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The Node Ledger: one institution's decision points

The Appellate Courts

Husband asked the Second District Court of Appeal whether a judge he is suing may keep deciding his divorce. The court denied the petition in one sentence, seven days after it was filed.

How every card reads. Each card follows five steps, LIVED.

L, the law: the constitution first, then statute, then rule, with the presumption and who carries the burden.

I, the facts that decide it: facts that require the result on their own.

V, the record: the institution’s own documents, certified transcripts, and arithmetic. Disputes are noted openly. Where someone was shown a claim and did not answer, the card records silence, never a finding.

E, what happened: the institution’s acts, by date.

D, the gap: the distance between what L, I and V required and what E delivered.

The Start here entries tell the same five steps as a story: the gap as the headline, then what happened by date, each line linked to the cards it comes from, then the rule that governed it, then whose interest the result served.

What the law required is the legally expected output: for a records request, the records or a written basis for withholding them; for a motion, a ruling; for a disqualification, a neutral judge. A card where that output arrived and held shows alignment; where it did not, a divergence. A disqualification that changes the judge is the rule applied; the realignment it exists to produce happens only if the successor brings the case back in line with the law. Where the requests the movant had pending at the disqualification are still pending under the successor, the realignment has not happened, and the card records a divergence. The cards record effects and assert no one’s motive. They hold the disputes that grew out of one divorce, a record of those disputes and never a sample of everything these institutions did.

L. Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an impartial tribunal. Where a rule and the Constitution conflict, the Constitution prevails (N-078).

I. Judge Felix is a named defendant in Husband’s public-records lawsuit, and he presides over Husband’s divorce (N-059).

V. The petition asked for a writ "disqualifying Judge Matthew Felix and all judges of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit from presiding over Case No. 24-DR-001150" (N-078).

E. On February 10, 2026, the order read in full: "Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied." No response was required from anyone (N-078). In a separate appeal in the same divorce, the court kept the April 4, 2025 courthouse video out of the record, then affirmed in three words, "PER CURIAM. Affirmed.", meaning a decision by the court with no opinion (N-066, N-088).

D. The question whether a defendant judge may preside went to an appellate court and came back unanswered, and the judge stayed on the case.

14decision points
9did not end in the expected output
2still pending, no output yet
0aligned and enforced
  • DENIED8the expected output was refused
  • IGNORED1no ruling ever came
  • PENDING2not yet decided; still live
  • PARTIAL3part of the expected output issued

3 of the 14 were partly aligned: part of the expected output issued. They are counted in neither the first cell nor the aligned cell.

Of the 12 no longer pending, none ended with the full legally expected output enforced. That is a count, not an estimate.

Each class is glossed above in terms of the legally expected output. The ledger's own definitions are on the full ledger page.

Take any card on this page: identify a false statement, or show that the decision matched what the facts required, and the card changes.

That request stands to anyone reading this. The allegations collected in this ledger have been put in writing, more than once, to the institutions with authority to examine them, and no false statement has been identified in response. Every card carries its receipt, so a wrong card can be shown wrong from the same records.

14 decision points, in order

Select any row to open its full card, with the receipt. The Spawned by line names the earlier decision point this one grew out of, and it is a link. Cards listed on more than one institution page say so on their face.

N-0542025-09-122D DCAthe petition asking for the first written review of the orders that shut off the financial records was dismissed in three words, and the order that later denied every post-dismissal motion carries no judge's name at allDENIED
Date
2025-09-12
Actor
2D DCA panel (per curiam)
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-0681)
Mechanism
the petition asking for the first written review of the orders that shut off the financial records was dismissed in three words, and the order that later denied every post-dismissal motion carries no judge's name at all
What the law required
Article V, section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 9.030(b)(2)(A) give the Second District certiorari jurisdiction over a non-final order that departs from the essential requirements of law and causes material injury with no adequate remedy on appeal; Rule 9.100 supplies the procedure. Rule 9.330(a)(2)(D) lets a party ask for a written opinion, and the court's own Internal Operating Procedures, section 3.3, direct the clerk to identify on the face of every dispositive order the names of the participating judges.
What happened
On September 12, 2025 the Second District dismissed the certiorari petition per curiam, naming the panel: "NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur." Every post-dismissal motion was denied on February 2, 2026 by an order naming no one, reading in full: "Petitioner's motion for rehearing, clarification, oral arguments, en banc review, and/or written opinion is denied." A written opinion was asked for in terms and refused in terms, by an order that gives no reason and identifies no judge. The mandate issued February 19, 2026. The discovery freeze below was left undisturbed, and the orders that produced it remain unexamined. [DENIED: review refused without a written explanation.]
Baseline deviation
Certiorari would have been the first written look at the orders that cut off the financial records (N-018). The court dismissed in three words. The 2/2/26 order that later denied every post-dismissal motion names nobody, in a court whose own procedures direct the clerk to put the participating judges' names on every dispositive order. Asked in writing which judges decided, the court answered that no record shows who participated (N-114). This is the first of three unexplained appellate silences on this record (N-066, N-088).
Receipt
  • 9/12/25 dismissal, eDCA original, 2D2025-0681 docket 065: "PER CURIAM." / "Dismissed." Panel: "NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur." Lower tribunal: Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, Kelly A. Ayers, Judge. Footer: "Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication."
  • Also in 1150 record at Doc 248 p.2 (filed by Wife 10/14/25) and Doc 275.
  • 2/2/26 order, eDCA original, docket 066: "BY ORDER OF THE COURT:", denies "Petitioner's three motions for oral argument, all filed on November 4, 2025", and denies the notice of filing error/request to strike as moot; no judge named; certified by Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk. Also at 1150 Doc 263.
  • Mandate 2/19/26.
  • Orders that cut records off below: N-018, N-018. Three-doors pattern: N-066, N-088. Refusal to identify deciding judges: N-114.

Spawned by: N-018, N-018

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

N-0592025-10-14 -> ongoingMulti-forumone structural question was put to three courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related oneIGNORED
Date
2025-10-14 -> ongoing
Actor
Judge Matthew Felix; the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; a 2D DCA panel (Villanti, Sleet, Smith); The Florida Bar
Institution
25-CA-010255 (13th Cir.); 24-DR-001150 (13th Cir.); 2D2026-0279; 2025-CA-2469 (Leon)
Mechanism
one structural question was put to three courts and answered by none: may a judge who is a defendant in one case keep presiding over the related one
What the law required
Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest: In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (disqualification required where the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable); Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016) (the error is structural). Court rules govern "practice and procedure" (Art. V, s. 2(a), Fla. Const.); the impartial tribunal is a constitutional guarantee, and the federal Constitution binds "the Judges in every State," any state rule to the contrary notwithstanding (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Under Rule 2.330(h) the facts alleged are taken as true and the motion is judged on legal sufficiency alone. In a records mandamus the respondent's role is to answer the writ (Radford v. Brock, 914 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 674 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)), so the named judges are either nominal custodians with no stake, in which case no merits advocacy for them is proper, or parties with a stake, in which case Murchison and Williams apply; no court in this record has answered either way.
What happened
The conflict takes three forms across related cases: Judge Felix, a named defendant in the records mandamus, kept presiding over the family case; the mandamus was filed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, with the Attorney General appearing for the judicial defendants; and The Florida Bar is itself a party in two of the forums. Three courts were asked whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one, and each disposed of the request without reaching that question. Judge Felix denied the disqualification motions on the successive-motion rule, the second time 9 hours and 27 minutes after it was filed, ruling it legally insufficient and stating that he can be fair and impartial (N-069, N-118). The Second District denied the prohibition petition in one sentence, seven days after filing, with no response required (N-078). The Sixth Circuit judge assigned to the records case ruled that he had no power to transfer the family case (N-075). No court has said why a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one. [IGNORED]
Baseline deviation
Due process forbids anyone to judge a cause in which he has an interest, and a procedural rule cannot override that guarantee. A judge named as a defendant in the records case kept presiding over the related family case. The question was put to three courts; each disposed of it without reaching the merits, and no court has said why a judge who is a defendant in one case may preside over the related one.
Receipt
  • Amended mandamus petition caption (e-filed 11/13/25, 25-CA-10255).
  • Disqualification order rested on the successive-motion rule (Rule 2.330(i)).
  • 2D DCA denial: prohibition petition filed 2/3/26 and denied 2/10/26, seven days later, one day after fee paid, no opinion, no response required (N-078).
  • 1150 Doc 258 (1/8/26) and Doc 331 (6/10/26, e-signed 9:27:13 AM; the motion, Doc 329, e-filed 12:00:02 AM).
  • 10255 Doc 61 paras. 9 and 11 (family-case transfer denied for lack of authority).
  • Two of the judges in this chain have ruled for Husband.
  • Defendants have a nominal-party answer available; naming a court and its judges in a mandamus about the court's own records is how such petitions are normally styled.

Spawned by: N-058, N-069, N-078, N-091

This decision point also appears on: Under Judge Felix, Court Oversight and Conflict Judges in the Sixth Circuit, The Florida Bar, the full ledger.

N-0662025-11-262D DCAthe appellate court kept the courthouse video out of the record in orders that name no judge and give no reason, and when asked who decided, answered that no such record is filed anywhere a party can reachDENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Second District refused even an in camera look at the April 4, 2025 video Judge Ayers offered as proof of her own conduct, twice in one-sentence orders naming no judge, then withheld as "confidential and exempt" any record of which judges decided.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) presumes the Second District's own records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the court as custodian. Which judges ruled on a party's motion is a fact of the court's administration: under its own procedures "The clerk schedules and assigns cases." Asked who decided, the court names the judges, or identifies each record it withholds and states the specific basis, as Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Sept. 23, 2025: Husband moved to supplement the record with the video of the hearing where Judge Ayers said, "I will go get the camera footage and do it because I have not rolled my eyes at you," and with Judge DePaul's recusal document. In the alternative he asked the court to "conduct an in camera review of the evidence." N-042, N-066
    Read them: Motion to supplement, Sept. 23, 2025 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Nov. 26, 2025 to Jan. 27, 2026: "BY ORDER OF THE COURT: Appellant's 'Motion to Supplement the Record with Video of 4/4/25 Hearing and Recusal Documents' is denied." No judge is named; the only signature is the clerk's certification. Husband moved for rehearing and a "Formal Written Order." Denied in one sentence, again naming no judge. On April 6, 2026 the court refused the video a third time, nine days before affirming. N-066, N-087
    Read them: Order, Nov. 26, 2025 (link pending redacted copy) · Order, Jan. 27, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • May 14 to July 27, 2026: asked for the records identifying which judges issued these orders, Clerk Kuenzel answered for Chief Judge Lucas: those records "are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1) unless filed as a part of the court record. There are no documents filed as part of the court record that reflect which judges participated in those orders." N-114, N-066
    Which judges decided the November 26, 2025 and January 27, 2026 orders?
I
Independent encounter

The unnamed judges of the Second District (both orders). Clerk Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel (certified both orders; answered for Chief Judge Lucas). One motion, two orders, one records answer. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and the court's own procedures on this motion alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for each denial. The court's procedures place case assignment with the clerk.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2025-11-26
Actor
2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named)
Institution
2D2025-1936
Mechanism
the appellate court kept the courthouse video out of the record in orders that name no judge and give no reason, and when asked who decided, answered that no such record is filed anywhere a party can reach
What the law required
Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(f) provides for supplementing an appellate record that omits an item the trial court considered. Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of establishing an exemption on the custodian, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a written basis for any denial.
What happened
On November 26, 2025 the Second District denied the motion to supplement the record with the April 4, 2025 courthouse video, the video Judge Ayers herself invoked and then declined to pursue (N-042), and the recusal documents, naming no panel and giving no reasoning. Husband moved for rehearing of that order on December 1, 2025; the court denied rehearing on January 27, 2026, again naming no judge. Two more followed the same pattern, April 6 and May 12, 2026 (N-087, N-101). Asked in writing to identify who decided, the court refused: writing for Chief Judge Lucas on July 27, 2026, Clerk Kuenzel answered that no document reflects which judges participated, and any unfiled record is confidential under rule 2.420(c)(1). Chief Judge Lucas wrote the same on July 14, and Marshal Haynes again on August 4, 2026 (N-149); Clerk Kuenzel had denied the same category on June 3, 2026 (N-114). Four written refusals, and not one name on any of the orders. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Rule 9.200(f) lets a party supplement an incomplete record. Two orders from the same court kept the courthouse video out, and a third denied rehearing; none names a panel and none gives a reason. Asked in writing which judges decided, the court refused four times. Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden of proving an exemption on the custodian, and a bare rule citation carries none of it.
Receipt
  • As pleaded at complaint para. 30E.
  • 11/26/25 order denying Appellant's "Motion to Supplement the Record with Video of 4/4/25 Hearing and Recusal Documents", filed 2D2025-1936 docket 041: issues "BY ORDER OF THE COURT", carries Kuenzel certification, names no judge.
  • 1/27/26 order denying "Motion for Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc, for Clarification, for Formal Written Order, and/or Certification" under Rules 9.330/9.331, filed 2D2025-1936 docket 042; no judge named.
  • Chief Judge Lucas's 7/14/26 letter and Marshal Haynes's 8/4/26 email.
  • Clerk Kuenzel's 6/3/26 email on file as native PDF; her 7/27/26 response held only as a mailbox text capture, no page image, quoted at N-114 on that basis.
  • Video's origin at N-042; withholding of it at N-053.
  • Related decision points: N-115.
  • Husband's December 1, 2025 motion for rehearing "of its November 26, 2025, order denying Appellant's 'Motion to Supplement the Record with Video of 4/4/25 Hearing and Recusal Documents'" (Filing 236689274), 2D2025-1936 docket 046.

Spawned by: N-053

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

N-0782026-02-102D DCAAsked whether a judge he is suing may keep deciding his divorce, Husband got one sentence: the petition "is denied."DENIED
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

Asked whether a judge Husband is suing may keep deciding Husband's divorce, a Second District panel that included Judge Andrea Teves Smith, whom the court has since disclosed is recused in another of Husband's appeals, denied the petition in one sentence seven days after filing, required no response, and said nothing about transferring venue.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 9 guarantees an impartial judge, and Rule 2.330(e)(2)(C) makes a judge's own interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding a ground for disqualification. Shown that the trial judge is a defendant in the petitioner's lawsuit, the Second District orders a response and rules on that ground, with reasons. It decides the request to transfer venue. A judge recused in one of the petitioner's related cases explains, when asked, why that ground did not reach the others, and the clerk answers when the recusal took effect.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Feb. 3, 2026: the petition asked for a writ "disqualifying Judge Matthew Felix and all judges of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit from presiding over Case No. 24-DR-001150 and directing a transfer of venue to a neutral circuit". N-078
    Read them: Petition, Feb. 3, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Feb. 10, 2026: seven days after filing: "Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied." Judges Villanti, Sleet and Smith concurred. No response was required; the order says nothing about venue or the circuit named as a respondent. N-078
    Read them: Order, Feb. 10, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • July 27 to Oct. 2, 2026: the clerk, for the Chief Judge: "Judge Andrea Teves Smith is recused in case no. 2D2025-0681." Judge Smith, the only Smith on the court's letterhead, sat on this panel and on the April 15, 2026 panel in 2D2025-1936. Asked whether any judge "is recused, or has been recused at any point" in those cases: "no judges are recused in these cases." The recusal date: "confidential and exempt." Oct. 2, 2026: under IOP section 1.7, Husband asked when the recusal took effect, its ground, and whether it was considered here. Unanswered as of Oct. 3, 2026. N-138, N-078
    When did Judge Smith's recusal in 2D2025-0681 take effect, on what ground, and was that ground considered before she sat on this panel?
    Read them: Husband's email to the clerk, Oct. 2, 2026 (link pending redacted copy) · Decision, 2D2025-1936, Apr. 15, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Judges Villanti, Sleet and Smith (the one-sentence denial). Clerk Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, answering for Chief Judge Lucas. One petition, one order, one seven-entry docket. Every duty here arises from the Second District's own prohibition jurisdiction over this petition alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 9, Fla. Const. and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an impartial tribunal: "[N]o man can be a judge in his own case" (In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). Art. V, s. 4(b)(3) gives the Second District jurisdiction in prohibition to enforce that guarantee. Court rules govern "practice and procedure" (Art. V, s. 2(a)); the federal guarantee binds "the Judges in every State" over any conflicting state rule (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Art. I, s. 24(a) presumes the court's own records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-02-10
Actor
2D DCA panel: Villanti, Sleet, Smith
Institution
2D DCA (2D2026-0279)
Mechanism
the petition asking whether a judge who is a defendant in one case may keep presiding over the related one was denied in a single sentence, seven days after filing and one day after the fee posted, with no response ever required from anyone
What the law required
Article V, section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 9.030(b)(3) give the Second District original jurisdiction in prohibition; Rule 9.100 supplies the procedure. Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an impartial tribunal, disqualification is constitutionally required where the probability of actual bias is too high to be tolerable (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.), and the federal Constitution binds "the Judges in every State" over any conflicting state rule (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Court rules govern "practice and procedure" (Art. V, s. 2(a), Fla. Const.).
What happened
On February 10, 2026 a panel of Villanti, Sleet, and Smith denied the prohibition petition seven days after it was filed, and one day after the fee posted. The order reads: "Petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition is denied." No opinion, no order to show cause, no response ever required. The petition had asked for a writ "disqualifying Judge Matthew Felix and all judges of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit from presiding over Case No. 24-DR-001150 and directing a transfer of venue to a neutral circuit pursuant to Fla. Stat. s. 47.122", and named the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit itself as a respondent. The order does not mention venue, transfer, section 47.122, or the circuit as an entity; its caption lists only the two spouses. Judge Felix remained presiding. The structural question this petition raised has now been put to three courts and answered by none (N-059). [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Prohibition exists to stop a judge from presiding where disqualification is required, and the Constitution controls over any rule that would let him stay. The petition put a structural question to the court: may a judge who is a named defendant in Husband's pending suit keep deciding Husband's case. The one-sentence denial names its judges and answers nothing else. It required no response, and it is silent on the second thing the petition asked for, transfer of venue under section 47.122. Judge Felix kept presiding.
Receipt
  • Denial order 2/10/26, 2D2026-0279 docket 001, p.1, and copy at docket 008, Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel clerk certification, served on Hillsborough Clerk, Davis, Felix, Hanson.
  • Petition of 2/3/26, 2D2026-0279 docket 007, PDF pp. 4-5, 16, 26-27, verified: prayer at section III, para. 44 and WHEREFORE clause: "remanding with instructions to transfer venue to the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Pasco County, or another neutral venue".
  • 2D2026-0279 docket sheet, text layer, seven entries, no order-to-show-cause and no response entry.
  • Disqualification ruling this followed: N-069. Structural-conflict spine: N-059.

Spawned by: N-069

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

N-0872026-04-062D DCAnine days before it affirmed, the court refused to add the video to the record and struck five filings in a one-page order naming no judge, while an order from the same court fifty-five days earlier named all three of its judges.DENIED
Date
2026-04-06
Actor
2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named)
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-1936)
Mechanism
nine days before it affirmed, the court refused to add the video to the record and struck five filings in a one-page order naming no judge, while an order from the same court fifty-five days earlier named all three of its judges.
What the law required
Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(f) provides for supplementing a record that omits an item the trial court considered. Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of establishing an exemption on the custodian.
What happened

On April 6, 2026 the Second District refused to supplement the record with the April 4, 2025 video and the recusal documents, and struck five filings in the same one-page order. The order names no judge. It issues only "BY ORDER OF THE COURT". The per curiam affirmance came nine days later, on a record that still did not contain the video (N-088).

Fifty-five days earlier the same court had denied the prohibition petition in an order that did name its judges: Villanti, Sleet, and Smith (N-078).

Four written refusals followed the question of who decided: by the Clerk on June 3 and again on July 27, 2026, by the Chief Judge on July 14, 2026, and by the Marshal on August 4, 2026, each resting on rule 2.420(c)(1). This is the middle order in the series opened at N-066 and continued at N-101. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Rule 9.200(f) permits supplementing an incomplete record. Same court, same year, two orders: the prohibition denial fifty-five days earlier carries three names; this one carries none. The unnamed order decided whether the central evidence would be in the record, nine days before the court affirmed on that record. Husband asked which judges decided; the court refused four times in writing. Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden of proving an exemption on the custodian.
Receipt
  • The 4/6/26 order, filed in 2D2025-1936 at docket 043, one page. It strikes five filings (Appendices 1 through 3 of 3/31 and the Notices of Filing of 4/1), treats the 4/3 "Updated Notice of Related Cases, Supplemental Motion to Supplement the Record, and Motion for Panel Review of 4-4-25 Video" as a motion to supplement and denies it, and names no judge.
  • The named comparator at Doc 270, the 2/10/26 prohibition denial (N-078), naming Villanti, Sleet, and Smith.
  • The four written refusals to identify the deciding judges: Clerk Kuenzel on 6/3/26 and again on 7/27/26 (N-114), Chief Judge Lucas on 7/14/26 (N-115), and Marshal Haynes on 8/4/26 (N-149).

Spawned by: N-042, N-049

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

N-0882026-04-152D DCAthe appeal ended in three words, on the same record the court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video at the center of the caseDENIED
Date
2026-04-15
Actor
2D DCA panel
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-1936)
Mechanism
the appeal ended in three words, on the same record the court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video at the center of the case
What the law required
Article V, section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 9.130(a)(3) give the Second District jurisdiction to review the order denying transfer of venue. Article I, section 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an impartial tribunal (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.), and findings are required before a section 47.122 transfer is granted (Fast v. Nelson). Rule 9.330(a)(2)(D) lets a party ask for a written opinion, and without one the Florida Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review a per curiam affirmance for conflict (Jenkins v. State).
What happened
On April 15, 2026 the Second District affirmed per curiam. The opinion reads "PER CURIAM. Affirmed." The panel line reads "KHOUZAM, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and SMITH, JJ., Concur." Oral argument had been held on April 7, 2026, eight days before the affirmance. The mandate issued June 2, 2026. One week earlier the same court had struck five filings and refused to put the April 4, 2025 video into that record (N-087), and five months before that it had refused the same thing without naming a panel or giving a reason (N-066). The rulings below stood, and no court has written an examination of them. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
The appeal asked whether a venue ruling made without findings could stand, and a January 2026 notice put the structural conflict before the court. A per curiam affirmance without opinion decides it without a word, and under Jenkins the Florida Supreme Court cannot review it for conflict, so the written opinion Husband then asked for was the last door. This one carries three judges' names. It affirmed on the record the same court had twice refused to complete with the courthouse video (N-066, N-087, N-054).
Receipt
  • The 4/15/26 per curiam affirmance in 2D2025-1936, the eDCA original, filed at docket 045, two pages: the disposition and the panel line as quoted
  • The appeal taken "pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Matthew L. Felix, Acting Circuit Judge"
  • The copy at docket 036 is a KB-layer copy and is superseded by 045 for citation
  • Mandate at Doc 035
  • The refusals to supplement at N-087 and N-066; the first of the three unexplained dispositions at N-054
  • Clerk Kuenzel's letter of June 3, 2026: "The April 7, 2026, oral argument in case no. 2D2025-1936 was live-streamed on the Court's YouTube channel."

Spawned by: N-049

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

N-1012026-05-122D DCAHusband asked the court in writing to state its reasoning; the order refusing that request states no reasoning and names no judge, and it is the fifth of its kindDENIED
Date
2026-05-12
Actor
2D DCA ('BY ORDER OF THE COURT', no panel named; clerk certification only)
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-1936)
Mechanism
Husband asked the court in writing to state its reasoning; the order refusing that request states no reasoning and names no judge, and it is the fifth of its kind
What the law required
Rules 9.330 and 9.331 let a party ask for rehearing, rehearing en banc, clarification, certification, and a written opinion (Rule 9.330(a)(2)(D)); a per curiam affirmance without opinion is beyond the Florida Supreme Court's conflict jurisdiction (Jenkins v. State), so the written opinion is the last route to further review.
What happened
On May 12, 2026 the Second District denied, in one order, Husband's motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, written opinion, clarification, and certification. That motion listed among its grounds "that supplementation of the record below, and in this Court, was denied". The order issues "BY ORDER OF THE COURT". It names no judge and no panel. The only name on it is the clerk's certification that it is a true copy. The four orders before it are the November 26, 2025 and January 27, 2026 orders (N-066), the February 2, 2026 denial at Doc 263, and the April 6, 2026 order (N-087). The rulings below stood without any written examination, and no judge is identified as having made that choice. [DENIED]
Baseline deviation
Husband asked in writing for the court's reasoning and for the written opinion that would open the door to Florida Supreme Court review. The order answers in one sentence, states no reason, and identifies no judge. It is the fifth anonymous order in this series; the same court named its judges three months earlier (N-078). Asked which judges decided, the court refused (N-066, N-114).
Receipt
  • Doc 301 in the 1150 docket, one page, dated May 12, 2026, 2D2025-1936, L.T. 24-DR-001150, signed by Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk, electronically filed 05/12/2026 10:35:30 AM
  • The named comparator at Doc 270
  • The earlier anonymous orders at N-066, Doc 263, and N-087
  • The refusals to identify the panel at N-066 and N-114
  • Husband's April 21, 2026 motion (Filing 246531481), 2D2025-1936 docket 047, ground (6).

Spawned by: N-088

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

N-1112026-06-01FL Supreme Courtthe Florida Supreme Court's records office answered seven of ten categories with a single rule citation that identifies no record, and three categories it never answered at allDENIED
Date
2026-06-01
Actor
Paul Flemming, PIO
Institution
Florida Supreme Court
Mechanism
the Florida Supreme Court's records office answered seven of ten categories with a single rule citation that identifies no record, and three categories it never answered at all
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect judicial-branch records; access is the presumption and the custodian carries the burden of establishing an exemption. Rule 2.420 implements that right for the judicial branch, and subdivision (m)(2) requires the basis for a denial in writing. Rule 2.420(c) is a list of discrete exemptions, each with its own elements, so a written basis identifies the subdivision and the record withheld.
What happened

On June 1, 2026 the Florida Supreme Court's public information officer, Paul Flemming, asserted blanket confidentiality under Rule 2.420(c) over seven of the ten categories in a May 30 request about SB 1652 and the Vexatious Litigant Workgroup. He identified no record and cited no sub-provision. Categories 1, 5, and 9 he did not address at all. The file carries a promise: "A response to your request will be given in a reasonable amount of time."

A follow-up and pre-suit letter went by email on July 8, 2026, setting a deadline of "no later than Tuesday, July 15, 2026". That deadline passed with no response in the channels searched, and the request is still open. The June 1 response arrived at the Yahoo address, which has not been swept, so nothing here claims nothing was sent, only that nothing was found where the search ran. [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect court records. Access is the presumption, and the burden of proving an exemption sits on the custodian. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for denial. A basis that identifies nothing tells no one what is withheld, so one rule citation across seven categories leaves nothing to test; three of the ten categories drew no answer, not even a refusal.
Receipt
  • Flemming's response of 6/1/26, held as a native PDF; the 6/1/26 text is carried verbatim
  • The original request of 5/30/26 as sent and the 6/2/26 reply as sent
  • The as-sent follow-up of 7/8/26, an archive built from the Gmail copy, message id 19f41c10b40d43cf; sent 8:42 AM ET as a reply on the existing thread; it is a verbatim text archive rather than an image of the send
  • The 7/6/26 files are drafts, not send copies, and a 7/14/26 version was drafted and exported but never sent
  • Search scope for the silence: the Florida Supreme Court public-records matter file, which holds no inbound after the 6/1/26 response, and the Gmail account, checked 7/14/26
  • The Yahoo mailbox has not been swept, and there is no exported page image of the 7/8 send

This decision point also appears on: Public Records Litigation, the full ledger.

N-1142026-06-032D DCAthe court withheld its own machinery, case assignment, scheduling, the case-management system, and phone logs, behind an exemption that protects deliberation, and the category asking which judges decided the unnamed orders drew the same boilerplate as the restDENIED
Date
2026-06-03
Actor
Clerk Mary Beth Kuenzel
Institution
2D DCA
Mechanism
the court withheld its own machinery, case assignment, scheduling, the case-management system, and phone logs, behind an exemption that protects deliberation, and the category asking which judges decided the unnamed orders drew the same boilerplate as the rest
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of establishing an exemption on the custodian. Rule 2.420(b)(3) makes the chief judge the custodian of a court's administrative records, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to determine, record by record, whether a requested record is exempt and to state in writing the basis for any denial. Subdivision (c)(1) reaches material prepared as part of deciding cases; case assignment, scheduling, and phone logs are administrative machinery.
What happened

On June 3, 2026 the Second District's clerk, Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, denied nearly all of a nine-category administrative-records request. Every administrative category drew the identical line: non-court-file records "are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1)." The administrative records have still not been produced.

Asked specifically who decided, she answered in writing on July 27, 2026, for Chief Judge Lucas, again citing rule 2.420(c)(1) for anything not filed in the court record: "There are no documents filed as part of the court record that reflect which judges participated in those orders."

Read precisely, that is not a statement that no such records exist. It is a statement that none is in the court record, and anything outside it is withheld as exempt. The effect is that the orders deciding these appeals name no judge, and the court's own record contains nothing that would (N-066, N-087, N-101). [DENIED]

Baseline deviation
Rule 2.420(c)(1) protects a court's deliberation, not its machinery. Article I, section 24(a) puts the burden on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires a written basis for denial. Identical boilerplate across nine categories identifies no record and gives no basis specific to any, so nothing can be tested. Assignment records are how a reader learns which judges issued an order that names none (N-087, N-101). The order in case 0279 does name its judges (N-078).
Receipt
  • Clerk Kuenzel's 6/3/26 email from 2dcaclerk@flcourts.org, Wednesday, June 3, 2026 at 2:53 PM EDT, her substantive response to the Rule 2.420 request, on file as a native PDF export
  • On the judge-identification category it states: "There are no other documents filed as a part of the court record that are responsive to this request, and any records not filed as a part of the court record are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1)."
  • The 6/3 email states on its face that it responds to a request of May 18, 2026
  • Full 7/27/26 answer: "You have asked for any 'records that reflect which judges participated in those orders' prior to or following the disposition in each case, but these records are confidential and exempt under rule 2.420(c)(1) unless filed as a part of the court record. There are no documents filed as part of the court record that reflect which judges participated in those orders." This is a complete mailbox text capture whose operative sentence also appears at p. 5 of the 7/30/26 email to the Second District clerk; the native message itself is not held
  • Intake note, recorded as the clerk's stated reason and not as a departure: the clerk's office declined to open the 5/14/26 request because it arrived as an attachment, stating verbatim "we do not generally open attachments from unknown senders", which cost five days at the front of the request and supports a Question Protocol ask for the written policy

Spawned by: N-087

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

N-1152026-06-042D DCAthe chief judge answered forty days after the request reached him and six days after the follow-up, produced a record for free, then placed every other record behind one rule citation naming no document, and the supplement he promised has not issuedPARTIAL
Date
2026-06-04
Actor
Chief Judge Matt Lucas
Institution
2D DCA
Mechanism
the chief judge answered forty days after the request reached him and six days after the follow-up, produced a record for free, then placed every other record behind one rule citation naming no document, and the supplement he promised has not issued
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect and copy judicial-branch records; access is the presumption, and the burden of establishing an exemption rests on the custodian, a judge included. Rule 2.420(b)(3) makes the chief judge the custodian of the court's administrative records, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires him to determine whether each requested record is exempt and to state in writing the basis for any denial. A categorical assertion over a whole class, identifying nothing withheld, leaves nothing a requester or a reviewing court under Rule 2.420(l)(1) can test, and so carries none of the custodian's burden.
What happened

On June 4, 2026 Husband's narrowed records request was redirected to Chief Judge Lucas as custodian. A follow-up went by email July 8. Lucas responded by signed letter dated July 14, forty days after the routing and six days after the follow-up. He named the governing law correctly, citing the Constitution before the rule, and produced the Court's Internal Operating Procedures at no charge.

Everything else he placed behind one sentence: "Other than the case records provided previously by Clerk Kuenzel, any other records that may exist relating to this request are confidential and exempt pursuant to Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420(c)(1)." No record was identified and no index accompanied the claim.

On the two remaining categories he found nothing responsive and said a report was coming: "We expect a report this week; when it is received, I will update this response." No update issued. [PARTIAL]

Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) presumes judicial-branch records open, and Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to state in writing the basis for any denial. He answered within six days of the follow-up, cited the constitution first, and produced a record at no charge. Withholding an entire class under one rule citation, naming no document, still leaves nothing to test. And he wrote that he would update his response when a report arrived. He did not.
Receipt
  • Chief Judge Lucas's signed letter response, dated July 14, 2026, pp. 1-2, wet signature over "Matthew C. Lucas", "Encl."
  • Record produced: Second District's Internal Operating Procedures, effective 12/1/2025, 22 pages, produced 7/14/26.
  • Cover email 7/14/26 8:53 AM EDT from 2dcaAdministrative: "Please see the attached response from Chief Judge Lucas."
  • Follow-up and pre-suit notice sent 7/8/26 2:14 PM, demand paragraph setting 7/14 and closing paragraph setting 7/15; the 7/6/26 files are drafts, not send copies.
  • Kuenzel's 6/4/26 8:04 AM EDT routing confirmation: "Your request will be forwarded to the Chief Judge of the Second District Court of Appeal, Chief Judge Matt Lucas."
  • Letter states it "responds to yours of June 4, 2026, and July 8, 2026."
  • Full chronology and search scope for every negative held in the 2D DCA records-front status memo of 8/16/26.
  • Elapsed as of 8/16/26: 73 days since the 6/4 routing, 94 days since the original 5/14/26 request, 32 days of Rule 2.420(l)(1) ripeness attaching 7/15/26.
  • Letter dated Tuesday 7/14/26; the week he named ended Sunday 7/19/26. 28 days ran from that date to 8/16/26, 33 days from the letter itself.
  • Kuenzel answered on his behalf 7/27 and Marshal Haynes answered 8/4 (N-138, N-149); neither purports to be the promised update.
  • Which of the two answers (categorical exemption vs. no-records-identified) governs which category is unresolved; ambiguity raised in writing 7/20 and again 7/30, unresolved.
  • Search scope for the negative: 60-day Gmail sweep across the court's domains, both 2D DCA records folders, the four 2D DCA matter folders, and the downloads folder, as of 8/16/26; Husband's Yahoo address was not searched.
  • RE line on the letter mistypes the first case number as "2D20225-1936" and reads "Office of State Courts Administrator" without "the".
  • Two limits: the current text of Rule 2.420(m)(2) is held here only as Husband's own verbatim quotation in the 7/30/26 letter; and which court reviews a DCA chief judge's denial is answered here as (l)(1) rather than circuit-court mandamus under (l)(2).

Spawned by: N-114

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

N-1262026-06-301D DCAthe appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decisionPENDING
Date
2026-06-30
Actor
The Florida Bar, appellees in 1D2026-0728, by Keating and Londot, Greenberg Traurig
Institution
1D2026-0728
Mechanism
the appeal is where the Bar wrote its positions down: the grievance file "was closed without further investigation," it would be "obligated" to produce Davis communications if the file held any, and no one may compel discipline or appeal a non-discipline decision
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 2.420(l)(2) place enforcement of the access right against a non-judge custodian in the circuit court. The First District reviews a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo, taking the verified petition's allegations as true; Rule 1.630(d)(2) requires an alternative writ on a prima facie showing, and a disputed allegation that a record exists is decided after a hearing (Consumer Rights, LLC v. Bradford County, 153 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)).
What happened

On 6/30/26 the Bar appellees filed their Answer Brief in 1D2026-0728. It states that "Mr. Hanson's grievance file against Mr. Davis was closed without further investigation," and that because review was limited to submissions and court records, the file held no communications with Davis. In a footnote it concedes the condition on which its production duty binds: "If the grievance file contained information pertaining to communications with Mr. Davis, the Bar would be obligated to provide it."

The brief also restates settled law that a person has neither the right to compel discipline nor standing to appeal a non-discipline decision, and describes the 2/24/25 closure as a no-jurisdiction finding, wording absent from the letter. The appeal record carries the Bar's own letters, including a 9/24/25 letter describing a Senior Staff Attorney investigation and two further reviews of the same file the brief says was closed without further investigation (N-055). [PENDING]

Baseline deviation
An appeal reviews whether a case was rightly ended. This one asks whether a verified records petition could be dismissed with prejudice on an unsworn assertion that the records do not exist, before the opposition was filed and without a hearing (N-079). No decision has issued. What the appellate papers supply is the regulator's positions in writing and unhedged, and two concede more than any letter did: the file 'was closed without further investigation,' and the Bar 'would be obligated to provide' Davis communications if the file held any.
Receipt
  • Answer Brief of Appellees, 1D2026-0728, filed 6/30/26, Filing 251514921, 34 PDF pages and 28 numbered, signed M. Hope Keating and John K. Londot, held in the appeal's brief file.
  • Quotes at PDF pp. 8 (brief p. 2, the "no jurisdiction" characterization), 18 (brief p. 12, the standing sentence), 30 (brief p. 24, both admissions), and 31 (brief p. 25 fn. 3, the conditional concession).
  • Precision note, load-bearing: "no jurisdiction" is the BRIEF's phrase, anchored to Standing Board Policy 15.75(d)(1), and does NOT appear in the Huston letter; attribute the phrase to the brief and the deferral language to the letter.
  • Composite Exhibit A to the 1/27/26 motion to dismiss with the judicial-notice request at Leon ROA p. 626; the letters at ROA pp. 640-643.
  • Underlying letters quoted by the brief at ROA pp. 44 and 103.

Spawned by: N-079

This decision point also appears on: The Florida Bar, the full ledger.

N-1372026-07-252D DCAthe certiorari challenge to the guardian ad litem order is pending, and the Second District has ordered a responsePENDING
Date
2026-07-25
Actor
2D DCA
Institution
2D2026-1955 (L.T. 24-DR-001150)
Mechanism
the certiorari challenge to the guardian ad litem order is pending, and the Second District has ordered a response
What the law required
Rule 9.100 provides certiorari review of the guardian ad litem order (Doc 337).
What happened
On July 25, 2026 Husband filed a certiorari petition challenging the June 25, 2026 guardian ad litem order, 38 pages with a 429-page appendix, asking the court to "quash the June 25, 2026 order". The Second District docketed it July 27 as 2D2026-1955. A first fee submission was rejected for a case-number error; the resubmission, $311.85, was confirmed docketed the next morning, though its status still read "Processing" at that capture, so nothing here says the payment settled. On August 3, 2026 the Second District ordered a response within thirty days, ordered a reply thirty days after that, and imposed on both parties a duty to keep the court apprised of hearings affecting the proceeding. The order under challenge is being reviewed while the trial court's retainer terms run (N-134, N-135). [PENDING]
Baseline deviation
Rule 9.100 provides certiorari review of the guardian ad litem order. No determination has issued. The court's earlier dispositions in this lane (N-054, N-078, N-087, N-088) are noted for context. What the record shows at this step is a schedule: a response ordered, a reply ordered, a respondent named, and a duty on both sides to keep the court advised.
Receipt
  • Filing #253269488 (the petition as filed). The relief quoted at para. 44, PDF p. 18, and again in the conclusion at para. 93, PDF p. 37; the string "Doc 351" appears nowhere in the 38 pages, and the 7/23/26 appointment order is mentioned once, descriptively, at para. 46, PDF p. 19.
  • Filing #253628363 (the rejected fee submission), clerk's stated reason: "Case Number Cannot Be Determined or Case Number Not for This Court", with a refund auto-generated; whether the refund posted is unknown.
  • Filing #253668293 (the accepted $311.85 fee, Order #19922246, memo line "Statutory Convenience Fee: $11.85 / Total Paid: $311.85"), with the 7/31/26 8:24 AM clerk processing confirmation, native PDF p.1.
  • The 8/3/26 order was entered as DIN 363.
  • As-filed word count 7,932 per the compliance certificate, PDF p. 38. Appendix tab 35 is the same facially incomplete Doc 351 artifact.
  • Three limits: the rejection notice is held without a page image; the portal returned "No Matching Entries" for the certificate of service, and service went by a separate 10:08 AM email; the para. 92 "For 800 days" figure is not recomputed here.
  • The 7/30 fee record still displayed "NEW CASE."

Spawned by: N-134, N-125

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

N-1382026-07-272D DCAasked under the court's own procedures whether any judge is recused in four named cases, the court disclosed one recusal in one case and gave no date it took effect; asked a second time, it said no judge is now recused in the other cases, left unanswered whether one had been, and said any record of the date is exemptPARTIAL
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Second District disclosed that Judge Andrea Teves Smith "is recused in case no. 2D2025-0681," though she sat on panels deciding two of Husband's other cases. Asked whether any judge "has been recused at any point" in those two, it answered "no judges are recused" and withheld the date hers took effect.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) presumes the court's records open and puts the burden on the custodian. Section 1.7 of the court's own procedures says "Parties may inquire of the clerk to determine whether any judge is recused in their case," and a judge who finds a conflict notifies the clerk, "who will designate a substitute judge." Asked about four matters, the clerk answers for each, says whether any judge has been recused at any point, and gives the date the disclosed recusal took effect. A recusal the clerk records is administration, not deliberation.

V
Verified facts and law
  • July 20 to 27, 2026: invoking section 1.7, Husband asked about four matters. Clerk Kuenzel, "On behalf of Chief Judge Lucas": "You have asked whether any judge is recused in your cases. Judge Andrea Teves Smith is recused in case no. 2D2025-0681." That is the whole recusal answer: no date, nothing on the other cases. N-138
  • Feb. 10 and Apr. 15, 2026: Judge Smith, the only Smith on the court's letterhead, sat on both panels: "VILLANTI, SLEET, and SMITH, JJ., Concur." (prohibition, 2D2026-0279) and "KHOUZAM, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and SMITH, JJ., Concur." (2D2025-1936). N-078, N-138
    Read them: Order, Feb. 10, 2026 (link pending redacted copy) · Decision, Apr. 15, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
  • Aug. 20 to Oct. 3, 2026: asked whether any judge "is recused, or has been recused at any point": "no judges are recused in these cases." On the date and her participation: "Any responsive records are confidential and exempt pursuant to rule 2.420(c)(1)." Oct. 2: under section 1.7, Husband asked when the recusal took effect, its ground, and whether it was considered in the other two cases. Unanswered as of Oct. 3, 2026. N-138, N-078
    Has any judge been recused at any point in 2D2025-1936 or 2D2026-0279, and on what date did Judge Smith's recusal in 2D2025-0681 take effect?
    Read them: Husband's email to the clerk, Oct. 2, 2026 (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Clerk Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, writing for Chief Judge Lucas (both answers). One inquiry under the court's own procedure, one disclosed recusal, one withheld date. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and section 1.7 of the court's procedures on this inquiry alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of any exemption on the custodian; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the written basis for each denial. Art. I, s. 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an impartial tribunal, and the date a recusal took effect is how a party tests that guarantee.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-07-27
Actor
Mary Beth Kuenzel, Clerk, Florida Second District Court of Appeal, writing "On behalf of Chief Judge Lucas"
Institution
2D DCA (2D2025-0681, 2D2025-1936, 2D2026-0279)
Mechanism
asked under the court's own procedures whether any judge is recused in four named cases, the court disclosed one recusal in one case and gave no date it took effect; asked a second time, it said no judge is now recused in the other cases, left unanswered whether one had been, and said any record of the date is exempt
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution makes judicial-branch records open and access the presumption; the custodian carries the burden of justifying anything withheld. The Court's own Internal Operating Procedures section 1.7 provides that a party may ask the clerk whether any judge is recused in the party's case, which supplies both the mechanism and the expectation that an inquiry naming four cases is answered as to four cases. Canon 3E of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct governs disqualification. The lawful path in one sentence: answer the inquiry as to each case named in it, and state the effective date of any recusal disclosed.
What happened
On July 20, 2026 Husband asked the Second District's clerk, under the court's own Internal Operating Procedures, whether any judge is recused in his cases, naming four matters. On July 27, 2026 Clerk Kuenzel answered, "On behalf of Chief Judge Lucas": "You have asked whether any judge is recused in your cases. Judge Andrea Teves Smith is recused in case no. 2D2025-0681." That is the whole answer. No effective date. No statement whether that judge participated in anything in that case before the recusal took effect. Nothing at all about 2D2025-1936 or 2D2026-0279. On July 30 Husband asked for the date the recusal took effect, whether the judge participated in any order before it, and whether any judge is or has been recused in 2D2025-1936, 2D2026-0279 or 2D2026-1955. On August 20, 2026 the Clerk answered the question about the other cases in the present tense only, 'no judges are recused in these cases,' leaving 'or has been recused at any point' unanswered, and answered the date and participation questions with an exemption: 'Any responsive records are confidential and exempt pursuant to rule 2.420(c)(1).' The Court's own letterhead on the July 14, 2026 letter lists exactly one judge named Smith, ANDREA TEVES SMITH, and N-078 records the February 10, 2026 prohibition denial in 2D2026-0279 as issued by a panel of Villanti, Sleet, and Smith. If that is the same judge, then a judge recused in one of this requester's cases sat on the panel that denied prohibition in another. The date that would test it is the date the Court now withholds as exempt. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution presumes judicial-branch records open and puts the burden of justifying any withholding on the custodian. The Court's own Internal Operating Procedures, section 1.7, invite exactly this question: a party may ask the clerk whether any judge is recused in the party's case. A judge who is disqualified in a case steps aside from it,. The lawful path was one sentence long: answer as to each case the inquiry named, and state the effective date of any recusal disclosed.
Receipt
The clerk's 7/27/26 email, read from the native Gmail message (id 19fa51c4eab02f25, 3:45 PM ET) on 9/26/2026 and matching both tree captures verbatim. The clerk's 8/20/26 reply (Gmail id 1a01fbd3a01d2ddd, filed under Public_Records\by_agency\2D-DCA) answering the 7/30/26 follow-up. The judge roster naming ANDREA TEVES SMITH appears on the page image of the 7/14/26 Lucas letterhead, p. 1. The N-078 panel composition is confirmed on the face of the order, checked against the page image from the rendered page on 9/26/2026: Husband supplied the 2/10/26 prohibition-denial order in 2D2026-0279 on 8/20/26 and it was filed at that case's docket 008, and it names the panel, "VILLANTI, SLEET, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.", over the certification of Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel, Clerk. The four-case inquiry of 7/20/26 under IOP section 1.7. The same 7/27/26 email is the response quoted at N-114 and N-066. Question Protocol, asked 7/30/26 and answered 8/20/26 (date: exempt under 2.420(c)(1); other cases: no judge recused): the effective date of the 2D2025-0681 recusal, her participation before it, and recusals in the two related cases. A date and a yes or no closes the question. A refusal, after the Court volunteered the fact of one recusal, marks the recusal record itself as withheld. An answer that no record of the effective date exists establishes that the Court does not document when its judges step aside.

Spawned by: N-114, N-078

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.

N-1492026-08-042D DCA"Upon receipt of payment, I will proceed with the review": $313 before the court would look for Husband's records.PARTIAL
D.E.V.I.L. misalignment analysis: Deviation · Expected output · Verified facts and law · Independent encounter · Law
D
Deviation

The Second District's marshal declared "Any records of" two whole request categories confidential and exempt without identifying a single record, put the name-search review behind $313 paid in advance, and then named the exemption she expects before reading anything.

E
Expected output

Art. I, s. 24(a) and Rule 2.420(m)(2) require the marshal to find the records, decide each one, and state in writing the basis for each denial. The marshal's own email describes that method: review each message and "determine whether the message is confidential and exempt." Any charge is reasonable and tied to the cost actually incurred, and the exemption is decided after the review, not announced before it.

V
Verified facts and law
  • Aug. 4, 2026: Answering Husband's July 20 request, Marshal Haynes gave two categories a blanket exemption, with no record identified. Under the same numbered category she attached two records, one a Teams message reading, in full, "Pro Se, Christopher Hanson has arrived". For the name search: "The charge for this time is $313.00. Upon receipt of payment, I will proceed with the review of these e-mail messages and attachments." N-149
    Read them: Marshal Haynes email, Aug. 4, 2026 (redacted) (link pending redacted copy)
  • Aug. 20, 2026: "There are no responsive phone logs." She estimated at least four hours of review "Based on the volume of potentially responsive account records identified in the first query." N-149
  • Sept. 29, 2026: "No waiver is authorized." "No document or record identifies how many potentially responsive records the first query identified." "Upon payment, I will ask them to update the first query." And: "I expect that any record withheld will be a confidential and exempt record under Rule 2440(c)(1). I will state the basis in writing when I have reviewed the records." N-149
    Asked on Aug. 18 and Sept. 25, 2026: does the Second District hold any record in the two categories it declared exempt, and under which subdivision is each one withheld?
    Read them: Marshal Haynes email, Sept. 29, 2026, with the Aug. 20 email below it (link pending redacted copy)
I
Independent encounter

Marshal Jacinda (Jo) Haynes, custodian of the Second District's administrative records (every answer and the $313 charge). One request, one custodian, one email thread. Every duty here arises from Article I, section 24 and Rule 2.420 on this request alone; no other card is needed to establish it.

L
Law: the authority that creates the duty

Art. I, s. 24(a), Fla. Const. gives every person the right to inspect or copy public records, presumes them open, and places the burden of establishing an exemption on the entity asserting one. Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to determine whether each requested record is exempt and to state in writing the basis for any denial. Rule 2.420(m)(3) sets fees at the amounts section 119.07 provides, which limits any special charge to a reasonable one based on the cost actually incurred.

The details are where it lives: full record, receipts, related cards
Date
2026-08-04
Actor
Marshal Jacinda (Jo) Haynes
Institution
2D DCA
Mechanism
the appellate court's custodian asserted a blanket exemption over records "referencing me by name," attached two records of exactly that description in the same email, and put everything else behind $313 in advance
What the law required
Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution gives every person the right to inspect or copy public records and places the burden of establishing an exemption on the entity asserting one; Rule 2.420(m)(2) requires the custodian to determine whether each requested record is exempt and to state in writing the basis for any denial. Internal Operating Procedures section 4.1(K) assigns the marshal the duty of responding to administrative-records requests. Inspection is a constitutional right, and Rule 2.420(m)(3) sets copy fees at the amounts section 119.07 provides, which limits any special charge to a reasonable one based on the cost actually incurred.
What happened
On August 4, 2026 the Second District's marshal answered a request pending since July 20. Two categories drew a blanket exemption as confidential and exempt. Four lines later the same email reads: "Or records 'referencing me by name.' I have attached two administrative records referencing you by name." One attachment is a Teams message reading, in full, "Pro Se, Christopher Hanson has arrived". On August 4 the telephone-records category drew only that the logs contain phone numbers and voicemails would be reviewed as part of the same process, with no existence statement and no denial; on August 20 the marshal answered it: "There are no responsive phone logs." Everything further was priced at $313.00, payable before any review would proceed. No privilege log, no list of what is withheld, and no description of the search have ever issued. [PARTIAL]
Baseline deviation
Article I, section 24 presumes records open and puts the burden of proving an exemption on the withholder; an unstated basis is an unmet burden, and a price is not a basis. A categorical exemption's test is whether it is applied categorically. Here the same officer, over the same category, on the same day, asserted the exemption and then attached two records of that description four lines later. Everything else was priced at $313, payable before any review would begin, for records nobody had yet said exist.
Receipt
  • The marshal's 8/4/26 email with both attachments, produced by the court itself.
  • The 7/20/26 request and 7/21/26 acknowledgment in the quoted chain of the same PDF.
  • On the telephone-records category, the same email neither produced a record, nor stated one exists, nor cited an exemption. Her 8/20/26 2:40 PM email answered the category: "There are no responsive phone logs." (quoted chain in the marshal's 9/29/26 email PDF, p. 3).
  • Full quote: "Telephone records (call detail logs) contain phone numbers. Voicemails will be reviewed as part of the email process above."
  • Full quote: "The charge for this time is $313.00. Upon receipt of payment, I will proceed with the review of these e-mail messages and attachments."
  • The unattributed supplement denials at N-066 (denied without panel name or reason).
  • Cross-links N-115 (the request chain) and N-138 (the IOP provision).

Spawned by: N-115

This decision point also appears on: the full ledger.