The Florida Bar

Date

2025-02-24

Actor

Allie Huston

Institution

The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861)

Mechanism

the regulator closed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's lawyer in six days without ever asking him to answer it, and told the complaining lawyer to come back once a court made the finding that court has since refused to make

What the law required

R. Reg. Fla. Bar 3-7.3(a)-(b) governs intake handling of a facially sufficient sworn complaint.

What happened

Husband signed a 25-page written complaint against Wife's counsel Scott Davis on February 18, 2025. Six calendar days later, Bar Counsel Allie F. Huston closed it: "The matters upon which your allegations are premised present questions of law and involve a dispute over which a court has jurisdiction." No response cycle began; Davis was never asked to respond. The letter disclosed no review process, no timeframe, and no reconsideration path, and started a one-year clock on the file's destruction. Every Bar decisional letter to Husband on this file came by U.S. mail with no email address, while the same bar counsel answered him by email three times on status alone, deciding nothing (NEW-P6). On files where Husband was respondent or complainant elsewhere, the Bar emailed him; he asked why this file alone came by mail, and no answer is in the record. [DENIED: closed without a response cycle]

Baseline deviation

The Bar's rule requires investigating allegations in a signed written complaint and permits dismissal only "after complete investigation." The published cycle gives the accused lawyer 15 days to answer; that cycle never began, so Davis was never asked a question. The letter offered resubmission only if a court later made a supporting finding. The presiding judge had said she does not discipline lawyers and declined to question Davis (N-046); her successor has refused to make findings six times (N-091).

Receipt

• Huston closure letter 2/24/25, RFA 25-6861, at 1150 Doc 200 p. 29 of 42, filed by Davis himself 6/4/25, Filing #224549972; also at Leon ROA p. 103.
• The complaint signed 2/18/25; Exhibit A is the 2/12/25 Chief Judge letter, Exhibit B is Wife's 12/13/24 motion for a psychological examination, Filing #212815329, incomplete in the filed copy.
• The grammatical subject of the quoted sentence is "The matters upon which your allegations are premised," never "the allegations": quote the full sentence outward.
• Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from the current rule as printed in the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 13 (June 30, 2026 / July 1, 2026 edition); Rules 3-7.3(a), (c) and (d) come from the tree's Bar-intake research, edition unpinned.
• The 15-day and 10-day windows come from the Bar's public ACAP process page, which is NOT yet captured and filed as a record.
• Six calendar days and four business days both computed from 2/18/25 to 2/24/25; the federal complaint's "six business days" at paras. 2 and 49 is wrong and four is both accurate and stronger.
• Channel list sourced to BAR_ADDRESSED_VS_OUTSTANDING_2026-08-02 secs. 5.1(d) and 5.2.
• Husband's quoted question is at p. 2 of his 6/10/26 6:58 AM email to Bar leadership re the Davis grievance and conflicts, as sent; that file's text layer is ciphered. The file that holds it carries a bounce assertion in its name that the document itself does not show (N-124); cite the email by date and page, never by that name.
• Good-standing certificate: Cynthia B. Jackson, CFO, 8/7/26, CTM-428037.
• The 12/19/24 pre-affirmation of Davis by the same court sits at N-018.
• Court-side receipts for the locked exit: N-046 (4/22/25), N-091 (4/17/26 Tr. 181).
• Husband's own standing: admitted 9/28/2007, active, in good standing, 10-Year Discipline History: None. The only Bar complaint ever filed against him came nine months later, from the judge who had been disqualified from this case (N-032, N-064).
• Related decision points: N-121.

Spawned by: N-011, N-018

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-02-24 -> ongoing

Actor

The Florida Bar (Allie F. Huston; Christopher Stephen Wackes; Jason R. Kelley)

Institution

The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861; RFA 26-13570; File 2026-10,395(13F))

Mechanism

one family-law docket, two opposite answers from the same regulator: the reason it would not examine the opposing lawyer, and the source of the material it examined when the complaining lawyer was the one accused

What the law required

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(a) permits a screening closure only on a determination that the facts, taken as proven, would not constitute a violation warranting discipline. Rule 3-7.3(b) provides that bar counsel 'must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath.' Rule 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal only 'after complete investigation.' No rule makes the pendency of a civil proceeding a jurisdictional bar to intake, and neither closure letter cites a rule for the deferral. Whatever weight a pending court proceeding carries at intake, the rule that assigns it is the same rule whether the lawyer accused is opposing counsel or the complainant.

What happened

Both of Husband's grievances against Wife's counsel closed at intake on the same ground, in near-identical words, sixteen months apart: six days for one, twenty-three for the other, finding only that the allegations "involve a dispute over which a court has jurisdiction." Neither reached the merits. A third file ran opposite: Judge Ayers, disqualified 4/28/25, filed a complaint against Husband on 11/24/25. Bar Counsel Jason Kelley referred it, describing its scope: "You have an extensive social media footprint I have had to go through, as well as your filings and documents in your family law case." As of 8/10/26 that file had been open 259 days, with no statement identified as false. In candor, Davis's conduct sits inside a case with its own sanction authority; the complaint against Husband concerns public statements about a judge. That distinction does not explain why the family-law filings were the material reviewed. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Rule 3-7.4(e) bars deferring an investigation for civil litigation without a reviewer's approval. Deferral is therefore an approved exception, not a default, and the approval is the Bar's to produce. The Bar's counsel described a deferral policy in open court: the Bar defers to the presiding judge because discipline "can happen there." But the judges declined on the record to examine that same conduct and expressly left it to the Bar (N-046), so the policy is circular in practice.

Receipt

• Huston letter 2/24/25 (RFA 25-6861) and Wackes letter 6/16/26 (RFA 26-13570) pp. 1-2; the Della-Donna year prints in the Wackes letter as "(Fla. 1989)," quote as printed and do not adopt it.
• NOT jurisdiction-ground letters and not to be cited for it: Gangi 9/23/25 and Schuyler 9/24/25, neither of which contains the phrase.
• Kelley referral letter to Joshua Gammon Sheridan, Chair, 12/3/25, p. 1, certifying the complaint "forwarded to your committee for further investigation and disposition," captioned "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson."
• Kelley scope email 3/19/26 11:45 AM, at pp. 2-3 of the 3/30/26 email to Kelley (the standalone 3/19 and 3/20 PDFs are empty export stubs; cite the 3/30 document).
• Deferral policy in Bar counsel's own words: 7/7/26 PM Tr. 6:23-7:3 for the back-and-forth sentence and Tr. 7:10-20 for the closure-language sentence; the corrected cite to 7:10-20 is the one used here.
• Rule 3-7.4(e) is quoted verbatim, and Rules 3-4.4, 3-7.16(a)(2) and (a)(3) and 3-3.5 are summarized, from the current Chapter 3 (June 30, 2026 edition) as printed in the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 15; Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from Item 13 of the same ledger.
• Husband's 4/30/25 questions are at p. 21 of the 10-10-25 Huston-Gangi chain PDF, sent 10:37:03 AM to ACAP intake; quote them as his questions, never as a syllogism he did not write.
• Court-side receipts: N-046 (Doc 192 Tr. 41); 5/29/26 Tr. 45:12-19 (held from the transcript text layer); 7/7/26 PM Tr. 31:17-18.
• Ayers disqualification Doc 184, 4/28/25 (N-047). Day counts machine-computed 8/10/26: 2/18/25 to 2/24/25 = 6; 5/24/26 to 6/16/26 = 23; 11/24/25 to 8/10/26 = 259.
• Two captions from the same office five months apart, reported without inference: 12/3/25 "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson"; 5/21/26 "Complaint of Christopher Alan Hanson against Vivian Cortes Hodz." No second referral letter exists in the tree for comparison (documented negative); a records request for two or three unrelated 13F referral cover letters is the next concrete step and either answer is evidence.
• Related decision points: N-064, N-085.

Spawned by: N-031, N-064, N-121

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-02-24 -> 2025-10-10

Actor

The Florida Bar, ACAP (Allie F. Huston; review by Alicia Gangi, Chair, Grievance Committee 13A)

Institution

The Florida Bar (RFA 25-6861)

Mechanism

seventeen emails in this chain, six replies out, three emailed status formulas and three mailed letters, and not one of his questions answered; when he asked in writing whether there was a rule against speaking with him, no one replied

What the law required

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b) provides that bar counsel "must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath," and 3-7.3(d) permits dismissal only "after complete investigation" (both as quoted in the tree's Bar-intake research). The Bar's own 5/6/25 letter set the review pace: "may take as long as 60 days." Whatever discretion the Bar has over outcomes, its own stated process is engagement on a stated clock. [Chris's in-chain citations of 3-7.3(c) and 3-7.4(g) are his characterizations; the text of those two subsections has not been checked against the official rule.] Complainant-notice provisions, quoted from the official RRTFB Chapter 3 text (floridabar.org publication, 2019 edition;): Rule 3-7.3(a): 'The complainant and respondent shall be notified of a decision not to pursue an inquiry and shall be given the reasons therefor.' Rule 3-7.3(d) (Dismissal of Disciplinary Cases): 'If a disciplinary case is dismissed, the complainant shall be notified of the dismissal and shall be given the reasons therefor.' Rule 3-7.4(f) (Counsel and Investigators): bar counsel 'shall prepare status reports for the committee, notify complainants and respondents of committee actions as appropriate.' Rule 3-7.4, Notice of Committee Action provision: 'Bar counsel shall notify the respondent and complainant of the action of the committee.' Notice of Board Action provision: 'Bar counsel must give notice of board action to the respondent, complainant, and grievance committee.' Honest scope: these duties attach at DECISION POINTS (inquiry declined, dismissal, committee action, board action). No quoted rule compels mid-investigation status updates; the 'as appropriate' clause in 3-7.4(f) is the only status-flavored duty and it is discretionary on its face.

What happened

Between the six-day closure on 2/24/25 and the letters sustaining it on 9/23-9/24/25, Husband sent seventeen emails to the Bar's intake office and reviewers, offering documentation and asking for status. The Bar replied three times, all status formulas, including on 9/19: "This matter remains under review of the grievance committee chair. You will be informed of the outcome of that review via US mail." Five days later he wrote the same reviewers enclosing a photograph, telling them the failures have consequences; the photograph is not described here and no one in it is named. That email drew no response, nor did his 10/3 or 10/10 follow-ups. The reviewers had already given themselves permission to stop: the 9/24/25 letter states that "Further correspondence from you regarding this matter will be placed in the file without response" (N-055). In fairness, the Bar sent three mailed letters inside the window. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

An institution that takes evidence from a complainant either engages it or says why not. The Bar's rules require investigating a written complaint meeting the form requirements, and permit dismissal only after complete investigation. The complainant here was a member of the same Bar, offering transcripts it had not asked for. What came back was status formula. He finally asked the question that measures the whole arc: "Is there a rule against speaking with me?" No one answered that either.

Receipt

• 22-page as-sent chain, Husband to the Bar's intake office and reviewers, 5/14 to 10/10/25, held in the matter's Bar correspondence file.
• Court-filed copies in the Leon mandamus exhibit bundle at pp. 15-19 (9/29/25 email; picture sentence at p. 19) and 1D2026-0728 Record on Appeal pp. 53-57.
• Picture sentence and 9/29/25 header at exhibit bundle pp. 15 and 19; the three Huston replies are text-layer only from the as-sent chain pp. 8, 18, 20, and their page images have not been checked.
• 140 days computed 5/6 to 9/23/25 (31+30+31+31+17), and NOT used in prose: the Bar's 60-day figure is per review and is a ceiling, not a promise.
• N-124 carries the Bar's own plural formula, "Each of these reviews may take as long as 60 days to complete," and N-055 records three reviewers, so a sixty-against-a-hundred-forty ratio is defeated by the Bar's own words.
• The out-count is six, not three: three emailed status formulas plus the three mailed letters this card's own candor records. The seventeen-email count is from this chain alone, and the headline carries "in this chain" on its face.
• The pre-announced no-response sentence is at Leon ROA p. 641 (Schuyler 9/24/25).
• Rules 3-7.3(b) and (d) as quoted in the tree's Bar-intake research; Husband's in-chain citations of 3-7.3(c) and 3-7.4(g) are his characterizations and those subsections are unchecked.
• The 9/12/25 statement that the intake auto-reply promises responses within 7 days is an uncontradicted in-chain characterization, not an imaged Bar document.
• Children are never named and the photograph is never described beyond its existence and his own accompanying words.
• The 9/29/25 email postdates the sustained closure by five days: this card carries 9/29/25 and never "mid-review."
• Status emails: 5/14, 6/30, 9/19/25. Requests/offers: 5/15, 6/13, 6/26, 7/8, 7/21 (x2), 9/1, 9/12/25.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-09-24

Actor

Alicia Gangi + Shanell M. Schuyler

Institution

The Florida Bar

Mechanism

the Bar described three internal reviews of the closure but produced no record of what any of them did, and told the complainant that anything further he wrote would go in the file without response

What the law required

R. 3-7.3 requires meaningful review of a challenge to a file closure.

What happened

On 9/24/25 the Bar sustained its own closure. Its Director of Intake described three internal reviews of the closure: by a Senior Staff Attorney, by the Director of Intake, and by the Chair of Grievance Committee 13A. The letter stated: "While your disagreement with the outcome of the Bar's investigation is duly noted, there is no further review afforded to closed files and no right to appeal. Further correspondence from you regarding this matter will be placed in the file without response." A day earlier the Chair had made the same point in her own sustaining letter, copying Davis on it. A later public-records request for the file that review would have generated produced, from the closed file, one email about a typographical error (FNEW-B1). The Bar has never reconciled this account with its later, inconsistent statements about the same closure (N-105, N-116). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

A review that examined a closure documents what was actually done; this letter describes a review instead of producing one. Later Bar statements do not square with it: a filed paper said the Bar "did not act" (N-105); its Deputy General Counsel said the file was "disposed of" (N-116). What remains unanswered is what each of the three reviews produced, and no product of any of them appears in any Bar letter, filed paper, or brief across the record swept.

Receipt

• Schuyler letter 9/24/25, Leon ROA p. 641: also states "Extensive rules, procedures, and policies exist to ensure that bar complaints are fully aired, investigated, and reviewed at multiple levels," and "The review of your allegations against Mr. Davis included investigation by a Senior Staff Attorney, review of the closure by the undersigned as Director of Intake, and a review by the Chair of Grievance Committee 13A."
• Gangi letter 9/23/25, Leon ROA p. 641 vicinity and Bar file copy: "I am also copying Mr. Davis on my response so that the attorney is aware that an additional review of this matter has taken place and that I am sustaining the former decisions to close this file as proper and correct."
• Both filed by the Bar's own counsel as Composite Exhibit A to the 1/27/26 motion to dismiss, judicial notice requested at ROA p. 626.
• Answer Brief admissions at 1D2026-0728 Answer Brief p. 24 (PDF p. 30), filed 6/30/26, signed M. Hope Keating: file "was closed without further investigation" and review "limited to the submissions and court records."
• Huston letter 5/6/25, Doc 200 p. 1 (single-Director, up-to-60-days process). Standing Board Policy 15.75 gives complainant 30-day review windows and sets no time standard for the Bar's own reviews.
• "Three-level review" is NOT the letter's phrase and is barred, as are "three-layer," "three-stage," "three-tier"; name the letter's own three steps instead.
• Later inconsistent statements at N-105 (5/22/26) and N-116 (6/5/26). Produced set at FNEW-B1.
• Related decision points: N-126.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-10-14 -> ongoing

Actor

Judge Matthew Felix; the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; a 2D DCA panel (Villanti, Sleet, Smith); The Florida Bar

Institution

25-CA-010255 (13th Cir.); 24-DR-001150 (13th Cir.); 2D2026-0279; 2025-CA-2469 (Leon)

Mechanism

one structural question was put to four courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related one

What the law required

Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330 governs disqualification, and 2.330(h) requires that a facially sufficient motion be granted without passing on the truth of the facts alleged. Due process supplies an independent floor: no one may judge a cause in which he has an interest, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); disqualification is required where the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); and a judge who had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case may not later sit on it, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016). Mandamus supplies the frame that makes the question answerable either way. A Chapter 119 mandamus is a summary, duty-focused proceeding in which the respondent's role is to answer the alternative writ, Radford v. Brock, 914 So. 2d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), and the dispute is whether a ministerial duty exists and has been performed, Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 674 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). So either the named judges are nominal custodians with no substantive stake, in which case no merits advocacy on their behalf is proper, or they have a stake, in which case Murchison and Williams are engaged. None of these authorities turns on a finding of actual partiality, and none has been applied to this fact pattern by any court in this record.

What happened

The conflict takes three forms across four cases: Judge Felix, a named defendant in the records mandamus, kept presiding over the family case; the mandamus was filed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, with the Attorney General appearing for the judicial defendants; and The Florida Bar is itself a party in two of the forums. Every tribunal asked about this disposed of it without reaching it: a successive-motion rule, an eight-day denial without opinion, and on 4/17/26 the trial judge refused six times to make findings: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so". Asked the same question on 7/7/26, the answer was "I'm not going to answer that question." In fairness, the rule applies on its face, and an out-of-circuit judge was later assigned. The record contains no answer to the question itself. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Due process forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest. Florida's disqualification rule gives successor judges a narrower, discretionary track, and that track is what the order here rested on. That question was put to four tribunals, each disposing of it on a ground that made the merits unnecessary; no court has yet said why a judge named as a defendant in a pending case may preside over the related one.

Receipt

• Amended mandamus petition caption (e-filed 11/13/25, 25-CA-10255).
• Disqualification order rested on the successive-motion rule (Rule 2.330(i)).
• 2D DCA denial: prohibition petition denied 8 days after filing, one day after fee paid, no opinion, no response required (N-078).
• 4/17/26 transcript (six refusals to make findings). 7/7/26 transcript ("I'm not going to answer that question").
• Two of the judges in this chain have ruled for Husband.
• Defendants have a nominal-party answer available; naming a court and its judges in a mandamus about the court's own records is how such petitions are normally styled.

Spawned by: N-058, N-069, N-078, N-091

This decision point also appears on: Under Judge Felix, Court Oversight and Conflict Judges in the Sixth Circuit, The Appellate Courts, the full ledger.

Date

2025-11-24

Actor

Judge Ayers (complainant); Jason Kelley (Bar Counsel)

Institution

The Florida Bar (File 2026-10,395(13F))

Mechanism

the complaint against Husband says he said something untrue in public; he has asked in writing, again and again, which statement, and the Bar has never named one, while the file stays open and the Bar's own rules keep an open file confidential

What the law required

Rule 3-7.3 and due process require identifying the allegedly false statement, investigating promptly, and taking the sworn testimony offered. Rule 3-7.1(a)(4) sets the disclosure consequence: "Any disciplinary case that has been concluded by a finding of no probable cause for further disciplinary proceedings is public information." Under Rule 3-7.3(g), a closure or dismissal by staff counsel before a grievance committee hearing is treated as a finding of no probable cause. A pending file is confidential. A concluded one is not.

What happened

Judge Ayers filed a Bar complaint against Husband on 11/24/25, about seven months after she was disqualified from his case. The file has stood open since, 259 days as of August 10, 2026, without a single allegedly false statement ever identified. Husband first demanded that the Bar name the statement or close the file on 12/8/25, and repeated the demand sixteen times through 7/23/26, seven months and fifteen days later. No response has ever named a statement. On 3/20/26 the Bar announced it would subpoena him for a sworn statement, "expecting 3-4 hours," listing the resources it would need to schedule. Husband accepted at once, waived confidentiality, and asked that the proceeding be public. The subpoena was never served and the statement was never taken (N-085). This is the first Bar complaint ever filed against him in a career admitted 9/28/2007, active and in good standing. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

Truth is an absolute defense to the charge this complaint makes; it has never identified a false statement. The complaint form's Part Three reads "Mr. Hanson has violated Bar Rules 4-8.2(a) and Rule 4-8.4(d)." A closure before a grievance committee hearing becomes public under the Bar's own rules (3-7.1(a)(4), 3-7.3(g)); an open file stays confidential. Husband's two complaints against Wife's counsel closed in six and twenty-three days and became public; the one against him stays open and confidential (N-031, N-121).

Receipt

• Bar File 2026-10,395(13F), complaint filed 11/24/25; 259 days machine-computed 11/24/25 to 8/10/26.
• Complaint form Part Three quoted in full from the intake form.
• The sixteen demands: 12/8/25, 12/18/25, 1/7/26, 1/15/26, 2/13/26, 3/17/26, 3/19/26, 3/30/26, 4/17/26, 4/27/26, 5/13/26, 6/19/26, 7/4/26, 7/10/26, 7/11/26, 7/23/26; first to last is 7 months 15 days.
• Date requests (a smaller, different set): 3/30, 4/27, 5/13, 7/10/26 on this card; N-085 enumerates five, adding 4/17/26.
• Underlying emails in the matter's Bar correspondence file, including 3/30/26 email to Kelley, 4/17/26 email reiterating unanswered questions, 7/10/26 sworn-statement and preservation letter, 7/11/26 letter to Bar leadership and Board of Governors, 7/23/26 followup (13 pp.).
• Kelley 3/20/26 3:05 PM email, image-only PDF, no text layer; pp. 2-16 not read.
• "the bar is not an investigative agency like law enforcement. Our investigative resources are limited." (Courtemanche, 11/24/25, Leon ROA p. 44; source spells "investigative"; motion to dismiss and Answer Brief render it "investitive").
• Kelley 12/3/25 referral letter, caption "Complaint by The Florida Bar against Christopher Alan Hanson."
• Rules 3-7.1(a)(4) and 3-7.3(g). Good-standing certificate CTM-428037, 8/7/26: "10-Year Discipline History: None."
• Acceptance chain verbatim in the 7/10/26 letter, Gmail id 19f4d070ee6ec12a; arc card N-085.
• The 11/24/25 same-day sequence (article emailed 10:18 AM, chambers forward 11:43 AM, forward to counsel 12:17:07 PM, personal-to-official email 4:52 PM, intake submission 4:56:32 PM) is a composite exhibit, sequence only.
• Intervals by true endpoints: 10:18 AM to 4:56:32 PM intake is six hours thirty-eight minutes; 11:43 AM chambers forward to 4:56:32 PM intake is five hours thirteen minutes. "Six hours thirty-eight minutes chambers to intake" is wrong and barred; N-065 states the same-day interval correctly and controls.
• Related decision points: N-032, NEW-P9.

Spawned by: N-031, N-062

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-11-24

Actor

Judge Ayers and Judge Felix (Div. A and D chambers); Chief Judge Sabella, the 13th Circuit General Counsel, and the trial court administrator; the Florida Bar ACAP and the Judicial Qualifications Commission; Scott Davis

Institution

13th Judicial Circuit / The Florida Bar / JQC

Mechanism

every institution named in the article was invited in writing to point out anything false in it, with an offer to amend; in the nearly nine months from November 24, 2025 through August 20, 2026, not one has named a single sentence

What the law required

No rule obliges an official to answer a critic, and none is asserted here. Two settled principles do apply. A regulator that receives a specific, documented allegation of attorney or judicial misconduct processes it. And an official who has a correction available has the means to make it, so a documented failure to identify any false statement is evidence of what the record contains.

What happened

On November 24, 2025, within sixteen minutes, Husband sent three emails under one subject line, each linking a published article and naming specific officials, to the judicial divisions and Wife's counsel, to circuit administration, and to the Bar and JQC. Each carried the same offer: "If you believe that anything stated in the article is untrue, please let me know so I can consider amending the article if appropriate," with a request for comment. No deadline was set. The Bar, the JQC, and the 13th Circuit produced no reply. Wife's counsel answered same-day with a cease-and-desist letter naming no false statement; asked which order he meant, he wrote: "certain discovery was withheld or delayed pursuant to a valid court order." Six hours twenty-two minutes after the third email, Judge Ayers filed a Bar complaint against Husband, kept open since without the Bar naming a false statement (N-064). [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

No rule obliges an official to answer a critic. A regulator that receives a specific, documented allegation of misconduct processes it, and an official who can correct a false statement has the means to. Correcting this cost nothing: the sender offered in writing to amend the article. The silence does not prove the article true; it is evidence that nobody positioned to correct it has tried.

Receipt

• Three sends of 11/24/25 at 10:18, 10:27 and 10:34 AM, in the correspondence folder; the 4:40 PM cease-and-desist; the 11/25/25 reply chain.
• Wife's counsel's reply to which order he meant: "I'll see you in court."
• The article, 16 pages, published on X on or about November 21, 2025, filed at Doc 267 pp. 14-56.
• Scope of no-reply finding: rests on the 7/13/26 Gmail sweep and correspondence folder; these three sends originated from a Yahoo account, so a Yahoo-side reply cannot be excluded.
• The two 11/25/25 capture PDFs are text-layer only.

Spawned by: N-064

This decision point also appears on: Court Oversight and Conflict Judges in the Sixth Circuit, the full ledger.

Date

2026-02-09

Actor

John Londot, Greenberg Traurig, counsel for The Florida Bar

Institution

2025-CA-2469 (Leon)

Mechanism

asked whether communications with Wife's lawyer ever existed, the Bar's counsel answered, three minutes later, that none were withheld from production; his own filed paper thirteen days earlier had said flatly that they do not exist

What the law required

A public-records respondent asked whether records ever existed answers whether they existed. Rule 3-7.1(b) defines the Bar's public record to include any reports, correspondence and papers furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent. A narrower answer about what was withheld from production does not reach the question.

What happened

On 12/1/25 Husband asked the Bar's Deputy General Counsel whether the Bar had ever communicated with Davis about the complaint, apart from one email about a typo. No reply appears in the record swept. On 1/27/26 the Bar's motion to dismiss, signed by John Londot, stated without qualification: "Such records were not provided because they do not exist." Thirteen days later, Husband asked the same lawyer directly whether any such communications ever existed. Three minutes later: "there are no comms with Mr. Davis at all withheld from public record production. There aren't any to withhold." The filed paper says the records do not exist; the email says only that nothing was withheld. Read against later Bar statements on this closure, that it did not act on the complaint (N-105) and that records were disposed of (N-116), the accounts do not converge. Which is correct is not asserted here. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

A respondent asked whether records ever existed answers whether they existed; saying nothing was withheld from production is a narrower answer. The Bar's own rule defines a closed case's public record to include correspondence with the respondent lawyer "or the complainant," and Husband is the complainant. The Bar's counsel has since conceded the obligation in its brief: "the Bar would be obligated to provide it." What remains is a fact question the Bar has answered two different ways.

Receipt

• 1/27/26 motion to dismiss, Filing #240404774, e-filed 4:38:07 PM, Leon ROA p. 634 (motion internal p. 10); motion occupies ROA pp. 625-643, signature block at ROA p. 638; footnote 4 on the same page as the quoted sentence.
• 2/9/26 chain, subject "Re: 2025CA2469 - Hanson v The Florida Bar," Londot's message timestamped 5:04:46 PM EST from his firm address, Husband's question at 5:01 PM same day; Bar correspondence folder and Leon matter tree.
• 12/1/25 email in the same folder.
• Answer Brief footnote 3, 1D2026-0728, PDF p. 31 (brief p. 25), filed 6/30/26: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it."
• Courtemanche no-reply negative is a FILENAME-LEVEL sweep only, 8/17/26, of the Bar correspondence folder and Leon matter tree; scoped to filenames, no full-text or mailbox sweep run.
• Londot statement carried standing alone; Husband's own replies in the same chain are argumentative and not reproduced.
• Rule 3-7.1(b) quoted in full at FNEW-B1 from the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 16; "or the complainant" is part of the subdivision.
• Stored 16-page text export of the motion to dismiss is not the filed original; nothing on this card is quoted from it.
• N-105, filed 5/22/26: "the Bar did not act on his complaint and so did not share it with or request a response from Mr. Davis". N-116, 6/5/26: records "disposed of pursuant to judicial branch and bar records retention schedule and are no longer available".
• Related decision points: N-055.

Spawned by: N-055, N-116

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-02-13

Actor

Judge Dempsey

Institution

2d Cir. Leon Co. (2025-CA-002469)

Mechanism

the court solicited the dismissal order from the Bar's counsel the day before Husband's opposition was even filed, granted the dismissal without ever holding a hearing, and denied rehearing with the file ordered closed

What the law required

A ripe motion is ruled on after the response is filed or waived. Chapter 119 and mandamus supply jurisdiction over a records suit against the Bar.

What happened

On February 4, 2026 the judicial assistant to Judge Dempsey emailed the Bar's counsel: "Please provide an order in word granting the Motion to Dismiss." Counsel returned a draft the same day. Husband filed his opposition the next day and asked for a hearing. On February 13 the court dismissed with prejudice, adopting the Bar's own grounds, whose operative assertion, that the records "were not provided because they do not exist," is not sworn. Rehearing was denied five days later for lack of any legal or factual basis, with no further motions allowed and the file ordered closed. The certified docket's hearing table is empty; no hearing was ever held. In fairness, the court added the grounds itself; the Bar's draft had granted the motion in one line. The signed order recites having considered a response that did not exist when the order granting the motion was solicited. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

A ripe motion is decided after the response is in; a court that asks the winning side to draft the order does so after deciding. Here the sequence runs backward: order requested first, opposition filed second, dismissal signed third, reciting a response that did not yet exist when the order was requested. Husband asked for a hearing four times in writing; none was set.

Receipt

• Chambers email chain of 2/4, 2/5, and 2/19/26.
• Both orders and the certified Leon progress docket (First DCA record pp. 4-5, 769-770, 775).
• The Bar's motion (pp. 625-638): "for all the reasons articulated in the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,".
• Husband's response (pp. 644-713).
• Draft-vs-signed comparison by exact text extraction, not OCR.
• Rehearing denial: "no legal or factual basis,".

Spawned by: N-055

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-03-09

Actor

Rick Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, The Florida Bar

Institution

The Florida Bar (W016061-022526)

Mechanism

the records showing what the Bar spent on the law firm defending it against its own member were priced and made payable in advance, with the letter noting on its face that Florida law provides no waiver for indigency or public interest

What the law required

Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(3) and F.S. 119.07(4) allow a custodian to charge only a reasonable fee.

What happened

On 3/9/26 the Bar's records office demanded prepayment before releasing the outside-counsel engagement and billing records it had identified. The letter states on its face that Florida law provides no fee waiver for indigency or public interest, and it states the Bar's own policy that "any time spent in excess of 30 minutes constitutes 'extensive labor' and will be charged." The records stayed behind the demand. Fees are lawful and this card makes no claim otherwise. The same page carries the internal IT rate that later recomputes a four-figure estimate exactly (N-132). Two more requests reaching the same subject were priced afterward and also lapsed behind their fees: $89.36 on 6/5/26 and $101.09 on 7/6/26 (N-116, N-129). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

The Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of justifying any barrier on the custodian, not the person asking. A custodian may charge a reasonable fee, and a fee is not a denial. The question is not lawfulness. It is what sits behind the price. These are not the grievance-file records. They are the records of the Bar's own use of member resources to retain outside counsel to resist a member's records requests.

Receipt

• Fee letter 3/9/26, request W016061-022526, signed Rick Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel, p. 1; the $43.58 per hour IT Labor rate is on that page
• Article I, section 24(a) and (c), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(3); section 119.07(4), Fla. Stat.
• Later fee gates: $89.36 (6/5/26, N-116 lineage) and $101.09 (7/6/26, W016548-070626, N-129)
• Fee figures are per custodian and are never summed across custodians without listing each

Spawned by: N-079

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-03-20 -> ongoing

Actor

Bar Counsel Jason Kelley (Florida Bar)

Institution

Florida Bar

Mechanism

the regulator announced it would put Husband under oath, he agreed the same week without conditions, waived confidentiality, and invited the public; he renewed his availability repeatedly in writing, and as of August 20, 2026, 153 days later, no subpoena and no dates have issued

What the law required

A subpoena to a non-party witness is quashed on stated grounds and, where the rule requires them, on findings. A regulator that announces it will take a respondent's sworn statement either takes it or withdraws the demand. The settled principle underneath both is the same: a proceeding that decides facts has to let someone test them.

What happened

On March 20, 2026, Bar counsel told Husband the regulator would put him under oath: "I am going to send you a subpoena to appear in person for a sworn statement." Husband accepted three days later, without condition, waived confidentiality, and asked that the proceeding be public.

He renewed his availability in writing five times over the following months. On July 10 he wrote: "I agreed at once and without condition. More than 110 days have passed; no subpoena and no dates have issued. I renew my unconditional availability."

No subpoena and no dates have issued, 153 days as of August 20, 2026. In the same period every other witness Husband subpoenaed in this proceeding was released, quashed, or did not appear, with no protective order obtained for those who did not appear. [IGNORED: the announced statement was never taken, and the request for dates stands unanswered.]

Baseline deviation

A regulator that announces it will take a respondent's sworn statement either takes it or withdraws the demand. A witness who agrees without condition and renews his availability in writing cannot be the reason the statement never happened. In candor, a regulator may decide it does not need the statement after all. The record shows neither answer: it did not take the testimony and it did not close the file.

Receipt

• The 3/20/26 email and Husband's 3/30, 4/27, 5/13 and 7/10/26 follow-ups are carried verbatim in one document, the 7/10/26 as-sent letter (Gmail id 19f4d070ee6ec12a, sent 2026-07-10T17:15:34Z)
• Full 3/20/26 announcement, 16-page chain PDF, Bar correspondence folder, p. 3: "It appears you have a lot to say, and I am going to give you the opportunity to make it all part of the record. I am going to send you a subpoena to appear in person for a sworn statement. I will send you some dates and give you your choice. I am expecting 3-4 hours."
• Counsel's 3/19/26 message at p. 4; Husband's 3/19/26 12:10 PM reply at p. 3, "Can you tell me one statement that I've made that is false?"; Husband's 3/23/26 unconditional acceptance and his request that the proceeding be public, "I request that they be public and I would even invite the public to attend the deposition if that is an option," at p. 2
• Renewals, enumerated: five, on 3/30, 4/17, 4/27, 5/13 and 7/10/26; the 4/17/26 1:05 AM email states the interval on its own face
• Intervals machine-computed: 3/20/26 to 8/20/26 is 153 days; 3/20/26 to the 7/10/26 letter is 112 days
• Negative, with scope: no subpoena, no dates, and no identification of any allegedly false statement appears in any document across the three swept Bar roots through 8/6/26, and no reply from that counsel after 3/20/26 appears there either
• Other witnesses in the same period, each counted once at its own row and not recounted here: three quashed from the bench 5/29 (N-109), former counsel released with no findings (N-112), the circuit's records custodian released with no findings (N-113), a protective order signed about four hours after the proposed order reached chambers (N-123), four Bar officials quashed 7/7 with no written order in the following thirty-one days (N-130), two university witnesses who did not appear (N-145)
• No fact originates here; every element is receipted on an underlying row

Spawned by: N-109, N-064

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-05-22

Actor

John Londot / Greenberg Traurig, for Florida Bar Recipients

Institution

The Florida Bar (in 1150)

Mechanism

the Bar told a court it "did not act" on the complaint and so never shared it with Wife's lawyer; two of its letters on that file carry "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)," and a third letter says out loud why he was copied

What the law required

Candor toward the tribunal is required (R. 4-3.3). Statements about records must be accurate.

What happened

On 5/22/26 the Bar's outside counsel filed Doc 309 for the four Bar recipients. Paragraph 5 states: "Mr. Hanson simply refuses to believe that such records were not produced because they do not exist—the Bar did not act on his complaint and so did not share it with or request a response from Mr. Davis."

Three things in the Bar's own record run against the first two clauses. Its closure letter recites a docket review. Its review letter describes three levels of internal review (N-055). Two Bar letters on that file, predating the statement, cc Scott Paul Davis with enclosure.

Husband put paragraph 5 to Judge Felix on 5/29/26. No one answered it. The same judge barred cross-examination on the Bar complaint (N-108), and later quashed all four Bar officials' subpoenas without a rule-factor finding (N-130). The determination remains pending. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

A lawyer's statement to a tribunal has to be accurate, and stays the lawyer's responsibility after filing. This one was put to the judge seven days later and has never been answered or corrected. The sentence separates cleanly: "did not request a response from Mr. Davis" is consistent with the record; "did not act" and "did not share it with" are not. A narrower reading of "did not act" is available to the Bar; it has not been argued.

Receipt

• Doc 309 paras. 1 and 5, filed 5/22/26; Husband's opposition is DIN 316, docket-confirmed, not 310
• 5/29/26 Tr. 45:5-9
• Closure letter: "In addition to the submitted documentation, I also reviewed the underlying docket in Hillsborough County Case No. 2024-DR-1150."
• Review letter describes a Senior Staff Attorney investigation, a Director of Intake review, and a Grievance Committee Chair review of the same file (N-055)
• The cc lines are on four letters: Huston 2/24/25 p. 1; Schuyler 9/24/25 p. 1; Wackes 6/16/26 p. 2; Wackes 7/24/26 p. 2
• The stated reason is Gangi, Chair of Grievance Committee 13A, 9/23/25 p. 1: "I am also copying Mr. Davis on my response so that the attorney is aware that an additional review of this matter has taken place and that I am sustaining the former decisions to close this file as proper and correct."
• SET SPLIT, load-bearing and it always travels: of the four cc letters, only Huston 2/24/25 and Schuyler 9/24/25 sit on RFA 25-6861, the file Doc 309 para. 5 is about, and only those two predate the 5/22/26 filing; Wackes 6/16/26 and 7/24/26 are on RFA 26-13570 and both postdate it. The set bearing on the filed sentence is those two, not four
• SCOPE THAT ALWAYS TRAVELS: the enclosures are not identified on the cc lines, and the 9/24/25 body identifies its enclosure as a Bar document. No enclosure has been produced, so the record does not show that the complaint itself went to Davis
• The 2/24/25 docket-review sentence is at Leon ROA p. 103 and 1150 Doc 200 p. 29
• The 6/30/26 Answer Brief states the same posture in signed appellate form: the file "was closed without further investigation" and the review "was limited to the submissions and court records" (brief p. 24, PDF p. 30)
• Cross-links: N-055, N-116, N-108 (Tr. 43:2-5), N-130 (7/7/26 Tr. 31:1-3)
• The quoted paragraph contains an em dash in the original and is reproduced verbatim

Spawned by: N-055, N-058

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-05-22 -> ongoing

Actor

The Florida Bar, Tampa Branch (Michelle Robertson, Bar Counsel, Lawyer Regulation; file TFB 2026-10,601(13C), the Cortes Hodz complaint)

Institution

The Florida Bar

Mechanism

the Bar's own letter sent this complaint to its Tampa office for additional investigation; seventy-five days later the office running that investigation had not answered its own complainant's two requests to know whether anything was happening

What the law required

Complainant-notice provisions, quoted from the official RRTFB Chapter 3 text (floridabar.org publication, 2019 edition;): Rule 3-7.3(a): 'The complainant and respondent shall be notified of a decision not to pursue an inquiry and shall be given the reasons therefor.' Rule 3-7.3(d) (Dismissal of Disciplinary Cases): 'If a disciplinary case is dismissed, the complainant shall be notified of the dismissal and shall be given the reasons therefor.' Rule 3-7.4(f) (Counsel and Investigators): bar counsel 'shall prepare status reports for the committee, notify complainants and respondents of committee actions as appropriate.' Rule 3-7.4, Notice of Committee Action provision: 'Bar counsel shall notify the respondent and complainant of the action of the committee.' Notice of Board Action provision: 'Bar counsel must give notice of board action to the respondent, complainant, and grievance committee.' Honest scope: these duties attach at DECISION POINTS (inquiry declined, dismissal, committee action, board action). No quoted rule compels mid-investigation status updates; the 'as appropriate' clause in 3-7.4(f) is the only status-flavored duty and it is discretionary on its face. Interval check (Chris asked 8/17; full-text sweep of the official Ch. 3 PDF): NO rule sets a 15-day-after-request or every-90-day complainant-update interval. The objective day-counts that exist sit at other stages: 10 days (committee-direct complaint resolution reporting), 15 days (respondent rejection of a minor-misconduct report), 90 days (the REFEREE must report after appointment, a different stage entirely), 20/30/60 days (pleading and review windows). The 90-day figure in circulation is the referee deadline plus informal contact-the-agency guidance, not a complainant right. No complainant-update interval is asserted here, because none appears in the rules. The applicable measure is whatever time standard the Bar states for itself in writing.

What happened

On 5/21/26 the Bar transferred Husband's complaint against his former counsel to its Tampa Branch Office for additional investigation. He complied the next day, filing a litigation-disclosure notice listing six related proceedings. Bar Counsel replied the same day: "Thank you for the additional information. If you have any questions, etc., please let me know." That is the Bar's last substantive communication on the file.

He asked for status on 7/30 and 8/5/26: "I respectfully request a brief written status of the investigation. I remain ready to provide any additional documents". Neither request drew a reply. From 5/22 to 8/5 is 75 days.

Measured against the same institution's other files: this file drew a written response from the accused attorney by 3/11/26. On the Davis file, by the Bar's own brief, the file was closed without further investigation, and the lawyer was never asked anything. [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

The Bar's rules promise the complainant notice, with reasons, whenever a complaint is declined, dismissed, or acted on. Nothing has been decided here, so those rights have not triggered. In candor, no rule compels a status update mid-investigation. This is the third file with the same shape: seventeen letters to three form replies on the Davis file (NEW-P6), sixteen demands with no statement named on the Ayers file (N-064), and here, silence toward a complainant who kept offering evidence.

Receipt

• The 8/5/26 email chain on the Hodz complaint, File 2026-10,601, received 8/17/26, all 3 pages, containing the 5/21 transmittal, the 5/22 litigation notice and reply, and the 7/30 and 8/5 requests
• 7/30/26 request: it had "been at least a couple of months since I've heard anything," requesting someone contact him "for details and additional information about the violations that was difficult to fit in the complaint"
• 8/5/26 request, full text: "I respectfully request a brief written status of the investigation. I remain ready to provide any additional documents, correspondence, sworn statement, or other information."
• 75 days computed 5/22 to 8/5/26 (9+30+31+5)
• Complainant-notice provisions quoted from the official Rules Regulating The Florida Bar Chapter 3 text, 2019 edition PDF pulled 8/17/26
• Interval check run 8/17/26 against the full official Chapter 3 text: NO rule sets a 15-day-after-request or every-90-day complainant-update interval; the 90-day figure in circulation is the referee's post-appointment deadline, a different stage, plus informal contact-the-agency guidance
• The accused attorney's 3/11/26 written response, filed in the Leon mandamus matter, pp. 1 and 5, opening "Thank you for your letter of February 24, 2026"; pp. 6-25 are enclosures and were not read
• The Davis-file comparison is the Answer Brief, 1D2026-0728, brief p. 24 (PDF p. 30)
• The no-reply negative covers the captured chain and the tree as swept 8/17/26 and should be re-scoped at each use
• Do not double-count with N-032 (the caption comparison) or N-083 (the respondent's own filing)

Spawned by: N-032, N-083

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-05

Actor

Richard Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel

Institution

The Florida Bar (W016446-060426)

Mechanism

the Bar reported the file destroyed while the appeal about that very file was pending, and named no disposal date, no schedule provision and no one who authorized it

What the law required

A preservation duty applies. Records that are the live subject of pending appeal 1D2026-0728 may not be destroyed. The two authorities the Bar relies on for declining to identify records: Bivens v. Tony, 368 So. 3d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023); Doe v. DeSantis, 390 So. 3d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).

What happened

On 6/5/26 the Bar's Deputy General Counsel stated that the records of RFA 25-6861 "have been disposed of pursuant to judicial branch and bar records retention schedule and are no longer available." Appeal 1D2026-0728 was pending when he wrote it. His letter names no disposal date, no schedule provision and no authorizer.

Eleven days later, a second Davis complaint's closure letter calendared that file for disposal too, one year out, in the same words: "In light of the foregoing, this file has been closed effective February 24, 2025. Pursuant to the Bar's records retention schedule, the computer record and file of this matter will be disposed of one year from the date of closure." In fairness, that clock was disclosed, not concealed. What matters is what was disposed of during a pending appeal, and the three facts the statement leaves out. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Records subject to a pending appeal cannot be destroyed while it is pending, and a custodian who says a record is gone can state when it went, under what provision, and on whose authority. Article I, section 24(a) presumes records open and puts that burden on the custodian. The file reported destroyed would show how the complaint at N-031 was handled, which the Bar's own papers describe three ways (N-055, N-077, N-105). None of the three required facts appears here.

Receipt

• Courtemanche letter 6/5/26, request W016446-060426; the $89.36 Category 2 charge recomputes exactly as $65.89 attorney plus $23.47 clerical.
• Wackes letter 6/16/26 p. 2 for the second file's clock, wording identical to Huston 2/24/25 p. 1.
• Huston retention sentence at Leon ROA p. 103; Schuyler restatement at Leon ROA p. 642, 7/16/25, filed by the Bar's own counsel as Composite Exhibit A with a judicial-notice request at ROA p. 626.
• Dates recomputed in the Leon position mine: closure 2/24/25, one year from closure is 2/24/26; records request made 11/10/25; Leon petition filed 12/17/25; dismissal order entered 2/13/26 and rehearing denial 2/24/26, the same calendar day the announced disposal date fell.
• Authorities the Bar relies on for declining to identify records: Bivens v. Tony, 368 So. 3d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) and Doe v. DeSantis, 390 So. 3d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
• The Leon action's pendency is stated here against the 2/24/26 disposal date; the arithmetic has not been independently rechecked.
• The operative sentences of the 8/17/26 qualification email sweep are held in that sweep and are not reproduced verbatim on this card.

Spawned by: N-079, N-105

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-16

Actor

Christopher Stephen Wackes

Institution

The Florida Bar (RFA 26-13570)

Mechanism

the second complaint arrived with a written conflicts notice on its face, and closed in 23 days without a word about the conflicts, from an institution that was at that moment an active defendant in the complainant's pending lawsuit against it

What the law required

R. 3-7.3 requires investigation of a sworn, rule-keyed resubmission. Noticed conflicts must be addressed.

What happened

On 6/16/26 Bar counsel closed Husband's second complaint against Wife's counsel in 23 days. The letter named no rule of professional conduct, made no finding on most allegations, and said nothing about the conflicts notice. Its one adverse finding: "A review of court records indicates that the appeal was disposed of prior to the hearing mentioned in your complaint." It closed with the same door the first closure offered: a supporting court order would reopen review.

That condition was already met by Exhibit A, the 11/20/24 order compelling Wife's compliance with mandatory disclosure and awarding Husband fee entitlement (N-009), which the letter never mentions. The exit it names is one the court has repeatedly declined to open, refusing more than once to find any fact. In fairness, Exhibit A runs against the party, not her counsel. That gap has a real answer available. The Bar has not given one. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

The Bar's rule states the duty plainly: "Bar counsel must investigate the allegations contained in any written complaint that is signed under oath as provided in this rule." This resubmission named the conflicts in writing; whether its oath block satisfies the rule is unchecked. The conflicts run two layers deep: the Bar was an active defendant in Husband's pending suit against it when it closed this complaint, and the 2026 complaint sits atop the Bar's handling of the 2025 file.

Receipt

• Wackes letter 6/16/26, RFA 26-13570, pp. 1-2; the adverse stay/appeal finding is on p. 1 and must never be characterized as "no ground was engaged." The full condition sentence includes the affirmative promise.
• The 5/24/26 complaint with the conflicts notice on its face.
• Exhibit A is the 11/20/24 "Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Compel Petitioner's Compliance with Mandatory Disclosure (Hon. K. Ayers)," 1150 Doc 054 (N-009).
• Pending-litigation posture on 6/16/26: Leon County 2025-CA-2469 and the appeal 1D2026-0728.
• Rule 3-7.3(b) is quoted in full from the current rule as printed in the citation-check ledger of 8/11/26, Item 13; Rules 3-7.3(c) and (d) come from the tree's Bar-intake baselines research, edition unpinned. The same rule permits dismissal only "after complete investigation."
• Court-side receipts for the locked exit: N-091 (4/17/26 Tr. 181, findings refused six times); N-108 (5/29/26 Tr. 53:9-15, "Are you ever going to find any facts about my constitutional rights?" answered "Maybe."); N-046 (4/22/25, misconduct named against both parties only); 7/7/26 PM Tr. 31:17-18 ("I'm not going to answer that question.").
• 23 days computed 5/24 to 6/16/26. The Della-Donna year misprint is noted, not weaponized.

Spawned by: N-031

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-19

Actor

Bar leadership (Orr, Greenlee, Baker-Barnes, Doyle, et al.)

Institution

The Florida Bar

Mechanism

the routine request got the routine answer in twenty days; the conflicts notice, the litigation hold and the request for executive-committee review drew nothing in writing from anyone

What the law required

An oversight duty applies. Ordinary professional practice is to answer a documented governance complaint.

What happened

On 6/19/26, the new Bar president's swearing-in day, Bar leadership received the full record, a litigation-hold demand, and a request for a conversation. No named officer replied in writing. A nine-point objection followed on 7/4/26, asking the Bar to "proceed with all additional review and oversight options relating to my complaint," including review through the executive committee.

Twenty days later, on 7/24/26, the Bar answered that one point only: the Director of ACAP "will review this file and decide if closure was appropriate." That review may take up to 60 days. The letter does not mention the conflicts notice, the litigation hold, or the executive-committee request, and no named officer answered personally in any document in the file. Through 8/7/26, forty-nine days, no named officer replied at all. In fairness, several officer addresses reportedly bounced and were later corrected, though no bounce notice confirms it. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

An oversight body that answers a documented objection in twenty days is doing the ordinary thing. What differs is which parts got answered. The request that fit an existing channel, review of a closed file, came back with a written grant. The three requests that reached the institution itself produced no writing from any person. It answered where a form existed and not where a decision would have been required.

Receipt

• The 6/19/26 send as an as-sent PDF.
• The 7/4/26 objection as sent, 6:16:15 PM EDT, preserved as.eml with a true-copy PDF read from its text layer, not from a page image.
• The Bar's answer, Wackes letter 7/24/26 p. 2, granting ACAP Director review of the RFA 26-13570 closure, scanned as received, on letterhead naming Joshua E. Doyle as Executive Director; the board of governors policy the letter says is attached is NOT in the scan.
• All seven pages of the 6/11/26 email to Bar leadership were rendered and contain NO bounce notice; the stored file's name asserts a bounce the document does not show, and the bounce assertion must not be repeated as fact until a notice is filed. The message itself and its twelve-address recipient list are at p. 1.
• Forty-nine days computed 6/19 to 8/7/26, scoped to the matter's Bar correspondence file and its Gmail archive.
• The 7/24/26 letter also carries "cc: Scott Paul Davis (with enclosure)" at p. 2 (N-105).

Spawned by: N-116, N-121

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-30

Actor

The Florida Bar, appellees in 1D2026-0728, by Keating and Londot, Greenberg Traurig

Institution

1D2026-0728

Mechanism

the appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decision

What the law required

The appeal calls for appellate review of the Leon dismissal.

What happened

On 6/30/26 the Bar appellees filed their Answer Brief in 1D2026-0728. It states that "Mr. Hanson's grievance file against Mr. Davis was closed without further investigation," and that because review was limited to submissions and court records, the file held no communications with Davis. In a footnote it concedes the condition on which its production duty binds: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it."

The brief also restates settled law that a person has neither the right to compel discipline nor standing to appeal a non-discipline decision, and describes the 2/24/25 closure as a no-jurisdiction finding, wording absent from the letter. The appeal record carries the Bar's own letters, including a 9/24/25 letter describing a Senior Staff Attorney investigation and two further reviews of the same file the brief says was closed without further investigation (N-055). [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

An appeal exists to review whether a case was rightly ended. This one asks whether a records case could be dismissed with prejudice before the opposition was even filed, without a hearing (N-079). Nothing has been decided yet. What the appellate papers supply is the regulator's positions, in writing and unhedged. Two concede more than any letter did. A third restates settled law on standing, recorded here as the Bar's framing, not an admission.

Receipt

• Answer Brief of Appellees, 1D2026-0728, filed 6/30/26, Filing 251514921, 34 PDF pages and 28 numbered, signed M. Hope Keating and John K. Londot, held in the appeal's brief file.
• Quotes at PDF pp. 8 (brief p. 2, the "no jurisdiction" characterization), 18 (brief p. 12, the standing sentence), 30 (brief p. 24, both admissions), and 31 (brief p. 25 fn. 3, the conditional concession).
• Precision note, load-bearing: "no jurisdiction" is the BRIEF's phrase, anchored to Standing Board Policy 15.75(d)(1), and does NOT appear in the Huston letter; attribute the phrase to the brief and the deferral language to the letter.
• Composite Exhibit A to the 1/27/26 motion to dismiss with the judicial-notice request at Leon ROA p. 626; the letters at ROA pp. 640-643.
• Underlying letters quoted by the brief at ROA pp. 44 and 103.

Spawned by: N-079

This decision point also appears on: The Appellate Courts, the full ledger.

Date

2026-07-04 -> ongoing

Actor

The Florida Bar (Richard Courtemanche, Deputy General Counsel; Gypsy Bailey, General Counsel); demand directed also to Jason Kelley and to outside counsel John Londot

Institution

The Florida Bar (PRR W016548-070626; prior W016061-022526 and W016446-060426 Category 2)

Mechanism

a dues-paying member asked who funds the outside firm his own Bar retained against him, four times between July 4 and July 11, two fifty-six minutes apart the same evening; the Bar priced the question at $101.09 and has never answered it

What the law required

Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(3) and section 119.07(4), Fla. Stat., allow a custodian to charge only a reasonable fee, and 2.420(m)(1) requires a custodian to respond to a request for records. A member of an integrated bar may be compelled to fund the regulation of the legal profession and the improvement of legal services, but not activities outside that purpose, Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); the compelled-subsidy analysis was tightened in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878 (2018). A member who asks which category his dues are funding is asking the question those cases make relevant.

What happened

The Bar retained Greenberg Traurig to defend it in Husband's Leon County records action, to carry the appeal, and to move in the family case to quash the subpoenas of four Bar officials. Husband pays dues to that Bar. He asked who funds the engagement four times between 7/4/26 and 7/11/26, including a formal records request, Category D, seeking records identifying who authorized the engagement and its funding source.

What came back was a price: $101.09, on a 30-day pay-or-close clock. On 8/6/26 the General Counsel answered the fee questions in detail, confirming the financial records exist, but did not say who pays. No exemption and no denial was ever asserted as to Category D. Two earlier requests reaching the same subject also lapsed behind fees, $254.67 (N-082) and $89.36 (N-116). The request remains priced and unproduced as of 8/10/26 (N-150). [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

The cost of answering is the measure: one sentence, and the Bar's own counsel confirmed Finance and Accounting already located the records. No exemption was claimed; nothing was refused. The request was priced. A member of an integrated bar may be compelled to fund regulation of the profession, not activities outside it. In fairness, the Bar answered both requests promptly. Nothing establishes that dues pay for this engagement. The question was asked four times and remains unanswered.

Receipt

• Demands: (1) 7/4/26 6:16:15 PM objection letter item 8; (2) 7/4/26 7:12:36 PM records request Category D (the companion file marked MISDIRECTED and resent; the 7:12 PM version is operative); (3) 7/10/26 1:15 PM email sec. 1; (4) 7/11/26 8:35:37 PM Request 5.
• Interval, stated at its true width: the four demands run 7/4/26 to 7/11/26, seven days; demands (1) and (2) are fifty-six minutes and twenty-one seconds apart the same evening (6:16:15 PM and 7:12:36 PM). "Four times in eight days" is wrong and is barred.
• 7/4/26 6:16 PM letter: "I am a dues-paying member of The Florida Bar. As a member, I object to that allocation of the Bar's resources, and I ask the Bar's leadership to account for it."
• 7/10/26 email: "Please confirm in writing the funding source for that engagement, including whether it is paid from mandatory member dues."
• Courtemanche's fee letter: "The bar is not obligated to divide its efforts by category, regardless of whether you accept our prior estimate."
• Responses held as native text captures with no page image: Courtemanche 7/6/26 acknowledgment and $101.09 estimate; Bailey 8/6/26 7:00 PM inline reply that Finance and Accounting "had to produce these records and spent more time than our customary 30-minute period"; "The bar will not waive the $101.09 estimate"; the clerical hours were to "locate the records and pull records that do not contain confidential attorney-client information".
• W-number mapping, counterintuitive on its face: W016548-070626 is the Greenberg Traurig BILLING request; W016547 is the RETENTION and DISPOSITION request.
• Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878 (2018).
• Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420(m)(1) and (m)(3); section 119.07(4), Fla. Stat.
• The 6/19/26 letter contains no Greenberg Traurig, dues or funding-source content, across all 10 of its pages; any draft dating the funding demand to 6/19/26 is unsupported.
• The 7/15/26 ESI demand and the 7/23/26 followup name the firm but contain no funding ask; the 8/5/26 fee letter deliberately omits it.
• Searched for any Bar answer on funding, and none appears in: the Bar correspondence and JQC file, the Leon mandamus matter, the 1D2026-0728 appeal file including the 6/30/26 Answer Brief, and the node ledger.

Spawned by: N-082, N-105, N-131

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-07-07

Actor

John Londot, Greenberg Traurig (outside counsel for the Bar recipients)

Institution

The Florida Bar (through outside counsel, in open court)

Mechanism

the Bar's lawyer told a judge he had a "spidey-sense" about the other side's mental health, said he is not a doctor, and advised the self-represented father to spend better time with his children; the objection was immediate and drew no answer, correction, or withdrawal

What the law required

[PENDING RULE PULL: Rules 4-4.4(a) and 4-8.4(d) texts have not been pulled and scoped; per standing guard no rule citation ships until they are. The present anchor is the record itself: statements by counsel to a tribunal about an opposing party's mental health, and an objection that drew no response from counsel or the court.]

What happened

At the 7/7/26 afternoon hearing, counsel for the Bar recipients told the court: "I got a very strong spidey-sense, and I'm not a doctor, but I think there are -- is some emotional mental difficulties happening there. I heard Mr. Hanson acknowledge that," adding that he hoped Husband would recalculate and devote better family time than litigation. Husband objected on the record: "Mr. Londot's comments about my mental health status, and how I should be spending time with my children are unconscionable." Neither counsel nor the court addressed the objection. No correction and no withdrawal appears anywhere in this record. Inside the same speech sits one checkable factual dispute: counsel said he called Husband and was refused further phone contact; Husband, on the record, said no such call happened, only email. Which account is correct has not been established. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Husband had already said it himself, at the same hearing: "The Florida Bar is even well aware of some emotional and mental difficulties that I've had". Husband has had some physical and mental health challenges; his own testimony stays verbatim. What followed is the deviation: a lawyer offered the diagnosis-shaped statement anyway, disclaiming his own qualification, and moved from that to how Husband should spend time with his children. The objection is in the same transcript, unanswered.

Receipt

• 7/7/26 PM transcript (Guldin, certified 7/13/26), 23:15-26:4: the two quoted lines at 25:8-21; the objection at 26:10-16; the phone-call statements at 24:20-21, 25:7-8 and 26:17-19.
• No rule is cited here: 4-4.4(a) and 4-8.4(d) were not pulled.
• Husband's own same-hearing statement, "The Florida Bar is even well aware of some emotional and mental difficulties that I've had" (18:24-19:1, held from the transcript text layer only), is what "I heard Mr. Hanson acknowledge that" points at, and it leads the baseline above.
• Counsel: "when I first got the file I called Mr. Hanson" and Husband "refused to talk to me on the phone any more." Husband: "I never got on the phone with him. We had an e-mail communication."
• His 7/9 email calls the Bar this lawyer's "client and co-conspirator" and announces him and his firm as federal defendants.

Spawned by: NEW-P5

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-07-07

Actor

John Londot, Greenberg Traurig (drafting counsel for the Bar recipients); Judge Felix (bench grant, assignment)

Institution

The Florida Bar (outside counsel), in 13th Cir. 24-DR-001150

Mechanism

the Bar's lawyer won the ruling, accepted the court's assignment to write the order, and six weeks later the ruling still did not exist as an order, so the party that lost it has nothing to appeal

What the law required

The duty is the acceptance, not a rule debate: the court directed 'Mr. Londot, will you please prepare an order?' and Londot answered 'Yes.' (7/7 PM Tr. 31:4-8). Counsel who accepts a tribunal's drafting assignment owes performance or a stated withdrawal. No rule is stated here as the duty: the texts of R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-4.4(a) and 4-8.4(d) are not confirmed in this record, and 4-4.4's 'third persons' scope is unresolved.

What happened

On 7/7/26 the court granted the Bar recipients' motion to quash from the bench, gave one ground, and asked the Bar's outside counsel to prepare the order. He accepted on the record. No deadline was set. That evening he emailed the proposed order to an address Husband says he had directed him in writing three weeks earlier not to use. Husband found it and objected two days later, on 7/9/26, raising constitutional issues and stating that the proposed order offered no explanation for the decision and should address each witness and the relevance of their testimony. No reply ever came. No revised order issued. As of the 8/15/26 clerk review no order had been entered. The ruling the Bar won on 7/7/26 still cannot be appealed because it does not exist on paper. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

A lawyer who accepts a drafting assignment either finishes it or says why not. The court asked, "Mr. Londot, will you please prepare an order?" and he answered "Yes." A bench ruling that never becomes a written order binds no one and cannot be appealed, so the party holding the unwritten win keeps it. This is the fourth unwritten ruling on this record (N-060, N-074, N-092, N-090). Three other orders were entered within about a day (N-123, N-128, N-134).

Receipt

• 7/7/26 PM transcript (Guldin, certified 7/13/26): bench grant at 29:24-25, the single stated ground at 31:1-3, the assignment and acceptance at 31:4-8. The 31:4-8 duty anchor rests on the 8/17 first-read digest; its page image has not been checked.
• The 7/9/26 email to Londot: "As far as the proposed order, I object. I have raised constitutional issues. The proposed order fails to offer any explanation or basis for the decision." It goes on to ask that each witness and the relevance of their testimony be addressed and that objections be noted if submitted as is. Both pages; no reply and no new proposed order followed.
• The unentered-order negative is CLERK-REVIEW-SCOPED to 8/15/26 (PROV-JN-7), current as of the docket as reviewed on 8/15/26. No deadline was set for the order, so the claim here is not a missed deadline; it is silence against an accepted assignment.
• The 6/16/26 address directive rests on Husband's 7/9 account only and the native 6/16 message is NOT in the tree (documented negative 8/18/26).
• The 7/9 message asserting "I have never emailed you from this email address other than to request that you NOT use it" was itself sent from that address, per its From line.
• No rule is cited here. Velocity comparators: N-123 (about 4 hours), N-128 (about 19h54m), N-134 (about 25 hours). Unwritten-ruling family: N-060, N-074, N-092, N-090, N-133.
• The same hearing's commentary about Husband's mental health is its own card, NEW-P10.

Spawned by: N-129

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.