Under Judge Ayers

Date

2024-05-22 -> ongoing

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers, then Judge Matthew Felix

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

on the one issue this case turns on, from May 2024 through February 2025, the excusals ran one way.

What the law required

Rule 12.285's mandatory-disclosure text and stipulated deadlines bind both sides. A documented violation squarely presented draws a consequence. A compliance certificate is verified by the party under section 92.525, Florida Statutes, under penalties of perjury, and the verification reaches only as far as the periods and items the certificate itself covers.

What happened

On May 22, 2024 Wife stated in writing that she would supplement and amend her financial disclosures. The lawyers then stipulated a June 28, 2024 production date. Husband answered her three-year interrogatories on that date. Wife's disclosures ran about four months past it, and the compel order that followed was granted with a fee finding and never enforced (N-009).

Three compliance certificates followed, and the sworn words moved each time. The first, filed six days before the October 28, 2024 hearing, swears only that a list of documents is accurate to the best of the signer's knowledge. It never swears that the rule was complied with. The second, filed three days after that hearing, is verified the same way. Husband's December 2024 motion named the limit: the certificates "made no attempt to comply with the requirements in Rule FFLRP 12.285(j)"; they "only certify that Wife held no interest in any relevant accounts or assets in 'the last 12 months'"; "Wife is only swearing that she had no interest in relevant accounts from October of 2023 forward."

The third was filed twice, eleven minutes apart near midnight, about eleven hours after that motion was denied on the rule's literal text (N-029). It states the rule and takes it back in the same sentence: the disclosure is "complete, accurate, and in compliance with Fla. R. Fam. L. P. 12.285 unless otherwise specifically stated herein." What the document specifically states is a twelve-month window. The qualifier returns to the certificate whatever the certificate itself limits. Wife signed under penalties of perjury. The open question is how far the signature reaches, and a window fixed at "the last 12 months" moves forward with every month of delay. [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation

The disclosure rule binds both sides the same way. A compliance certificate is the party's own statement, sworn under penalties of perjury, and it reaches only the periods and the items the certificate itself names. When one party documents that the other missed the rule and puts that in front of the court, something is supposed to happen. Every innocent explanation for what followed predicts a random distribution: excusals falling on both sides, scattered across issues. This chain is one issue, one beneficiary, and nine months, all inside Judge Ayers's tenure. A single excusal is discretion.

Receipt

• Doc 156, the 5/22/24 supplement statement.
• Doc 155 Tr. 21:8-11 (transcript of the October 28, 2024 hearing), Samarkos, the June 28 date as "an agreement between Counsel"; Tr. 13:20-14:12 for Husband's answers on that date.
• Docs 044 p. 9 and 046 p. 9, the certificates of October 22 and October 31, 2024, each signed by Wife under section 92.525, Florida Statutes, "under penalties of perjury," e-signed 13:57 EDT and 09:30 EDT.
• The first-certificate defect (the verification swears a list is accurate to the best of the signer's knowledge and never that the rule was complied with) is carried from gate GATE_FNEW-W3 v2 and is stated here in characterized form. **The verbatim certificate text of Docs 044 p. 9 and 046 p. 9 is not reproduced in either source file, so no words are quoted from those two pages. `` pull both page images and quote the operative sentence of each before publish.**
• Doc 054, the compel order, e-filed 11/20/24.
• Doc 084 paras. 15-17, 19, and 21, the quoted language-gap passages; para. 19, "six months late from the stipulated due date."
• Docs 124 and 125 p. 10, the two identical amended certificates of 2/12/25, Filing #216669496 at 11:15:25 PM and Filing #216669860 at 11:26:49 PM, same DocuSign envelope 0518E64D-6C12-4C6B-BDFC-A83E1B488B9A, each carrying the qualified oath quoted above.
• Doc 130, the written denial, 2/14/25.
• Doc 142, Husband's on-deadline certificate, 2/26/25.
• Doc 203 para. 5, the postmarital agreement signed 10/8/23 without financial disclosures. The record's own name for that instrument is the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23; "postmarital" and "post-marital" are aliases, and quoted material stays as spoken.
• The nine-month span runs from the first enumerated event (5/22/24) to the last (2/26/25) and recomputes at build, as does every day count.
• Carded elsewhere and deliberately not counted in this chain: the post-disqualification conduct (N-047), the undecided prescribed motion (N-019, N-033), and the never-ruled objection to the second subpoena set (N-034).
• Related decision points: N-003, N-007, N-040.

Read the source document: Doc 155, Transcript of 10-28-24 hearing

Spawned by: N-006, N-007, N-009, N-016, N-029

This decision point also appears on: Under Judge Felix, the full ledger.

Date

2024-10-28

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

Wife's side was already late enough that a fee award had issued, then filed the court-ordered memorandum six days late over objection, and the sanction the rules provide for exactly that pattern, striking the objections, was never applied.

What the law required

A deadline the court sets binds both sides. A late submission over objection is either excluded or its acceptance is explained.

What happened

By October 2024 Wife's side had already been late enough on mandatory disclosure that the court granted a compel with a fee finding (N-009). At the October 28, 2024 hearing Judge Ayers took Wife's objections to the first set of Chase bank subpoenas under advisement and told both sides to submit the two agreements plus a short memorandum within ten days. The length of the deadline was Davis's own: the court said "whatever works with you," Davis said "Ten days is fine," and the court said "All right, 10 days."

Husband filed on day ten. Davis filed six days past the deadline, at 4:50 PM. Husband objected to the late memorandum, and then asked the court in writing to clarify "how the Court handled Mr. Davis's late filing." No ruling on that objection was ever entered. On December 13 the court's answer was: "this has already been argued. I have memorandums. I'm going to rule on the memorandums."

Documents were still being produced in increments while the compel order sat unenforced. The rules answer that pattern with escalating sanctions, up to striking the objections. That sanction was never applied, and no reason for it appears in the record as swept. The objections stood. The discovery did not come. The ruling that followed, announced by chambers email on December 16, made orally on December 19, and signed on December 30, did what the late memorandum asked (N-018). [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation

A deadline the court sets binds both sides. When a paper comes in late and the other side objects, a court either refuses the paper or explains why it is taking it anyway. Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.380 supplies the escalating remedies for discovery that does not come, and one of them is striking the objections that are holding it up. The remedy runs on the court's own record of what has already happened. Here a fee award for late disclosure was already on the books before this deadline was set, and the documents were still arriving in pieces.

Receipt

• Doc 047, Husband's memorandum, e-filed 11/7/24, day ten.
• Doc 053, Davis's memorandum, e-filed 11/13/2024 4:50:23 PM, Filing #210882545.
• Doc 155, transcript of the October 28, 2024 hearing, Tr. 22:24-23:21 for the instruction and the deadline colloquy, including Tr. 23:6-7 and 23:18-21.
• Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 16:1-3 for the quoted ruling statement and Tr. 13:25-14:14 for the timeliness passage.
• Doc 098 relief para. F, the written clarification request. The earliest written flag is the 11/25 email filing at Doc 70, Filing #212769787, e-filed 12/12/2024 11:19:00 PM. Doc 091 Wherefore clause C repeats the request.
• Doc 093, the written order.
• Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.380 for the sanctions ladder and for striking objections as one of the available sanctions. `` pin the subdivision before the cite ships in a filing; the proposition ships publicly on Chris's authority per his 8/20 ruling on re-derivation.
• The already-issued fee award and the four-months-late production are carded at N-009 and are referenced here rather than re-recited.
• Fact ledger F266.
• The reporter's garbled name "Soroka's" is preserved as printed; Merritt spells the same attorney "Samarkos."
• Related decision points: N-006, N-013, N-014, N-018.

Read the source document: Doc 155, Transcript of 10-28-24 hearing

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2024-11-20 (heard 10-28)

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

Husband won the order compelling Wife's financial disclosures, and in the twenty months that followed, through July 2026, no one ever made her comply with it and no court ever set the fee it awarded.

What the law required

Rules 12.380 and 12.285 govern enforcement. A fee entitlement must then be liquidated.

What happened

Judge Ayers granted the motion to compel and the fee entitlement at the October 2024 hearing, and reaffirmed the entitlement twice on February 12, 2025. The written order was e-filed on November 20, 2024. At the hearing the disclosures the order compelled already stood about four months past the June 28, 2024 production date the lawyers had stipulated. The only consequence imposed for that lateness was fees, and the fee amount was never set by any court through July 2026. Actual compliance with mandatory disclosure was never required, and Husband's position is that the noncompliance is continuing. Husband has not yet enforced the fee award in his favor because Wife has still not complied with basic mandatory disclosures. [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]

Baseline deviation

An order compelling disclosure exists to put documents in someone's hands; winning one should change what a party actually has. Judge Ayers marked the fee award as unusual for her: "you both know I very rarely give out fees. but this one." She never required actual compliance with mandatory disclosure, and the fee was never liquidated, so the order produced nothing. This is the anchor row of the excusal chain at N-004.

Receipt

• Doc 054 (the written order, e-filed 11/20/24).
• Doc 155 Tr. 18:19-25 (the oral compel grant that became that order) and Tr. 18-22 (the fee colloquy, including the quoted sentence at 22:22-25).
• Doc 152 Tr. 65:25 and 66:13-14 (the 2/12/25 reaffirmations).
• Doc 93, pulled from the Clerk, recites the hearing date on its face.
• Day and month spans are carded, not recomputed here.

Spawned by: N-006

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2024-12-13

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

a withdrawal motion that had been set thirty-four days out was heard twenty-four days early, on one day's notice, with no emergency asserted and no basis for the acceleration stated; the client had objected in writing twice before it began, and it ended his representation.

What the law required

A contested withdrawal requires reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Rule 4-1.16(b) puts the withdrawal justification on the lawyer.

What happened

Husband's own counsel, Vivian Cortes Hodz, had a withdrawal motion on file since December 3, 2024, set for hearing thirty-four days out on January 6, 2025. On December 11 at 4:09 PM she filed an expedited motion. Chambers offered three hearing slots at 5:22 PM that day, and counsel picked the earliest without consulting her client.

At 11:17 PM that night the client objected in writing. He asked for more time, described the prejudice, said "I have never practiced in circuit or county Court in my life," waived his attorney-client privilege, and stated his unavailability. At 9:09 AM the next morning chambers confirmed the December 13 setting for 4:30 PM. Eight minutes later he objected again, expressly: "I object to the hearing occurring without me." Nothing changed.

The hearing went ahead on December 13 at 4:30 PM, two days and twenty-one minutes after the expedited motion, on one-day notice, per the court's own recital in its order. No emergency was asserted, and no basis for moving the date up appears in the order or in the transcript. Judge Ayers granted the withdrawal from the bench over Husband's objection and cancelled the January 6 setting from the bench. A motion for judicial default premised on the unanswered petition was filed at 8:32 that same morning (N-013), and Husband answered self-represented three days later. Whether the extended response deadline fell on the hearing date itself is not pinned in the records reviewed, and the sequence does not depend on it. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

A lawyer who wants out over the client's objection carries the burden of justifying it. Rule 4-1.16(b) puts that burden on the lawyer, not on the client, and the client gets reasonable notice and a real chance to be heard. Moving a hearing up twenty-four days is the kind of act that rests on a stated emergency. None was stated. Judge Ayers later said so herself: setting it "in one day's notice might have been a little soon." The same court's speed of relief is distributed across the docket at N-123, N-128, N-134, and N-139.

Receipt

• Doc 056, the 12/3/24 withdrawal motion.
• Doc 058 paras. 1, 5, and 8, the 12/11/24 4:09 PM expedited motion; p. 4 recites that counsel "has sought all appropriate extensions of time and communicated the same so as to ensure no interim prejudice to the Husband,"
• Doc 167, the Wednesday 12/11/2024 11:17 PM EST objection email, with the privilege waiver at p. 2.
• Doc 168, the Thursday 12/12/2024 9:17 AM EST objection, which embeds the court's own 12/12 9:09 AM setting email eight minutes before it.
• Doc 100 para. 1, the court's own "one-day notice" recital, and Doc 100 as the 1/13/25 re-grant despite that recited notice.
• Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 17:13-17. Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 16:22-24.
• Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing, Tr. 15:20-16:3 for the quoted concession that one day's notice "might have been a little soon."
• Doc 059 p. 2 and Doc 061 p. 3, opposing counsel's written refusal of any further extension: "I cannot agree to an extension of time. He should be required to adhere to the same standards."
• Doc 075, the 8:32 AM default motion of 12/13/24. Doc 079, Husband's self-represented answer of 12/16/24.
• Doc 214 p. 1, Filing #227245890, the 10/21/24 email from counsel, found 8/7/26; quoted in text at N-023.
• Fact ledger F146 and F147. Complaint v2.5 paras. 11 and 40A-B, as pleaded.
• The velocity distribution under the successor judge: N-123 (about 4 hours, a non-party's proposed order), N-128 (19h54m, opposing counsel's exit order), N-134 (about 25 hours, an order billing Husband $3,000), against N-139, where a filed motion, a proposed order, and acceptance of the court's own offered dates drew no hearing, no order, and no reply. Cite that family for distribution only, never as purpose.
• Related decision points: N-151.

Read the source document: Doc 158, Transcript of 12-13-24 hearing, Doc 90, Dec 19, 2024 hearing transcript (Judge Ayers)

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2024-12-13

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

the rule puts the burden on the lawyer who wants to leave; the court demanded instead that the client produce a legal basis for keeping his own lawyer, kept the lawyer's stated reason free of any question, and made no findings when he asked for them.

What the law required

A contested withdrawal requires an actual determination of the basis, and findings on request. The burden sits with withdrawing counsel, not the client.

What happened

Husband waived attorney-client privilege in writing the night before the hearing and again on the record that day, so nothing on his side was left to protect. His written objection, filed at 1:21 PM on December 13, 2024, demanded that the withdrawing lawyer finish five identified tasks and said "Mr. Davis should have to answer for what changed."

At the hearing that afternoon Judge Ayers cut off the prejudice argument: "I've already ruled." She deflected the notice-fairness question: "That's not the legal standard." She then put the burden on the client to supply a legal basis for keeping the counsel he had hired. The January 13, 2025 written order records the result in its own words: Husband "failed to establish a legal basis," and all other relief was denied.

On January 9, 2025 allegations he describes as repugnant were aired with no specifics attached, and he asked her directly for findings: "I deserve some findings of fact here." None were ever made. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

When a lawyer withdraws over the client's objection, the lawyer has to establish the basis. Rule 4-1.16(b) puts it there and nowhere else. Determining that basis is the only thing that would have documented why the hearing was accelerated in the first place (N-014). No statement of that basis appears in either withdrawal transcript, in the written objection, or in the order that ended it, which is the record swept here. The court also told Husband "You have nothing pending" while the first-set subpoena ruling sat under advisement and four of Wife's motions had been filed that morning (N-013).

Receipt

• Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 16:21-25, 17:13-17, 17:19-24, and 18:5-9.
• Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing, Tr. 13:23-14:5 and 18:6-15.
• Doc 098 paras. 8-11.
• Doc 072, the written objection of 12/13/24 1:21 PM: the five-task demand, the privilege waiver, and the quoted sentence about Davis.
• Doc 100, the written order of 1/13/25: "failed to establish a legal basis," all other relief denied.
• Privilege waiver, three independent sources: the on-record waiver at Doc 158 Tr. 4, pleaded at F110; the written waiver at Doc 167 p. 2; and the opposing side's own Doc 075 para. 7.b asserting that Husband "thereby waiv[ed] attorney-client privilege."

Spawned by: N-014

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2024-12-19

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

the court said it was not ruling on the two marital agreements because nobody had asked it to, and in the same breath used those agreements to shut off the discovery that would test them.

What the law required

Under Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, agreements signed without financial disclosure are challengeable, and a challenge entitles the challenger to financial discovery.

What happened

The written ruling chambers had promised for December 16, 2024 never issued. The email said instead, "At this juncture, the Court is not issuing a ruling." What filled the sixty-three days from hearing to order was a memorandum Davis filed six days late, over an objection the court never ruled on (N-007).

At the December 19 hearing Judge Ayers said: "nobody has asked me to do anything with the premarital agreement or separation agreement. So at this juncture I'm not ruling on them with respect to anything because it's not in front of me, but as far as I'm concerned they're both in full force and effect and that would limit your discovery requests, Mr. Hanson." On the discovery objection she ruled: "I've sustained it actually. So that discovery is not going to be produced." Four months later she described the same ruling in her own words: "the only substantive ruling that I've made is you can't get your discovery because we've got the two agreements."

On December 30 she e-signed the order sustaining Wife's amended objection and killing the Chase non-party subpoenas. Paragraph 3 of that order declined to rule on whether either agreement is valid, because the issue "has not been challenged by either Party or properly brought before the Court."

The effect ran both directions. Husband got no bank records, and the records Wife had not produced stayed unproduced (N-006). Wife also owed no reciprocal discovery on the agreements that shut the subpoenas off. The court had named the missing step at the hearing, saying the agreements stand "unless you file something otherwise." Husband filed exactly that. No judge has ruled on it since (N-019, N-033). [DENIED: the discovery was cut off on the strength of agreements the same ruling refused to adjudicate]

Baseline deviation

Under Casto v. Casto, an agreement signed without financial disclosure can be challenged, and making that challenge entitles the challenging party to financial discovery. Casto also raises a presumption where one spouse lacks knowledge of the other's finances, and that presumption puts the burden on the spouse holding the records. What makes Casto apply here sits in Wife's own petition: no financial disclosures accompanied the agreement signed in October 2023. A subpoena to a bank is how a party gets records the other side will not hand over, and killing one takes a stated ground. The ground stated here was the agreements themselves.

Receipt

• Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 4:3-11, 6:5-8, and 7:14-16 for the quoted rulings; Tr. 12:14-25 (the "Nope." exchange at 12:22-24), 13:2-5, 13:9-10, and 13:25-14:2 ("It's killing me to watch what it's doing to them").
• Doc 091 Ex. A p. 14, the Heyward email of 12/16/24 9:30 AM. Its sentence opens "At this juncture, the Court is not issuing a ruling," and that opener travels with any use of the quote.
• Doc 192, transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 29:6-9, the judge's own later description of the same ruling.
• Doc 093, "Order Sustaining Wife's Amended Objection," e-signed by Judge Ayers 12/30/2024 4:03:22 PM. Decretal para. 2 names DIN 28 and 29 only. Para. 3 declines to rule on validity, quoted above. Doc 102's notice corroborates the 12/30 order date.
• Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 10 and 19.
• Doc 203 para. 5, no financial disclosures with the October 2023 agreement. The record's own name for that instrument is the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23; "postmarital" and "post-marital" are aliases; Judge Ayers says "postnuptial" on the record and quoted material stays verbatim.
• Doc 090 Tr. 7:19-20 for the counsel-relayed refusal to void, "He said no. She's not willing to do it," Doc 205, Wife's deposition of April 2, 2025, Tr. 132:21 for the sworn refusal and Tr. 133:6-8 for the figures as Wife stated them.
• Doc 146 para. 107 for the affidavit arithmetic, citing Docs 34 and 43: Wife's disclosed assets over liabilities at $104,611 against Husband's in excess of $800,000. The $104,611 is her disclosed net worth; the $100,000 is the payment she received under the agreement. Two different figures, and they should not be read as one.
• Doc 181 (4/23/25) para. 2, bolded, on the reissued subpoenas. The second set did not exist for another sixty days (N-034).
• Docs 127 and 129 for the challenge-chain dispositions (N-028). A template artifact appears at p. 2 of the challenge chain, an unfilled "[Wife's Name]" writ-of-bodily-attachment block.
• Division check: every Ayers-era transcript cover and Doc 054 read "Division D"; Division A is the post-reassignment designation.

Spawned by: N-006, N-007

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2024-12-19

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers (prescription + post-filing confirmations) -> Judge Felix (non-adjudication)

Institution

13th Cir. Fam. Div.

Mechanism

the judge told Husband exactly which motion to file to get the financial records, he filed it in exactly that form, she confirmed on the record that it had worked, and as of August 2026, seventeen months on, no judge has ruled on it.

What the law required

Due process. A court that prescribes the exact procedural path to relief, receives full compliance, and confirms on the record that the compliance changed the movant's entitlement must then determine the motion in a meaningful time and manner.

What happened

Across four hearings between December 19, 2024 and February 12, 2025, Judge Ayers told Husband what to file. In her words: "I just told you how to do your whole case. You need to file a motion." She also said "I'm not saying that again."

Under Casto no motion was legally necessary to open the discovery. The challenge itself carries the entitlement, and it attaches when the motion is filed rather than when it is granted. The prescribed route also required Husband to move against the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23, which on its terms protected his interests, and whose protection depended on the honest disclosure that never came. He filed it anyway, sixteen days after the last of those hearings. Following the court's own instruction produced no relief.

The route rested on both agreements at once. The ruling that limited discovery reached the premarital agreement of 10/25/16 as well, and that agreement does not reach marital income and assets, which is what the subpoenas sought.

After the filing she confirmed twice on the same day that it had changed his position (N-040). At the April 22, 2025 hearing she described the whole sequence herself: ".I think I did 'wink wink', you got to do something before I consider it and then you finally said oh, okay. I will try to set aside the postnuptial because that does change the trajectory of the discovery." Then she recused without ruling on it. Judge Felix has not ruled on it either. [IGNORED: the motion the court itself prescribed to resolve this case has never been decided]

Baseline deviation

When a court tells a litigant the specific step that unlocks relief, receives that exact step, and confirms on the record that it changed what he is entitled to, the court then has to decide the motion. The measure here is not an outside standard. It is the judge's own words across four hearings, her own stated commitment to review the motion, and her own two confirmations after it was filed, set against zero adjudication by anyone. That combination forecloses the one innocent reading available, that he misunderstood the ruling. Under Casto the filing itself carried the entitlement.

Receipt

• DIN 146, filed 2/28/25, with the Casto cite at para. 75.
• Doc 090, transcript of the December 19, 2024 hearing, Tr. 9:7-14 and 10:21-11:1.
• Doc 118, transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing, Tr. 14:20-22 and 24:19-21.
• Doc 152, transcript of the February 12, 2025 hearing, Tr. 44:12-16, 48:11, and 50:10-14.
• Doc 198 Tr. 7:7-17 and 187:20-23. the hearing date on this transcript's cover page. It is not established in either source file, and R18 requires the hearing date, not the e-filing date.
• Doc 192, transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 18:13-23 for the passage quoted above, and Tr. 29:6-22, "now you set up the posture for getting another bite at apple on your discovery."
• Transcript of the April 17, 2026 hearing, Tr. 114:10-13, 115:3-12, 116:9-11. The reference at that hearing to an order on the first-filed compel motion turned out to be illusory (N-090, N-033).
• June 10 corroboration at Tr. 110:17-111:4, where the entitlement-path arc was restated unchallenged.
• the Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23: pull the instrument and read the terms that protect Husband. "Protected me" is currently unreceipted.
• the premarital agreement dated 10/25/16: pull it and read its scope before this proposition is pleaded or relied on.
• Naming: the record's exhibit list says "Marital Separation Agreement dated 10/8/23." Public cards have also used "postmarital" and "post-marital." Judge Ayers says "postnuptial" on the record and that quotation stays verbatim.
• The seventeen-month span is carded and recomputes at build.

Read the source document: Doc 118, Transcript of 1-21-25 hearing

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-01-09

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

Husband won his rehearing on paper, and by the day it was heard he had already lost his lawyer, answered the petition alone, and been served with a motion to default him.

What the law required

The standards governing withdrawal of counsel over a client's objection control.

What happened

On January 9, 2025 Judge Ayers reheard the withdrawal and granted it again over Husband's objection. He had won the rehearing on paper: the court had stamped his motion GRANTED, setting it for hearing on the open docket. At the hearing the court told him he had not given a legal basis, acknowledged the one-day notice for the December hearing might have been too soon, cut him off mid-question with "Stop. Stop. Stop." and ended the hearing. She told him: "If you want to appeal me, that's fine. That's why they all have jobs." His grounds had been one-day-notice due process, absent findings, and prejudice. He is self-represented from here. [DENIED: the paper win arrived after the loss it was supposed to prevent]

Baseline deviation

A rehearing is a second look that can still change something; this one could not. The relief had already operated: counsel was removed December 13, 2024, before his response was due, and he answered self-represented December 16 (N-013). In candor, the ruling is defensible: there was a full hearing, and no basis compels a lawyer to stay. It does not answer: no findings were made, and the attorney whose conduct triggered the sequence was absent and excused that day (N-022).

Receipt

• Docs 094 and 095, both slots holding Husband's 12/22/24 Rule 1.530 rehearing motion, Filing #213357446, stamped GRANTED with the quoted handwritten note, done and ordered 12/30/24 (the copy at Doc 094 mis-writes "25"; clerk stamp 12/31/24).
• Doc 109 Tr. 3:9-20, 8:6-9, 12:18-21, 14:5, 14:20-23, 15:22-24, 16:25, 17:5-9, 17:14, and 18:6-15.
• Doc 087 for the rehearing grounds, including Garden v. Garden and the 12/12 6:49 PM Dropbox transfer under twenty-four hours before the hearing.
• Tally guard: this is one withdrawal. The notice defect counts at N-014, the findings refusal at N-015, the fiduciary reversal at N-010, and the 2026 Bar-response chronology at N-083. No tally counts the withdrawal more than once.

Spawned by: N-014

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-01-09

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers (excusing); Scott Davis (non-appearance)

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

the court answered a showing about opposing counsel's specific conduct with its own general impression of the lawyer, and the conduct in the case pending before her went unexamined.

What the law required

A hearing on an attorney's alleged misconduct examines that attorney. A party's objection to the accused's absence is ruled on, not deflected. Canon 3D(2) states the judge's duty when lawyer misconduct is credibly presented.

What happened

The evening before the hearing Davis wrote to chambers that he did "not plan on attending." Husband demanded his attendance in writing three minutes later. Chambers said nothing. The email loop included Husband, so nothing about attendance was said off the record.

In the courtroom on January 9, 2025 Husband put Davis's obstruction on the record at length. The court did not take up any of it. It answered with its own impression of the lawyer: "I'm starting my fifth year in this division. I see Mr. Davis all the time," and "So the fact that you're telling me that all of these lawyers are talking to Mr. Davis and they're afraid and running from him is complete opposite of how Mr. Davis practices in front of me. He's like a good, old teddy bear."

On the absence itself the court supplied the excuse from the bench: "Because he's not required to come. he also has the right not to come." It confined the hearing to the withdrawal motion and told Husband "I cannot discuss the case with you because Mr. Davis is not present," Davis wrote afterward that "I did not wish to waste your wife's money by attending a hearing that was not pertinent to her case."

A specific-conduct showing drew a general impression. The conduct was never examined. [EXCUSED: the showing about the accused lawyer's conduct was answered with an impression of him, and the objection to his absence drew no ruling]

Baseline deviation

When a litigant puts an officer of the court's conduct on the record, the court either examines it or says why it will not, and it rules on the party's objection rather than deflecting it. Examining the accused attorney is what would have documented the obstruction Husband presented (N-011). A general impression of how a lawyer usually behaves is not a finding about what he did in this case. The same duty was declined a second time three months later (N-045), and twelve days after this hearing the same substitution appears again with the lawyer present in the room (NEW-AYERS-0121).

Receipt

• Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing: Tr. 3:4-5 (appearances), 4:8-12, 8:19-23 (the certification point Husband raised, which went unaddressed), 10:9-14, 11:4-7 (the confinement), 16:4-9 and 16:11-16 (the quoted vouching), 16:25, 17:14, 17:21-18:5 (the quoted excusal), and 18:6-8.
• Doc 118, transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing, Tr. 4:3-7 and 26:2-5 for the echoes.
• Doc 110 image exhibits for the 1/8/25 5:51 PM email in which Davis said he did not plan on attending, the 5:54 PM attendance demand three minutes later, and the 1/10/25 reply. Davis also wrote that "your request for our attendance did not necessitate our attendance."
• The absence and the objection are docketed, not remembered. Doc 112, the first disqualification motion, e-filed 1/29/25 10:21 PM, sworn, stating the same facts. Doc 113, Wife's response at 2:53 AM the same night with a fee demand.
• Doc 098 (1/9/25 3:22 PM), the same-day receipt. Doc 097, the hearing memo, paras. 4, 6, 35, and 40.
• Pair the teddy-bear line with the 12/19 pre-affirmation at N-018 for the pattern. Its subject is the withdrawal rehearing and it never attaches to the certification point.
• Related decision points: N-007, N-014.

Spawned by: N-011

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-01-21

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

Husband had waived his own privilege three separate ways; the court still closed off any inquiry into the call that ended his representation, by invoking a privilege belonging to the other side that the other side had never claimed.

What the law required

Privilege protects communications between a lawyer and that lawyer's own client (s. 90.502, Fla. Stat.). A conversation between opposing counsel is an attorney-client communication for neither side. And the client's express on-record waiver opens his own side's communications in any event. Discovery into the call that preceded the reversal was the relief requested (pleaded at para.111B(iv)).

What happened

On January 21, 2025 Judge Ayers answered Husband's request to inquire into the call from Davis to his own then-counsel this way: "Well, I can assure you, even if you waived privilege, Mr. Davis wouldn't have been able to discuss what he discussed with your lawyers because his client, I'm assuming, didn't waive privilege." She added, "Attorneys a lot of times work together to get things done." Privilege was assumed for a party who never asserted it, on the court's own initiative, with no motion on the subject pending and no ruling entered. Husband objected to the premise on the record, and the objection drew a generality (NEW-AYERS-0121).

That closed the loop. He was made to carry a burden the rule never placed on him, then barred from the only avenue of proof.

What sits on either side of the call is in writings on file. On October 21, 2024 his lawyer wrote: "This can be a long and difficult process but I assure you that you will get the answers that you need to move forward." Twelve days before this ruling, in open court and before this same judge, he described the change: "but for some reason, after each of my attorneys have had a conference with Mr. Davis, they went from, this is straight forward, we'll get you the records, to, I can't help you."

No fact and no ruling changed between those two positions. Only his own counsel's position changed. He had retained her already knowing Davis was difficult. No privilege existed, inquiry was barred anyway, and the conduct was never examined in any forum (N-045). [EXCUSED: the one conversation that would explain the withdrawal was closed off by a privilege no party asserted, and the subject never returned]

Baseline deviation

Privilege protects what a lawyer and that lawyer's own client say to each other. A call between opposing counsel is an attorney-client communication for neither side. Privilege also belongs to the holder, and it is the holder's to assert or to give up. Rule 4-1.16(b) put the burden of justifying the withdrawal on the withdrawing lawyer. The court had already inverted that burden, demanding that Husband justify keeping his own counsel (N-015). Discovery into the call was how he proposed to carry the burden he had been handed, and it was the relief he was asking for.

Receipt

• Doc 118, transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing, Tr. 6:14-7:23, the full colloquy, quoted verbatim. The first quoted sentence ends at 7:4 and the second sits at 7:15-16. The exchange in which Husband objected to the premise is at Tr. 7:6-19 and is carded at NEW-AYERS-0121.
• Fact ledger F199. Complaint para. 111B(iv), as pleaded.
• Section 90.502, Florida Statutes, for the privilege definition.
• Waiver, three independent sources: Doc 158, transcript of the December 13, 2024 hearing, Tr. 4:19-24, pleaded at F110; Doc 167 p. 2, written, 12/11/24 11:17 PM; and Doc 075 para. 7.b, the opposing side's own assertion that Husband "thereby waiv[ed] attorney-client privilege."
• The 10/21/24 email at Doc 214 p. 1. Its opening sentences ("I understand your frustrations and will do all that I can to shift the direction. Hang in there.") are on the page and are deliberately not quoted; the sentence that carries the point is the one in the text. Doc 087 p. 6 para. 35 refers to that email by date and time and reports it in Husband's own words. It is a corroborating reference, not a quotation.
• Doc 167 p. 3 for the written before-and-after rendering of the same change, in a December 11, 2024 email to the judicial assistant. Doc 112 para. 12.K for the sworn rendering; the earlier pin to Doc 112 para. 9 was wrong and is superseded. These are different renderings by the same speaker on different occasions and each is recorded as it was said.
• Doc 109, transcript of the January 9, 2025 hearing, Tr. 10:11-14, and Doc 192, transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 40:13-18, both Husband speaking.
• Doc 115, the 2/12/25 four-motion agenda, frames what the 1/21 to 2/12 window was set to adjudicate.
• the pre-retention awareness that Davis was difficult, which is the stated reason Husband retained this lawyer. Unreceipted as of this build.

Spawned by: N-015

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-01-21

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

with the accused lawyer present in the room and the legal question put squarely twice, inquiry into his alleged misconduct was again refused on a privilege ground that does not exist.

What the law required

A court presented with a specific showing about an officer of the court's conduct either examines it or states why it will not.

What happened

With Davis present, Husband put the legal question squarely. The exchange, at Tr. 7:6-19:

MR. HANSON: "Well, if he talks to my attorney, there's no privilege that attaches there, is there?"

THE COURT: "Well, I'm sure when Mr. Davis is talking to your attorney is talking about his client's information."

MR. HANSON: "It's waived when he talks to the attorney, right? You can't tell the other side something and say this is privileged from your client."

THE COURT: "Attorneys a lot of times work together to get things done. I'm sure, once attorneys get together and talk, they do the best they can to talk about legal perspectives and to tone down what their clients are feeling so they can get a resolution."

The legal question was asked twice and answered neither time. What answered it was a generality about

how attorneys behave. That is the same substitution recorded at N-022, now documented at two hearings

twelve days apart.

Earlier on the same pages the court said she did not know whether inquiry was available at all: "I

don't know really off the top of my head whether you could have even questioned him because I've

never seen anybody do that and I'm not sure how I would have addressed it. I probably would have

listened to the argument."

Husband stated the position on the record in real time: "There's no alternative explanation for why

Ms. Hodz withdrew other than what I said Mr. Davis' conversations. No one has disputed anything I've

said and there's no explanation."

Inquiry did not happen. [EXCUSED: with the accused lawyer present and the legal question put twice,

inquiry was refused on a ground no party had asserted, and the conduct was never examined]

Baseline deviation

A litigant who alleges misconduct by an officer of the court is entitled to an answer to the legal question that controls whether he may inquire. Privilege belongs to a holder, and it covers what a lawyer says to that lawyer's own client. It does not cover what one lawyer tells another. Twelve days earlier the same court had excused the same lawyer's absence rather than examine the same showing (N-022). This time he was present, and the question was answered with a description of how attorneys generally behave. A general practice is not a finding about a particular conversation.

Receipt

• Doc 118, the transcript of the January 21, 2025 hearing before Judge Kelly Ayers, held via Zoom, 4:41 to 5:24 p.m., 44 pages, reporter Nika M. Priestley. Pages 5 through 8 were rendered at 115 dpi and.
• Tr. 7:6-19 for the quoted exchange, reproduced in full above.
• Tr. 5:17-21 for the court's statement that she did not know whether inquiry was available.
• Tr. 6:12-24 for Husband's contemporaneous statements, including "So it seems like there's definitely something there and it wasn't investigated."
• Tr. 6:1-11, where the court stated "No. You were requesting it while we were having the hearing. At that juncture I can't do anything about it." and Husband corrected the record: "No. I requested it before the hearing, Your Honor. There was an email to your assistant where Mr. Davis told her there's a hearing next week."
• Tr. 7:24-8:12, where the judge describes directing her own judicial assistant: "I told her to be a little lenient with you. She's there for procedural scheduling." This supports "the court" as actor over the judicial assistant under R6.
• Section 90.502, Florida Statutes, for the privilege definition; the privilege ruling itself is carded at N-023, and the failure to examine the conduct in any forum is aggregated at N-045.
• Husband's privilege waiver, three independent sources, receipted at N-015 and N-023.

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-02-05

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

the first motion asking Judge Ayers to step aside was denied as legally insufficient with no reason given; twelve weeks later the same species of motion was granted with its ground stated on its face, and the denial has still never been explained.

What the law required

R. 2.330: a facially sufficient disqualification motion is granted, a denial states the basis for legal insufficiency, and the judge may not pass on the truth of the allegations.

What happened

Judge Ayers denied Husband's first disqualification motion on February 5, 2025 as "legally insufficient," stating no grounds. The motion she denied was sworn, filed a week earlier, and carried the Davis-absence facts among its grounds. Husband moved to vacate that denial on February 13. The response he got supplied only the cannot-comment rationale drawn from Bundy and Hill, which is an explanation in name only. When the second motion was granted twelve weeks later, the granting order described itself as ruling on an initial motion, while its own caption calls it the second verified motion (N-047). [DENIED: no explanation was given, so there is nothing to review]

Baseline deviation

The disqualification rule is unusual: the presumption runs toward the movant, whose allegations are taken as true. The comparison sits inside the same case: same movant, same species of motion, opposite outcomes twelve weeks apart. The granting order states its ground (N-047); the denial states nothing, though its grounds included the January 9, 2025 hearing where the accused attorney did not appear and the court excused it (N-022).

Receipt

• Doc 112, e-filed 1/29/25 10:21 PM, sworn.
• Doc 119 (2/5/25), the denial. Doc 128 (2/13/25), the motion to vacate. Doc 131 (2/17/25), the Bundy and Hill rationale.
• Doc 184 for the initial-versus-second inconsistency. Rule 2.330.

Spawned by: N-022

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-02-10

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

Husband's challenge to the order that killed the bank subpoenas was set for an evidentiary hearing; two days before it, the court denied the parent motion on paper, then denied the hearing motion as moot, and the hearing never happened.

What the law required

A motion noticed for an evidentiary hearing is heard at that hearing. Mooting it by an unnoticed paper order two days beforehand forecloses the record the hearing existed to make.

What happened

The evidentiary hearing was set for February 12, 2025. On February 10 at 5:05 PM Judge Ayers denied the parent motion on paper. On February 12 at 5:24 PM she denied the motion actually noticed for that hearing as moot, on the ground that the February 10 order "rendered this Motion moot." The whole challenge chain, the December 30 order, the clarification motion, and the rehearing motion, was extinguished in forty-eight hours, entirely on paper. No step in it engaged the merits. Husband objected in writing at the time, saying the sequence was "robbing Husband of the chance to create a record." The same February 10 order also denied his continuance request by quoting his own complaints about delay back at him. [DENIED: the challenge was closed on paper before the hearing that would have made the record]

Baseline deviation

A motion noticed for an evidentiary hearing is heard at that hearing, which is where a litigant makes the record an appellate court later reads. Deciding it on paper beforehand removes the record the hearing existed to produce. The hearing here would have tested the December 30 order that killed the bank subpoenas (N-018). In the same fortnight, the same court carried Wife's own motion to compel all the way to a merits order.

Receipt

• Doc 127 (order, 2/10/25 5:05 PM, stamp), denying Doc 098.
• Doc 129 (order, 2/12/25 5:24 PM, stamp), denying Doc 091 as moot in the quoted words.
• Doc 115, the notice setting DIN 91 for 2/12. Doc 128 para. 10, the contemporaneous objection quoted above.
• Doc 138 (2/19/25), Wife's compel granted in part in the same fortnight. The 2/12 transcript memo corroborates.

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-02-12

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

the motion challenged the certificate of compliance under one subdivision of the disclosure rule; the order denied it for failing to identify a document under a different subdivision, and the same order recorded Wife's agreement to file a corrected certificate.

What the law required

R. 12.285 governs discovery enforcement and contempt.

What happened

By the February 12, 2025 hearing Wife had been under a court order compelling her financial disclosures since November 2024, entered after those disclosures ran about four months past the stipulated production date. Her own lawyer told the court: "I cannot as an officer [the] court say 100 percent" that she had complied. The contempt motion was denied anyway, without prejudice.

The motion and the order are about different subdivisions of the same rule. Husband's motion is a certificate challenge: Wife and her counsel "made no attempt to comply with the requirements in Rule FFLRP 12.285(j)." The order denies it because the motion "does not identify any document required to be produced by Wife in accordance with Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.285 (e) that was not produced by Wife." Subdivision (j) is the certificate. Subdivision (e) is production. The order does not reach (j).

The same order records that "Petitioner stipulated to file an amended certification of compliance" carrying the rule's full oath. The defect was conceded on the page that denied relief for it.

Two cure paths issued: Husband could refile identifying a document, and Wife would then have twenty days to produce it. Amended certificates were filed that night, about eleven hours later, twice, eleven minutes apart, from one DocuSign envelope. The written denial followed two days later. [DENIED: denied without prejudice; the subdivision the motion raised was not reached]

Baseline deviation

Rule 12.285 separates two duties. Subdivision (e) governs producing documents. Subdivision (j) governs the certificate of compliance, the sworn statement that the rule was followed. A motion attacking the certificate raises (j). Answering it requires reaching (j). Husband's motion never argued the certificate was unsworn. The problem was that it did not actually swear to compliance with mandatory disclosures. The court held the literal text satisfied without reaching the subdivision the motion raised.

Receipt

• Doc 084, Husband's Motion for Enforcement and Contempt, filed 12/18/2024, paras. 15 and 21 (the Rule 12.285(j) certificate challenge), and paras. 24 to 26, which invoke Rule 12.380 and quote subdivision (b)(2)(C). Read from the page image 8/20/2026.
• Doc 130, Order Denying Respondent's Motion for Enforcement and Finding of Contempt, e-signed 2/14/2025 6:26:10 PM: findings A and B (the Rule 12.285(e) ground), para. 2 (Husband may refile identifying a document), para. 3 (Wife then has 20 days), para. 5 (Petitioner's stipulation to file an amended certification). Read from the page images 8/20/2026.
• Rule 12.380 appears nowhere in Doc 130.
• Doc 152, transcript of the February 12, 2025 hearing, Tr. 30:14-19 for the quoted concession. The transcript reads "officer [the] court" with no "of" and the bracket is preserved as printed. Tr. 30 for the self-imposed audit quote, and Tr. 39.
• Doc 084, the motion, resting on a December 6 deficiency email. It cites neither section 57.105 nor Doc 60, and it must not be linked to the 12/5 letter. Anomalies on Doc 084: no exhibit was actually attached, and the certificate of service says "13th day of December" against the 12/18 stamp.
• Doc 102, Filing #214808284, 1/17/25 9:35 AM, set Docs 84 and 91 for 1/21/25 4:30 PM.
• Doc 054, the compel order.
• Doc 130 (2/14/25), the written denial on the name-a-missing-document rationale.
• Docs 124 and 125, the same certificate filed at 11:15:25 PM and 11:26:49 PM from one DocuSign envelope, each sworn by Wife at p. 10, each carrying the qualified oath quoted above. Docs 044 and 046, sworn by Wife at p. 9, are the certificates that were actually before the court.
• Ledger correction of 2026-08-16 supersedes V10's earlier note that Docs 124 and 125 were signed by counsel only.
• The ruling is defensible on its own terms: it states a merits rationale, it names the missing document, and it invites a cure path. That concession is recorded here rather than argued in the card.
• Related decision points: N-009.

Spawned by: N-009

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-02-18

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

an order to show cause backed by an arrest warning issued against both parties without naming a single email, date, sender, or count, and a hearing on it had already been noticed before the order existed.

What the law required

A reported threat of violence from counsel is addressed to the counsel who made it. The reporting party is not placed under the same arrest-warning order as the reported party.

What happened

On February 7, 2025, Davis's email inserted the word bat into Husband's ball-and-go-home phrase and added a defamation warning about publishing. Husband objected that it was at least the second time Davis had alluded to violence. Davis answered: "The only time I would engage in violence is if it were necessary in self defense". Eleven days later Judge Ayers entered an order to show cause directing both parties to appear under an arrest warning; a hearing on it had already been noticed before it was signed. She reset it twice, heard it April 22, 2025 without evidence, with Wife excused over objection, made no findings, imposed only an email-only limit on Husband, and told him: "Do you realize you just won this hearing?" Davis's response had converted the order into a request to restrict Husband's emails. [EXCUSED: the email came from Wife's counsel, who drew no consequence]

Baseline deviation

An order that puts a person at risk of arrest tells that person what he is said to have done. This one does not: its only finding describes an extraordinary volume of email communication, naming no email, date, sender, or count. The stated reason, given three times, is volume alone. The email described below came from Wife's counsel, who drew no consequence, while the order issued against both parties, including the one who had objected to that email.

Receipt

• Doc 137 exhibits pp. 5-8, the complete 2/7/25 email chain quoted above in both directions, including Davis's follow-up "I don't even own a bat."
• Doc 120 p. 3, Husband's contemporaneous characterization.
• Doc 136 (2/18/25), the order to show cause on the court's own initiative, with its only finding that "Counsels for the Parties are engaging in an extraordinary exchange of email communications between themselves and the Parties between the Judicial Assistant to the undersigned."
• Doc 141, the amended order resetting to 4/3/25, the eve of the 4/4 hearing. Doc 135, Davis's response and email-restriction request.
• Doc 123 (2/12/25 3:03 PM), noticing a 2/25 hearing on an order "to be entered by the Court prior to February 25"; Doc 136 was entered 2/18/25; Doc 123's footnote 1 is the email-restriction receipt.
• Doc 192 Tr. 4:5-9 for the court's own 4/22/25 explanation, Tr. 46:5-22 for the email-limit ruling as corrected, and Tr. 46:24-25 for the quoted "won this hearing" line.
• Doc 198 Tr. 4:19-24 and 180:9-24 for the 4/4 roadmap placement and the reset.
• Docs 133 and 134, the Zoom-deposition order granted without hearing on unspecified good cause, and the document tying it to the 2/7 email.
• Related decision points: N-014, N-022.

Spawned by: N-011

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-03-02

Actor

Judge Ayers then Judge Felix

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

Wife objected to the second set of bank subpoenas and told the court a fifteen-minute hearing would resolve it; as of August 17, 2026 the objection had gone more than five hundred days without a ruling, blocking the records that whole time.

What the law required

Rule 12.351 governs non-party production: an objection stops issuance until the court acts on it, so an objection that is never ruled on operates as a permanent quash without adjudication. Rule 2.215(f) requires judges to conclude submitted matters promptly. The burden posture matters: the objection is Wife's instrument, she asked for an expedited hearing on it herself, and the non-ruling has given her its full benefit without her ever having to carry it.

What happened

Husband refiled the Chase subpoenas February 28, 2025, the day he filed the motion that was the route to that discovery (N-033). Wife objected two days later, joined motions for sanctions and fees, and sought an expedited hearing, writing that "the undersigned attorney believes that this issue can be resolved by the Court at the conclusion of a 15-minute hearing." No order has ever ruled on that objection. Husband moved for an immediate ruling June 28, 2025; the court's entire answer was a form order checking one box: "The matter is not an emergency and should be handled in the normal course." A contemporaneous hearing memo records the successor judge would not rule on the request. More than a year later, Wife's own notice of continued hearing still lists it among matters yet to be heard. [IGNORED: an untested objection has functioned as a quash no judge ever signed]

Baseline deviation

An objection to a non-party subpoena stops it until the court rules; until then the records stay blocked and no judge passes on whether the objection was any good. Wife's objection is her own instrument; she asked for the expedited hearing herself, and years of non-ruling have given her its benefit without ever carrying it. The first set of subpoenas at least drew an order (N-018). This set has drawn nothing, over records both sides call the financial center.

Receipt

• DIN 147 (JPMorgan Chase, Filing 217820385, 2/28/25 1:49 PM) and DIN 148 (Chase Bank, Filing 217820597, 1:51 PM), each with the Exhibit A scope quoted above.
• DIN 149 (Filing 217872880, 3/2/25), the objection, paras. 17-18, including her own para. 17 calling these Husband's "latest" notices.
• DIN 209 (6/28/25) para. 32. DIN 210 (6/30/25), the checked-box form order.
• The hearing-memo characterization that the successor judge "does not rule on the subpoena request" is drawn from a memo of that period.
• DIN 361, Wife's 7/30/26 notice for the 10/9/26 setting, still listing DIN 209.
• Doc 93's decretal para. 2 names DIN 28 and 29 only, and Set 2 was filed sixty days after it was signed.
• Day counts in the card: 535 days from 2/28/25 and 533 days from 3/2/25, both to 8/17/26, per ledger sec. 3e; recompute at use.

Spawned by: N-018, N-033

This decision point also appears on: Under Judge Felix, the full ledger.

Date

2025-03-04

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

in the same fortnight, Wife's motion to compel was granted in part with a deadline attached, and Husband's motion attacking the orders that left him with no disclosure came back to him as his own paper with the word DENIED stamped on it.

What the law required

A motion challenging an order that suppresses enforcement of mandatory disclosure must be decided with at least a stated basis.

What happened

Husband filed his Motion to Vacate on February 26, 2025, aimed at the orders that left him without mandatory-disclosure compliance. It came back as the same paper, stamped "DENIED", March 4, 2025, Kelly Ayers, with no findings and no reasoning. He met the deadline the court had set on his own side: his sworn compliance certificate, one page, was filed on that same February 26 date. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

A motion challenging an order suppressing mandatory disclosure gets decided with at least a stated basis, since that is the only thing a reviewing court can examine. A stamp gives none. Both sides sought the same relief in the same two weeks before the same judge; only one side's was processed on the merits. The motion here targeted the order denying Husband's enforcement motion on a naming technicality (N-029). A stated basis would have documented why that denial stood.

Receipt

• Doc 145 (the 2/26/25 motion).
• Doc 151 (the same paper returned stamped "DENIED" 3/4/25, stamp).
• Doc 130 (2/14/25), the denial the motion targeted.
• Doc 138 (2/19/25), Wife's compel granted in part with a comply-or-object deadline.
• Doc 142, Husband's sworn compliance certificate filed on the 2/26/25 deadline, verified 8/7/26.

Spawned by: N-029

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-04-01

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers (rescission and non-engagement); Scott Davis (the default)

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

the court asked Wife's lawyer in writing to summarize her testimony, he promised it the same day and never sent it, and the court told its own assistant not to remind him.

What the law required

Relief that reshapes children's lives must rest on a stated good-faith basis. A party's child-welfare objections in the record must be engaged, not ignored.

What happened

On April 7, 2025 the court emailed Davis asking for a written summary of Wife's testimony while preparing its orders. He answered the same day that he was happy to and would need a couple of days. Nothing came in eight days. On April 16 the court's own order erased the ask: "No summaries have been provided to the Court. No summaries are being requested by the Court." Orders were prepared from the April 4 record anyway. On the other side of the same file, Husband's filed oppositions about the children were never engaged, including his statement that "Dragging happy, healthy, thriving children back into a conflict is counter-intuitive and cruel." His April 15 motion was never ruled on. The guardian ad litem was appointed fourteen months later with no finding of unfitness (N-125). [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Relief that reshapes children's lives rests on a stated basis, and the court asked the movant to put that basis in writing. She had lost her staff attorney and was drafting the order herself; she was clear the ask was a request, not an order: "It wasn't order." On the other side of the file, Husband's documented objections about the children drew no ruling. The two halves are one shape: nothing required of the movant, nothing engaged from the objector.

Receipt

• Doc 169 (4/1/25, Filing #220088124), the welfare showing including the Elovitz "Be Wary of Saviors" guardian-ad-litem risk literature.
• Doc 173 (4/7/25 11:22 AM), paras. 5, 10, 14, and 25 for the quoted passages.
• Doc 177 (4/15/25) para. 11 for the quoted sentence.
• Doc 182 (order, 4/16/25) for the quoted rescission.
• The 4/7 email pair is preserved inside Docs 173 and 177.
• Doc 192 Tr. 51:11 for "It wasn't order" and for the judicial assistant instruction, "I actually said to Dee Dee, don't give him a reminder," with the court's own stated explanation in the same passage.
• Caution: Doc 169's certificate carries a stale "13th day of December, 2024" template date, and Doc 177 says "April 3" where Docs 173 and 182 fix the hearing as 4/4.
• Additional oppositions never engaged: cross-examination not completed; no affidavits, police reports, or teacher emails existed; and that there was "nothing that approaches any reasonable concern about Husband's parenting ability."
• Related decision points: N-041.

Spawned by: N-041

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-04-04

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

thirty-five days after Husband filed the motion the court itself had told him to file, the judge said on the record that he had "now opened a door to entitle yourself to more evidence"; twenty-four days after that she recused, without ruling on it.

What the law required

A court that confirms on the record that a filed motion changed the movant's entitlement must then decide it within a meaningful time. Confirmation without adjudication is its own determination point.

What happened

Judge Ayers prescribed the motion across four hearings (N-019). Husband filed it in exactly the prescribed form. On April 4, 2025 she confirmed twice on the record that it had changed his position, telling him: "You have now opened a door to entitle yourself to more evidence", and confirmed the filing itself and that the motion was going to open up the discovery. No adjudication ever followed, from her or anyone. She recused about April 28, 2025 with the motion unruled, and it is still unruled. A different set of events from the same hearing day, the courthouse video Judge Ayers volunteered and then declined to pursue, is carded separately at N-042. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

A court that confirms on the record that a filed motion changed what a litigant is entitled to has to decide that motion within a meaningful time. Confirmation without adjudication is its own decision point: nobody can say the motion was insufficient when the judge who prescribed it said on the record that it had worked. The recusal left the confirmed and undetermined motion in the hands of a successor who has now carried it for months on end (N-033).

Receipt

• Doc 198 Tr. 7:7-17 (the key phrase sits at 7:13-14), 187:20-23, 188:9-14, and 191:7-9 (also carrying "that will probably be open to you now receiving that discovery," "You have it filed," and the "going to open up the discovery" characterization).
• DIN 146, filed 2/28/25.
• Recusal lineage at Docs 184 and 187; note the 8/18/26 correction carried at N-047 that Doc 187 is Judge DePaul's own recusal order, not an Ayers instrument.
• Day count in the card: 535 days as of 8/17/26; recompute at use.

Spawned by: N-019

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-04-04

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

the court gave the day to the motion questioning Husband as a parent and pushed the discovery two months out, and in four years the only documented concern about either child was that each had once seemed tired.

What the law required

Discovery disputes are ordinarily resolved before the merits they feed. That is especially so where the pending discovery bears on the merits of the very motion being advanced (the guardian ad litem's best-interest predicate).

What happened

On April 4, 2025 Judge Ayers put Wife's guardian ad litem and psychological-evaluation motions first and confined the day to the children. Husband's position, held since the guardian ad litem motion was filed, was that he needed the discovery to prove the retaliatory motive, and he argued on the record that his pending discovery fed the guardian ad litem question itself. The school administrator who testified that day said that in four years the only documented concern about either child was one notation that each had seemed tired. Wife's entire showing went to Husband, not to the children. The court twice announced it would rule on the guardian ad litem that day. It ended the day with no rulings at all and deferred discovery wholesale to June 10. The guardian ad litem request became an ultimatum: mediate, or take less than fifty percent. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Discovery disputes are ordinarily resolved before the merits they feed, especially where the pending discovery bears on the merits of the motion being advanced. This same court had already conditioned discovery on a future merits ruling (N-018, N-019), and here it advanced the merits instrument ahead of the discovery relevant to it. Taking discovery first would have documented the factual predicate of the guardian ad litem motion, which alleged no incident, no date, no observation, and no witness (N-001).

Receipt

• Doc 198 Tr. 8:21-25 and 136:8-13 (the roadmap); 100:19-25, 101:3-13, and 115:12-14 (the discovery-first argument and the confinement of the day); 116:16-20 and 136:15-17 (the rule-today announcements); 193:18-20 (no rulings); 185:2-8, 188:15-17, and 191:16-18 (the deferral to June); 170:19-23 and 173:2-4 (the ultimatum); 20:10-14 (the tired-notation testimony); 68:2-3 (the court on chronic depression).
• Born-digital text layer, twenty key pages.
• Tally guard: the school administrator's April 4 testimony is counted once; the same testimony is carded at N-043 and at FNEW-W1 in the Wife lane and is never counted as three.

Spawned by: N-001

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-04-04

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

the judge offered the courthouse camera footage as proof about her own conduct, and when Husband asked her to go get it she refused twice and ended the hearing, and it has never been produced.

What the law required

Evidence a judge volunteers about her own conduct should be obtainable. R. 2.420 governs access.

What happened

On April 4, 2025 Judge Ayers volunteered courthouse-camera footage to disprove an alleged eye-roll: "I will go get the camera footage and do it because I have not rolled my eyes at you." Husband asked her to pursue that footage. She refused twice, telling him he was crossing a line, and ended the hearing. The footage has never been produced to Husband, and no court or party has ever examined it on the record (N-103 records the defendants' own denial that nobody viewed it). This is the April 4, 2025 courthouse video, called the video in later cards: courthouse demeanor footage, not a recording of the proceedings. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Evidence a judge volunteers about her own conduct should be obtainable; once she points to a record as her own proof, it has to be reachable by the other person in the room. The same footage becomes the object of the public-records litigation that follows, later confirmed to exist and withheld (N-053 lineage). The underlying eye-roll is Husband's sworn firsthand account in a verified motion later granted as legally sufficient; it is always "alleged," never a bare fact.

Receipt

• Doc 198 Tr. 75:12-16 and 75:15-17 (the volunteered footage and the first refusal), and Tr. 193:9-11 with context at 193:13-14 (the second refusal, "No, sir," "you're crossing the line. This hearing is ended," and the end of the hearing).
• Doc 183 p. 10, the verified second disqualification motion carrying the sworn eye-roll account under its own heading, filed 4/24/25 and granted as legally sufficient 4/28/25 (N-047).

Spawned by: N-018

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-04-04

Actor

Judge Felix

Institution

24-DR-001150

Mechanism

the cooperative route to what the children's school knew was refused in writing, so the school was subpoenaed under a contempt warning, and the compelled witness said nothing had been documented about either child in four years beyond one instance of seeming tired.

What the law required

A guardian ad litem is appointed to obtain information about the children's circumstances. Where a less intrusive route to that same information is put before the court on the record, it bears on whether the appointment is necessary. A court is not required to adopt it. It is required to reach it.

What happened

Husband sought agreement from Wife's counsel that the children's school complete wellness forms; the school itself had named simple party agreement as one of three routes to its participation. Counsel substituted the still-pending guardian ad litem instead: "The Guardian Ad Litem, if appointed, will make those determinations and/or recommendations." No answer came to Husband's question of what the downside of trying the questionnaire first would be. The cooperative route was refused in writing (N-036), and the school was subpoenaed under a contempt warning instead. On April 4, 2025 the school's director testified that in four years nothing was documented about either child's health or welfare beyond one occasion each of seeming tired. Both of Husband's attempts to ask her about the forms request were objected to and sustained. He raised the point again on April 17, 2026 before Judge Felix; the court has not addressed it since. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

A guardian ad litem is appointed to obtain information about the children's circumstances. A less intrusive route offered on the record is ordinarily adopted, rejected for a stated reason, or addressed by a finding; this drew none of the three. The school named three ways to participate, one being simple agreement. Husband sought that in writing; it was refused in writing. What remained was the route carrying a contempt warning. The order issued later contains no finding on it (N-125).

Receipt

• Doc 165, the subpoena, dated 3/24/2025 and e-filed 3/25/2025, pp. 1-3; cited by docket entry and date only, because the map withholds what the instrument names.
• Doc 166 pp. 3, 4, and 6, the 3/18 and 3/24/2025 emails including the quoted refusal, which carries a 2:20:05 PM stamp.
• Doc 134 pp. 10-12, the complete 2/7/2025 exchange with Davis.
• Doc 117 pp. 7-9, Husband's 2/7/2025 request and the judicial assistant's 2/10/2025 reply.
• Doc 198, the certified 4/4/2025 hearing transcript, at Tr. 12, 18, 20, 28, and 29. The 4/17/2026 transcript at Tr. 119:6-8 and 125:21-25.
• The school's own reply of 3/6/2025 at 8:54 AM.
• Lane note: every decision point carded here sits in the Ayers era; she recused 4/28/25, and the later consequences run into the Felix era by cross-link.
• Tally guard: this school-subpoena episode is counted once; the same episode is carded at N-036 in the Wife lane and is never counted as two. The school-records fact it rests on also appears at N-041 and at FNEW-W1 and is never counted as three.
• Two limits: no document has been found in which Wife or Davis objects to the wellness forms themselves; Davis called that premise "blatantly and patently false" on October 17, 2025, and Wife answered "None" to a discovery request for any instruction to the school to withhold the forms. And Husband's statement that the subpoena damaged his relationship with the school is his own account, with no independent corroboration in the record.

Spawned by: N-001

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-04-22

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

twenty-five pages of unrefuted evidence about opposing counsel's conduct produced no inquiry, no finding, and no conduct identified, in any forum; the court pointed to the Bar, the Bar had already closed the file and pointed back to the court, and the judicial commission later pointed back to the courts as well.

What the law required

Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3D(2) provides that a judge with knowledge of lawyer misconduct shall take appropriate action.

What happened

On April 22, 2025 Judge Ayers declined to take up Davis's conduct herself and pointed to the Bar, saying she is not the Florida Bar. In the same hearing Davis announced that the Bar had declined. The court's stated condition for acting was future: "if he comes to my courtroom and lies to me. order to show cause."

The finger-pointing is pinned on both ends of the loop. No forum ever addressed the misconduct described over twenty-five pages of unrefuted evidence. This was the third time the same duty was declined in the same case (N-022, NEW-AYERS-0121). [EXCUSED]

Baseline deviation

A judge who learns of a lawyer's misconduct is expected to do something with what she learns. What she does with it is what would have produced a judicial record of the conduct. Here the pointing went in a circle. The Bar had closed the file six days after it arrived, saying the matter belonged to a court (N-031), and the judicial commission later dismissed on the same reasoning, pointing back to the normal court process (N-062). A judge is right that she does not discipline lawyers. The claim made here is narrower: no inquiry, no finding, and no conduct identified.

Receipt

• Transcript of the April 22, 2025 hearing, Tr. 36, the "I'm not the Florida Bar" loop, confirmed against the page image 8/7/26. The exact wording ships per the Draft 4 checklist.
• N-031 for the six-day Bar closure and its quoted rationale. N-062 for the judicial commission dismissal.
• N-046 for the same hearing's specification void.
• N-022 for the first refusal of the same duty three months earlier, and NEW-AYERS-0121 for the refusal twelve days after that one.
• Lane and actor confirmed at R17: this is a Judge Ayers card in the Judge Ayers lane, 13th Cir., 4/22/25. It is not a Bar card. Its content crosses forums, which is what made it read that way.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-04-22

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers; Scott Davis (Tampa Bay Family Law & Mediation, P.A.)

Institution

24-DR-001150

Mechanism

asked in court twice and under oath once to name one thing Husband had filed or done that was inappropriate, no motion, paragraph, or sentence has been identified; the only conduct ever named was an email exchange about baseball equipment, charged to both sides.

What the law required

A party accused of misconduct is entitled to notice of the conduct alleged. A court asked to address an officer of the court's conduct either addresses it or states on the record why it will not.

What happened

Husband repeatedly asked, on the record, for anyone to name one thing he had done that was inappropriate. No one ever did. On April 22, 2025, pressed to address opposing counsel's conduct, Judge Ayers said she could not question him, then named the only conduct she attributed to either party: "the only thing that both of you have acted inappropriately were those emails about going to the baseball field with bats and balls and I called you both in and gave you both a lecture." He renewed the challenge twice more, drawing no answer. At deposition, asked for a specific example, Wife named two filings instead: his writ of certiorari and his motion to recuse the judge, the filings a litigant uses to ask a court to decide that question. No motion or sentence was ever identified. [EXCUSED: conduct named against Husband was an email exchange charged to both sides]

Baseline deviation

A party accused of misconduct is entitled to know what conduct is alleged, and a court asked to address counsel's conduct either addresses it or states why it will not. The measurable thing is the asymmetry: across more than two years, the filings and orders adverse to Husband rest on characterizations rather than incidents (N-001). In fairness, disciplining lawyers is the Bar's role, not the court's. The deviation is that no forum, court or Bar, ever named the conduct.

Receipt

• Doc 192 Tr. 35:3-25 (4/22/25, including "I'm not the Florida Bar. I don't discipline lawyers" and "I can't ask him any questions").
• Doc 212 Tr. 6:20-25 (6/3/25, Husband's renewed challenge: "I would ask Mr. Davis to show you one example of an inappropriate email I've sent.").
• Doc 152 Tr. 55:1-8 (2/12/25, "No one can name anything negative about what I have done as a father").
• Doc 205 Tr. 146:2-147:25 (the deposition passage, including Tr. 147:2-4 for "a specific example" and Tr. 147:17-25 for Wife's answer naming the writ of certiorari and the recusal motion).
• The Doc 192 reporter's verbatim includes the garbled "I don't that I've ever done" and is preserved as spoken.
• Specification-void family, cited as a family with each card's own candor limits traveling with it: NEW-P8 (Davis in correspondence), NEW-P6 (the Bar), N-062 (the judicial commission), N-064 (the Bar file and its sixteen demands), NEW-P7 (the invitation to name a false statement), and N-117 and N-136 (the mandamus court).

Spawned by: N-001, N-042

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-04-28

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir.

Mechanism

the one time the disqualification rule was applied as written, Husband won and the judge left the case; not one of the things he had been asking that court to decide moved.

What the law required

R. 2.330(e)(1) requires that a facially sufficient disqualification motion be granted.

What happened

The second disqualification motion was filed on April 24, 2025 and granted four days later. Judge Ayers was disqualified and the case was reassigned to Judge Felix. After reassignment, the first-filed discovery motion stayed unruled (N-003), the psychological-evaluation prong stayed unresolved (N-016), and the 2024 fee entitlement was never liquidated (N-009). The granting order's operative sentence reads that "Because Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(h) requires the Court to accept all allegations in an INITIAL motion for disqualification as true, the Court finds the Motion to be legally sufficient," while its own caption calls it the second verified motion; a first motion had already been denied as legally insufficient without grounds twelve weeks earlier (N-027). Same movant, same species of motion, two orders that cannot both be applying the rule the same way. The order also expressly declines to rule on the venue request. [WON-THEN-NULLIFIED]

Baseline deviation

The rule requires that a facially sufficient disqualification motion be granted. The presumption inside it runs toward the movant: the allegations are taken as true and are not weighed. This is the one occasion where the rule was applied as written and Husband won, which defeats any claim that he loses because his positions are weak. What the grant changed was the identity of the judge. What it did not change is stated as observable effect only.

Receipt

• Doc 183, the granted second disqualification motion, Filing #221772754, e-filed 4/24/25 11:24 PM, verified 4/23/25; pp. 1 and 8 (paras. 61-63) and p. 10 (the eye-roll heading and paras. 78-79 and 82).
• Doc 184, the disqualification order, at its operative sentence.
• Doc 181 (4/23/25, stamp) para. 2, bolded: neither the court nor Davis could produce "a single email, nor even a single sentence" of inappropriate conduct.
• Doc 180 (4/21/25, stamp) para. 8, the first docketed capture of the summary position change.
• Rule 2.330(e)(1).

Spawned by: N-042

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-11-24

Actor

Judge Kelly Ayers

Institution

13th Cir. / The Florida Bar (file 2026-10,395(13F))

Mechanism

invited in writing to name one false statement in the article about her, she filed a Bar complaint the same afternoon; through July 23, 2026, across sixteen written demands, nobody has named one.

What the law required

Two lawful paths sat side by side that morning, and the card states both honestly. A judge who believes a published statement about her is false can say which one, in a sentence; the invitation asked exactly that. And a judge who knows of a lawyer's misconduct may report it, and the Code of Judicial Conduct may even require reporting in defined circumstances. What no rule anywhere requires is the combination the record shows: no identification of any false statement, that day or ever, in a file that sixteen written demands have since asked to specify one.

What happened

A published article named Judge Ayers and described her conduct. Two days later, at 10:18 AM, Husband emailed her division: "If you believe that anything stated in the article is untrue, please let me know so I can consider amending the article if appropriate." The same ask went to circuit administration and to the Bar and JQC minutes later (N-065). No identification of any false statement ever came from her or her division. That same afternoon, Judge Ayers filed her Florida Bar complaint against Husband (N-064). Through July 23, 2026, across sixteen written demands, that file still has not specified a single false statement, and the Bar's own referral letter captions the matter as "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson," not as a complaint by the judge. In fairness, filing a Bar complaint is lawful, and the invitation went to her division inbox. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Anyone who believes a published statement about them is false can say which one; that fixes the record. Truth is an absolute defense in a disciplinary case, so naming the false statement is the one thing that could make the complaint stick. No rule requires the combination the record shows: no identification of any false statement, that day or ever, in a file sixteen written demands have since asked to specify one. Nothing here asserts purpose.

Receipt

• Three 11/24/25 invitation emails at 10:18, 10:27, and 10:34 AM, per N-065; division email is the one that reaches her.
• The article, posted on X 11/22/25 14:56 UTC, post 1992245722901577796, printed at Doc 267 pp. 14-56; complaint pleads publication on or about 11/21, conflict unresolved.
• Bar complaint intake 11/24/25, carded at N-064 with sixteen written specification demands running 12/8/25 through 7/23/26.
• Bar's referral letter to the grievance committee, dated December 3, 2025, and its caption.
• Timing arithmetic carded at N-065 as 6 hours 22 minutes from the 10:34 AM send; intake timestamp is ACAP intake of "Hanson FL BAR Complaint.pdf" at 4:56:32 PM.

Spawned by: N-064, N-065

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.