The Florida Bar

Spawned by: N-011, N-018

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-02-24 -> ongoing

Actor

The Florida Bar (Allie F. Huston; Christopher Stephen Wackes; Jason R. Kelley)

Institution

The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861; RFA 26-13570; File 2026-10,395(13F))

Mechanism

one family-law docket, two opposite answers from the same regulator: the reason it would not examine the opposing lawyer, and the source of the material it examined when the complaining lawyer was the one accused

What the law required

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath.' A declination under 3-7.3(a) requires a determination that the facts, if proven, would not constitute a violation warranting discipline; neither closure letter makes one, and neither cites a rule for deferring to the court. Rule 3-7.4(e) bars deferring an investigation for civil litigation without a designated reviewer's approval, and that approval is the Bar's to produce. One rule governs intake whether the lawyer accused is opposing counsel or the complainant.

What happened

Both of Husband's grievances against Wife's counsel closed at intake on the same ground, in near-identical words, sixteen months apart: six days for one, twenty-three for the other, finding only that the allegations "involve a dispute over which a court has jurisdiction." Neither reached the merits. A third file ran opposite: Judge Ayers, disqualified 4/28/25, filed a complaint against Husband on 11/24/25. Bar Counsel Jason Kelley referred it, describing its scope: "You have an extensive social media footprint I have had to go through, as well as your filings and documents in your family law case." As of 8/10/26 that file had been open 259 days, with no statement identified as false. The complaint against Husband concerns public statements about a judge, yet the material reviewed included the family-law filings. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Rule 3-7.4(e) bars deferring an investigation for civil litigation without a reviewer's approval. Deferral is therefore an approved exception, not a default, and the approval is the Bar's to produce. The Bar's counsel described a deferral policy in open court: the Bar defers to the presiding judge because discipline "can happen there." But the judges declined on the record to examine that same conduct and expressly left it to the Bar (N-046), so the policy is circular in practice.

Receipt

• Huston letter 2/24/25 (RFA 25-6861) and Wackes letter 6/16/26 (RFA 26-13570) pp. 1-2; the Della-Donna year prints in the Wackes letter as "(Fla. 1989)".
• Gangi 9/23/25 and Schuyler 9/24/25 are not jurisdiction-ground letters; neither contains the phrase.
• Kelley referral letter to Joshua Gammon Sheridan, Chair, 12/3/25, p. 1, certifying the complaint "forwarded to your committee for further investigation and disposition," captioned "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson."
• Kelley scope email 3/19/26 11:45 AM, at pp. 2-3 of the 3/30/26 email to Kelley (the standalone 3/19 and 3/20 PDFs are empty export stubs).
• Deferral policy in Bar counsel's own words: 7/7/26 PM Tr. 6:23-7:3 for the back-and-forth sentence and Tr. 7:10-20 for the closure-language sentence.
• Rule 3-7.4(e) is quoted verbatim, and Rules 3-4.4, 3-7.16(a)(2) and (a)(3) and 3-3.5 are summarized, from the current Chapter 3 (June 30, 2026 edition); Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from the same source.
• Husband's 4/30/25 questions are at p. 21 of the 10-10-25 Huston-Gangi chain PDF, sent 10:37:03 AM to ACAP intake.
• Court-side receipts: N-046 (Doc 192 Tr. 41); 5/29/26 Tr. 45:12-19; 7/7/26 PM Tr. 31:17-18.
• Ayers disqualification Doc 184, 4/28/25 (N-047). 2/18/25 to 2/24/25 = 6; 5/24/26 to 6/16/26 = 23; 11/24/25 to 8/10/26 = 259.
• Two captions from the same office five months apart, reported without inference: 12/3/25 "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson"; 5/21/26 "Complaint of Christopher Alan Hanson against Vivian Cortes Hodz." No second referral letter has been obtained for comparison (documented negative); a records request for two or three unrelated 13F referral cover letters is the next concrete step and either answer is evidence.
• Related decision points: N-064, N-085.

Spawned by: N-031, N-064, N-121

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-02-24 -> 2025-10-10

Actor

The Florida Bar, ACAP (Allie F. Huston; review by Alicia Gangi, Chair, Grievance Committee 13A)

Institution

The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861)

Mechanism

seventeen emails in this chain, six replies out, three emailed status formulas and three mailed letters, and not one of his questions answered; when he asked in writing whether there was a rule against speaking with him, no one replied

What the law required

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath,' and 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal only 'after complete investigation' with written notice to the complainant of 'the reasons for dismissal.' Rules 3-7.3(a), 3-7.4(j)(2) and 3-7.5(d) require written notice to the complainant of every decision not to pursue an inquiry, every committee action and every board action. The Bar's own 5/6/25 letter set the pace of its review in writing: 'may take as long as 60 days.'

What happened

Between the six-day closure on 2/24/25 and the letters sustaining it on 9/23-9/24/25, Husband sent seventeen emails to the Bar's intake office and reviewers, offering documentation and asking for status. The Bar replied three times, all status formulas, including on 9/19: "This matter remains under review of the grievance committee chair. You will be informed of the outcome of that review via US mail." Five days later he wrote the same reviewers enclosing a photograph, telling them the failures have consequences; the photograph is not described here and no one in it is named. That email drew no response, nor did his 10/3 or 10/10 follow-ups. The reviewers had already given themselves permission to stop: the 9/24/25 letter states that "Further correspondence from you regarding this matter will be placed in the file without response" (N-055). [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Bar counsel 'must investigate' a sworn complaint and may dismiss only 'after complete investigation'; the Bar's own letter set the review clock at up to 60 days. The complainant, a member of the same Bar, offered transcripts across seventeen emails. What came back was three status formulas, three mailed letters, and a sentence closing the door: further correspondence 'will be placed in the file without response.' He asked the question that measures the arc: 'Is there a rule against speaking with me?' No one answered.

Receipt

• 22-page as-sent chain, Husband to the Bar's intake office and reviewers, 5/14 to 10/10/25, held in the matter's Bar correspondence file.
• Court-filed copies in the Leon mandamus exhibit bundle at pp. 15-19 (9/29/25 email; picture sentence at p. 19) and 1D2026-0728 Record on Appeal pp. 53-57.
• Picture sentence and 9/29/25 header at exhibit bundle pp. 15 and 19; the three Huston replies (as-sent chain pp. 8, 18, 20) are sourced from extracted text, and the underlying page images are unconfirmed.
• 140 days computed 5/6 to 9/23/25 (31+30+31+31+17); the Bar's 60-day figure is per review and is a ceiling, not a promise.
• N-124 carries the Bar's own plural formula, "Each of these reviews may take as long as 60 days to complete," and N-055 records three reviewers, so a sixty-against-a-hundred-forty ratio is defeated by the Bar's own words.
• The out-count is six, not three: three emailed status formulas plus three mailed letters.
• The seventeen-email count is from this chain alone.
• The pre-announced no-response sentence is at Leon ROA p. 641 (Schuyler 9/24/25).
• Rules 3-7.3(b) and (d); Husband's in-chain citations of 3-7.3(c) and 3-7.4(g) are his characterizations, and those subsections are unchecked.
• The 9/12/25 statement that the intake auto-reply promises responses within 7 days is an uncontradicted in-chain characterization, not an imaged Bar document.
• Children are never named and the photograph is never described beyond its existence and his own accompanying words.
• The 9/29/25 email postdates the sustained closure by five days.
• Status emails: 5/14, 6/30, 9/19/25. Requests/offers: 5/15, 6/13, 6/26, 7/8, 7/21 (x2), 9/1, 9/12/25.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-10-14 -> ongoing

Actor

Judge Matthew Felix; the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; a 2D DCA panel (Villanti, Sleet, Smith); The Florida Bar

Institution

25-CA-010255 (13th Cir.); 24-DR-001150 (13th Cir.); 2D2026-0279; 2025-CA-2469 (Leon)

Mechanism

one structural question was put to three courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related one

What the law required

Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest: In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (disqualification required where the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable); Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016) (the error is structural). Court rules govern "practice and procedure" (Art. V, s. 2(a), Fla. Const.); the impartial tribunal is a constitutional guarantee, and the federal Constitution binds "the Judges in every State," any state rule to the contrary notwithstanding (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Under Rule 2.330(h) the facts alleged are taken as true and the motion is judged on legal sufficiency alone. In a records mandamus the respondent's role is to answer the writ (Radford v. Brock, 914 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 674 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)), so the named judges are either nominal custodians with no stake, in which case no merits advocacy for them is proper, or parties with a stake, in which case Murchison and Williams apply; no court in this record has answered either way.

What happened

The conflict takes three forms across related cases: Judge Felix, a named defendant in the records mandamus, kept presiding over the family case; the mandamus was filed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, with the Attorney General appearing for the judicial defendants; and The Florida Bar is itself a party in two of the forums. Three courts were asked whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one, and each disposed of the request without reaching that question. Judge Felix denied the disqualification motions on the successive-motion rule, the second time 9 hours and 27 minutes after it was filed, ruling it legally insufficient and stating that he can be fair and impartial (N-069, N-118). The Second District denied the prohibition petition in one sentence, seven days after filing, with no response required (N-078). The Sixth Circuit judge assigned to the records case ruled that he had no power to transfer the family case (N-075). No court has said why a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Due process forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest, and a procedural rule cannot override that guarantee. A judge named as a defendant in the records case kept presiding over the related family case. The question was put to three courts; each disposed of it without reaching the merits, and no court has said why a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one.

Receipt

• Amended mandamus petition caption (e-filed 11/13/25, 25-CA-10255).
• Disqualification order rested on the successive-motion rule (Rule 2.330(i)).
• 2D DCA denial: prohibition petition filed 2/3/26 and denied 2/10/26, seven days later, one day after fee paid, no opinion, no response required (N-078).
• 1150 Doc 258 (1/8/26) and Doc 331 (6/10/26, e-signed 9:27:13 AM; the motion, Doc 329, e-filed 12:00:02 AM).
• 10255 Doc 61 paras. 9 and 11 (family-case transfer denied for lack of authority).
• Two of the judges in this chain have ruled for Husband.
• Defendants have a nominal-party answer available; naming a court and its judges in a mandamus about the court's own records is how such petitions are normally styled.

Spawned by: N-058, N-069, N-078, N-091

This decision point also appears on: Under Judge Felix, Court Oversight and Conflict Judges in the Sixth Circuit, The Appellate Courts, the full ledger.

Date

2025-11-10

Actor

The Florida Bar (signatory of the W015656-111025 response)

Institution

The Florida Bar (PRR W015656-111025; closed file RFA 25-6861)

Mechanism

the file that the Bar said had been investigated at multiple levels produced, on request, one email about a typographical error

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution makes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of justifying any withholding on the custodian. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.1(b) defines the public record of a closed disciplinary case to include 'any reports, correspondence, papers, recordings, or transcripts of hearings furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent or the complainant.' A production from a closed file therefore includes respondent correspondence, or states the basis on which it is not included. The Bar's own later filed paper concedes Rule 2.420, not Chapter 119, governs its records (Leon record p. 634 n.4), and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state the basis for any denial in writing.

What happened

In November 2025 the Bar answered a public-records request for the closed complaint file about Wife's counsel. The produced set contained one email concerning a typographical error and no other correspondence from Davis to the Bar, and no Bar correspondence to Davis beyond letters on which he was copied. That one email runs from Davis to the Bar's intake mailbox on 8/20/25 at 3:45 PM, and its subject is traceable: the Bar's own 7/16/25 letter to Husband had said "there are court orders finding that Mr. Davis has filed frivolous motions or delayed the proceedings," and five days after Davis's email the Bar reversed that sentence to say there are NO such orders. Set that production beside what the Bar had written about the same file seven weeks earlier: a Senior Staff Attorney investigation, a Director of Intake review, and a Grievance Committee Chair review (N-055). Then set it beside what the Bar filed in court eleven weeks later: "Such records were not provided because they do not exist" (N-077). And beside its appellate brief, filed June 30, 2026, which says the review "was limited to the submissions and court records" and the file therefore "did not contain any communications with Mr. Davis." The Bar's reconciliation is available and is stated here rather than argued against: three reviewers reading the same submissions and the same public court records would generate no new correspondence with the accused lawyer. What the reconciliation does not supply is what each of those three reviews produced. A Senior Staff Attorney investigation, a Director of Intake review and a Grievance Committee Chair review are three pieces of work, and the Bar has not identified the product of any of them, in any letter, in any filed paper, or in its appellate brief, across the record as swept. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

The Bar's own rule defines the public record of a closed disciplinary case, in full: "(b) Public Record. The public record consists of the record before a grievance committee, the record before a referee, the record before the Supreme Court of Florida, and any reports, correspondence, papers, recordings, or transcripts of hearings furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent **or the complainant**." (emphasis added) Husband is the complainant. The Bar's own definition of its public record therefore reaches what was furnished to, served on, or received from him, and it reaches recordings and transcripts of hearings, not only paper. So a production from a closed file either contains the respondent lawyer's correspondence or reflects that none exists. The Bar's own counsel has stated the condition in its own words, in a footnote to its appellate brief: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it." That sentence turns the whole records fight into one verifiable fact, which is what the file contained. Whatever else is disputed, that much is conceded.

Receipt

Public-records request W015656-111025. The 630-page production packet and its three inventories are held in the matter's public-records file; all 630 pages catalogued. The typographical-error email at packet p. 401, FROM Davis TO the ACAP mailbox, 8/20/25 3:45 PM. Its antecedent is the Bar's own 7/16/25 closure letter at packet pp. 340-343 and 403-404, whose sentence was reversed by the 8/25/25 letter at packet pp. 407-409. Rule 3-7.1(b) is quoted in full from the current rule as printed in the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 16 (June 30, 2026 / July 1, 2026 edition). The bold on "or the complainant" is EMPHASIS ADDED; the words themselves are the rule's. Answer Brief footnote 3, 1D2026-0728, PDF p. 31 (brief p. 25), filed 6/30/26. Answer Brief brief p. 24 (PDF p. 30) for the "limited to the submissions and court records" sentence. The 1/27/26 filed statement is at Leon ROA p. 634 (motion internal p. 10), footnote 4 on the same page. SCOPE, and it always travels: "no other correspondence to or from Davis" means BAR-to-Davis correspondence. The packet holds many Husband-to-Davis emails as complaint exhibits, plus Bar letters copied to Davis at pp. 58-60, 88, 102-104 and 504-505. The production transmittal is the Bar's letter dated November 10, 2025, signed by Rick Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, captioned 'Public Records Request: W015656-111025 of 11/10/2025' and stating 'You have been provided with the entire public record related to your request'; it sits in the Leon mandamus exhibit bundle (Seq. 006, pp. 10-11), and the Bar's own 7/16/26 records letter (item A) dates the production to 11/10/2025. Request and production carry the same date.

Spawned by: N-031, N-055

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-11-24

Actor

Judge Ayers (complainant); Jason Kelley (Bar Counsel)

Institution

The Florida Bar (File 2026-10,395(13F))

Mechanism

the complaint against Husband says he said something untrue in public; he has asked in writing, again and again, which statement, and the Bar has never named one, while the file stays open and the Bar's own rules keep an open file confidential

What the law required

The First Amendment protects true statements about a judge, and truth is a complete defense to the charge this complaint makes. Rule 4-8.2(a) reaches only a statement the lawyer knows to be false or makes with reckless disregard of its truth, so the complainant and the Bar carry the burden of naming the statement, and due process requires a complaint specific enough to answer. Rule 3-7.3(b) requires investigation, and the sworn statement the Bar itself proposed is the investigation it chose. Rules 3-7.1(a)(4) and 3-7.3(g): a staff-level closure becomes public information; a pending file stays confidential.

What happened

Judge Ayers filed a Bar complaint against Husband on 11/24/25, about seven months after she was disqualified from his case. The file has stood open since, 259 days as of August 10, 2026, without a single allegedly false statement ever identified. Husband first demanded that the Bar name the statement or close the file on 12/8/25, and repeated the demand sixteen times through 7/23/26, seven months and fifteen days later. No response has ever named a statement. On 3/20/26 the Bar announced it would subpoena him for a sworn statement, "expecting 3-4 hours," listing the resources it would need to schedule. Husband accepted at once, waived confidentiality, and asked that the proceeding be public. The subpoena was never served and the statement was never taken (N-085). This is the first Bar complaint ever filed against him in a career admitted 9/28/2007, active and in good standing. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

Truth is an absolute defense to the charge this complaint makes; it has never identified a false statement. The complaint form's Part Three reads "Mr. Hanson has violated Bar Rules 4-8.2(a) and Rule 4-8.4(d)." A closure before a grievance committee hearing becomes public under the Bar's own rules (3-7.1(a)(4), 3-7.3(g)); an open file stays confidential. Husband's two complaints against Wife's counsel closed in six and twenty-three days and became public; the one against him stays open and confidential (N-031, N-121).

Receipt

• Bar File 2026-10,395(13F), complaint filed 11/24/25; 259 days, 11/24/25 to 8/10/26.
• Complaint form Part Three quoted in full from the intake form.
• The sixteen demands: 12/8/25, 12/18/25, 1/7/26, 1/15/26, 2/13/26, 3/17/26, 3/19/26, 3/30/26, 4/17/26, 4/27/26, 5/13/26, 6/19/26, 7/4/26, 7/10/26, 7/11/26, 7/23/26; first to last is 7 months 15 days.
• Date requests (a smaller, different set): 3/30, 4/27, 5/13, 7/10/26 on this card; N-085 enumerates five, adding 4/17/26.
• Underlying emails in the matter's Bar correspondence file, including 3/30/26 email to Kelley, 4/17/26 email reiterating unanswered questions, 7/10/26 sworn-statement and preservation letter, 7/11/26 letter to Bar leadership and Board of Governors, 7/23/26 followup (13 pp.).
• Kelley 3/20/26 3:05 PM email; pp. 2-16 not read.
• "the bar is not an investigative agency like law enforcement. Our investigative resources are limited." (Courtemanche, 11/24/25, Leon ROA p. 44; source spells "investigative"; motion to dismiss and Answer Brief render it "investitive").
• Kelley 12/3/25 referral letter, caption "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson."
• Rules 3-7.1(a)(4) and 3-7.3(g). Good-standing certificate CTM-428037, 8/7/26: "10-Year Discipline History: None."
• Acceptance chain verbatim in the 7/10/26 letter, Gmail id 19f4d070ee6ec12a; arc card N-085.
• The 11/24/25 same-day sequence (article emailed 10:18 AM, chambers forward 11:43 AM, forward to counsel 12:17:07 PM, personal-to-official email 4:52 PM, intake submission 4:56:32 PM) is a composite exhibit, sequence only.
• Intervals by true endpoints: 10:18 AM to 4:56:32 PM intake is six hours thirty-eight minutes; 11:43 AM chambers forward to 4:56:32 PM intake is five hours thirteen minutes. "Six hours thirty-eight minutes chambers to intake" is wrong and barred; N-065 states the same-day interval correctly and controls.
• Related decision points: N-032, NEW-P9.

Spawned by: N-031, N-062

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-11-24

Actor

Judge Ayers and Judge Felix (Div. A and D chambers); Chief Judge Sabella, the 13th Circuit General Counsel, and the trial court administrator; the Florida Bar ACAP and the Judicial Qualifications Commission; Scott Davis

Institution

13th Judicial Circuit / The Florida Bar / JQC

Mechanism

every institution named in the article was invited in writing to point out anything false in it, with an offer to amend; in the nearly nine months from November 24, 2025 through August 20, 2026, not one has named a single sentence

What the law required

Rule 3-7.3(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: bar counsel “must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath.” Canon 3D(2) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct: a judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has violated the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar “shall take appropriate action.” Both duties are written in mandatory terms. An official who has a correction available has the means to make it, so a documented failure to identify any false statement is evidence of what the record contains.

What happened

On November 24, 2025, within sixteen minutes, Husband sent three emails under one subject line, each linking a published article and naming specific officials, to the judicial divisions and Wife's counsel, to circuit administration, and to the Bar and JQC. Each carried the same offer: "If you believe that anything stated in the article is untrue, please let me know so I can consider amending the article if appropriate," with a request for comment. No deadline was set. No reply from the Bar, the JQC, or the 13th Circuit appears in the records swept. Wife's counsel answered the same day with a cease-and-desist letter that denied the article wholesale and identified no specific sentence as false. Its one concession: "certain discovery was withheld or delayed pursuant to a valid court order and consistent with the prenuptial and postnuptial agreements." Asked the next day which order he meant, he wrote: "I'll see you in court." Six hours twenty-two minutes after the third email, Judge Ayers filed a Bar complaint against Husband, kept open since without the Bar naming a false statement (N-064). [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

A regulator that receives a specific, documented allegation of misconduct processes it, and an official who can correct a false statement has the means to. Correcting this cost nothing: the sender offered in writing to amend the article. The silence is evidence that nobody positioned to correct it has tried.

Receipt

• Three sends of 11/24/25 at 10:18, 10:27 and 10:34 AM; the 4:40 PM cease-and-desist; the 11/25/25 reply chain.
• Wife's counsel's reply to which order he meant: "I'll see you in court."
• The article, 16 pages, published on X on or about November 21, 2025, filed at Doc 267 pp. 14-56.
• Scope of no-reply finding: rests on the 7/13/26 Gmail sweep; these three sends originated from a Yahoo account, so a Yahoo-side reply cannot be excluded.

Spawned by: N-064

This decision point also appears on: Court Oversight and Conflict Judges in the Sixth Circuit, the full ledger.

Spawned by: N-055, FNEW-B1

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-02-09

Actor

John Londot, Greenberg Traurig, counsel for The Florida Bar

Institution

2025-CA-2469 (Leon)

Mechanism

asked whether communications with Wife's lawyer ever existed, the Bar's counsel answered, three minutes later, that none were withheld from production; his own filed paper thirteen days earlier had said flatly that they do not exist

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Rule 3-7.1(b) makes a closed file's 'reports, correspondence, papers, recordings, or transcripts of hearings furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent or the complainant' public. A custodian asked whether records ever existed either produces them or confirms under oath that none exist; an answer about what was withheld from production reaches a different question.

What happened

On 12/1/25 Husband asked the Bar's Deputy General Counsel whether the Bar had ever communicated with Davis about the complaint, apart from one email about a typo. No reply appears in the record swept. On 1/27/26 the Bar's motion to dismiss, signed by John Londot, stated without qualification: "Such records were not provided because they do not exist." Thirteen days later, Husband asked the same lawyer directly whether any such communications ever existed. Three minutes later: "there are no comms with Mr. Davis at all withheld from public record production. There aren't any to withhold." The filed paper says the records do not exist; the email says only that nothing was withheld. Read against later Bar statements on this closure, that it did not act on the complaint (N-105) and that records were disposed of (N-116), the accounts do not converge. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

A respondent asked whether records ever existed answers whether they existed; saying nothing was withheld from production is a narrower answer. The Bar's own rule defines a closed case's public record to include correspondence with the respondent lawyer "or the complainant," and Husband is the complainant. The Bar's counsel has since conceded the obligation in its brief: "the Bar would be obligated to provide it." What remains is a fact question the Bar has answered two different ways.

Receipt

• 1/27/26 motion to dismiss, Filing #240404774, e-filed 4:38:07 PM, Leon ROA p. 634 (motion internal p. 10); motion occupies ROA pp. 625-643, signature block at ROA p. 638; footnote 4 on the same page as the quoted sentence.
• 2/9/26 chain, subject "Re: 2025CA2469 - Hanson v The Florida Bar," Londot's message timestamped 5:04:46 PM EST from his firm address, Husband's question at 5:01 PM same day; Bar correspondence folder and Leon matter tree.
• 12/1/25 email in the same folder.
• Answer Brief footnote 3, 1D2026-0728, PDF p. 31 (brief p. 25), filed 6/30/26: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it."
• Courtemanche no-reply negative is a FILENAME-LEVEL sweep only, 8/17/26, of the Bar correspondence folder and Leon matter tree; scoped to filenames, no full-text or mailbox sweep run.
• Londot statement carried standing alone; Husband's own replies in the same chain are argumentative and not reproduced.
• Rule 3-7.1(b) quoted in full at FNEW-B1; "or the complainant" is part of the subdivision.
• The stored 16-page text export of the motion to dismiss is not the filed original, and no quotation here is drawn from it.
• N-105, filed 5/22/26: "the Bar did not act on his complaint and so did not share it with or request a response from Mr. Davis". N-116, 6/5/26: records "disposed of pursuant to judicial branch and bar records retention schedule and are no longer available".
• Related decision points: N-055.

Spawned by: N-055, N-116

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Spawned by: N-055

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-03-09

Actor

Rick Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, The Florida Bar

Institution

The Florida Bar (W016061-022526)

Mechanism

the records showing what the Bar spent on the law firm defending it against its own member were priced and made payable in advance, with the letter noting on its face that Florida law provides no waiver for indigency or public interest

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the record open and puts the burden of any barrier on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(3) carries section 119.07(4)'s fee terms into the judicial branch: a custodian may charge only what that statute allows, a special service charge tied to actual cost where a request requires extensive clerical or supervisory assistance.

What happened

On 3/9/26 the Bar's records office demanded prepayment before releasing the outside-counsel engagement and billing records it had identified. The letter states on its face that Florida law provides no fee waiver for indigency or public interest, and it states the Bar's own policy that "any time spent in excess of 30 minutes constitutes 'extensive labor' and will be charged." The records stayed behind the demand. Two more requests were priced afterward: $89.36 on 6/5/26 and $101.09 on 7/6/26 (N-116, N-129). [ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE]

Baseline deviation

The Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of justifying any barrier on the custodian, not the person asking. What matters is what sits behind the price: the records of the Bar's own use of member resources to retain outside counsel to resist a member's records requests. The Bar priced them, stated on the letter's face that no waiver exists, and produced none.

Receipt

• Fee letter 3/9/26, request W016061-022526, signed Rick Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, p. 1; the $43.58 per hour IT Labor rate is on that page
• Article I, section 24(a) and (c), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(3); section 119.07(4), Fla. Stat.
• Later fee gates: $89.36 (6/5/26, N-116) and $101.09 (7/6/26, W016548-070626, N-129)
• Fee figures are per custodian and are never summed across custodians without listing each

Spawned by: N-079

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-03-20 -> ongoing

Actor

Bar Counsel Jason Kelley (Florida Bar)

Institution

Florida Bar

Mechanism

the regulator announced it would put Husband under oath, he agreed the same week without conditions, waived confidentiality, and invited the public; he renewed his availability repeatedly in writing, and as of August 20, 2026, 153 days later, no subpoena and no dates have issued

What the law required

The First Amendment and Article I, section 4 of the Florida Constitution protect a citizen's truthful reporting on the courts and the Bar. Rule 3-7.3(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar requires bar counsel to investigate a sworn complaint; a regulator that announces it will take the respondent's sworn statement either takes it or withdraws the demand, and tells the respondent which statement it claims is false. A subpoena to a non-party witness is quashed on stated grounds and, where the rule requires them, on findings; a proceeding that decides facts has to let someone test them.

What happened

On March 20, 2026, Bar counsel told Husband the regulator would put him under oath: "I am going to send you a subpoena to appear in person for a sworn statement." Husband accepted three days later, without condition, waived confidentiality, and asked that the proceeding be public.

He renewed his availability in writing five times over the following months. On July 10 he wrote: "I agreed at once and without condition. More than 110 days have passed; no subpoena and no dates have issued. I renew my unconditional availability."

No subpoena and no dates have issued, 153 days as of August 20, 2026. In the same period every other witness Husband subpoenaed in this proceeding was released, quashed, or did not appear, with no protective order obtained for those who did not appear. [IGNORED: the announced statement was never taken, and the request for dates stands unanswered.]

Baseline deviation

Truthful reporting on the courts is protected speech. A regulator that announces it will take a respondent's sworn statement either takes it or withdraws the demand, and names the statement it claims is false. A witness who agrees without condition and renews his availability in writing cannot be the reason the statement never happened. A regulator may decide it does not need the statement after all. The record shows neither answer: it did not take the testimony, did not identify a false statement, and did not close the file.

Receipt

• The 3/20/26 email and Husband's 3/30, 4/27, 5/13 and 7/10/26 follow-ups are carried verbatim in one document, the 7/10/26 as-sent letter (Gmail id 19f4d070ee6ec12a, sent 2026-07-10T17:15:34Z)
• Full 3/20/26 announcement, 16-page chain PDF, Bar correspondence folder, p. 3: "It appears you have a lot to say, and I am going to give you the opportunity to make it all part of the record. I am going to send you a subpoena to appear in person for a sworn statement. I will send you some dates and give you your choice. I am expecting 3-4 hours."
• Counsel's 3/19/26 message at p. 4; Husband's 3/19/26 12:10 PM reply at p. 3, "Can you tell me one statement that I've made that is false?"; Husband's 3/23/26 unconditional acceptance and his request that the proceeding be public, "I request that they be public and I would even invite the public to attend the deposition if that is an option," at p. 2
• Renewals, enumerated: five, on 3/30, 4/17, 4/27, 5/13 and 7/10/26; the 4/17/26 1:05 AM email states the interval on its own face
• Intervals machine-computed: 3/20/26 to 8/20/26 is 153 days; 3/20/26 to the 7/10/26 letter is 112 days
• Negative, with scope: no subpoena, no dates, and no identification of any allegedly false statement appears in any document across the three swept Bar roots through 8/6/26, and no reply from that counsel after 3/20/26 appears there either
• Other witnesses in the same period, each counted once at its own row and not recounted here: three quashed from the bench 5/29 (N-109), former counsel released with no findings (N-112), the circuit's records custodian released with no findings (N-113), a protective order signed about four hours after the proposed order reached chambers (N-123), four Bar officials quashed 7/7 with no written order in the following thirty-one days (N-130), two university witnesses who did not appear (N-145)
• No fact originates here; every element is receipted on an underlying row

Spawned by: N-109, N-064

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-05-22

Actor

John Londot / Greenberg Traurig, for Florida Bar Recipients

Institution

The Florida Bar (in 1150)

Mechanism

the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copied

What the law required

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(1): a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal, and the duty runs to correcting one the lawyer has made. Because a closed grievance file is public under Rule 3-7.1(b) and Article I, section 24(a), a filed statement about what the Bar did with that file is testable against the Bar's own letters on the same file.

What happened

On 5/22/26 the Bar's outside counsel filed Doc 309 for the four Bar recipients. Paragraph 5 states: "Mr. Hanson simply refuses to believe that such records were not produced because they do not exist—the Bar did not act on his complaint and so did not share it with or request a response from Mr. Davis."

Three things in the Bar's own record run against the first two clauses. Its closure letter recites a docket review. Its review letter describes three levels of internal review (N-055). Two Bar letters on that file, predating the statement, cc Scott Paul Davis with enclosure.

Husband put paragraph 5 to Judge Felix on 5/29/26. No one answered it. The same judge barred cross-examination on the Bar complaint (N-108), and later quashed all four Bar officials' subpoenas without a rule-factor finding (N-130). The determination remains pending. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

A lawyer's statement of fact to a tribunal must be accurate, and it remains the lawyer's to correct after filing. This one was put to the judge seven days later and has never been answered or corrected. The sentence separates cleanly: 'did not request a response from Mr. Davis' is consistent with the record; 'did not act' and 'did not share it with' run against the Bar's own closure letter, its three-review letter (N-055), and two cc lines to Davis on the same file.

Receipt

• Doc 309 paras. 1 and 5, filed 5/22/26; Husband's opposition is DIN 316, docket-confirmed, not 310
• 5/29/26 Tr. 45:5-9
• Closure letter: "In addition to the submitted documentation, I also reviewed the underlying docket in Hillsborough County Case No. 2024-DR-1150."
• Review letter describes a Senior Staff Attorney investigation, a Director of Intake review, and a Grievance Committee Chair review of the same file (N-055)
• The cc lines are on four letters: Huston 2/24/25 p. 1; Schuyler 9/24/25 p. 1; Wackes 6/16/26 p. 2; Wackes 7/24/26 p. 2
• The stated reason is Gangi, Chair of Grievance Committee 13A, 9/23/25 p. 1: "I am also copying Mr. Davis on my response so that the attorney is aware that an additional review of this matter has taken place and that I am sustaining the former decisions to close this file as proper and correct."
• SET SPLIT, load-bearing and it always travels: of the four cc letters, only Huston 2/24/25 and Schuyler 9/24/25 sit on RFA 25-6861, the file Doc 309 para. 5 is about, and only those two predate the 5/22/26 filing; Wackes 6/16/26 and 7/24/26 are on RFA 26-13570 and both postdate it. The set bearing on the filed sentence is those two, not four
• SCOPE THAT ALWAYS TRAVELS: the enclosures are not identified on the cc lines, and the 9/24/25 body identifies its enclosure as a Bar document. No enclosure has been produced, so the record does not show that the complaint itself went to Davis
• The 2/24/25 docket-review sentence is at Leon ROA p. 103 and 1150 Doc 200 p. 29
• The 6/30/26 Answer Brief states the same posture in signed appellate form: the file "was closed without further investigation" and the review "was limited to the submissions and court records" (brief p. 24, PDF p. 30)
• Cross-links: N-055, N-116, N-108 (Tr. 43:2-5), N-130 (7/7/26 Tr. 31:1-3)
• The quoted paragraph contains an em dash in the original and is reproduced verbatim

Spawned by: N-055, N-058

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-05-22 -> ongoing

Actor

The Florida Bar, Tampa Branch (Michelle Robertson, Bar Counsel, Lawyer Regulation; file TFB 2026-10,601(13C), the Cortes Hodz complaint)

Institution

The Florida Bar

Mechanism

the Bar's own letter sent this complaint to its Tampa office for additional investigation; seventy-five days later the office running that investigation had not answered its own complainant's two requests to know whether anything was happening

What the law required

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath.' Rules 3-7.3(a), 3-7.3(d), 3-7.4(j)(2) and 3-7.5(d) require written notice to the complainant, with reasons, of any decision not to pursue an inquiry, any dismissal, and any committee or board action. The Bar's own transfer letter said the complaint went to its Tampa office for additional investigation, and the time standard is whatever the Bar states for itself in writing.

What happened

On 5/21/26 the Bar transferred Husband's complaint against his former counsel to its Tampa Branch Office for additional investigation. He complied the next day, filing a litigation-disclosure notice listing six related proceedings. Bar Counsel replied the same day: "Thank you for the additional information. If you have any questions, etc., please let me know." That is the Bar's last substantive communication on the file.

He asked for status on 7/30 and 8/5/26: "I respectfully request a brief written status of the investigation. I remain ready to provide any additional documents". Neither request drew a reply. From 5/22 to 8/5 is 75 days.

Measured against the same institution's other files: this file drew a written response from the accused attorney by 3/11/26. On the Davis file, by the Bar's own brief, the file was closed without further investigation, and the lawyer was never asked anything. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

The Bar's rules require investigation of a sworn complaint and written notice, with reasons, whenever it is declined, dismissed or acted on. The Bar's own letter said this complaint went to its Tampa office for additional investigation. Two written requests to learn whether that investigation was moving drew no reply in 75 days, from a complainant who kept offering evidence. This is the third file with the same shape: seventeen emails to three status formulas (NEW-P6), sixteen demands with no statement named (N-064).

Receipt

• The 8/5/26 email chain on the Hodz complaint, File 2026-10,601, received 8/17/26, all 3 pages, containing the 5/21 transmittal, the 5/22 litigation notice and reply, and the 7/30 and 8/5 requests
• 7/30/26 request: it had "been at least a couple of months since I've heard anything," requesting someone contact him "for details and additional information about the violations that was difficult to fit in the complaint"
• 8/5/26 request, full text: "I respectfully request a brief written status of the investigation. I remain ready to provide any additional documents, correspondence, sworn statement, or other information."
• 75 days computed 5/22 to 8/5/26 (9+30+31+5)
• Complainant-notice provisions quoted from the official Rules Regulating The Florida Bar Chapter 3 text, 2019 edition, pulled 8/17/26; current-edition text not yet confirmed, and amendments through 2025 exist.
• Interval check run 8/17/26 against the full official Chapter 3 text: NO rule sets a 15-day-after-request or every-90-day complainant-update interval; the 90-day figure in circulation is the referee's post-appointment deadline, a different stage, plus informal contact-the-agency guidance
• The accused attorney's 3/11/26 written response, filed in the Leon mandamus matter, pp. 1 and 5, opening "Thank you for your letter of February 24, 2026"; pp. 6-25 are enclosures and were not read
• The Davis-file comparison is the Answer Brief, 1D2026-0728, brief p. 24 (PDF p. 30)
• The no-reply negative covers the captured chain and the tree as swept 8/17/26.
• See also N-032 (the caption comparison) and N-083 (the respondent's own filing)

Spawned by: N-032, N-083

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Spawned by: N-079, N-105

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-16

Actor

Christopher Stephen Wackes

Institution

The Florida Bar (RFA 26-13570)

Mechanism

the second complaint arrived with a written conflicts notice on its face, and closed in 23 days without a word about the conflicts, from an institution that was at that moment an active defendant in the complainant's pending lawsuit against it

What the law required

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath as provided in this rule,' and 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal only 'after complete investigation.' The resubmission was keyed to Rules 4-3.1, 4-3.2, 4-3.3, 4-3.4, 4-4.4(a) and 4-8.4, rules that govern a lawyer's conduct in litigation. A written conflicts notice to an institution that is a defendant in the complainant's pending suit against it calls for a written answer before the institution acts on the complaint.

What happened

On 6/16/26 Bar counsel closed Husband's second complaint against Wife's counsel in 23 days. The letter named no rule of professional conduct, made no finding on most allegations, and said nothing about the conflicts notice. Its one adverse finding: "A review of court records indicates that the appeal was disposed of prior to the hearing mentioned in your complaint." It closed with the same door the first closure offered: a supporting court order would reopen review.

That condition was already met by Exhibit A, the 11/20/24 order compelling Wife's compliance with mandatory disclosure and awarding Husband fee entitlement (N-009), which the letter never mentions. The exit it names is one the court has repeatedly declined to open, refusing more than once to find any fact. Exhibit A runs against the party, not her counsel. That gap has a real answer available. The Bar has not given one. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

The Bar's rule states the duty plainly: 'Bar counsel must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath as provided in this rule.' This resubmission was keyed rule by rule to the docket and named the conflicts on its face. The conflicts run two layers deep: the Bar was a defendant in Husband's pending suit when it closed this complaint in 23 days, and the 2026 complaint sits atop its handling of the 2025 file. The closure names no rule and says nothing about the conflicts.

Receipt

• Wackes letter 6/16/26, RFA 26-13570, pp. 1-2; the adverse stay/appeal finding is on p. 1. The full condition sentence includes the affirmative promise.
• The 5/24/26 complaint with the conflicts notice on its face.
• Exhibit A is the 11/20/24 "Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Compel Petitioner's Compliance with Mandatory Disclosure (Hon. K. Ayers)," 1150 Doc 054 (N-009).
• Pending-litigation posture on 6/16/26: Leon County 2025-CA-2469 and the appeal 1D2026-0728.
• Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from the current rule. Rules 3-7.3(c) and (d) are read in the June 30, 2026 edition (print pp. 116-117). The same rule permits dismissal only "after complete investigation."
• Court-side receipts for the locked exit: N-091 (4/17/26 Tr. 181, findings refused six times); N-108 (5/29/26 Tr. 53:9-15, "Are you ever going to find any facts about my constitutional rights?" answered "Maybe."); N-046 (4/22/25, misconduct named against both parties only); 7/7/26 PM Tr. 31:17-18 ("I'm not going to answer that question.").
• 23 days computed 5/24 to 6/16/26. The Della-Donna year misprint is noted, not weaponized.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-19

Actor

Bar leadership (Orr, Greenlee, Baker-Barnes, Doyle, et al.)

Institution

The Florida Bar

Mechanism

the routine request got the routine answer in twenty days; the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and the request for executive-committee review drew nothing in writing from anyone

What the law required

Standing Board Policy 15.75 provides for review of a staff-level closure on the complainant's written request made within 30 days, with a written explanation of the reasons; the 7/4/26 request came on day 18. Records that are the subject of pending appeal 1D2026-0728 and a written litigation-hold demand are preserved. A conflicts notice and a request for executive-committee review, sent to an institution that is a defendant in the complainant's suit against it, call for a written answer from someone with authority to give one.

What happened

On 6/19/26, the new Bar president's swearing-in day, Bar leadership received the full record, a litigation-hold demand, and a request for a conversation. No named officer replied in writing. A nine-point objection followed on 7/4/26, asking the Bar to "proceed with all additional review and oversight options relating to my complaint," including review through the executive committee.

Twenty days later, on 7/24/26, the Bar answered that one point only: the Director of ACAP "will review this file and decide if closure was appropriate." That review may take up to 60 days. The letter does not mention the conflicts notice, the litigation hold, or the executive-committee request, and no named officer answered personally in any document in the file. Through 8/7/26, forty-nine days, no named officer replied at all. Several officer addresses reportedly bounced and were later corrected, though no bounce notice confirms it. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

Policy 15.75 review was granted in writing twenty days after it was requested: the routine request got the routine answer. The three requests that reached the institution itself, the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and executive-committee review, produced no writing from any named officer. The Bar answered where a form existed and not where a decision would have been required.

Receipt

• The 6/19/26 send as an as-sent PDF.
• The 7/4/26 objection as sent, 6:16:15 PM EDT, preserved as.eml with a true-copy PDF read from its text layer, not from a page image.
• The Bar's answer, Wackes letter 7/24/26 p. 2, granting ACAP Director review of the RFA 26-13570 closure, scanned as received, on letterhead naming Joshua E. Doyle as Executive Director; the board of governors policy the letter says is attached is NOT in the scan.
• All seven pages of the 6/11/26 email to Bar leadership were rendered and contain NO bounce notice; the stored file's name asserts a bounce the document does not show, and the bounce assertion must not be repeated as fact until a notice is filed. The message itself and its twelve-address recipient list are at p. 1.
• Forty-nine days computed 6/19 to 8/7/26, scoped to the matter's Bar correspondence file and its Gmail archive.
• The 7/24/26 letter also carries "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)" at p. 2 (N-105).

Spawned by: N-116, N-121

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-30

Actor

The Florida Bar, appellees in 1D2026-0728, by Keating and Londot, Greenberg Traurig

Institution

1D2026-0728

Mechanism

the appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decision

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 2.420(l)(2) place enforcement of the access right against a non-judge custodian in the circuit court. The First District reviews a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo, taking the verified petition's allegations as true; Rule 1.630(d)(2) requires an alternative writ on a prima facie showing, and a disputed allegation that a record exists is decided after a hearing (Consumer Rights, LLC v. Bradford County, 153 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)).

What happened

On 6/30/26 the Bar appellees filed their Answer Brief in 1D2026-0728. It states that "Mr. Hanson's grievance file against Mr. Davis was closed without further investigation," and that because review was limited to submissions and court records, the file held no communications with Davis. In a footnote it concedes the condition on which its production duty binds: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it."

The brief also restates settled law that a person has neither the right to compel discipline nor standing to appeal a non-discipline decision, and describes the 2/24/25 closure as a no-jurisdiction finding, wording absent from the letter. The appeal record carries the Bar's own letters, including a 9/24/25 letter describing a Senior Staff Attorney investigation and two further reviews of the same file the brief says was closed without further investigation (N-055). [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

An appeal reviews whether a case was rightly ended. This one asks whether a verified records petition could be dismissed with prejudice on an unsworn assertion that the records do not exist, before the opposition was filed and without a hearing (N-079). No decision has issued. What the appellate papers supply is the regulator's positions in writing and unhedged, and two concede more than any letter did: the file 'was closed without further investigation,' and the Bar 'would be obligated to provide' Davis communications if the file held any.

Receipt

• Answer Brief of Appellees, 1D2026-0728, filed 6/30/26, Filing 251514921, 34 PDF pages and 28 numbered, signed M. Hope Keating and John K. Londot, held in the appeal's brief file.
• Quotes at PDF pp. 8 (brief p. 2, the "no jurisdiction" characterization), 18 (brief p. 12, the standing sentence), 30 (brief p. 24, both admissions), and 31 (brief p. 25 fn. 3, the conditional concession).
• Precision note, load-bearing: "no jurisdiction" is the BRIEF's phrase, anchored to Standing Board Policy 15.75(d)(1), and does NOT appear in the Huston letter; attribute the phrase to the brief and the deferral language to the letter.
• Composite Exhibit A to the 1/27/26 motion to dismiss with the judicial-notice request at Leon ROA p. 626; the letters at ROA pp. 640-643.
• Underlying letters quoted by the brief at ROA pp. 44 and 103.

Spawned by: N-079

This decision point also appears on: The Appellate Courts, the full ledger.

Date

2026-07-04 -> ongoing

Actor

The Florida Bar (Richard Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel; Gypsy Bailey, General Counsel); demand directed also to Jason Kelley and to outside counsel John Londot

Institution

The Florida Bar (PRR W016548-070626; prior W016061-022526 and W016446-060426 Category 2)

Mechanism

a dues-paying member asked who funds the outside firm his own Bar retained against him, four times between July 4 and July 11, the first two fifty-six minutes apart the same evening; the Bar answered the question with a price, $101.09, and has never given the answer itself

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes the records open and puts the exemption burden on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the basis for any denial in writing, and 2.420(m)(3) limits fees to those section 119.07 allows.

What happened

The Bar retained Greenberg Traurig to defend it in Husband's Leon County records action, to carry the appeal, and to move in the family case to quash the subpoenas of four Bar officials. Husband pays dues to that Bar. He asked who funds the engagement four times between 7/4/26 and 7/11/26, including a formal records request, Category D, seeking records identifying who authorized the engagement and its funding source.

What came back was a price: $101.09, on a 30-day pay-or-close clock. On 8/6/26 the General Counsel answered the fee questions in detail, confirming the financial records exist, but did not say who pays. No exemption and no denial was ever asserted as to Category D. Two earlier requests also went unproduced behind fees, $254.67 (N-082) and $89.36 (N-116). As of August 10, 2026 the records had not been produced and the Bar had not said who pays. [ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE]

Baseline deviation

The cost of answering is the measure: one sentence, and the Bar's own counsel confirmed Finance and Accounting had already located the records. No exemption was claimed and nothing was refused; the request was priced. Husband pays mandatory dues to the Bar that retained the firm against him; who pays for the engagement is exactly what the request asked. It was asked four times and remains unanswered.

Receipt

• Demands: (1) 7/4/26 6:16:15 PM objection letter item 8; (2) 7/4/26 7:12:36 PM records request Category D (the companion file marked MISDIRECTED and resent; the 7:12 PM version is operative); (3) 7/10/26 1:15 PM email sec. 1; (4) 7/11/26 8:35:37 PM Request 5.
• The four demands run 7/4/26 to 7/11/26; demands (1) and (2) are fifty-six minutes apart the same evening (6:16:15 PM and 7:12:36 PM).
• 7/4/26 6:16 PM letter: "I am a dues-paying member of The Florida Bar. As a member, I object to that allocation of the Bar's resources, and I ask the Bar's leadership to account for it."
• 7/10/26 email: "Please confirm in writing the funding source for that engagement, including whether it is paid from mandatory member dues."
• Courtemanche's fee letter: "The bar is not obligated to divide its efforts by category, regardless of whether you accept our prior estimate."
• Responses: Courtemanche 7/6/26 acknowledgment and $101.09 estimate; Bailey 8/6/26 7:00 PM inline reply that Finance and Accounting "had to produce these records and spent more time than our customary 30-minute period"; "The bar will not waive the $101.09 estimate"; the clerical hours were to "locate the records and pull records that do not contain confidential attorney-client information".
• W-number mapping, counterintuitive on its face: W016548-070626 is the Greenberg Traurig BILLING request; W016547 is the RETENTION and DISPOSITION request.
• Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), and Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878 (2018), both cited in the demand; reporter cites verified 9/15/26.
• Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(2) and (m)(3); section 119.07(4), Fla. Stat.
• The 6/19/26 letter contains no Greenberg Traurig, dues or funding-source content, across all 10 of its pages.
• The 7/15/26 ESI demand and the 7/23/26 followup name the firm but contain no funding ask; the 8/5/26 fee letter deliberately omits it.
• Searched for any Bar answer on funding, and none appears in: the Bar correspondence and JQC file, the Leon mandamus matter, the 1D2026-0728 appeal file including the 6/30/26 Answer Brief, and the node ledger.

Spawned by: N-082, N-105, N-131

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-07-07

Actor

John Londot, Greenberg Traurig (outside counsel for the Bar recipients)

Institution

The Florida Bar (through outside counsel, in open court)

Mechanism

the Bar's lawyer told a judge he had a "spidey-sense" about the other side's mental health, said he is not a doctor, and advised the self-represented father to spend better time with his children; the objection was immediate and drew no answer, correction, or withdrawal

What the law required

Rule 4-8.4(d) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar bars conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants," and Rule 4-4.4(a) provides that a lawyer "may not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person." A statement to a tribunal about an opposing party's mental health, prefaced by the speaker's own "I'm not a doctor," carries no evidentiary support by its terms. A timely objection calls for a ruling from the court; this one drew none, and counsel neither corrected nor withdrew the statement.

What happened

At the 7/7/26 afternoon hearing, counsel for the Bar recipients told the court: "I got a very strong spidey-sense, and I'm not a doctor, but I think there are -- is some emotional mental difficulties happening there. I heard Mr. Hanson acknowledge that," adding that he hoped Husband would recalculate and devote better family time than litigation. Husband objected on the record: "Mr. Londot's comments about my mental health status, and how I should be spending time with my children are unconscionable." Neither counsel nor the court addressed the objection. No correction and no withdrawal appears anywhere in this record. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Husband had already said it himself, at the same hearing: "The Florida Bar is even well aware of some emotional and mental difficulties that I've had". Husband has had some physical and mental health challenges; his own testimony stays verbatim. What followed is the deviation: a lawyer offered the diagnosis-shaped statement anyway, disclaiming his own qualification, and moved from that to how Husband should spend time with his children. The objection is in the same transcript, unanswered.

Receipt

• 7/7/26 PM transcript (Guldin, certified 7/13/26), 23:15-26:4: the two quoted lines at 25:8-21; the objection at 26:10-16; the phone-call statements at 24:20-21, 25:7-8 and 26:17-19.
• Rule text: Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 4-4.4(a) and 4-8.4(d), official June 30, 2026 print.
• Husband's own same-hearing statement, "The Florida Bar is even well aware of some emotional and mental difficulties that I've had" (18:24-19:1), is what "I heard Mr. Hanson acknowledge that" points at, and it leads the baseline above.
• Counsel: "when I first got the file I called Mr. Hanson" and Husband "refused to talk to me on the phone any more." Husband: "I never got on the phone with him. We had an e-mail communication."
• His 7/9 email calls the Bar this lawyer's "client and co-conspirator" and announces him and his firm as federal defendants.

Spawned by: NEW-P5

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-07-07

Actor

John Londot, Greenberg Traurig (drafting counsel for the Bar recipients); Judge Felix (bench grant, assignment)

Institution

The Florida Bar (outside counsel), in 13th Cir. 24-DR-001150

Mechanism

the Bar's lawyer won the ruling, accepted the court's assignment to write the order, and for 56 days the ruling did not exist as an order, so the party that lost it had nothing to appeal; the order entered on 9/1/26 states no ground and addresses no witness

What the law required

Counsel who accepts a tribunal's assignment to prepare an order performs it or states why not. The court asked, 'Mr. Londot, will you please prepare an order?' and he answered 'Yes.' (7/7/26 PM Tr. 31:4-8). Until a written order is entered the ruling binds no one and cannot be appealed, so the party that lost it has nothing to take up.

What happened

On 7/7/26 the court granted the Bar recipients' motion to quash from the bench, gave one ground, and asked the Bar's outside counsel to prepare the order. He accepted on the record. No deadline was set. That evening he emailed the proposed order to an address Husband says he had directed him in writing three weeks earlier not to use. Husband found it and objected two days later, on 7/9/26, raising constitutional issues and stating that the proposed order offered no explanation for the decision and should address each witness and the relevance of their testimony. No reply ever came. No revised order issued. On 9/1/26, 56 days after the bench ruling, the court signed a one-page order granting the motion that states no ground and addresses no witness; it is dated "this ______ day of August, 2026" over the 9/1/26 electronic signature and was docketed 9/2/26 (Doc 378). [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

A lawyer who accepts a drafting assignment either finishes it or says why not. The court asked, "Mr. Londot, will you please prepare an order?" and he answered "Yes." A bench ruling that never becomes a written order binds no one and cannot be appealed, so the party holding the unwritten win keeps it. Until 9/1/26 this was the fourth unwritten ruling on this record (N-060, N-074, N-092, N-090). Three other orders were entered within about a day (N-123, N-128, N-134).

Receipt

• 7/7/26 PM transcript (Guldin, certified 7/13/26): bench grant at 29:24-25, the single stated ground at 31:1-3, the assignment and acceptance at 31:4-8. The 31:4-8 duty anchor has not been checked against a page image.
• The 7/9/26 email to Londot: "As far as the proposed order, I object. I have raised constitutional issues. The proposed order fails to offer any explanation or basis for the decision." It goes on to ask that each witness and the relevance of their testimony be addressed and that objections be noted if submitted as is. Both pages; no reply and no new proposed order followed.
• The written order is Doc 378, e-signed 9/1/26 4:01:11 PM and docketed 9/2/26: one page, no ground stated, no witness addressed, dated "this ______ day of August, 2026" over the 9/1/26 signature. No deadline was set for the order, so the claim here is not a missed deadline; it is 56 days of silence against an accepted assignment.
• The 6/16/26 address directive rests on Husband's 7/9 account only and the native 6/16 message has not been located (documented negative 8/18/26).
• The 7/9 message asserting "I have never emailed you from this email address other than to request that you NOT use it" was itself sent from that address, per its From line.
• No rule is cited here. Velocity comparators: N-123 (about 4 hours), N-128 (about 19h54m), N-134 (about 25 hours). Unwritten-ruling family: N-060, N-074, N-092, N-090, N-133.
• The same hearing's commentary about Husband's mental health is its own card, NEW-P10.

Spawned by: N-129

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-07-16

Actor

Gypsy Bailey, General Counsel and Division Director, Ethics and Consumer Protection, The Florida Bar

Institution

The Florida Bar (Rule 2.420 request, Category F: audit-trail, metadata, user-access and purge-log records for RFA 25-6861)

Mechanism

the last remaining records, the ones showing how, when and by whom the Bar's file was destroyed, were priced at $2,614.80 in advance; the figure is exactly 60 hours at the Bar's own internal IT rate, with nothing in it for the vendor whose involvement is the stated reason the price does not change

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect judicial-branch records, and access is the presumption; section 24(c) permits exemptions only where created by law with specificity. The burden of justifying a withholding or a barrier to access rests on the custodian, not the requester. The Bar invoked section 119.07(4)(d), Florida Statutes, which permits a special service charge only where the request requires extensive use of information technology resources or extensive clerical assistance, and provides that the charge "shall be reasonable and shall be based on the cost incurred." Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(3) carries the same limit into the judicial branch. Subdivision (m)(2) requires the custodian to state the basis for a denial in writing. The lawful path in one sentence: produce the cost calculation behind the figure, the systems queried, the tasks, the hours per task, the personnel classification and rate for each, and the vendor charge stated separately, or reduce the charge to the cost actually incurred.

What happened

On 7/16/26 at 2:56 PM the Bar priced the last outstanding category, the audit-trail, metadata, user-access and purge-log records showing how the RFA 25-6861 file was disposed of, at $2,614.80: "Under Rule 2.420(m)(3) and FS §119.07(4)(d), the bar would have to engage in extensive labor to produce such records, and the estimate for this work is $2,614.80. The records will not be provided until payment is made. If you do not reply within 30 days from the date of this response, we will assume that you no longer wish to receive the records and your request will be closed." Asked to itemize, the Bar answered 70 minutes later, on 7/17/26 at 12:15:17 PM, in three lines: "The estimate remains the same for both, as both will involve approximately 60 hours of IT time and working with our vendor for the items you requested," then "See 1 above.", then "As previously stated, Categories A-E have been produced, and Category F has not." On 8/6/26 at 3:00 PM the same author wrote: "The system the bar uses for disciplinary matters, including complaints against members, may have all this information but we have no access to it. We do not know what the vendor would charge to build the necessary access, how long it would take for the vendor to program that for the bar, what the bar's IT department would have to do to produce such data after the vendor completes any build, etc. I consulted with the bar's IT department to arrive at that estimate, and it is just that – an estimate." The arithmetic is checkable by anyone. $2,614.80 divided by 60 hours is $43.58 to the cent, with no remainder, and $43.58 per hour is the IT Labor rate printed on the Bar's own 3/9/26 letter, where it appears as "$43.58 per hour x 0.5 hours = $21.79" and also recomputes exactly (N-082). So the figure is 60 hours at the Bar's internal rate and nothing else, in a price whose stated justification is "60 hours of IT time and working with our vendor." The Bar's reconciliation is available: the 60 hours is an estimate of unknown work. What that reading costs is the scope answer, because an estimate built on admittedly unknown vendor and IT inputs cannot also be the reason the same figure prices one file and two files alike. The Bar answered every one of these letters promptly and in substance: a 7/16 reply to a 7/15 letter, a 7/17 reply in 70 minutes, and an 8/6 reply about 24 hours after the 8/5 letter, answering line by line. The specific questions still went unanswered. [ONLY-FOR-A-PRICE]

Baseline deviation

The Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open, and section 24(c) permits exemptions only where created by law with specificity. The burden of justifying any barrier to access sits with the custodian, never with the person asking. Florida law permits a special service charge only where a request requires extensive labor, and the charge "shall be reasonable and shall be based on the cost incurred." The lawful path is one sentence: produce the cost calculation behind the figure, the systems queried, the tasks, the hours per task, the personnel classification and rate for each, and the vendor charge stated separately, or reduce the charge to the cost actually incurred. Instead the itemization request came back pointing at the aggregate, and three weeks later the author wrote that the vendor cost, the vendor timeline and the Bar's own IT scope are all unknown.

Receipt

All three 2026 messages were read from the native Gmail messages on 9/26/2026 and every quoted sentence matches the tree captures: the Bar's 7/16/26 response to the 7/15 six-category records request carrying the $2,614.80 estimate; Bailey's 7/17/26 inline reply received 12:15 PM ET (60 hours of IT time plus vendor, same estimate for both scopes, Categories A-E produced and F not); and Bailey's 8/6/26 General Counsel responses on W016548 and W016547, fee waiver and itemization. The $43.58 IT Labor rate is confirmed against the rendered page of the 3/9/26 prepayment letter, p. 1; the $2,614.80 figure is confirmed against the native 7/16/26 message. Fee sequence recomputes: $254.67 + $89.36 + $101.09 + $2,614.80 = $3,059.92. Article I, section 24(a) and (c), Fla. Const.; section 119.07(4)(d), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(2) and (m)(3).

Spawned by: N-129, N-116, N-082

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-07-24

Actor

The Florida Bar: Shanell Schuyler, Director of ACAP/Intake (assigned 7/24/26); Gypsy Bailey, General Counsel (9/11/26 status reply); Christopher Stephen Wackes, Bar Counsel (7/24/26 grant letter)

Institution

The Florida Bar (RFA 26-13570)

Mechanism

the Bar assigned the review of its closure to an official the complainant's conflicts notice had named, said the review could take 60 days, and on day 60 had no decision and no answer to who assessed the conflicts

What the law required

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b): bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath as provided in this rule.' The review runs under Standing Board Policy 15.75: the ACAP/Intake director 'will review bar counsel's decision to close' and may agree with the closure, reopen the matter, or forward it to the grievance committee (15.75(e)), and 'at each level of review, bar counsel will inform the complaining witness and respondent or respondent's counsel of actions taken or decisions made' (15.75(c)). The policy sets no deadline; the 60 days is the Bar's own written estimate.

What happened

On July 24, 2026 the Bar granted review of the June 16 closure (N-121): "Each of these reviews may take as long as 60 days to complete." Day 60 was September 22. On September 11 the General Counsel wrote that the review was assigned on July 24 to Shanell Schuyler, Director of ACAP/Intake, and that "it is likely that the review will not be completed until sometime in October." Asked what safeguards addressed the conflicts, she answered that the file "was assigned to Ms. Schuyler under Standing Board Policy 15.75." The May 24 conflicts notice had named Ms. Schuyler. On September 23 Husband asked five status questions and the conflict questions again, with a reply requested by close of business September 24. The General Counsel replied on September 24 at 10:30 AM: the file 'is still under Ms. Schuyler's review,' she 'conducts a de novo review of each file, and some reviews take longer than others to complete,' and notice will come in writing. Asked that evening what actions had been taken since July 24 and whether any recusal standard applies to the Director, she replied on September 25: Ms. Schuyler 'is reviewing the file to determine whether closure was appropriate or whether further investigation is warranted,' the file 'remains in closed status,' and she 'will review all materials submitted and conduct an independent investigation.' As of September 26, the five status questions, who assessed the conflicts, and why the Director who upheld the first closure is reviewing the second remain unanswered. [IGNORED: status and conflict questions]

Baseline deviation

A review with a stated length ends with a decision or a new date and a reason, and the Bar's own policy requires bar counsel to tell the complainant the 'actions taken' at each level of review. The questions asked were who is deciding, what has been done, and how the conflicts were handled. Each has a one-line answer.

Receipt

• Wackes letter 7/24/26 granting Director review, RFA 26-13570
• Bailey email 9/11/26
• Husband's email 9/23/26 1:21 PM (as sent)
• Conflicts notice 5/24/26 p. 1
• Bailey emails 9/24/26 10:30 AM and 9/25/26 10:07 AM (received)
• Schuyler letters 7/16/25 and 9/24/25 upholding the first closure, RFA 25-6861
• Standing Board Policy 15.75, Standing Board Policies effective 7/17/26, pp. 102-105
• Day counts: 7/24/26 plus 60 days is 9/22/26; 7/24/26 to 9/26/26 is 64 days

Spawned by: N-121

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-08-06

Actor

Gypsy Bailey, General Counsel, The Florida Bar

Institution

The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861, RFA 26-13570, W016548), against 1D2026-0728 and 24-DR-001150

Mechanism

asked three times to confirm that nothing would be destroyed while the appeal about those very records is pending, and that the hold had reached the outside vendor, the Bar answered every fee question in the same document line by line and answered these three with one sentence

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution makes access to judicial-branch records a constitutional right, and records that are the live subject of a pending appeal cannot be destroyed while that appeal is pending. A litigation hold attaches when litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated, and it reaches records held on the party's behalf by a third-party vendor. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(2) requires a written basis where a request is refused. The one-year disposal clock on the RFA 26-13570 file runs from the 6/16/26 closure, and the appeal about those very records, 1D2026-0728, is pending. The burden of justifying nondisclosure or nonpreservation sits with the custodian. The lawful path in one sentence: confirm in writing that the hold covers the vendor-operated systems and that nothing will be disposed of while the appeal about those records is pending, or state in writing what is scheduled for disposal and when.

What happened

Husband asked three specific questions in writing on 7/15/26, again on 7/17/26 and again on 8/5/26. Verbatim from the 8/5 letter: "Please confirm in writing that Request No. W016548 remains open." / "the June 16, 2026 closure letter for RFA No. 26-13570 states that its file and computer records will be disposed of one year from closure. Proceedings concerning these matters are pending in First DCA Case No. 1D2026-0728 and in Hillsborough County Case No. 24-DR-001150; please confirm in writing that no disposal will occur while either proceeding is pending. If the Bar will not confirm that, please state in writing what is scheduled for disposal and when." / "the July 17 response states that the Category F work involves the Bar's vendor; please confirm in writing that the litigation hold has been communicated to that vendor for the systems it operates." The Bar's 8/6/26 reply answered the fee questions inline and in detail. On these three, the entire answer was: "As stated before, the bar's legal hold remains in place." That is a real answer. It is also not a confirmation about the vendor, not a confirmation about the disposal clock, and not a statement of what is scheduled for disposal and when. The disposal language it was asked about is the Bar's own, printed on the closure letter in the same words the 2025 letter used: "the computer record and file of this matter will be disposed of one year from the date of closure." [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

Records that are the live subject of a pending appeal cannot be destroyed while the appeal is pending, and a litigation hold reaches records a vendor operates on the party's behalf. The lawful path was to confirm in writing that the hold covers the vendor's systems and that nothing will be disposed of while the appeal is pending, or to state what is scheduled for disposal and when. The custodian carries the burden of justifying anything less. The same author answered the fee questions in the same document, line by line, which is exactly what makes the selectivity checkable. And the consequence is dated and running: the file on the first Davis complaint was already reported destroyed while the appeal was pending, with no disposal date, no schedule provision and no authorizer ever given (N-116), and a second one-year clock now runs on a second file from 6/16/26.

Receipt

Bailey's 8/6/26 General Counsel responses on W016548 and W016547, fee waiver and itemization, read from the native Gmail message (id 19fd872fa706e2d2) on 9/26/2026 with every quoted sentence matching; the only attachment is the Bar's signature-block logo (image001.png). The 6/16/26 one-year disposal sentence appears at Wackes p. 2, wording identical to Huston 2/24/25 p. 1. The same clock appears at Leon ROA p. 103 (Huston 2/24/25) and ROA p. 642 (Schuyler 7/16/25, which restates it without stating a new closure date). Article I, section 24(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(2).

Spawned by: N-116, N-124, N-129

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.