The Appellate Courts

Date

2025-09-12

Actor

2D DCA panel (per curiam)

Institution

2D DCA (2D2025-0681)

Mechanism

the petition asking for the first written review of the orders that shut off the financial records was dismissed in three words, and the order that later denied every post-dismissal motion carries no judge's name at all

What the law required

R. 9.100 provides certiorari review of the discovery freeze.

What happened

On September 12, 2025 the Second District dismissed the certiorari petition per curiam, naming the panel: "NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur." Every post-dismissal motion was denied on February 2, 2026 by an order naming no one, reading in full: "Petitioner's motion for rehearing, clarification, oral arguments, en banc review, and/or written opinion is denied." A written opinion was asked for in terms and refused in terms, by an order that gives no reason and identifies no judge. The mandate issued February 19, 2026. The discovery freeze below was left undisturbed, and the orders that produced it remain unexamined. [DENIED: review refused without a written explanation.]

Baseline deviation

Certiorari review would have been the first written look at the orders that cut off the records below (N-018, N-018). It never happened. Per curiam dispositions are routine and one alone means little; the weight rests on the pattern of three unexplained appellate silences (N-066, N-088). This dismissal at least names its judges; the order five months later denying every post-dismissal motion names nobody. Asked in writing which judges decided, the court answered that no record shows who participated (N-114).

Receipt

• 9/12/25 dismissal, eDCA original, 2D2025-0681 docket 065: "PER CURIAM." / "Dismissed." Panel: "NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur." Lower tribunal: Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, Kelly A. Ayers, Judge. Footer: "Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication."
• Also in 1150 record at Doc 248 p.2 (filed by Wife 10/14/25) and Doc 275.
• 2/2/26 order, eDCA original, docket 066: "BY ORDER OF THE COURT:", denies "Petitioner's three motions for oral argument, all filed on November 4, 2025", and denies the notice of filing error/request to strike as moot; no judge named; certified by Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk. Also at 1150 Doc 263.
• Mandate 2/19/26.
• Orders that cut records off below: N-018, N-018. Three-doors pattern: N-066, N-088. Refusal to identify deciding judges: N-114.

Spawned by: N-018, N-018

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2025-10-14 -> ongoing

Actor

Judge Matthew Felix; the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; a 2D DCA panel (Villanti, Sleet, Smith); The Florida Bar

Institution

25-CA-010255 (13th Cir.); 24-DR-001150 (13th Cir.); 2D2026-0279; 2025-CA-2469 (Leon)

Mechanism

one structural question was put to four courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related one

What the law required

Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330 governs disqualification, and 2.330(h) requires that a facially sufficient motion be granted without passing on the truth of the facts alleged. Due process supplies an independent floor: no one may judge a cause in which he has an interest, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); disqualification is required where the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); and a judge who had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case may not later sit on it, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016). Mandamus supplies the frame that makes the question answerable either way. A Chapter 119 mandamus is a summary, duty-focused proceeding in which the respondent's role is to answer the alternative writ, Radford v. Brock, 914 So. 2d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), and the dispute is whether a ministerial duty exists and has been performed, Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 674 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). So either the named judges are nominal custodians with no substantive stake, in which case no merits advocacy on their behalf is proper, or they have a stake, in which case Murchison and Williams are engaged. None of these authorities turns on a finding of actual partiality, and none has been applied to this fact pattern by any court in this record.

What happened

The conflict takes three forms across four cases: Judge Felix, a named defendant in the records mandamus, kept presiding over the family case; the mandamus was filed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, with the Attorney General appearing for the judicial defendants; and The Florida Bar is itself a party in two of the forums. Every tribunal asked about this disposed of it without reaching it: a successive-motion rule, an eight-day denial without opinion, and on 4/17/26 the trial judge refused six times to make findings: "I can make the ruling without findings of facts, and if the Second DCA says I need to find facts, then I'll do so". Asked the same question on 7/7/26, the answer was "I'm not going to answer that question." In fairness, the rule applies on its face, and an out-of-circuit judge was later assigned. The record contains no answer to the question itself. [IGNORED]

Baseline deviation

Due process forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest. Florida's disqualification rule gives successor judges a narrower, discretionary track, and that track is what the order here rested on. That question was put to four tribunals, each disposing of it on a ground that made the merits unnecessary; no court has yet said why a judge named as a defendant in a pending case may preside over the related one.

Receipt

• Amended mandamus petition caption (e-filed 11/13/25, 25-CA-10255).
• Disqualification order rested on the successive-motion rule (Rule 2.330(i)).
• 2D DCA denial: prohibition petition denied 8 days after filing, one day after fee paid, no opinion, no response required (N-078).
• 4/17/26 transcript (six refusals to make findings). 7/7/26 transcript ("I'm not going to answer that question").
• Two of the judges in this chain have ruled for Husband.
• Defendants have a nominal-party answer available; naming a court and its judges in a mandamus about the court's own records is how such petitions are normally styled.

Spawned by: N-058, N-069, N-078, N-091

This decision point also appears on: Under Judge Felix, Court Oversight and Conflict Judges in the Sixth Circuit, The Florida Bar, the full ledger.

Date

2025-11-26

Actor

2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named)

Institution

2D2025-1936

Mechanism

the appellate court kept the courthouse video out of the record in orders that name no judge and give no reason, and when asked who decided, answered that no such record is filed anywhere a party can reach

What the law required

Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(f) governs supplementing the appellate record. A motion central to the appeal is entitled to a reasoned disposition.

What happened

On November 26, 2025 the Second District denied the motion to supplement the record with the April 4, 2025 courthouse video, the video Judge Ayers herself invoked and then declined to pursue (N-042), and the recusal documents, naming no panel and giving no reasoning. It denied rehearing on January 27, 2026, again naming no judge. Two more followed the same pattern, April 6 and May 12, 2026 (N-087, N-101). Asked in writing to identify who decided, the court refused: writing for Chief Judge Lucas on July 27, 2026, Clerk Kuenzel answered that no document reflects which judges participated, and any unfiled record is confidential under rule 2.420(c)(1). Chief Judge Lucas wrote the same on July 14, and Marshal Haynes again on August 4, 2026 (N-149); Clerk Kuenzel had denied the same category on June 3, 2026 (N-114). Four written refusals, and not one name on any of the orders. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Rule 9.200(f) lets a party supplement an incomplete appellate record. Three orders from the same court kept the same video out; none names a panel, none gives a reason. One denial proves nothing; three on the same central evidence does. Asked in writing which judges decided, the court answered four times that no document shows who participated, and anything outside the record is exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1), though the exemption's burden sits with the withholding custodian (Art. I, sec. 24(a)).

Receipt

• As pleaded at complaint para. 30E (F134).
• 11/26/25 order denying Appellant's "Motion to Supplement the Record with Video of 4/4/25 Hearing and Recusal Documents", filed 2D2025-1936 docket 041: issues "BY ORDER OF THE COURT", carries Kuenzel certification, names no judge.
• 1/27/26 order denying "Motion for Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc, for Clarification, for Formal Written Order, and/or Certification" under Rules 9.330/9.331, filed 2D2025-1936 docket 042; no judge named.
• Chief Judge Lucas's 7/14/26 letter and Marshal Haynes's 8/4/26 email.
• Clerk Kuenzel's 6/3/26 email on file as native PDF; her 7/27/26 response held only as a mailbox text capture, no page image, quoted at N-114 on that basis.
• Video's origin at N-042; withholding of it at N-053.
• Related decision points: N-115.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-02-10

Actor

2D DCA panel: Villanti, Sleet, Smith

Institution

2D DCA (2D2026-0279)

Mechanism

the petition asking whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may keep presiding over the related one was denied in a single sentence, seven days after filing and one day after the fee posted, with no response ever required from anyone

What the law required

Fla. R. App. P. 9.100 governs prohibition review of the structural conflict.

What happened

On February 10, 2026 a panel of Villanti, Sleet, and Smith denied the prohibition petition seven days after it was filed, and one day after the fee posted. The order reads: "Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied." No opinion, no order to show cause, no response ever required. The petition had asked for a writ "disqualifying Judge Matthew Felix and all judges of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit from presiding over Case No. 24-DR-001150 and directing a transfer of venue to a neutral circuit pursuant to Fla. Stat. s. 47.122", and named the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit itself as a respondent. The order does not mention venue, transfer, section 47.122, or the circuit as an entity; its caption lists only the two spouses. Judge Felix remained presiding. The structural question this petition raised has now been put to four tribunals and answered by none (N-059). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Rule 9.100 provides prohibition review, and this petition put a first-impression structural question to the court: may a judge named as a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related one. None was required, and none issued. Quick denials are permitted, and this order at least names its judges; nothing here is claimed beyond pattern weight. The petition asked for two things, disqualification and a venue transfer under section 47.122; the order addresses only the first.

Receipt

• Denial order 2/10/26, 2D2026-0279 docket 001, p.1, and copy at docket 008, Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel clerk certification, served on Hillsborough Clerk, Davis, Felix, Hanson.
• Petition of 2/3/26, 2D2026-0279 docket 007, PDF pp. 4-5, 16, 26-27, verified: prayer at section III, para. 44 and WHEREFORE clause: "remanding with instructions to transfer venue to the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Pasco County, or another neutral venue".
• 2D2026-0279 docket sheet, text layer, seven entries, no order-to-show-cause and no response entry.
• Disqualification ruling this followed: N-069. Structural-conflict spine: N-059.

Spawned by: N-069

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-04-06

Actor

2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named)

Institution

2D DCA (2D2025-1936)

Mechanism

one week before it affirmed, the court refused to add the video to the record and struck five filings in a one-page order naming no judge, while an order from the same court fifty-five days earlier named all three of its judges.

What the law required

Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(f) permits supplementing an incomplete record. Orders ordinarily issue over the names of the deciding panel.

What happened

On April 6, 2026 the Second District refused to supplement the record with the April 4, 2025 video and the recusal documents, and struck five filings in the same one-page order. The order names no judge. It issues only "BY ORDER OF THE COURT". The per curiam affirmance came one week later, on a record that still did not contain the video (N-088).

Fifty-five days earlier the same court had denied the prohibition petition in an order that did name its judges: Villanti, Sleet, and Smith (N-078).

Four written refusals followed the question of who decided: by the Clerk on June 3 and again on July 27, 2026, by the Chief Judge on July 14, 2026, and by the Marshal on August 4, 2026, each resting on rule 2.420(c)(1). This is the middle order in the series opened at N-066 and continued at N-101. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Rule 9.200(f) permits supplementing an incomplete record, and orders ordinarily issue over the names of the judges who make them. The comparison is like for like: same court, same year, two orders, one with names and one without. The one without decided whether the central evidence would be in the record at all, one week before the court affirmed on that record. Husband asked which judges decided. The court refused four times in writing. Article I, section 24(a) presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of proving an exemption on the custodian. The question is closed by refusal.

Receipt

• The 4/6/26 order, filed in 2D2025-1936 at docket 043, one page. It strikes five filings (Appendices 1 through 3 of 3/31 and the Notices of Filing of 4/1), treats the 4/3 "Updated Notice of Related Cases, Supplemental Motion to Supplement the Record, and Motion for Panel Review of 4-4-25 Video" as a motion to supplement and denies it, and names no judge.
• The named comparator at Doc 270, the 2/10/26 prohibition denial (N-078), naming Villanti, Sleet, and Smith.
• The four written refusals to identify the deciding judges: Clerk Kuenzel on 6/3/26 and again on 7/27/26 (N-114), Chief Judge Lucas on 7/14/26 (N-115), and Marshal Haynes on 8/4/26 (N-149).
• Complaint receipt F134.

Spawned by: N-042, N-049

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-04-15

Actor

2D DCA panel

Institution

2D DCA (2D2025-1936)

Mechanism

the appeal ended in three words, on the same record the court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video at the center of the case

What the law required

The appeal calls for merits review of the venue and impartial-tribunal issues.

What happened

On April 15, 2026 the Second District affirmed per curiam. The order reads "PER CURIAM. Affirmed." The panel line reads "KHOUZAM, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and SMITH, JJ., Concur." The mandate issued June 2, 2026. One week earlier the same court had struck five filings and refused to put the April 4, 2025 video into that record (N-087), and five months before that it had refused the same thing without naming a panel or giving a reason (N-066). The rulings below stood, and no court has written an examination of them. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

The appeal called for merits review of the venue and impartial-tribunal issues. A per curiam affirmance with no opinion ends that review and leaves no reasoning to examine. In candor, unelaborated affirmances are routine and this one carries three judges' names; nothing here is claimed beyond pattern weight. It is the third of three unexplained appellate dispositions on this record. The record it affirmed on is the record the same court had twice refused to supplement with the courthouse video.

Receipt

• The 4/15/26 per curiam affirmance in 2D2025-1936, the eDCA original, filed at docket 045, two pages: the disposition and the panel line as quoted
• The appeal taken "pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Matthew L. Felix, Acting Circuit Judge"
• The copy at docket 036 is a KB-layer copy and is superseded by 045 for citation
• Mandate at Doc 035
• The refusals to supplement at N-087 and N-066; the first of the three unexplained dispositions at N-054

Spawned by: N-049

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-05-12

Actor

2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named; clerk certification only)

Institution

2D DCA (2D2025-1936)

Mechanism

Husband asked the court in writing to state its reasoning; the order refusing that request states no reasoning and names no judge, and it is the fifth of its kind

What the law required

Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 and 9.331 govern rehearing, rehearing en banc, and requests for a written opinion. A court may deny them. What is at issue here is not the denial but the anonymity: the order that resolves an express request to be told the court's reasoning identifies no judge who decided it.

What happened

On May 12, 2026 the Second District denied, in one order, Husband's motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, written opinion, clarification, and certification. The order issues "BY ORDER OF THE COURT". It names no judge and no panel. The only name on it is the clerk's certification that it is a true copy. The four orders before it are the November 26, 2025 and January 27, 2026 orders (N-066), the February 2, 2026 denial at Doc 263, and the April 6, 2026 order (N-087). The rulings below stood without any written examination, and no judge is identified as having made that choice. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Rules 9.330 and 9.331 let a party ask for rehearing, a written opinion, clarification, and certification; rehearing denials without opinion are ordinary. The point is that this order, resolving a request to be told the court's reasoning, gives none and identifies no judge. That is the fifth anonymous order in this series; the same court named its judges three months earlier (N-078), so the practice was available. Asked which judges decided, the court refused, resting on rule 2.420(c)(1) (N-066, N-114).

Receipt

• Doc 301 in the 1150 docket, one page, dated May 12, 2026, 2D2025-1936, L.T. 24-DR-001150, signed by Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk, electronically filed 05/12/2026 10:35:30 AM
• The named comparator at Doc 270
• The earlier anonymous orders at N-066, Doc 263, and N-087
• The refusals to identify the panel at N-066 and N-114

Spawned by: N-088

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-01

Actor

Paul Flemming, PIO

Institution

Florida Supreme Court

Mechanism

the Florida Supreme Court's records office answered seven of ten categories with a single rule citation that identifies no record, and three categories it never answered at all

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect judicial-branch records, and access is the presumption. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420 implements that right for the judicial branch, and subdivision (m)(2) requires a written basis for a denial. There is no privilege-log rule in the text, but a written basis that identifies nothing does not tell a requester or a court what is being withheld. The burden of establishing an exemption rests on the custodian.

What happened

On June 1, 2026 the Florida Supreme Court's public information officer, Paul Flemming, asserted blanket confidentiality under Rule 2.420(c) over seven of the ten categories in a May 30 request about SB 1652 and the Vexatious Litigant Workgroup. He identified no record and cited no sub-provision. Categories 1, 5, and 9 he did not address at all. The file carries a promise: "A response to your request will be given in a reasonable amount of time."

A follow-up and pre-suit letter went by email on July 8, 2026, setting a deadline of "no later than Tuesday, July 15, 2026". That deadline passed with no response in the channels searched, and the request is still open. In fairness: the June 1 response arrived at the Yahoo address, which has not been swept, so nothing here claims nothing was sent, only that nothing was found where the search ran. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect court records. Access is the presumption, and the burden of proving an exemption sits on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for denial. A basis that identifies nothing tells no one what is withheld, so one rule citation across seven categories leaves nothing to test; three of the ten categories drew no answer, not even a refusal.

Receipt

• Flemming's response of 6/1/26, "6-1-26 FL Supreme Court response (Flemming) to public records request re SB1652.pdf", held as a native PDF; the 6/1/26 text is carried verbatim
• The original request of 5/30/26 as sent and the 6/2/26 reply as sent
• The as-sent follow-up, "7-8-26 Follow-Up and Pre-Suit Notice to Flemming re SB1652 PRR (AS SENT by email 7-8-26).md", an archive built from the Gmail copy, message id 19f41c10b40d43cf; sent 8:42 AM ET as a reply on the existing thread; it is a verbatim text archive rather than an image of the send
• The 7/6/26 files are drafts, not send copies, and a 7/14/26 version was drafted and exported but never sent, as the folder record says in terms
• Search scope for the silence: the Florida Supreme Court public-records matter file, which holds no inbound after the 6/1/26 response, and the Gmail account, checked 7/14/26
• The Yahoo mailbox has not been swept, and there is no exported page image of the 7/8 send

This decision point also appears on: Public Records Litigation, the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-03

Actor

Clerk Mary Beth Kuenzel

Institution

2D DCA

Mechanism

the court withheld its own machinery, case assignment, scheduling, the case-management system, and phone logs, behind an exemption that protects deliberation, and the category asking which judges decided the unnamed orders drew the same boilerplate as the rest

What the law required

R. 2.420(m)(2) requires particularity. Under (b)(3), the chief judge is the custodian. Subdivision (c)(1) protects deliberation, not machinery.

What happened

On June 3, 2026 the Second District's clerk, Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, denied nearly all of a nine-category administrative-records request. Every administrative category drew the identical line: non-court-file records "are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1)." The administrative records have still not been produced.

Asked specifically who decided, she answered in writing on July 27, 2026, for Chief Judge Lucas, again citing rule 2.420(c)(1) for anything not filed in the court record: "There are no documents filed as part of the court record that reflect which judges participated in those orders."

Read precisely, that is not a statement that no such records exist. It is a statement that none is in the court record, and anything outside it is withheld as exempt. The effect is that the orders deciding these appeals name no judge, and the court's own record contains nothing that would (N-066, N-087, N-101). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation

Rule 2.420(c)(1) protects a court's deliberation, not its machinery. Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a written basis for denial. Identical boilerplate across nine categories identifies no record and gives no basis specific to any, so nothing can be tested. Assignment records are how a reader learns which judges issued an order that names none (N-087, N-101). In fairness, the order in case 0279 does name its judges (N-078).

Receipt

• Clerk Kuenzel's 6/3/26 email from 2dcaclerk@flcourts.org, Wednesday, June 3, 2026 at 2:53 PM EDT, her substantive response to the Rule 2.420 request, on file as a native PDF export received from Chris on 8/10/26
• On the judge-identification category it states: "There are no other documents filed as a part of the court record that are responsive to this request, and any records not filed as a part of the court record are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1)."
• The 6/3 email states on its face that it responds to a request of May 18, 2026
• Full 7/27/26 answer: "You have asked for any 'records that reflect which judges participated in those orders' prior to or following the disposition in each case, but these records are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1) unless filed as a part of the court record. There are no documents filed as part of the court record that reflect which judges participated in those orders." This is a complete mailbox text capture whose operative sentence also appears at p. 5 of the 7/30/26 email to the Second District clerk; the native message itself is not held
• Intake note, recorded as the clerk's stated reason and not as a departure: the clerk's office declined to open the 5/14/26 request because it arrived as an attachment, stating verbatim "we do not generally open attachments from unknown senders", which cost five days at the front of the request and supports a Question Protocol ask for the written policy

Spawned by: N-087

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-04

Actor

Chief Judge Matt Lucas

Institution

2D DCA

Mechanism

the chief judge answered forty days after the request reached him and six days after the follow-up, produced a record for free, then placed every other record behind one rule citation naming no document, and the supplement he promised has not issued

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect and copy judicial-branch records. Access is the presumption and secrecy is the exception. The burden of establishing an exemption rests on the custodian, not on the requester, and it does not shift because the custodian is a judge. Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.420 implements that right for the judicial branch; 2.420(b)(3) makes the chief judge the custodian of administrative records; and 2.420(m)(2) sets the response duty, requiring the custodian to determine whether a requested record is subject to the rule and, if so, whether it or portions of it are exempt, and to state the basis for a denial in writing. Constitutional provision first, rule second, which is the order this custodian used himself. A categorical assertion over an entire class of requested records, identifying nothing withheld and stating no basis as to any particular item, leaves nothing a requester or a reviewing court can test, and so does not carry the custodian's burden. Rule 2.420(l)(1) supplies the review route once a denial has issued.

What happened

On June 4, 2026 Husband's narrowed records request was redirected to Chief Judge Lucas as custodian. A follow-up went by email July 8. Lucas responded by signed letter dated July 14, forty days after the routing and six days after the follow-up. He named the governing law correctly, citing the Constitution before the rule, and produced the Court's Internal Operating Procedures at no charge.

Everything else he placed behind one sentence: "Other than the case records provided previously by Clerk Kuenzel, any other records that may exist relating to this request are confidential and exempt pursuant to Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420(c)(1)." No record was identified and no index accompanied the claim.

On the two remaining categories he found nothing responsive and said a report was coming: "We expect a report this week; when it is received, I will update this response." No update issued. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

Article I, section 24(a) presumes judicial-branch records open, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for any denial. In fairness: he answered within six days of the follow-up, cited the constitution first, and produced a record at no charge. But withholding an entire class under one rule citation, naming no document, leaves nothing to test. And he wrote that he would update his response when a report arrived. He did not.

Receipt

• Chief Judge Lucas's signed letter response, dated July 14, 2026, pp. 1-2, wet signature over "Matthew C. Lucas", "Encl."
• Record produced: Second District's Internal Operating Procedures, effective 12/1/2025, 22 pages, produced 7/14/26.
• Cover email 7/14/26 8:53 AM EDT from 2dcaAdministrative: "Please see the attached response from Chief Judge Lucas."
• Follow-up and pre-suit notice sent 7/8/26 2:14 PM, demand paragraph setting 7/14 and closing paragraph setting 7/15; the 7/6/26 files are drafts, not send copies.
• Kuenzel's 6/4/26 8:04 AM EDT routing confirmation: "Your request will be forwarded to the Chief Judge of the Second District Court of Appeal, Chief Judge Matt Lucas."
• Letter states it "responds to yours of June 4, 2026, and July 8, 2026."
• Full chronology and search scope for every negative held in the 2D DCA records-front status memo of 8/16/26.
• Elapsed as of 8/16/26: 73 days since the 6/4 routing, 94 days since the original 5/14/26 request, 32 days of Rule 2.420(l)(1) ripeness attaching 7/15/26.
• Letter dated Tuesday 7/14/26; the week he named ended Sunday 7/19/26. 28 days ran from that date to 8/16/26, 33 days from the letter itself.
• Kuenzel answered on his behalf 7/27 and Marshal Haynes answered 8/4 (N-138, N-149); neither purports to be the promised update.
• Which of the two answers (categorical exemption vs. no-records-identified) governs which category is unresolved; ambiguity raised in writing 7/20 and again 7/30, unresolved.
• Search scope for the negative: 60-day Gmail sweep across the court's domains, both 2D DCA records folders, the four 2D DCA matter folders, and the downloads folder, as of 8/16/26; Husband's Yahoo address was not searched.
• RE line on the letter mistypes the first case number as "2D20225-1936" and reads "Office of State Courts Administrator" without "the".
• Two limits: the current text of Rule 2.420(m)(2) is held here only as Husband's own verbatim quotation in the 7/30/26 letter; and which court reviews a DCA chief judge's denial is answered here as (l)(1) rather than circuit-court mandamus under (l)(2).

Spawned by: N-114

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-06-30

Actor

The Florida Bar, appellees in 1D2026-0728, by Keating and Londot, Greenberg Traurig

Institution

1D2026-0728

Mechanism

the appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decision

What the law required

The appeal calls for appellate review of the Leon dismissal.

What happened

On 6/30/26 the Bar appellees filed their Answer Brief in 1D2026-0728. It states that "Mr. Hanson's grievance file against Mr. Davis was closed without further investigation," and that because review was limited to submissions and court records, the file held no communications with Davis. In a footnote it concedes the condition on which its production duty binds: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it."

The brief also restates settled law that a person has neither the right to compel discipline nor standing to appeal a non-discipline decision, and describes the 2/24/25 closure as a no-jurisdiction finding, wording absent from the letter. The appeal record carries the Bar's own letters, including a 9/24/25 letter describing a Senior Staff Attorney investigation and two further reviews of the same file the brief says was closed without further investigation (N-055). [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

An appeal exists to review whether a case was rightly ended. This one asks whether a records case could be dismissed with prejudice before the opposition was even filed, without a hearing (N-079). Nothing has been decided yet. What the appellate papers supply is the regulator's positions, in writing and unhedged. Two concede more than any letter did. A third restates settled law on standing, recorded here as the Bar's framing, not an admission.

Receipt

• Answer Brief of Appellees, 1D2026-0728, filed 6/30/26, Filing 251514921, 34 PDF pages and 28 numbered, signed M. Hope Keating and John K. Londot, held in the appeal's brief file.
• Quotes at PDF pp. 8 (brief p. 2, the "no jurisdiction" characterization), 18 (brief p. 12, the standing sentence), 30 (brief p. 24, both admissions), and 31 (brief p. 25 fn. 3, the conditional concession).
• Precision note, load-bearing: "no jurisdiction" is the BRIEF's phrase, anchored to Standing Board Policy 15.75(d)(1), and does NOT appear in the Huston letter; attribute the phrase to the brief and the deferral language to the letter.
• Composite Exhibit A to the 1/27/26 motion to dismiss with the judicial-notice request at Leon ROA p. 626; the letters at ROA pp. 640-643.
• Underlying letters quoted by the brief at ROA pp. 44 and 103.

Spawned by: N-079

This decision point also appears on: The Florida Bar, the full ledger.

Date

2026-07-25

Actor

2D DCA

Institution

2D2026-1955 (L.T. 24-DR-001150)

Mechanism

the certiorari challenge to the guardian ad litem order is pending, the Second District has ordered a response, and nothing here is charged against anyone

What the law required

Rule 9.100 provides certiorari review of the guardian ad litem order (Doc 337).

What happened

On July 25, 2026 Husband filed a certiorari petition challenging the June 25, 2026 guardian ad litem order, 38 pages with a 429-page appendix, asking the court to "quash the June 25, 2026 order". The Second District docketed it July 27 as 2D2026-1955. A first fee submission was rejected for a case-number error; the resubmission, $311.85, was confirmed docketed the next morning, though its status still read "Processing" at that capture, so nothing here says the payment settled. On August 3, 2026 the Second District ordered a response within thirty days, ordered a reply thirty days after that, and imposed on both parties a duty to keep the court apprised of hearings affecting the proceeding. The order under challenge is being reviewed while the trial court's retainer terms run (N-134, N-135). [PENDING]

Baseline deviation

Rule 9.100 provides certiorari review of the guardian ad litem order. There is no determination yet and nothing here counts against the Second District. The court's earlier dispositions in this lane (N-054, N-078, N-087, N-088) are noted for context, not asserted as a pattern. What the record shows at this step is a schedule: a response ordered, a reply ordered, a respondent named, and a duty on both sides to keep the court advised.

Receipt

• Filing #253269488 (the petition, draft version 19 as filed). The relief quoted at para. 44, PDF p. 18, and again in the conclusion at para. 93, PDF p. 37; the string "Doc 351" appears nowhere in the 38 pages, and the 7/23/26 appointment order is mentioned once, descriptively, at para. 46, PDF p. 19.
• Filing #253628363 (the rejected fee submission), clerk's stated reason: "Case Number Cannot Be Determined or Case Number Not for This Court", with a refund auto-generated; whether the refund posted is unknown.
• Filing #253668293 (the accepted $311.85 fee, Order #19922246, memo line "Statutory Convenience Fee: $11.85 / Total Paid: $311.85"), with the 7/31/26 8:24 AM clerk processing confirmation, native PDF p.1.
• The 8/3/26 order was entered as DIN 363 (F283); the fee sequence at F284; F305.
• As-filed word count 7,932 per the compliance certificate, PDF p. 38; the 7/25 service-record.md's 7,746 is a stale draft figure. Appendix tab 35 is the same facially incomplete Doc 351 artifact.
• Three limits: the rejection notice is held without a page image; the portal returned "No Matching Entries" for the certificate of service, and service went by a separate 10:08 AM email; the para. 92 "For 800 days" figure is not recomputed here.
• The 7/30 fee record still displayed "NEW CASE", so this card does not state the case as docketed.

Spawned by: N-134, N-125

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

Date

2026-08-04

Actor

Marshal Jacinda (Jo) Haynes

Institution

2D DCA

Mechanism

the appellate court's custodian asserted a blanket exemption over records "referencing me by name," attached two records of exactly that description in the same email, and put everything else behind $313 in advance

What the law required

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, and it places the burden of establishing an exemption on the entity asserting one. Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to determine whether a requested record is subject to the rule and, if so, whether it or portions of it are exempt, and requires that "[i]f the request is denied, the custodian must state in writing the basis for the denial." A determination is per record or per described set. Internal Operating Procedures section 4.1(K) is the provision under which this request was directed to the marshal. Presumption and burden: access is presumed, and the withholder carries the burden, so an unstated basis is an unmet burden and not a neutral silence.

What happened

On August 4, 2026 the Second District's marshal answered a request pending since July 20. Two categories drew a blanket exemption as confidential and exempt. Four lines later the same email reads: "Or records 'referencing me by name.' I have attached two administrative records referencing you by name." One attachment is a Teams message reading, in full, "Pro Se, Christopher Hanson has arrived". The telephone-records category drew only that the logs contain phone numbers and voicemails would be reviewed as part of the same process, with no existence statement and no denial. Everything further was priced at $313.00, payable before any review would proceed. No privilege log, no list of what is withheld, and no description of the search have ever issued. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation

Article I, section 24 presumes records open and puts the burden of proving an exemption on the withholder; an unstated basis is an unmet burden, not neutral silence. A categorical exemption's test is whether it is applied categorically. Here it was not: the same officer, over the same category, on the same day, asserted the exemption and then attached two records of that description four lines later. Withholding while stating no basis leaves the burden unmet.

Receipt

• The marshal's 8/4/26 email with both attachments, produced by the court itself.
• The 7/20/26 request and 7/21/26 acknowledgment in the quoted chain of the same PDF.
• On the telephone-records category, the same email neither produced a record, nor stated one exists, nor cited an exemption.
• Full quote: "Telephone records (call detail logs) contain phone numbers. Voicemails will be reviewed as part of the email process above."
• Full quote: "The charge for this time is $313.00. Upon receipt of payment, I will proceed with the review of these e-mail messages and attachments."
• The unattributed supplement denials at N-066 (denied without panel name or reason).
• Cross-links N-115 (the request chain) and N-138 (the IOP provision).

Spawned by: N-115

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.