper box that did not contain the judge-level communications the certification covered. The August 31, 2025 request for an explanation was unanswered a year later.

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy any public record, expressly including the judicial branch, and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder; Rule 2.420 implements that right for judicial-branch records (Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995)). The Circuit's own letter conceded the framework: “we are treating your public records request as a request for administrative records of the judicial branch in accordance with Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420 and article 1, section 24 of the Florida Constitution.” Rule 2.420(m)(2) then makes the custodian determine the form in which the record is provided and, for anything denied, state the basis in writing.

What happened

Between July 24 and 25, 2025 Husband emailed three requests: communications about scheduling for two hearings, and recordings of eight hearings. The August 21, 2025 letter certified twice: "Records do exist that satisfy this request." It counted them at 226 pages and demanded prepayment for pickup. Husband paid and picked up paper. His August 31, 2025 email itemized what the box did not contain: no records showing the judge directing or being informed of the emergency scheduling, nothing on the after-hours decisions, and no indication the judge knew opposing counsel would not attend. It also reported that "Many pages are unreadable due to low ink," while the box included unrequested pages. Follow-ups went out through October 9, 2025; after September 8 the circuit's only response was a form acknowledgment. No explanation of the gap has issued through August 20, 2026. Forty-four days later, the mandamus was filed (N-058). [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

When a custodian certifies in writing that records exist and takes the copying fee, the requester gets those records, or a written statement of what was withheld and why. The state constitution puts that burden on the custodian, including the judicial branch, and the circuit's own letter concedes the framework applies. The requests asked for electronic records. What came back was a mailed letter, a prepaid paper box, and no electronic files even after the unreadable pages were reported.

Receipt

• Exhibit 006 pp. 13-15 (8/21/25 letter: both certifications, 226-page count, both fee figures, cc line).
• 006 pp. 4, 6 (electronic-format request: "Please provide the records in electronic format if available.").
• 006 p. 23 (8/31/25 omissions email, native e-filed text layer).
• 006 p. 20 (9/15/25 acknowledgment: "responses to your requests will be made in a reasonable manner").
• Doc 012 paras. 17-21, 23, 26 (text layer); exhibit 010, the scanned 377-page production, interior not read.
• Fee arithmetic recomputes from 226 pages at the stated per-page rate. Interval 8/31/25 to 10/14/25 is 44 days.
• Exact paper-pickup date is not yet confirmed.
• Follow-ups: 8/26, 8/31, 9/9, 9/12, 9/24, 10/9/25.
• Scope note: production did include some December 2024 scheduling traffic among judicial assistants and counsel, so the claim is the narrower one: nothing showed the judge's own involvement, the after-hours decisions, or the non-attendance exchange.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears on: Public Records Litigation, the full ledger.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears on: Public Records Litigation, the full ledger.

Date

2025-10-14

Actor

13th Cir. respondents; assigned judges Wolfe (Div. B), then Frayman (FSC Assignment Order 2026-40), then Coleman (FSC Assignment Order 2026-63)

Institution

25-CA-010255

Mechanism

the court rule requires expedited review when judicial-branch administrative records are withheld; this case waited 91 days for its first substantive look and, 345 days after filing (as of September 24, 2026), has had no final hearing

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) grants the right of access to judicial-branch records and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(l) requires that review of a denial of access to judicial-branch administrative records be expedited, through an action for mandamus; Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995), routes judicial-branch records through the rule rather than chapter 119.

What happened

The petition was filed October 14, 2025 and amended November 13, 2025. The first assigned judge's opening act was a next-day order transferring the case for lack of jurisdiction, vacated one day later as "entered in error." No judicial act appears for the next 48 days. The petition's first substantive review came 91 days after filing, from a specially assigned outside judge. Hearings or arguments were held January 13, February 6, March 11, April 13, July 24 and August 17, 2026. No final hearing has been held as of September 24, 2026. The court's rulings on the peremptory writ are separate decision points (N-086, N-089). [IGNORED: the expedited review has reached no final hearing.]

Baseline deviation

Article I, section 24(a) grants the right of access to judicial-branch records and puts the burden of any exemption on the state actor asserting it. Rule 2.420(l) requires "[e]xpedited review" of a denial, through an action for mandamus. This case exists because a recording and administrative records were withheld on an exemption whose factual basis was never stated (N-053). A final hearing would put the withholding, and the reason for it, on a court record. None has been held.

Receipt

• Docs 003 and 012 (filing and amendment); Docs 005 and 008 (transfer order and its next-day vacatur).
• Doc 016 (first order of specially assigned judge, 12/3/25).
• Doc 040 p.1 stamp (first defense response, 1/8/26, at exactly 20 days from claimed 12/19/25 service; Clerk's counsel gives 12/23/25, discrepancy preserved at Doc 54 para. 2).
• Day counts: 10/16 to 12/3 is 48; 10/14/25 to 1/13/26 is 91.
• The same day the petition was filed, three further records requests went out; the answer, 64 days later, was a set of fee letters.
• Amended petition re-grounds the case on the state constitution's records right and judicial-branch rule first, statute as an argued extension.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears on: Public Records Litigation, the full ledger.

Date

2025-11-24

Actor

Richard T. Melendi, signer, with K. Angela Smith, Interim Court Administrator, cc'd on all three letters

Institution

13th Cir. AOC

Mechanism

the circuit put a price on the records while the lawsuit over those same records was pending, and the records stayed behind the price

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy judicial-branch records, and the custodian carries the burden of justifying any barrier to access. Rule 2.420(l) makes mandamus the remedy for a denial of access. The Circuit's own fee letters placed these requests under Rule 2.420 and Article I, section 24, stating that Chapter 119 does not apply.

What happened

Husband sent three records requests on October 14, 2025, the day he filed the mandamus petition: communications involving Judge Felix, Judge Ayers's disqualification records, and the handling of his correspondence with Chief Judge Sabella's office. On November 13 his amended petition asked the court to order those records produced. Eleven days later the Circuit's chief deputy court administrator began answering with deposit demands, each letter copied to the interim court administrator: $348.14 for the Felix communications (768 emails; the deposit sentence reads $348.41) on November 24, and $7,746.15 for the Ayers records (20,192 emails) on November 25. After Husband narrowed the Ayers and Felix requests, letters dated December 17 asked $236.02 (432 emails) and $973.39 (2,154 emails), and a December 18 letter asked $512.20 for the Sabella request (1,122 emails; table total $512.19). Every letter required the deposit before any review began. As of September 26, 2026, no records answering the three requests appear in the records file. The defendants' September 17, 2026 filing in the mandamus states: "All other documents were provided." The two accounts are in dispute. [ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE]

Baseline deviation

Article I, section 24(a) opens judicial-branch records to every person and puts the burden of justifying any barrier on the custodian. By the time the Circuit priced these requests, they were already part of the pending mandamus: Husband's amended petition of November 13, 2025 asked the court to order production of the records responsive to them. A price set by the defendant, on records already in suit, decides whether those records reach the lawsuit. This belongs to a family visible across forums: the Bar's prepayment demand (N-082) and the Sixth Circuit's half-deposit-before-search condition.

Receipt

The five letters, each signed by Richard T. Melendi, Chief Deputy Court Administrator - Operations, with K. Angela Smith, Interim Court Administrator, copied: November 24, 2025, Felix communications (768 emails; table total $348.14, deposit sentence $348.41); November 25, 2025, Ayers disqualification records (20,192 emails; page 1 states $7,746.04, the table and the deposit $7,746.15); December 17, 2025, narrowed Ayers (432 emails, $236.02); December 17, 2025, narrowed Felix (page 1: "2,154 emails have been identified"; page 2 prices "2,164" emails at $973.39); December 18, 2025, Sabella correspondence (1,122 emails; table $512.19, deposit $512.20). Each letter states that Chapter 119 does not apply and treats the request under Rule 2.420 and Article I, section 24. Amended petition, Doc 012 p. 7, para. 24. First Amended Response, Filing 257283141, p. 4.

Spawned by: N-058, NEW-P1

This decision point also appears on: Public Records Litigation, the full ledger.

Date

2026-01-13

Actor

Judge Evan Frayman

Institution

6th Cir. (specially assigned), 25-CA-010255

Mechanism

the outside judge who first read the petition found a case for Husband and, in the same order, removed the administrative-records claims against the three judges on a rule no defendant had cited and no defendant had argued

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian; Rule 2.420 implements that right for the judicial branch (Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995)), and Rule 2.420(l) requires that expedited review of a denial of access to judicial-branch administrative records “must be provided through an action for mandamus or other appropriate relief”. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d) requires the court, on a prima facie showing, to issue the alternative writ. A court decides the issues the parties present; it may not dismiss claims on a defense no defendant raised. Jones v. Sayer, 313 So. 3d 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020).

What happened

On January 13, 2026 an outside judge, specially assigned, found "an, albeit inartful, prima facie case" and issued the alternative writ. The same order struck the administrative-records claims against the chief judge and two trial judges, and dismissed the declaratory count. Both rulings were announced from the bench before any defense lawyer had addressed writ procedure. When the court asked defense counsel to confirm she would not need to respond to what it had just exempted, the answer was "That's correct." The carve-out then traveled into the writ itself and the next two defense responses as the operative limit on the case. At the case management conference the same day, the court muted Husband. No peremptory writ has ever followed. This is the control group: an outside judge on first look found a prima facie case for Husband, and the finding moved nothing. [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]

Baseline deviation

A court decides what the parties put before it, and the custodian, not the requester, carries the burden of justifying any withholding. When a limit on a case enters from the bench rather than a filing, nobody has been heard on it, and the limit still binds. The defense had filed one ten-page document that nowhere cites the rule the carve-out rests on, and the assistant attorney general's speaking record that day contains no legal argument. The court also volunteered discovery guidance to Husband on the record.

Receipt

• Doc 047 (writ; quoted finding at p. 3; carve-out at n.1).
• Doc 051 Tr. 8:15-25 and 9:1-6 (carve-out announced sua sponte); 14:18-15:6, 17:22-23, 20:11, 20:21-24 (the muting); 21:4-8 (counsel's confirmation, "would not need to respond"); 26:19-23 (discovery guidance volunteered); 27:8-13 (court disclaims having considered the defense response); 27:14-17.
• Doc 040, all ten pages read, does not cite the rule.
• Carve-out carried forward at Doc 55 para. 4 and Doc 65 para. 4.
• The later vacatur was relief Husband's own 1/16 combined motion invited (N-075, NEW-P13).

Spawned by: N-058

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-01-21

Actor

Judge Evan Frayman

Institution

6th Cir. (specially assigned, Assignment Order 2026-40), 25-CA-010255

Mechanism

the motion asked the judge to explain rulings he had made on his own initiative, and to step aside only if the explanation failed; five days later he stepped aside, addressed his order "solely to the alternative relief", and never explained the rulings

What the law required

A judge rules on every motion properly before him; disqualification does not extinguish the requests pending when it is granted, and the successor inherits them. Rule 2.545(a) makes the judge “accountable and responsible for the fair and timely management of all assigned cases,” and Rule 2.420(l) makes review of a records denial expedited. Rule 2.330(h) confines the disqualification ruling to legal sufficiency.

What happened

Husband's verified motion of January 16, 2026 asked first that the court vacate parts of the writ dismissing his administrative-records and declaratory claims without notice or a hearing, and provide clarification for the court's sua sponte actions. Disqualification was the fourth request, conditional: grant it only if he remained unsatisfied after clarification and rehearing. Five days later the court granted the consequence without the condition. Its order states: "This Order is addressed solely to the alternative relief requested in the Motion, namely the request to disqualify the undersigned," and "the Motion is GRANTED, as legally sufficient." The order says nothing about reassignment, the vacatur, or the rehearing requests, or the alternative writ then on day 8 of its 20-day window. Husband called the order incomplete. A successor was assigned January 29 and on February 9 vacated the entire writ, including the finding in Husband's favor (N-075). [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

A judge rules on the motions before him, and disqualification does not erase the ones pending when it is granted. This motion asked first that the court vacate the rulings it had made on its own initiative and explain them, and for disqualification only if that failed. Disqualification passed the first three requests to the successor. What the sequence left behind: rulings that entered from the bench, never explained by their maker, that his successor then vacated wholesale, including the one finding that had gone Husband's way.

Receipt

• Doc 049 pp. 1, 9, 10; Doc 050 pp. 1-2, full document; Doc 052 p. 1.
• Doc 061 p. 2 para. 7 (successor assignment, 1/29/26); Doc 055 p. 1 (defense response at 20 days, 2/2/26); Doc 047 p. 3 n.3 (special designation).
• Rule 2.330.
• Doc 049 pp. 2-6 are not otherwise cited; no quotation here is drawn from the motion's body.

Spawned by: N-070

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-02-09

Actor

Judge Sherwood Coleman

Institution

6th Cir. (assigned per FSC Order 2026-63), 25-CA-010255

Mechanism

the vacate-and-restart route, the case that justified it, and the argument that Husband had invited it all came from the bench, while the defendants' own lawyer told the court there was no case law giving that guidance

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d) requires the alternative writ on a facially sufficient complaint, and once it issues “the burden is on the respondent to come forth with facts upon which it refused to perform its legal duty” (Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), quoting Smith v. State, 696 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). Courts “rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020). A court that vacates a finding no party challenged decides an issue no party presented.

What happened

By order signed February 9 and filed February 17, 2026, the successor judge denied the neutral-judge request as moot, vacated the alternative writ pending his own review, and denied the family-case transfer for lack of authority. At the hearing, the court built the vacate-and-restart route itself, before any defense lawyer addressed writ procedure: "If I vacate Judge Frayman's order. then don't I move back to a point in time where this court needs to conduct its responsibilities under the rules of making its own determination about whether or not there's a prima facie case?. So don't I just end up all the way back at the status quo ante of January 12th." No defendant had raised that authority or the invited-error point that followed. Husband offered the narrower path, "You can vacate the order in parts," but the court vacated everything, restarting the response clock again (NEW-P3). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

A court rules on what the parties argue. When the winning theory, its controlling authority, and its rebuttal all originate with the judge, no party has been heard on any of them. Husband's own motion asked the court to vacate the carve-out and keep the finding in his favor; the court vacated the whole writ, and the order's footnote acknowledges the delay objection. The same judge signed his own alternative writ the next day, finding a prima facie entitlement on the same petition (N-080).

Receipt

• Doc 061 (signed 2/9/26, filed 2/17/26); Doc 61 p. 3 n.3 (delay footnote, comparing only against partial vacatur); date confirmed against Doc 64 p. 1 recital.
• Doc 66 (2/6/26 transcript, 79 pp., read in full): 31:16-33:1, 33:2-9, 35:14-25, 45:9-11, 48:15-17, 51:11-23, 68:6-9, 69:6-7, 70:5-21, 72:12-73:9.
• Court's own authority cite: "I would cite you to some other authorities. Ake vs. Moore seems to anticipate that The Court is supposed to engage in the prima facie review."
• AAG's answer: "I don't think there is specific case law that gives that kind of guidance."
• Invited-error exchange: "Well, you moved for his disqualification, didn't you, Mr. Hanson?" and "Oh, so you want to keep what you liked, but if he disagreed with you, you want The Court to disregard it?"
• Vacatur order signed 2/9/26; successor's own alternative writ signed 2/10/26; both entered 2/17/26.

Spawned by: N-070

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-02-17

Actor

Judge Sherwood Coleman

Institution

6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255

Mechanism

the day after vacating his predecessor's writ, the second outside judge looked at the same petition and again found Husband entitled on its face, set a date to produce the records or show cause, and nothing was produced and nothing was enforced

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d) requires the alternative writ and a return date on a facially sufficient mandamus complaint, and once the writ issues “the burden is on the respondent to come forth with facts upon which it refused to perform its legal duty.” Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), quoting Smith v. State, 696 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

What happened

Signed February 10, 2026, the day after the order vacating his predecessor's writ, and entered February 17, 2026 alongside it, the successor's own alternative writ found that the complaint "alleges a prima facie entitlement to some or all of the relief requested," and ordered production or a showing of cause by March 4, 2026. No merits ruling and no peremptory writ has followed it. Pressed directly at the July 24, 2026 hearing to enter the writ or state what remained in dispute, the court entered nothing and named no disputed issue (N-136). The motion to enforce this writ and its predecessor has sat unruled since April 2026 (N-089). [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]

Baseline deviation

When a mandamus complaint is facially sufficient, the court issues an alternative writ and sets a return date: produce the records, or come to court and say why not; from then on the respondent carries the burden of coming forward with facts. The judge ruled for Husband here. Two outside judges have each found a prima facie case for him, the second the day after vacating the first judge's writ (N-075), and in both instances enforcement stopped there. That is evidence about what happens after a finding, not an accusation against him.

Receipt

• Doc 062, quote at p. 1; p. 2 para. 3 (March 4, 2026 return date) and para. 4 (e-filing deemed sufficient service); signed "this 10th day of February 2026."

Spawned by: N-075

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Spawned by: N-070, N-075, N-080

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-03-23

Actor

Judge Sherwood Coleman

Institution

6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255

Mechanism

the order denying the writ certifies that the court "has adhered to the procedural requirements," makes no finding about the records themselves, sets no next step and no deadline, and explains that fees are premature because no final judgment has been entered

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder. Once the alternative writ issues, “the burden is on the respondent to come forth with facts upon which it refused to perform its legal duty” (Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), quoting Smith v. State, 696 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)), and under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(e) and 1.140(d) the legal sufficiency of the return is heard and determined before trial on a party's application. The ruling on the peremptory writ and on the fee claim follows from that record.

What happened

By order signed March 23, 2026, all three rulings rest on procedure. The motion to strike was denied for lack of any cited legal basis, and because a later filing had superseded the one being struck.

The peremptory writ was denied because "Plaintiff has not demonstrated a legal basis for the Court to deviate from the requirements established under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.630". That writ would have enforced the alternative writ the same judge had issued five weeks earlier (N-080); it has not issued.

Fees were held premature because "The Court has not yet entered a final judgment determining whether any party is entitled to relief on the merits." Four months later the same judge announced summary judgment as the exclusive path forward, a second controlling procedure pointing away from the same pending motion (N-089, N-136). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution grants the right of access and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder; once the writ issued, the respondents carried the burden of coming forward with facts, and the sufficiency of what they filed was to be decided before any trial. This order resolves three requests on procedural grounds: no disputed fact, no merits finding, no next step, no deadline, no hearing. The court that has not entered the final judgment the fee ruling waits on is the court.

Receipt

• Doc 073, 3 pages, read in full: title p. 1
• Strike ruling p. 2 para. 1, including "cite[s] no legal basis upon which the Court could appropriately grant the requested relief"
• Peremptory ruling and the Rule 1.630 sentence p. 2 para. 2, including "The Court has adhered to the procedural requirements for extraordinary remedies by issuing an alternative writ of mandamus and ordering a response"
• Fee ruling p. 3 para. 3
• Signature block p. 3 (signed in Chambers in Clearwater, Pinellas County, 23rd day of March 2026)
• Filed stamp p. 1, April 2, 2026, 11:11 AM
• The no-findings negative is scoped to this three-page document and is not a docket-wide claim

Spawned by: N-080

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-05-05

Actor

Judge Sherwood Coleman

Institution

6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255

Mechanism

the order signed May 5, 2026 recites and commands compliance with "an order dated April 18, 2026," an order that appears nowhere in the docket or the case file, and the court confirmed the error 114 days later, on August 27, 2026

What the law required

Mandamus actions “are governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure” (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(a)), so a mandamus plaintiff keeps the discovery those rules give every civil litigant, and Rule 2.420(l) makes review of a records denial expedited. An order must recite accurate predicates; a party can only obey an order that exists.

What happened

The order signed May 5, 2026 recites at its first paragraph "an order dated April 18, 2026" and commands compliance with it. April 18, 2026 was a Saturday, and the docket runs from an April 14 entry to this order with nothing between. Husband raised it in two filings and asked for formal confirmation of a scrivener's error. The confirmation came 114 days after the order: the order signed August 27, 2026 states that the Court "CONFIRMS that the reference to an order 'dated April 18, 2026' is a scrivener's error and is corrected to refer to the Order entered on April 28, 2026 (Doc 80)."

The same order restricted chambers email: "substantive arguments concerning the merits of the case, disagreement with rulings, or requests for court action are not to be communicated via email," it states. It says nothing about the motion for entry of the peremptory writ, then three weeks old and still pending (N-089). The court ruled on that motion August 27, 2026, denying the peremptory writ.

A week earlier, the order signed April 28, 2026 stayed all of Husband's discovery except requests for admission. The same April 18 recital also appears on the arc card at N-024, counted once across the two. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

An order must recite accurate predicates, because a party can only obey what exists. Husband's own filings call the recital a probable typing error for the order signed April 28. The order recited a dated order not in the file or docket, commanding compliance anyway; the point was raised twice in writing and was corrected 114 days later, on August 27, 2026. A discovery stay that closes every channel but one also leaves a one-way record.

Receipt

• Docs 080 and 081; the April 18 recital at Doc 81 para. 1
• the email restriction at Doc 81 para. 3, including "Email communications must be limited to scheduling matters only."
• Certified 4/13/26 transcript, Tr. 30 (Lexitas 446278): "At past times, you have not been correct on the law," with no instance identified when pressed
• Husband's Docs 085 and 086 for the confirmation request
• the April 28, 2026 stay (Doc 080) arrived after a deadline that passed while the defendants' stay motion was pending (N-081); the one channel it left open later produced the defendants' written admission that no court order determines the video confidential (N-053)
• The correction: the order signed August 27, 2026 (Doc 95, entered September 2, 2026), para. III(e)

Spawned by: N-089

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-05

Actor

Chambers of Judge Sherwood Coleman, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Section 6, over the signature block of Nichelle Ramsay, Judicial Assistant

Institution

25-CA-010255 (13th Cir. mandamus, Sixth Circuit judge assigned)

Mechanism

a court set a hearing in a records case the statute puts first in line and never said what the hearing was about, before it or after; six weeks later the same court held that facts were disputed and declined to name one.

What the law required

Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution guarantees due process, and notice of a hearing that does not identify what will be heard is not notice a party can prepare against; the burden of giving that notice sits with the court when the court sets the hearing on its own initiative rather than on a party's notice of hearing. Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives the right of access, and Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(l) requires that expedited review of a denial of access to judicial-branch administrative records “must be provided through an action for mandamus or other appropriate relief”, which is what makes an unexplained setting and unsetting consequential rather than merely untidy. The lawful path in one sentence: state what would be heard on June 15.

What happened

On June 5, 2026 the court wrote: "The Court has decided to set hearing on 6/15th at 10AM in Courtroom A on 49th street in Clearwater." No motion or matter was identified.

On June 11 Husband asked the court to "let me know either the subject for the 6-15 hearing or confirm that the Court is cancelling the hearing given the incoming motion to disqualify." The next morning the answer came that the hearing "regarding Mr. Hanson's most recent motion has been cancelled as requested." The subject was never stated, before or after.

Six weeks later the same court held at a case management conference that issues of material fact remained in the case and declined to name one (N-136). The pattern is the same actor's own: twice asked what is at issue, twice not saying.

The narrow fact that survives every fair reading is this one. A court set a hearing in a records-priority case and never said what it was for. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Due process guarantees notice, and notice of a hearing that does not say what will be heard is not notice a party can prepare against. When a court sets a hearing on its own initiative rather than on a party's notice, the burden of giving that notice sits with the court. Article I, section 24(a) and the judicial-branch records rule also put records cases on an expedited footing, which makes an unexplained setting and unsetting consequential. The lawful path was one sentence long: state what would be heard on June 15.

Receipt

• All four chambers and party emails from the 6/5 to 6/12/26 exchange, in the 10255 correspondence folder. The chambers emails issue over the signature block of Nichelle Ramsay, Judicial Assistant.
• The subject of the June 15 setting has never been identified as of 8/17/26.
• This chambers answers scheduling email promptly and civilly throughout. Recorded here.
• Question Protocol: identify the motion or matter that was to be heard on June 15, 2026. An identification answers it. A statement that no subject had been assigned establishes that the setting was made before the court determined what it would hear. A refusal preserves the question as outstanding and dated.

Spawned by: N-136, N-098

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-07-01

Actor

Judge Sherwood Coleman

Institution

6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255

Mechanism

the motion was denied on the successive-motion track, counting a different judge's disqualification as the first motion, and that track is the one that let the order find that the undersigned judge "has been fair and impartial in this case"

What the law required

Due process guarantees an impartial tribunal (Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)). An initial motion directed to a judge is judged on legal sufficiency alone, with the facts alleged taken as true (Rule 2.330(h)), and the test “focuses on those matters from which a litigant may reasonably question a judge's impartiality rather than the judge's perception of his ability to act fairly and impartially” (Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983)). A judge does not certify his own impartiality.

What happened

On July 1, 2026 the judge denied the motion to disqualify himself. The order treats the motion as successive, which permits review of the truth of its allegations. It holds the motion untimely under the twenty-day rule. It holds that adverse rulings and a "preconceived opinion" are insufficient. And it states: "the record demonstrates that the undersigned judge has been fair and impartial in this case." The order is hand-dated July 1, 2026. It was emailed that day and is not docketed. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

A motion to disqualify a judge is judged on whether a reasonable litigant could question his impartiality, with the facts alleged taken as true; the test excludes the judge's own view of his fairness. This was the first motion directed to this judge, and it rested on his own signed orders and transcript. The order took a different track: it counted a different judge's disqualification as the first motion, and on that track found the undersigned judge's own conduct fair and impartial. This judge has also ruled for Husband (N-080).

Receipt

• Order, rendered pages; Doc 88 (filed 6/15/26).
• Authorities cited in the order: Kokal and Cano; full citation, court, and year for each are not yet confirmed.
• Rule 2.330 subdivision lettering: (h) Determination, Initial Motion; (i) Determination, Successive Motions.
• The order is hand-dated, "1st day of July 2026."
• The order identifies no specific factual allegation as false.

Spawned by: N-098

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Spawned by: N-089, N-098, N-127

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-08-17

Actor

Judge Sherwood Coleman; Senior AAG Jessica Schwieterman for the served respondents

Institution

13th Judicial Circuit (conflict judge, 6th Circuit)

Mechanism

at the hearing on his motion to enter the writ, counsel for the custodian told the court no affidavit was needed and that the video would be released once the requester proved good cause; ten days later the order treated the requester's argument as that good-cause motion

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian asserting it. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state the basis for a denial in writing, and Rule 2.420(l) makes mandamus the remedy. The noticed subjects were entry of the peremptory writ (Doc 078) and rehearing on the discovery stay (Doc 086).

What happened

The hearing went forward on August 17, 2026 by Zoom on Husband's motion for the peremptory writ and sanctions (Doc 078) and his motion for reconsideration of the discovery stay (Doc 086). Counsel for the judicial defendants maintained, "pursuant to Florida Statute 119," that the video is confidential as surveillance or security footage and that "there are specific things that Mr. Hanson has to follow in order to have that released." On the missing affidavit she said: "We didn't need to attach an affidavit, because the documents Mr. Hanson produced proved our point." She agreed the video exists and can be obtained, named the step as a motion showing good cause, told the court it would not need to view the video to decide good cause, and said no other exemption would be asserted. Husband argued that the proper framework is Rule 2.420, not chapter 119, and that no affidavit or evidence supports the exemption. The August 27 order denied the writ, treated Husband's assertion as an ore tenus motion to find good cause, gave the defendants seven days to respond on the video, and required a record-by-record statement for everything else (N-089). On September 2 the defendants wrote that Husband "has failed to plead any form of good cause" and that they "will tender the video to the Court immediately upon such an order." As of September 24, 2026, the docket showed no order after August 27. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

The custodian that asserts an exemption carries the burden of proving the record falls within it, and a sworn statement is how a custodian proves what a recording is. The requester's right comes from the Constitution itself. Measured against that allocation, the question at this hearing was where the next step would fall.

Receipt

Certified transcript of the August 17, 2026 hearing (Lucente L26-133, reporter Lorial L. Milazzo, RPR, certified 8/19/26), filed with the Notice of Filing at Doc 096: 15:8-17, 16:4-7, 24:3-25:4, 26:2-9, 34:7-9, 34:20-35:3. Doc 095 (8/27/26, entered 9/2/26) pp. 1-5. Doc 094 (Filing 256242348, e-filed 9/2/26) pp. 2-3. Docket status: the 10255 README audit of 9/23/26 and the 9/24/26 email thread with Judge Coleman's chambers.

Spawned by: N-136, N-089

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-08-27

Actor

Judge Sherwood Coleman

Institution

6th Cir. (assigned), 25-CA-010255

Mechanism

two judges each found the case sufficient on its face; the motion to enforce those findings waited 134 days, and when it was decided on August 27, 2026, the peremptory writ and sanctions were denied and the defendants received new deadlines to justify the withholding

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder. Once the alternative writ issues, “the burden is on the respondent to come forth with facts upon which it refused to perform its legal duty” (Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), quoting Smith v. State, 696 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)); the sufficiency of the return is decided before trial on a party's application (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(e), 1.140(d)), and a court that finds facts disputed names them and sets them for hearing. Sanctions were sought in the alternative under Rule 2.420(i), Rule 1.380 and section 57.105, and the movant carries that burden.

What happened

Husband moved on April 15, 2026 for sanctions and for entry of the peremptory writ on five grounds. The motion was heard August 17 and decided August 27, 2026, 134 days after filing. The order denied the peremptory writ because "there are factual disputes," without naming one; denied sanctions without prejudice; and gave the defendants seven days on the video and fourteen days to justify every other withheld record.

Before that ruling, the court named two different controlling procedures, each pointing away from deciding this motion: in March, the writ was denied for lack of a Rule 1.630 basis (N-086); in July, the court called summary judgment "the exclusive remedy for you to move forward."

At that same July hearing the court also said: "You have not had to wait for hearings. You have not had to wait for responses. You have not had to wait for orders." That claim is checkable: when the court said it, the April 15 motion had been pending 100 days without a hearing or a ruling.

At the July hearing the court entered nothing and named no disputed issue. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution grants the right of access to records and puts the burden of any exemption on the withholder; after the writ, the respondent carries the burden of coming forward with facts. A court that has already found a complaint facially sufficient rules on the motion to enforce it, and if it finds facts disputed it names them. This same judge has ruled for Husband before (N-080).

Receipt

• Doc 078 (4/15/26, sanctions and peremptory writ on five grounds, safe-harbor letter served the same day, running about 5/6)
• Docs 085 and 086 (5/28)
• Doc 095 (8/27/26 order, entered 9/2/26), pp. 2-5
• the 5/16/26 motion for clarification
• Certified 7/24/26 transcript for the July quotations (N-136 ledger)
• Day counts run from 4/15/26: to 7/24/26 is 100; to the 8/17/26 hearing is 124; to the 8/27/26 order is 134

Spawned by: N-080, N-086

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-08-27

Actor

Judge Sherwood Coleman (Sixth Circuit, sitting by assignment)

Institution

25-CA-010255, 13th Cir. (assigned 6th Cir. judge)

Mechanism

the court treated Husband's argument as an oral motion for a good-cause finding under the statute; the transcript shows him asking for the peremptory writ, saying the law does not require that motion, and telling the court that Rule 2.420, not Chapter 119, governs

What the law required

Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution guarantees due process, and an adversarial court decides the case the parties bring: courts "rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present" (United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020) (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008))). Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden of establishing any exemption on the custodian, and the requester carries none. A good-cause motion under section 119.071(3)(a)3.d. presupposes an exemption that was never established.

What happened

On August 17, 2026 Husband asked the court to "immediately enter the peremptory writ on the video and then all of the documentation" (Tr. 32:12-14). Asked whether Chapter 119 applies, he answered that it "can be informative" but "does not apply" and that the governing provision is Rule 2.420 (Tr. 29:8-16; 34:7-9). Asked why he would not file a motion to determine good cause, he answered: "I know that the law doesn't require it" (Tr. 38:8-10). The August 27 order recorded that "Plaintiff emphatically asserted he has shown good cause" and stated: "This Court accepts Plaintiff's assertion as an ore tenus motion for the Court to find good cause for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit to disclose the Video to Plaintiff under section 119.071(3)(a)3.d., Florida Statutes." It then gave the defendants seven days to state a position on good cause. Husband moved on September 8, 2026 to vacate that characterization (Doc 97, prayer (b); Doc 100, prayer (c)). As of September 26, 2026 no ruling on either motion appears on the docket. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

A court decides the request the party makes. Husband asked for the peremptory writ on the video because no exemption had been proven. The order recorded a different request in his name: a motion for a good-cause finding, which starts from the premise that the exemption applies. The same order denied the writ he asked for (N-089). When the order issued, the deviation was complete.

Receipt

• Doc 095 p. 2 (order, signed 8/27/26, docketed 9/2/26): the "emphatically asserted" and "accepts Plaintiff's assertion as an ore tenus motion" sentences; fn. 1 (pp. 1-2) assumes Chapter 119 "for purposes of this analysis only."
• Doc 096 (certified 8/17/26 transcript, Lucente L26-133): Tr. 28:4-13 (no evidence the video falls under the exemption); Tr. 29:3-19 (Chapter 119 "does not apply"; Rule 2.420); Tr. 32:12-14 (ask: enter the peremptory writ on the video); Tr. 34:7-9 ("the proper cite. would be found in 2.420 and not Chapter 119"); Tr. 38:2-11 (court's question; "the law doesn't require it"); Tr. 39:17-22 ("Are you saying that pleading a fact is sufficient?").
• Doc 097 p. 5 para. 8-9 and p. 13 prayer (b); Doc 100 p. 2 para. 2 and p. 14 prayer (c): vacatur asked.
• Clerk docket screenshot 9/23/26 (DIN 94-102): no order after DIN 95; Gmail e-service sweep through 9/26/26: none.

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-08-27 -> 2026-09-26

Actor

Judge Sherwood Coleman (Sixth Circuit, sitting by assignment)

Institution

25-CA-010255, 13th Cir. (assigned 6th Cir. judge)

Mechanism

the court promised to decide the video question "expeditiously" on the papers; the papers were complete on September 8, 2026, the custodian had already said it would hand over the video on a good-cause finding, and as of September 26 no ruling has issued

What the law required

Justice "shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Art. I, s. 21, Fla. Const. "Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1). Rule 2.420(l) requires expedited review of a denial of access to judicial-branch records. The order added its own standard: the court "will resolve the good-cause question expeditiously based upon the parties' submissions."

What happened

The August 27, 2026 order recorded the Thirteenth Circuit's representation that, on a good-cause finding, "it would not interpose another exemption or objection and would provide Plaintiff the Video," and stated that if the defendants contested good cause "the Court will resolve the good-cause question expeditiously based upon the parties' submissions." The defendants filed their statement on September 2 (Doc 94), offering to "tender the video to the Court immediately upon such an order." Husband filed his submission on September 8 (Docs 97 and 100; Doc 101 is the same video motion resubmitted with exhibits on September 11). He asked chambers for hearing time on September 14 and again on September 24; the judicial assistant replied that day that the office was "working on freeing up time on the calendar for you if they cannot be decided on written submissions." As of September 26, 2026, the clerk's docket (pulled September 23, DIN 94 through 102) shows no order after the August 27 order, and no order has been served by e-mail through September 26. Elapsed: 18 days since Husband's submission, 24 since the defendants', 30 since the order, 40 since the hearing. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

A judge rules within a reasonable time on every matter submitted, and a records case gets expedited review. This order set a narrower standard for itself: once both sides filed, the good-cause question would be resolved expeditiously on those filings. The defendants had told the court that a good-cause finding would end the dispute, with no further exemption or objection. One ruling stands between Husband and the video.

Receipt

• Doc 095 p. 2, sec. I paras. 1 and 3 (representation recorded; "expeditiously" sentence).
• Doc 094 p. 1 stamp (e-filed 9/2/26 11:15:50 AM) and p. 3 (tender sentence).
• Doc 097 p. 13 stamp (e-filed 9/8/26 11:43 AM); Doc 100 (Filing 256559091, e-filed 9/8/26 12:09 PM; clerk clock-in 9/8, entered 9/14); DIN 101 (clock-in 9/11, entered 9/14).
• The 9-14-26 and 9-24-26 emails to Section 6 with the 9/24/26 1:21 PM JA Ramsay reply (Gmail capture).
• _DATA\DOCKET_SCREENSHOT_clerk_2026-09-23 (DIN 94-102, no order after 95); Gmail sweep 9/21 to 9/26/26 for court, clerk and AG senders: no 10255 order served.
• Day counts from 9/8, 9/2, 8/27 and 8/17 to 9/26/26: 18, 24, 30, 40.

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-01-21 -> ongoing

Actor

Judge Matthew Felix; Judge Sherwood Coleman; Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

24-DR-001150 (13th Cir. Fam. Div. A); 25-CA-010255

Mechanism

a court order barred both parents from writing anything critical about the guardian ad litem or her private law firm, recited that they had waived the right to, and no party had asked for any of it

What the law required

A parent's liberty interest in his children and his freedom of speech are protected by Article I, sections 9 and 4 of the Florida Constitution and by the First and Fourteenth Amendments; a limitation on protected speech is presumptively invalid and the state carries the burden of justifying it (Romero v. Erik G. Abrahamson, P.A., 113 So. 3d 870, 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)). In the adversarial system the parties frame the issues and the court rules on what they present; a court may not grant relief no party requested or decide on grounds no party raised. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020). Notice and an opportunity to be heard attach before an obligation is imposed.

What happened

Wife's motion for a guardian ad litem asked for three things: appoint a guardian, make Husband pay subject to reallocation, and any other relief appropriate. The order granting it, signed June 25, 2026, carried terms in no motion by any party. Paragraph 19 states: "The parents acknowledge that they are prohibited from posting any online reviews concerning the Guardian ad Litem and [the firm named in the appointment order]. Any postings to social media about the case shall be immediately removed and the parents authorize, Google, Avvo, Facebook, etc. to immediately remove the posts based upon this specific waiver." No such acknowledgment or waiver appears in the record. The order also has each parent waive future claims against the guardian, requires prepaying the guardian's counsel, and imposes mandatory paid OurFamilyWizard (N-134), none requested. A parallel pattern recurred in the mandamus case, receipted below. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

A court rules on what somebody asked for, and a restriction on a parent's speech is presumptively invalid until the state justifies it. Terms binding two parents appear in no party's papers, no one was heard on them, and the order recites agreements no party made. An order in the records case commanded compliance with a dated order that appears nowhere, uncorrected after two motions asked about it.

Receipt

• Wife's Motion for Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, 12/13/2024, prayer at p. 3.
• Doc 337 (order granting, signed 6/25/2026, 2 pp.). Appointment-order terms quoted from the amended order, DIN 365, p. 8; its 7/23/26 predecessor was served as a five-page odd-pages-only artifact and the page restoration is documented at N-134, where the Guardian's 8/3/26 request that "a complete copy of the Order be entered into the electronic court file so that I can fully carry out the duties the Court has entrusted to me" also sits.
• Mandamus-case scrivener pattern: Doc 81 para. 1 (5/5/2026) for the April 18 recital of a non-existent order (confirmed a scrivener's error for the April 28 order by the order signed August 27, 2026, para. III(e)); Doc 80 para. (e), signed 4/28/26, carries the actual dates directive; Husband's Docs 85 and 86 para. 30.
• Negative search scope, stated because it bounds the claim: filename patterns and full-text scan across the entire 10255 matter tree, plus the ACIS docket sheet read end to end (DIN 79 clocked in 4/14, DIN 80 on 5/5, nothing between). Email was not searched.
• Party-presentation authority: Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020).
• Related decision points: N-023.

Spawned by: N-023, N-098, N-134

This decision point also appears on: Under Judge Felix, the full ledger.

Date

2025-10-14 -> ongoing

Actor

Judge Matthew Felix; the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; a 2D DCA panel (Villanti, Sleet, Smith); The Florida Bar

Institution

25-CA-010255 (13th Cir.); 24-DR-001150 (13th Cir.); 2D2026-0279; 2025-CA-2469 (Leon)

Mechanism

one structural question was put to three courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related one

What the law required

Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest: In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (disqualification required where the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable); Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016) (the error is structural). Court rules govern "practice and procedure" (Art. V, s. 2(a), Fla. Const.); the impartial tribunal is a constitutional guarantee, and the federal Constitution binds "the Judges in every State," any state rule to the contrary notwithstanding (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Under Rule 2.330(h) the facts alleged are taken as true and the motion is judged on legal sufficiency alone. In a records mandamus the respondent's role is to answer the writ (Radford v. Brock, 914 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 674 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)), so the named judges are either nominal custodians with no stake, in which case no merits advocacy for them is proper, or parties with a stake, in which case Murchison and Williams apply; no court in this record has answered either way.

What happened

The conflict takes three forms across related cases: Judge Felix, a named defendant in the records mandamus, kept presiding over the family case; the mandamus was filed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, with the Attorney General appearing for the judicial defendants; and The Florida Bar is itself a party in two of the forums. Three courts were asked whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one, and each disposed of the request without reaching that question. Judge Felix denied the disqualification motions on the successive-motion rule, the second time 9 hours and 27 minutes after it was filed, ruling it legally insufficient and stating that he can be fair and impartial (N-069, N-118). The Second District denied the prohibition petition in one sentence, seven days after filing, with no response required (N-078). The Sixth Circuit judge assigned to the records case ruled that he had no power to transfer the family case (N-075). No court has said why a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Due process forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest, and a procedural rule cannot override that guarantee. A judge named as a defendant in the records case kept presiding over the related family case. The question was put to three courts; each disposed of it without reaching the merits, and no court has said why a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one.

Receipt

• Amended mandamus petition caption (e-filed 11/13/25, 25-CA-10255).
• Disqualification order rested on the successive-motion rule (Rule 2.330(i)).
• 2D DCA denial: prohibition petition filed 2/3/26 and denied 2/10/26, seven days later, one day after fee paid, no opinion, no response required (N-078).
• 1150 Doc 258 (1/8/26) and Doc 331 (6/10/26, e-signed 9:27:13 AM; the motion, Doc 329, e-filed 12:00:02 AM).
• 10255 Doc 61 paras. 9 and 11 (family-case transfer denied for lack of authority).
• Two of the judges in this chain have ruled for Husband.
• Defendants have a nominal-party answer available; naming a court and its judges in a mandamus about the court's own records is how such petitions are normally styled.

Spawned by: N-058, N-069, N-078, N-091

This decision point also appears on: Under Judge Felix, The Appellate Courts, The Florida Bar, the full ledger.

Date

2025-11-24

Actor

Judge Ayers and Judge Felix (Div. A and D chambers); Chief Judge Sabella, the 13th Circuit General Counsel, and the trial court administrator; the Florida Bar ACAP and the Judicial Qualifications Commission; Scott Davis

Institution

13th Judicial Circuit / The Florida Bar / JQC

Mechanism

every institution named in the article was invited in writing to point out anything false in it, with an offer to amend; in the nearly nine months from November 24, 2025 through August 20, 2026, not one has named a single sentence

What the law required

Rule 3-7.3(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: bar counsel “must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath.” Canon 3D(2) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct: a judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has violated the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar “shall take appropriate action.” Both duties are written in mandatory terms. An official who has a correction available has the means to make it, so a documented failure to identify any false statement is evidence of what the record contains.

What happened

On November 24, 2025, within sixteen minutes, Husband sent three emails under one subject line, each linking a published article and naming specific officials, to the judicial divisions and Wife's counsel, to circuit administration, and to the Bar and JQC. Each carried the same offer: "If you believe that anything stated in the article is untrue, please let me know so I can consider amending the article if appropriate," with a request for comment. No deadline was set. No reply from the Bar, the JQC, or the 13th Circuit appears in the records swept. Wife's counsel answered the same day with a cease-and-desist letter that denied the article wholesale and identified no specific sentence as false. Its one concession: "certain discovery was withheld or delayed pursuant to a valid court order and consistent with the prenuptial and postnuptial agreements." Asked the next day which order he meant, he wrote: "I'll see you in court." Six hours twenty-two minutes after the third email, Judge Ayers filed a Bar complaint against Husband, kept open since without the Bar naming a false statement (N-064). [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

A regulator that receives a specific, documented allegation of misconduct processes it, and an official who can correct a false statement has the means to. Correcting this cost nothing: the sender offered in writing to amend the article. The silence is evidence that nobody positioned to correct it has tried.

Receipt

• Three sends of 11/24/25 at 10:18, 10:27 and 10:34 AM; the 4:40 PM cease-and-desist; the 11/25/25 reply chain.
• Wife's counsel's reply to which order he meant: "I'll see you in court."
• The article, 16 pages, published on X on or about November 21, 2025, filed at Doc 267 pp. 14-56.
• Scope of no-reply finding: rests on the 7/13/26 Gmail sweep; these three sends originated from a Yahoo account, so a Yahoo-side reply cannot be excluded.

Spawned by: N-064

This decision point also appears on: The Florida Bar, the full ledger.